LEXSEE 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45
LAUREL GONSALVES, Petitioner, v. STRAIGHT ARROW PUBLISHERS,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Respondent.
Civil
Action No. 8474
COURT
OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE
793 A.2d 312; 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45
February
2, 1998, Date Submitted
March
26, 1998, Date Decided
OPINION:
[*314]
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AFTER REMAND
CHANDLER, Chancellor
In
this statutory appraisal action on remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the
central issue is the nature of the corporate enterprise. The parties dispute
the degree to which the most recent year's earnings of the company's chief
operating asset reflect the value of the company as a whole. Petitioner's
valuation places too [**2] much weight on the recent
success of this asset to the exclusion of other factors affecting the
enterprise's going concern value. Respondent's valuation, on the other hand, is
based on an overly pessimistic view of the company's future. After reviewing
the trial record and the post-trial and appellate briefs, I direct the parties
to appraise the shares in accordance with the guidelines below.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc. ("SAP") was founded in 1967 by Jann S.
Wenner ("Wenner"), editor of SAP's main operating asset, Rolling
Stone magazine. Before the merger of Straight Arrow Publishers Holding
Company, Inc. into SAP on January 8, 1986 (the "merger"), Wenner and
his wife Jane controlled, directly or indirectly, 79% of SAP's common stock. As
the merger effected a cash-out of then non-control
stock, it did not cause a change in control. Nor did the merger effect any particular efficiences or result in the
redeployment of existing assets by new management. n1
Petitioner Laurel Gonsalves ("petitioner") dissented from the merger,
declining to have her 2,000 shares converted into $ 100 per share, and
exercised her statutory right to have this Court appraise [**3] the fair value of her shares pursuant to 8
Del. C. § 262.
n1
Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Del. Supr.,
684 A.2d 289 (1996).
A. The
Business of SAP
SAP
was founded to publish Rolling Stone, a magazine devoted to pop culture
and rock and roll music. In the early 1980s, its publishers implemented a
Repositioning Plan to reorient the magazine's market position and take steps to
offset the start of a decline in advertising revenues. As a result of this
plan, Rolling Stone's advertising revenue, subscriptions, and net income
all increased from 1981 to 1985. [*315]
SAP's
business was not limited to publishing Rolling Stone. In 1981, SAP began
to publish Record, a magazine of rock and roll music. The magazine was
never a success, experiencing losses every year. Its last issue was published
shortly before the merger, and publication was discontinued shortly thereafter.
In 1983, another publication, College Papers, was also discontinued
after failing to achieve profitability. [**4]
Rolling Stone Productions, a
licensing division, was somewhat more successful, although its earnings
experienced great swings. n2 It and Rolling Stone
Press, a book packaging division, were both discontinued in 1985 prior to the
merger.
n2 See M.J. Whitman Report,
Petitioner's Appendix, Vol. II, PX 115 at 15.
SAP
also diversified in other ways, by investing in real estate and limited
partnership ventures. An illustration of SAP's diversification, and the gains
or losses attributable to its various divisions, shows:
________________________________________________________________________________
|
|
Adjusted to reflect year ended December 31, |
||||
|
Division |
1981 |
1982 |
1983 |
1984 |
1985 |
|
The Record |
($ 46,666) |
($ 118,968) |
($ 494,821) |
($ 741,545) |
($ 620,062) |
|
Rolling |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stone |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Press |
61,429 |
(50,293) |
105,692 |
(2,361) |
8,440 |
|
Rolling |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stone |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Productions |
179,335 |
(85,218) |
178,827 |
305,937 |
(93,163) |
|
College |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Papers |
(58,839) |
(52,602) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
US Magazine |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Total |
135,259 |
(307,081) |
(210,302) |
(437,969) |
(1,167,401) |
________________________________________________________________________________
[**5]
SAP's
most recent new venture prior to the merger was its investment in a limited
partnership that purchased substantially all of the assets of US
magazine. SAP's wholly owned subsidiary was a 25% general partner in this
partnership and had been required not only to invest $ 1 million in cash but
also to issue and secure with cash a $ 1 million promissory note. 1985 losses
resulting from this investment totaled just over $ 450,000, and future losses
were expected.
B. The
History of this Action
Petitioner
filed this action on May 5, 1986. At trial, held August 28-29, 1996, both
parties supported their valuations of the fair value of petitioner's shares
with the testimony of expert witnesses. Former Chancellor Allen found that the
valuation of SAP's expert, Martin J. Whitman ("Whitman"), provided a
more acceptable valuation of SAP overall and rejected the valuation prepared by
petitioner's expert, James B. Kobak ("Kobak"). Petitioner appealed,
contending, among other things, that the Chancellor failed to value the "operative
reality" of SAP on the date of the merger and, instead, accepted one
expert's valuation "hook, line and sinker." Respondent cross-appealed,
contending [**6] that the Chancellor abused
his discretion by arbitrarily awarding the legal rate of interest, without
explanation.
The
Supreme Court reversed in part, finding that "the Court of Chancery's
pretrial decision to adhere to, and rely upon, the methodology and valuation
factors of one expert to the exclusion of other relevant evidence and the
implementation of that mind-set in the appraisal process was [*316] error as a matter of law." n3 In a pre-trial
conference, the Chancellor had informed the parties that his "temperamental
approach to this case is to want to accept [the valuation of] one expert or the
other hook, line and sinker;" although he had made adjustments to
valuations he had accepted in the past, he did not want to do so in this case. n4
n3 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow
Publishers, Inc., Del. Supr., 701 A.2d 357, 358 (1997) [hereinafter "Supr.
Ct. Op."].
n4 Petitioner's Opening Appellate Br.,
Appendix, Vol. 1, Tab 6 at 3-4.
The
Supreme Court concluded that former Chancellor Allen had [**7] decided, before trial,
to follow his inclination to accept the whole of one expert's opinion over the
other. Moreover, the Supreme Court found that his decision to accept one over
the other forced the Chancellor to view aspects of the valuation process as an "either
or" process whereby the rejection of one expert's valuation (or a part of
one expert's valuation) automatically required the acceptance of the other
expert's conflicting views. Finding that the Chancellor's "evidentiary
construct he established for the subsequent trial created a standard for value
determination which is at odds with Section 262's command that the Court 'shall
appraise' fair value," the Supreme Court remanded for further
consideration under "the Court of Chancery's statutory obligation to
engage in an independent valuation exercise." n5
n5
Supr. Ct. Op. at 361, 362.
C. Legal
Standard
[HN1] Eight
Del. C. § 262(h) provides that
this Court "shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value
exclusive of any element [**8] of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value." The appraisal process
requires the Court to consider "all relevant factors," but allows
inclusion only of those elements of value "known or susceptible of proof
as of the date of merger." n6 Overall, the focus is on the "operative
reality" n7 on the date of merger, with the shareholder entitled to his "proportionate
interest in a going concern." n8 Each side in an appraisal action has the
burden of proving its respective valuation position. "No presumption,
favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation, including the
actual merger price." n9
n6 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del. Supr., 457
A.2d 701, 713 (1983).
n7 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
Del. Supr., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (1996).
n8 Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, Del. Supr., 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950), cited
approvingly by, In the Matter of the Appraisal of Shell Oil Company, Del. Supr.,
607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1992). [**9]
n9 Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 1989
Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, *19, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 7499, Jacobs, V.C. (Feb. 28, 1989).
D. Law
of the Case
[HN2] The
doctrine of law of the case normally requires that matters previously ruled
upon by the same court remain at rest. n10 This Court
has applied this doctrine in several cases following a Supreme Court remand,
most recently in Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., where the Supreme Court
remanded for a determination of damages. n11 In a
later opinion awarding attorneys' fees, the Court of Chancery addressed an
argument that it should reconsider certain issues:
[HN3] [*317]
The doctrine of law of the case promotes
efficiency and fundamental fairness in cases by counseling against the
reconsideration of issues that have already been decided. When an appellate
court reviews the judgment of a trial court, however, the trial court will, of
course, follow any direction given by the higher court and otherwise respect
its determinations of law and fact. Unless the appellate court has either
expressly or impliedly overturned the trial court's findings, however, the
doctrine [**10] of law of the case dictates
that ordinarily prior findings of the trial court continue as authoritative in
the case. Thus, only to the extent the Supreme Court has reversed the findings
or conclusions of the prior proceeding need or may this court take up those
matters for a new or different analysis. n12
Only to the extent the Supreme Court
expressly or impliedly overturned findings made by former Chancellor Allen in
his post-trial decision may I reconsider such decisions.
n10 Frank G. W. v. Carol M. W., Del. Supr.,
457 A.2d 715, 718 (1983).
n11 Del. Supr., 676
A.2d 436 (1996).
n12 Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 1997 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 18, *11-12, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 11713, Allen, C. (Feb. 6, 1997) (citations
omitted), aff'd, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 645 (1997).
The
parties agree that former Chancellor Allen's decision on respondent's motion in
limine to exclude proposed testimony relating to the market value of SAP's
CEO's compensation is the law of the case. In that [**11] decision,
the Chancellor rejected the proposed evidence as irrelevant, n13 and the Supreme
Court clearly, and separately from the discussion of the appraisal process,
affirmed his decision. n14 Accordingly, I will not
reconsider this issue on remand.
n13 Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 106, *7, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 8474,
Allen, C. (Aug. 22, 1996).
n14 Supr. Ct. Op. at 362
("Although we conclude that the valuation determination of the Court of
Chancery must be reversed, to assist the court and the parties on remand, we
take the occasion to rule upon a separate and significant claim of error
asserted by Petitioner--the exclusion of evidence that SAP should be valued, on
an ongoing basis, with an adjustment for alternative CEO compensation.").
Petitioner
argues that there are two additional decisions that constitute law of the case
below. First, she asserts that "it is the law of the case that SAP's
expert, Mr. Whitman, reverse-engineered his purported comparable companies [**12] analysis." n15 Second,
petitioner asserts that it is law of the case that her post-merger evidence
relating to the value of SAP is admissible.
n15 K. Abrams, December 24, 1997, Letter to
the Court at 2.
Respondent
asserts that every time the Supreme Court factually described a decision by the
experts but then failed to critically discuss the Chancellor's express or
implied ruling on the propriety of that decision, the Chancellor's decision
below is the law of the case. For example, respondent notes that former
Chancellor Allen rejected several of Kobak's proposed adjustments to SAP's
earnings. n16 Respondent argues that because the Supreme Court noted the fact
that Kobak's valuation reflected such adjustments, but did not, in respondent's
view, "expressly or implicitly reverse" the Chancellor's rejection of
these adjustments, the Chancellor's rejection of these adjustments should be
accepted as law of the case. Following this reasoning, respondent identifies
four issues it considers to be the law of [**13] the
case. First, respondent asserts that SAP
[*318] must be valued as a
whole, as it operated up to the merger date, rather than valued solely on the
basis of the earnings of Rolling Stone. Second, respondent asserts that
the investment in US magazine must be considered as an active, rather
than a passive, investment. Third, respondent contends that this Court may not
reconsider the Chancellor's decision to reject Kobak's addition of deferred
subscription income or, as described above, the Chancellor's decision to reject
Kobak's other adjustments to earnings. Finally, respondent argues that this
Court must accept the selection of Whitman's earnings multiple.
n16 Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, *25, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 8474,
Allen, C. (Nov. 27, 1996, revised Dec. 5, 1996) [hereinafter "Alien's
Op."].
I
cannot agree with respondent's assertion that the Supreme Court failed to
expressly or implicitly overrule each issue identified by respondent as law of
the case. The [**14] Supreme Court concluded that
former Chancellor Allen failed to perform an independent appraisal analysis as
required by 8 Del. C. § 262. The
error, as I believe that error is explained by the Supreme Court, is not that
the Chancellor concluded that the going concern value of a company is properly
represented by the valuation of one expert (and thus accepted the precise value
as determined by one expert), but that the decision to accept one valuation
over another, in toto, was pre-determined. Instead, this Court's
ultimate valuation decision should be based on considerations of the specific
issues addressed in each expert's valuation analysis, rather than a conclusion
that the entire valuation of one expert should be accepted on the theory that
doing so serves certain larger, institutional concerns.
Mindful
of the fact that the Supreme Court takes "'a dim view of a successor judge
in a single case overruling a decision of his predecessor,'" n17 I will
only reconsider 1) issues where former Chancellor Allen's decision does not
expressly provide justification for both the rejection of one expert's
conclusion and the acceptance of the other expert's conclusion, and 2) issues
[**15] that, although fully
supported initially, need to be re-addressed to reflect the availability of new
information not previously available. All other issues constitute law of the
case.
n17 Myer v. Dyer, Del. Super., 643 A.2d 1382
(1993) (citations omitted).
II. ANALYSIS
The
parties produced widely divergent valuations of SAP's stock on the merger date.
Nevertheless, the parties' experts agreed, for the most part, that the earnings
capitalization formula was the most appropriate methodology for valuing
petitioner's shares. Most of the issues on remand concern the inputs to the
earnings capitalization method, such as whether SAP's reported earnings should
be adjusted, what is the earnings period that should be capitalized, and what
multiple should be used to capitalize earnings and interest. My analysis of
these issues follows.
A. Earnings
Capitalization
The
vast difference between the experts' valuations of SAP as a going concern
results from their opposing views of SAP as a whole. If one were [**16] to believe petitioner, SAP was a phoenix
finally rising from the ashes of numerous unsuccessful diversification efforts
on the wings of Rolling Stone and the Repositioning Plan. According to
this view, the recent growth of Rolling Stone was merely the start of a
long trend of future prosperity for SAP as a whole.
If one
were to believe respondent, on the other hand, SAP was a company in the
business of launching new publishing-related and other diversified businesses,
with [*319] Rolling Stone being merely one of those
businesses that had not been divested and had only recently begun to soar. As a
result, respondent contends that it is inappropriate to view the future of SAP
as based primarily, if not entirely, on the recent success of Rolling Stone,
as SAP's investments are not limited to Rolling Stone. Moreover, Rolling
Stone would need to successfully weather 1) the increasing challenges of a
new competitor, 2) the threat of declining advertising revenues due to a
possible increase in government regulation of the tobacco and liquor
industries, and 3) the continued challenge posed by competition from general
interest magazines. All of these challenges would have [**17] to be met before one could accurately
determine if Rolling Stone and the Repositioning Plan were truly the
phoenixes wings of petitioner's vision or merely the temporary salvation of
Icarus' doomed wax wings.
Both
experts based their valuations on a capitalized earnings model. n18 This model, which may be used to predict the market
capitalization that a private company would enjoy were it publicly traded,
requires two basic inputs: a measure of the company's earnings and a
capitalization rate. Measures of earnings frequently employed include the
company's earnings before interest and taxes ("EBIT") or the
company's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA").
The capitalization rate is obtained through a comparison with similar publicly
traded companies whose market capitalization and earnings measures are publicly
disclosed. n19 By applying the implied capitalization
rate of the public companies to the earnings measure of the comparable private
company, an estimate of the private company's capitalization may be obtained.
n18 A capitalized earnings model is an
acceptable valuation method, if properly employed, especially for companies
with significant intangible assets and few fixed assets. See, e.g., In re
Radiology Assoc., Del. Ch., 611 A.2d 485 (1991). [**18]
n19 For example, a company with an
observable market capitalization of $ 200 million and an EBIT earnings measure
of $ 16 million would have an implied earnings capitalization of 12.5 ($ 200 / $
16 = 12.5).
The
legitimacy of this formula depends on the validity of at least four key
decisions: the choice of an appropriate earnings measure (e.g., EBIT,
EBITDA); 2) the selection of the historical time period on which the measure is
based; 3) the determination of which adjustments, if any, should be made to the
earnings measure to reflect items such as non-recurring expenses; and 4) the
determination of an appropriate capitalization rate. In this case, all of these
decisions are inseparably intertwined, for each depends on which view of SAP
one accepts: that of the phoenix soaring out of the ashes or that of Icarus
rising dangerously toward the sun. To ease the flow of the discussion below, I
begin with a brief comment on the parties' selection of an appropriate
capitalization rate.
1. Selection
of Capitalization Rate
Former
Chancellor Allen's Opinion provides a lull explanation [**19] for the rejection of Kobak's
capitalization rate, as well as support for the adoption of Whitman's capitalization
rate. My analysis does not affect any of the former Chancellor's assumptions or
the arguments of the parties. n20 If [*320]
anything, the additional
observations and conclusions below add further support for his decision that
Whitman offered a more appropriate capitalization rate. n21
Accordingly, I decline to re-open this matter on remand.
n20 None of the
discussion below affects the validity of former Chancellor Allen's conclusions
that 1) Kobak's selection of the highest of the median multiples of his
selected comparable companies was "counter-intuitive" given SAP's
history of highly volatile earnings, 2) that Kobak's mathematical calculations
appeared to be slightly erroneous, or 3) that Whitman's multiples appeared to
be "more accurate and reasonable than Mr. Kobak's, given the financial
position of SAP as of the date of the Merger"--a position characterized by
"SAP's predominant dependence on a single product; the volatility of its
earnings historically; its low operating margins; and its small capital
investment." Allen's Op. at 16-17. [**20]
n21 In addition, I am suspicious of Kobak's
methodology because his comparable companies were limited to those whose
ownership had recently changed. (See Kobak Report, Petitioners'
Appendix, Vol. I, PX1 at 27-29, explaining multiple was based on what buyers
had paid). As a result, Kobak's valuation included a control premium. Petitioner,
however, owns shares in a company where the majority shareholder owned 79% of
the stock prior to the merger. Thus, Kobak's method assumes that "fair
value" in an appraisal action properly includes a pro rata share of
a control premium even though the company here had a controlling block of stock.
I doubt whether this method properly values such a company as a going
concern, but I need not decide that question because I have other reasons
for rejecting Kobak's methodology and accepting Whitman's.
2. Measuring
Earnings
Consistent
with petitioner's view that the value of SAP was largely represented by the
recent success of Rolling Stone, Kobak elected to capitalize Rolling
Stone's 1985 calendar year earnings. He believed that [**21] this one-year period (rather than a longer
time period) was justified because SAP's earlier years' earnings were distorted
by the inclusion of relatively unsuccessful ventures that SAP had sold or
dissolved by the time of the merger, and because only the earnings base of 1985
truly reflected the success of the Repositioning Plan. After adjusting earnings
to reflect what he believed to be non-recurring expenses, Kobak calculated Rolling
Stone's capitalization with the assistance of the implied capitalization
rates of his selected comparable companies. He then made further adjustments to
reflect SAP's other businesses and reach the total value of SAP as an
enterprise. n22
n22 These adjustments reflecting SAP's other
businesses were not capitalized with the same capitalization rate he applied to
the earnings measure of Rolling Stone. They were not so capitalized
because Kobak did not believe that SAP's investments in these assets were
active assets deserving of such capitalization. Thus, Kobak did acknowledge
that SAP had assets other than Rolling Stone. While it would be
inappropriate to state that he valued SAP as if it only consisted of Rolling
Stone, it may be said that his inclusion of these assets without any
adjustment for capitalization reflects his belief that SAP's future earnings
would be based entirely on the potential earnings of Rolling Stone.
[**22]
Respondent's
expert capitalized SAP's five-year (1981-1985) average EBIT and EBITDA on the
belief that a shorter period would place too much emphasis on the peak years'
profits or contain figures too varied to average. He also felt that the value
of SAP as a going concern should be valued by focusing on SAP's earnings as a
whole, rather than just the earnings of Rolling Stone. Accordingly,
respondent supported its selection of a five-year period of SAP's earnings by
noting that it provided "for a balanced valuation reflecting the wide
variability of SAP's actual earnings performance." n23
n23 Respondent's Post-Trial Br. at 18.
Former
Chancellor Allen pointed out that acceptance of Kobak's proposed one-year
earnings base would require the Court to find "that something very
elementary and important with respect to the company's financial performance
had recently [*321] occurred, making the prior years, in effect,
irrelevant." n24 Noting that SAP had a history of volatile earnings, the
Chancellor did not believe [**23] that such a change had occurred with respect
to SAP's earnings and found that Kobak failed to "present a persuasive
reason to depart from the standard use of a five year earnings base." n25
Finally, the Chancellor concluded that "since there is no way to judge
whether the substantially higher 1985 earnings were aberrant or sustainable,
without the inappropriate aid of hindsight, the fair value of SAP as of the
Merger date should in this instance be approximated using the standard five
year average approach which was employed by Mr. Whitman." n26 Implicitly,
the Chancellor thus indicated his acceptance of not only the use of a longer
earnings base but also the use of the earnings base of SAP, not Rolling
Stone.
n24 Allen's Op., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144,
*25.
n25
Id.
n26
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, *25.
On
appeal, the Supreme Court noted that there was justification for the
Chancellor's decision to reject Kobak's use of a one-year earnings base but
noted that "rejection of a one year earnings base, however, does not, [**24] ipso facto, require acceptance of
Whitman's alternative five year base." n27 The Supreme Court also
questioned the Chancellor's conclusion that he was unable to determine if SAP's
recent earnings were sustainable without the "inappropriate aid of
hindsight."
As the Chancellor noted earlier in his
opinion, post-merger evidence is not necessarily inadmissible to show that
plans in effect at the time of the merger have born fruition. In Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., we noted that the failure to value the company as
a going concern may result in an understatement of fair value. While
speculative elements of value should be excluded from the valuation calculus,
the purpose of such restriction is to eliminate "pro forma data,"
not to bar expert evidence of value based on the nature of the enterprise. n28
n27
Supr. Ct. Op. 701 A.2d at 361.
n28
701 A.2d at 362 (citations omitted).
I find
it is necessary to reconsider the acceptance of a five-year base in the absence
of any presumption [**25] in its favor and in light of
admissible post-merger evidence on the subject of SAP's value. First, I note
that former Chancellor Allen rejected the use of a one-year base because SAP
had a history of volatile earnings and because he could not conclude that SAP
had recently undergone a change of such magnitude as would justify the belief
that the most recent year's earnings, viewed alone, were representative of the
company as a whole as it stood on the date of the merger. Second, I note that
his conclusion supported the rejection of a one-year base in general, not just
the one-year base of SAP or the one-year base of Rolling Stone. As both
parties recognize, SAP's 1985 earnings consisted largely of the earnings of Rolling
Stone. But, as the Chancellor's Opinion reveals, and as I independently
conclude below, SAP was not a company whose business was limited to publishing Rolling
Stone.
a. Scope
of the Earnings Base
As
former Chancellor Allen noted, the history of SAP revealed "a need and
desire to try new enterprises in an effort to diversify earnings and ... a
modest ability to successfully do so." n29 Moreover, the fact that certain
areas of business had recently [*322]
been [**26] discontinued did not contradict the fact that "the
need and talent of management to successfully diversify into other areas
remained." n30 When viewed in the light of SAP's history, the fact that Rolling
Stone (and thus, SAP as a whole) experienced incredible success in 1985 was
just as anomalous as the fact that SAP had relatively few other operating
assets in 1985, as it recently had divested Record, Rolling Stone
Production and Rolling Stone Press.
n29 Allen's Op. at 16 n.20.
n30
Id.
Petitioner's
argument that because respondent has failed to show the existence of any plans
for further diversification, so that according to the standard announced in Weinberger
the possibility of such diversification should be eliminated from the valuation
decision as unsupported by value that is "known or susceptible of proof as
of the date of the merger," n31 is somewhat disingenuous. To a large
degree, petitioner is similarly unable to provide that level of proof of the
continued success [**27] of the Repositioning Plan
and Rolling Stone. Petitioner does offer some internal projections of Rolling
Stone's future earnings and post-merger evidence of Rolling Stone's
actual earnings, n32 but petitioner fails to acknowledge that SAP is not a
company whose value is properly determined by the success of Rolling Stone
alone.
n31 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del. Supr., 457
A.2d 701, 713 (1983).
n32 Petitioner states that, according to the
tender offer materials, SAP expected Rolling Stone's earnings to
increase by 156% and that post-merger evidence reveals that it actually
increased by 239%. Similarly, petitioner notes that advertising revenue,
subscription revenue, and single copy revenue all increased over 1985 results. See
Petitioner-Appellant's Supreme Court Opening Brief at 5-6. None of this
information, however, changes the fact that SAP's financial results are not
necessarily reflected solely by Rolling Stone's performance.
Stated
differently, petitioner's [**28] decision to
value SAP by relying on the last year's performance of Rolling Stone is
suspect for two reasons. First, even if it were appropriate to consider a
valuation of SAP based on the assumption that Rolling Stone was its only
operating asset, a one-year earnings period does not sufficiently reflect the
variation in the earnings of Rolling Stone itself. As petitioner notes, Rolling
Stone's success was relatively recent and its ability to maintain its
recent performance was called into question by the existence of potentially
formidable challenges to its market position and ability to attract and retain
advertisers. Second, even if I were to find that this error in petitioner's
valuation could be corrected by extending the valuation to include a longer, more
representative history of Rolling Stone's performance, I conclude that
such a tactic would not solve the fact that petitioner's valuation also fails
to acknowledge that SAP is a company not represented solely by its investment
in Rolling Stone.
b. Period
of the Earnings Base
The
question whether respondent's chosen valuation period accurately reflects the
nature of SAP as a going concern is subject [**29] to
the same level of scrutiny as the scope question. I reject respondent's
contention that consideration of a shorter time period would improperly place too
much emphasis on the recent successful earnings of Rolling Stone or SAP
as a whole. Yet, I agree with former Chancellor Allen's observation that the
record does not support a conclusion that SAP had undergone a major change
sufficient to justify the belief that SAP's 1985 earnings represented the value
of SAP as a going concern. [*323]
An
appropriate valuation method in the circumstances here should, in my opinion,
acknowledge the fact that SAP was a company in the business of publishing Rolling
Stone as well as exploring ways to invest profitably the cash generated by Rolling
Stone and SAP's other investments. Such a method also should recognize the
fact that Rolling Stone's success immediately before the merger was of a
magnitude not experienced by any of SAP's other business ventures. Whether the
growth of Rolling Stone was sustainable, at what level, and for how
long, is not known with certainty. It must be acknowledged, however, that SAP
was operating under a Repositioning Plan that generated a success larger [**30]
than any ever before experienced and
that this success was not the result of outside factors, but rather was the
result of this internal operating plan under which SAP was operating on the
date of the merger. The fact that this plan was successful and that Rolling
Stone was providing a larger portion of SAP's revenue than ever before,
must be reflected in the valuation of SAP as a whole. Nevertheless, the
valuation must not ignore the fact that SAP was still a company without a
history of relying on one operating asset.
I
conclude that five years is an appropriate time period over which to examine
the earnings of SAP. This length of time reflects the creation and elimination
of more than one SAP asset, and thus reflects the nature of the enterprise as
an enterprise with a consistent history of attempts to diversify. Equal
emphasis on each of the past five years, however, would fail to reflect the
fact that SAP management had rather recently developed the operating plan
responsible for a large part of SAP's recent success. Whether that success
would continue, or whether the success of SAP's management with the
Repositioning Plan might even provide benefits that could be utilized [**31] in connection with SAP's
other investments, is unknown. But we do know that SAP was operating under a
plan that appeared to be causing at least the start of an upward trend in
earnings unlike anything in SAP's history.
Accordingly,
I believe it is appropriate to consider the full live years of SAP's earnings,
but to place greater weight on the more recent years. In this way, the nature
and history of the enterprise will not be ignored, nor will the company's less
successful past prevent recognition of recent trends. Therefore, I direct the
parties to weight SAP's earnings over the past five years, starting with 1981
and placing one additional weight on each successive year. Thus, the years and
the weights should be: 1981 (1); 1982 (2); 1983 (3); 1984 (4); and 1985 (5).
I
recognize that it may seem inconsistent to apply a capitalization rate based on
the average earnings over five years to an earnings measure based on a weighted
average of five years. The difference is not problematic, however, because
the assumptions justifying Whitman's adjustment of the comparable companies'
median capitalization rate match the assumptions supporting the Court's
selection of SAP's appropriate [**32] earnings measure. I believe it is necessary to
weight SAP's earnings as I have described in order to maintain a consistent
view of SAP as a going concern. This view is carried through to the discussion
below on the adjustment to earnings. In that discussion, bear in mind that
petitioner has attempted to impress her particular view of SAP as a whole on
the final capitalization figure by adjusting SAP's yearly earnings, while
respondent has attempted to impress its view of SAP as a whole on the final
capitalization figure by adjusting the capitalization rate. [*324]
3. Adjustments
to Earnings
Petitioner
argues that the Court cannot accept an earnings base of SAP's historical five-year
earnings unless it adjusts those earnings to reflect nonrecurring costs and
other necessary adjustments. Specifically, petitioner seeks adjustments for
costs incurred in connection with a change in printers, SAP's investment in US,
and the discontinuance of other businesses. In addition, petitioner seeks to
adjust SAP's earnings to reflect an increase in deferred subscription revenues.
First,
petitioner seeks to adjust SAP's 1984 calendar year earnings by $ 871,000, over
half of which ($ 570,000)
[**33] is
claimed to be the amount paid to cancel a printing contract. n33
Respondent argues that this charge is best described as an acceleration of
expense, rather than a non-recurring cost, as the payment to SAP's existing
printer allowed SAP to cancel that contract and to contract with another
company for lower printing costs in the future. Respondent also argues that
petitioner has failed to support the need for the remainder of the $ 870,000
adjustment. As respondent's expert management consultant, Daniel McNamee ("McNamee"),
explained, SAP was spending upwards of $ 5,000,000 per year on printing costs;
McNamee believed the savings SAP would obtain by switching printers would have
been reflected in the following year's expenses. n34
Moreover, he estimated such savings to amount to between 10-15% of the previous
printing costs or, in this case, at least enough to cover the full cost of
buying out the old contract. n35 It must be noted,
however, that McNamee had not seen the actual contract and did not know what
specific savings, if any, SAP received. n36
n33 Trial Tr. (Aug. 28, 1996) at 84-85. [**34]
n34 Trial Tr. (Aug. 29, 1996) at 350-51.
n35
Id.
n36
Id. at 416-17.
Petitioner
has failed to adequately explain why the $ 870,000 should be treated as non-recurring
costs and deducted from SAP's earnings. Whether the cost associated with the
change of printing contracts was motivated by savings or, as petitioner appears
to imply, by the need for a printer that could better meet the growing needs of
Rolling Stone, n37 the costs were associated with a very basic aspect of
SAP's operations. Accordingly, I conclude that SAP's earnings should not be
adjusted for the cost of canceling the printing contract. Nor should the
earnings be adjusted in 1984 or 1985 to reflect lowered costs. n38 I also decline to adjust SAP's earnings to reflect the
other expenses in the proposed $ 871,000 adjustment, as petitioner has failed
to sufficiently explain--and to a large degree even address--the justification
for such adjustments. n39
n37 See Petitioner's Post-Trial Br. at
69 n.37. [**35]
n38 Petitioner adjusts the 1984 and 1985
earnings by $ 48 and $ 44 million, respectively. These figures represent the
lower printing costs charged by the new printer, specifically in order to help
SAP meet the costs of canceling the old contract.
n39 Petitioner directs the Court to PX 38
for a list of these adjustments, but nowhere in Kobak's report nor at trial
does petitioner provide an explanation of the need for such adjustments. See
Trial Tr. (Aug. 28, 1996) at 231-32; Petitioner's Appendix, Vol. I, PX 1 at 17-18.
Second,
petitioner seeks to adjust SAP's earnings to reflect $ 51,000 in legal expenses
incurred in connection with SAP's acquisition of an interest in US
magazine. n40 According to respondent, the [*325] legal expenses to which petitioner refers are
expenses incurred in connection with SAP's share repurchase, not SAP's
investment in US. n41 Respondent further contends that even if the
expenses were associated with SAP's investment in US, the investment in US
was active, not passive, and thus a part of the ongoing value of SAP that must
be preserved, [**36] not eliminated. n42
Respondent is correct. If SAP did not have a history of consistent attempts at
diversification, these expenses might be properly viewed as non-recurring and,
thus, items properly excluded from earnings as elements not reflective of SAP's
value as a going concern. Because SAP was, in essence, in the business of
diversification, these costs, if they were legal costs associated with the
investment in US, must be considered as necessary evils resulting from
SAP's efforts to diversify. Accordingly, I decline to deduct these costs from
SAP's earnings, as they cannot properly be viewed as non-recurring costs of
SAP's business.
n40 See Trial Tr. (Aug. 28, 1996) at 83-84;
PX 1 at 18.
n41 See Respondent's Appendix, Vol. II,
RX 25 at S3101.
n42 See Allen's Op. at 5 n.7 (finding
that SAP's investment in US was an active investment because, among
other things, SAP provided some management personnel).
Third,
petitioner seeks to adjust SAP's 1985 earnings [**37] by $ 334,000 for general and administrative
expenses that she claims are not associated with SAP's operation of Rolling
Stone, but instead result from operation, or termination, of SAP's other
businesses. n43 I reject the exclusion of these costs
for the same reason I reject the exclusion of the legal expenses incurred in
connection with the acquisition of US. They must be viewed as necessary
evils of SAP's business. Moreover, even if it were improper to include such
costs in the valuation of SAP as a going concern, Kobak admitted that he was
not sure that he had properly identified these costs. n44
n43 See Trial Tr. (Aug. 28, 1996) at 90-91,
94-95, PX 1 at 17-18.
n44 See Trial Tr. (Aug. 28, 1996) at 228-230.
Fourth,
petitioner attempts to reargue the Chancellor's decision to reject her proposed
adjustment to SAP's earnings to reflect the increase in deferred subscription
revenue. The Chancellor's reasoning on this issue thoroughly addresses all of
petitioner's claims. His decision [**38] is
the law of the case.
Finally,
petitioner briefly raises a claim that the Chancellor failed to address Kobak's
adjustments to SAP's earnings to reflect SAP's tax expenses. n45 Yet, both
parties agree that SAP should be valued on a before-tax basis, as this is the
standard valuation practice for companies in the publishing industry, and
petitioner admits that respondent valued SAP on a before-tax basis. To the
extent either party believes this issue remains unresolved, I conclude that SAP
should be valued by examining its earnings on a before-tax basis.
n45 See Petitioner's Opening
Appellate Br. at 31; Petitioner's Post-Trial Br. at 66-68.
B. Adjustment
to SAP's Capitalization
With
the guidelines described above, the parties' experts should be able to confer
and calculate SAP's capitalization. Petitioner argues, however, that this
capitalization will not properly reflect the value of SAP as a going concern
unless an adjustment is made to reflect SAP's excess cash. Moreover, petitioner
argues [**39] that former
Chancellor Allen's failure to expressly address this issue and describe his
reasons for rejecting such an addition were violations of his duty under § 262 to perform an independent valuation. [*326]
In my
opinion, the evidence on this issue is thoroughly and accurately described in
the Chancellor's Opinion. n46 In sum, the decision
rested (and still rests) on whether the Court believed Whitman and McNamee, who
both concluded that SAP required sixty days of working capital, or Kobak, who
concluded that SAP required only thirty days of working capital. Both Whitman
and Kobak predicated their views on analysis of SAP's financials, while McNamee
based his view on the standard amount required in the publishing industry. I
agree with former Chancellor Allen's implicit decision to accept the opinions
of Whitman and McNamee. Thus, I find no need to adjust SAP's capitalization to
reflect the existence of excess cash.
n46 See Alien's Op. at 11, especially
n.13.
C. Consideration
of Other Valuation Methods [**40]
In
addition to calculating SAP's earnings capitalization value, respondent
calculated SAP's asset and market values. Respondent's methods and assumptions
underlying each of these valuation formulas are thoroughly explained in former
Chancellor Allen's Opinion. He did not, however, specifically critique either
formula or comment on whether either result should be weighted with SAP's value
as calculated using the earnings capitalization model. I reject the use of the
asset and market value models. While both models may be used, in an appropriate
situation, to provide a relevant estimate of fair value, I cannot conclude that
the use of either model is appropriate in this case.
As
Whitman noted, there were only six transactions involving the sale of SAP stock
in the five years before to the merger and none in the twenty-one months
immediately prior to the merger. Moreover, in every case, SAP was the purchaser.
I am unable to conclude that a market value based on such a thin market
deserves any weight in this appraisal action. Similarly, Whitman's asset
values deserve no weight. Both parties concede that SAP is a company with few
tangible assets. Moreover, even respondent argues [**41] elsewhere
that it is inappropriate to "theorize about Rolling Stone's potential sale
price." n47 I do not understand, therefore, why it would be appropriate to
consider the asset value resulting from respondent's theoretical takeover
method. Accordingly, I direct the parties to consider only SAP's value as
calculated by the earnings capitalization method described above.
n47 Respondent's Post-Trial Br. at 14.
D. Post-Merger
Interest
The
Supreme Court directed that the rate of interest and the period of time for
which interest is awarded be addressed on remand. An award of interest in an
appraisal case is a statutory adjustment that serves two purposes. It is
intended to compensate a petitioner for the loss of use of the fair value of
her shares during the pendency of an appraisal process and to cause the
surviving corporation to give up the benefit it obtained from the use of the
fair value of petitioner's shares during that same period. n48
n48 See Hintmann v.
Fred Weber, Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, *42-43, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12839,
Steele, V.C. (Feb. 17, 1998); Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 663,
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 141, *32 (1997); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications
Corp., 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, *35-36, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12334, Chandler,
C. (Aug. 26, 1997).
[**42]
Although
one can point to cases where this Court has considered the legal interest rate
relevant to the fair rate in an [*327]
appraisal action, n49 I have said
before that I do not think it is appropriate to consider the legal interest
rate where the parties have provided a substantial amount of evidence as to a
fair rate. The legal interest rate, in other words, serves as a useful default
rate when the parties have inadequately developed the record on the issue. n50 Where, as here, the record is sufficiently developed,
the legal interest rate (with one exception) simply is not relevant.
n49 See, e.g.,
Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127, *62, Del. Ch.,
C.A. No. 8282, Chandler, V.C. (Aug. 1, 1990) (awarding legal interest rate to
compensate plaintiff for long delay in payment resulting from protracted
litigation).
n50 See Chang's
Holdings, S.A. v. Universal Chemicals & Coatings, Inc., 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS
222, *8, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 10856, Chandler, V.C. (Nov. 22, 1994).
1. The
Prudent Investor [**43] Rate
Petitioner
argues that this Court should apply a compound prudent investor rate that
provides for a yearly yield of 12.2%. Kobak calculated this rate by developing
a portfolio consisting of equity investments such as the Standard and Poor's 500
(60%), a blend of mid- and long-term U.S. Treasury bonds (30%), and a mix of
short-term investments such as one-year U.S. Treasury bonds and six-month
certificates of deposit (10%). Kobak contends that this allocation is "extremely
close" to the blend referred to by the Wall Street Journal since
April 1988 as "the standard middle-of-the road blend," the "traditional
blend," and the "classic textbook portfolio blend." That blend
consists of 55% equity investments, 35% bonds, and 10% treasury bills or money
market funds. Petitioner further notes that the blend is similar to the average
asset allocation recommended by "top Wall Street brokerage firms" and
published in the Wall Street Journal as far back as 1987: 57.1% equity, 31.3%
bonds, and 11.6% cash.
Respondent's
suggested allocation for the prudent investor rate is based on the allocation
accepted by this Court in Chang's Holdings: 20% ten-year treasury bonds;
20% Moody's [**44] AAA corporate
bonds; 20% average risk mutual funds; 15% 90-day treasury bills; 15% 90-day
commercial paper; and 10% one year certificates of deposit. n51
Petitioner argues that respondent's forty percent allocation in short-term
investments would not even match inflation. But the prudent investor rate is
based on what a prudent investor would have done at the time, not what,
on hindsight, appears to have been the best investment or what appears to have
outpaced inflation.
n51
1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222, *13.
I
reject petitioner's calculation of the prudent investor rate, however, because
petitioner has failed to explain how she calculated some of the rates on which
her ultimate conclusion is based. For example, in his report, Kobak fails to
explain how he weighted or averaged the mid- and long-term treasury bonds or
the two categories of short-term investments to arrive at the mean returns of 7.32%
and 6.22%, respectively. n52 Kobak may have employed a
straight average, but as no specific numbers are provided, I cannot [**45] be sure. Moreover, Kobak notes that his
suggested allocation varies only slightly from the other recommended allocations
he identifies. But he fails to explain why--if these other allocations are
representative of the prudent investor rate--his allocation should vary at
all. Had Kobak provided, and justified, the specific rates employed for
each of his categories, it might have been [*328] possible to adjust his allocation percentages.
As this detail is not provided, I must reject Kobak's prudent investor rate. While
others might argue that a slightly different allocation is appropriate, I find
no reason to conclude that Whitman's allocation percentages are not
representative of a prudent investor rate. In addition, the calculation of his
rate is thoroughly explained and supported with the necessary details. Thus, I
accept Whitman's proposed allocation percentages for the prudent investor rate.
n52 See Kobak's Report, PX1 at 32.
2. SAP's
Cost of Borrowing
Petitioner
fails to provide any evidence [**46] of
SAP's cost of borrowing. As for respondent, Whitman's cost of borrowing is
allegedly based on consideration of three different types of SAP's debt. Whitman
fails, however, to provide any detail regarding how he was able to determine
yearly costs of debt from the three rates of interest alone. His report merely
provides the estimated cost of debt for each year during the pendency of the
proceeding, without discussing the amount of any type of debt at any specific
time or explaining how he weighted the various types of debt to reach his final
figures. Because petitioner has failed to provide any evidence of the cost of debt,
and respondent has failed to provide a credible explanation of its
calculations, I must rely on the legal rate to provide an estimate of SAP's
cost of debt.
3. Adjustment
for Delay
Respondent
suggests that the Court should adjust any final award of interest to reflect
the fact that petitioner has delayed these proceedings. Respondent complains
that former Chancellor Allen, without explanation, awarded the legal rate of
interest over a ten-year period and failed to address respondent's argument to
adjust for the delay. According to respondent, the interest [**47] rate should be awarded for only a three-year
period due to petitioner's delay in prosecuting this case.
I have
reviewed the trial record. It is true that this case took ten years to reach
trial. It also is true that the case inexplicably appears not to have been
actively litigated for months at a time during this ten-year period. Nothing in
the record, however, establishes that the delay was intentional or part of a
strategic maneuver by petitioner. Although respondent complained about the
delay on more than one occasion, the Chancellor never formally considered
dismissing the case for lack of prosecution under Court of Chancery Rule 41(e).
I also note that, at trial, neither petitioner nor respondent introduced
evidence on the nature of the delay or who was responsible for it. Therefore, I
find no basis for concluding that the delay was occasioned deliberately by
petitioner. As did the former Chancellor, I decline to adjust the time period
for payment of interest in a manner that would effectively punish the
petitioner with no clear basis for doing so.
4. Calculation
of Final Interest Award
The
final award of interest should be calculated as follows: 1) the prudent
investor [**48] rate shall consist
of the weightings identified by respondent; and 2) the interest rate for SAP's
common stock shall be the average of the prudent investor rate and the legal
interest rate since the merger, adjusted and compounded monthly.
III. CONCLUSION
The
parties shall instruct their experts to recalculate SAP's value using the
earnings capitalization method over a five-year period with the weightings
applied as described above. In addition, the parties shall recalculate the
interest award based [*329] on an equal weighting of respondent's prudent
investor rate and the legal interest rate as adjusted and compounded monthly
since the date of the merger. Once the appropriate calculation has been
performed, I ask the parties to confer and to agree, if possible, on a form of
order setting forth the recalculated valuation, consistent with the guidelines
that I have tried to provide in this decision after remand.
IT IS
SO ORDERED.