BY:  MICHAEL J. MEURER
              Boston University
              School of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=214949

           Other Electronic Document Delivery:
           http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers
           SSRN only offers technical support for papers
           downloaded from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection
           location. When URLs wrap, you must copy and paste
           them into your browser eliminating all spaces.

Paper ID:  Boston University School of Law Working Paper 99-10
    Date:  1999

 Contact:  MICHAEL J. MEURER
   Email:  Mailto:meurer@bu.edu
  Postal:  Boston University
           School of Law
           765 Commonwealth Avenue
           Boston, MA 02215  USA
   Phone:  617-353-6292
     Fax:  617-353-3077

Paper Requests:
 Contact Prof. V.S. Khanna, Boston Univ. School of Law, 765
 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, MA 02215. Phone:(617)353-6674.
 Fax:(617)353-3077. Mailto:vkhanna@bu.edu

ABSTRACT:
 In this article I introduce legal scholars to concepts of
 fairness developed by microeconomic theorists. My starting point
 is a review of the books: Cooperative Microeconomics: A
 Game-Theoretic Introduction, by Herve Moulin, and Equity: In
 Theory and Practice, by H. Peyton Young. The books explain how
 to use cooperative game theory to study the fair allocation of
 benefits and costs. I illustrate the use of cooperative game
 theory by applying it to various problems of fair division in
 the law. I believe formal analysis of fair division is valuable
 because it allows scholars to connect their intuitive sense of
 fairness to a particular solution concept and an underlying set
 of axioms. I apply the Shapley value and the nucleolus solutions
 to the problem of the fair assignment of property rights in a
 nuisance problem. I explain the axioms that give rise to each of
 these solution concepts, and I suggest that one can identify the
 moral significance of a solution concept with the content of its
 axioms (and the implicit assumptions hidden in the statement of
 the problem). Finally, I comment on the problems with
 implementing fair division schemes, and the relationship between
 fairness and efficiency.