Example:
Congress passes the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, which prohibits StripCo from
continuing mining operations on its property.
StripCo claims this governmental regulation is
a "taking" under the US Constitution,
which requires "fair compensation."
What has been taken and how much is it worth?
The company provides evidence of likely coal production,
comparable-company coal prices, likely operating
costs over a 24-year period, and the prevailing
average industry discount rate for proved coal
reserves of 10% -- to come to a "discounted
cash flow" estimate of the value of the company's
coal reserves. The government counters with evidence
of how much similar coal properties had sold for.
What is the value of the company's coal reserves?
Answer:
In a similar case, the court valued the company's
coal (now no longer mineable) by using a "discounted
cash flow" method to value the coal. See
Whitney Benefits, Inc v. The United States,
18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989) (Appendix B).
After determining that the SMCRA had rendered
the coal property useless and constituted a constitutional
taking, the court proceeded in three steps:
- Determination that company could mine and
sell 2.5 million tons of coal per year for 24
years
- 2 million tons to electric utilities,
based on contracts for similar coal by other
nearby mining companies (but not the 3 million
tons the plaintiff had asserted)
- 0.5 million tons to industrial users,
based on contracts and operations by other
mining companies (but not the 1 million
tons the plaintiff had asserted)
- Determination of annual net revenues over
24 years, based on --
- revenues: the annual production rate (as
already determined) times the price of coal
as of the taking, based on trade journal
price analysis and actual long-term coal
contracts by similar coal companies
- costs: operating costs (labor, general
corporate, insurance, taxes) and capital
costs (equipment, engineering, permitting,
reclamation), after adjusting the company's
business plan to reflect a lower annual
production rate (2.5 million rather than
4.0 million tons/year)
- Determination of present value of this stream
of net revenues (total $52,755,000)
- net revenues, which varied from year to
year
- a flat discount rate of 10%, based on
rate generally applied in the coal industry
for undeveloped coal reserves
- Adjustments and additions (final award $60,296,000)
- present value of salable reserves (2.5
million tons/year) reduced to account for
future reclamation costs (less $2 million)
and basic uncertainty / "sensitivity
analysis" (less 11%) - $45,172,000
- present value of residual reserves not
salable (89,441,000 tons) valued at 20%
of salable reserves per ton - $15,124,000
There are a number of particularities. First,
the court stated that it was not applying a "lost
profit" analysis -- who is its DCF analysis
different? Second, the court generally followed
the company's business plan (the Boyd plan) in
making its determinations of coal prices, costs
and discount rates , but not with respect to expected
annual sales -- why did the court cut the company's
estimates? Third, the court assumed a discount
rate of 10% even though in 1977 prevailing risk-free
interest rates were comparable -- why did it not
add a risk premium, or at least vary the discount
rate, to reflect the long-range risk of coal,
this coal region, mining operations? Fourth, what
about the significant "fudge factors"
the court used, such as the 11% "sensitivity
analysis" factor or the 20% factor for valuing
residual reserves -- what basis did the court
have for making these adjustments?
Consider the chart below, reproduced on the attached
spreadsheet. Notice that the court assumed
that at the beginning costs would exceed revenues,
hence the losses during the first three years.
Year |
Net revenues
($-000) |
Discount factor
(10%) |
Present Value
($-000) |
1 |
-829 |
0.909 |
-754 |
2 |
-8039 |
0.826 |
-6640 |
3 |
-10758 |
0.751 |
-8079 |
4 |
5690 |
0.683 |
3886 |
5 |
11944 |
0.621 |
7417 |
6 |
12656 |
0.564 |
7138 |
7 |
12299 |
0.513 |
6309 |
8 |
9740 |
0.467 |
4549 |
9 |
10634 |
0.424 |
4509 |
10 |
10124 |
0.386 |
3908 |
11 |
10526 |
0.350 |
3684 |
12 |
11965 |
0.319 |
3817 |
13 |
11719 |
0.290 |
3399 |
14 |
10987 |
0.263 |
2890 |
15 |
9250 |
0.239 |
2211 |
16 |
10784 |
0.218 |
2351 |
17 |
10828 |
0.198 |
2144 |
18 |
11178 |
0.180 |
2012 |
19 |
11609 |
0.164 |
1904 |
20 |
10936 |
0.149 |
1629 |
21 |
11621 |
0.135 |
1569 |
22 |
11723 |
0.123 |
1442 |
23 |
11780 |
0.112 |
1319 |
24 |
1384 |
0.102 |
141 |
Totals |
199751 |
|
52755 |
What would the effect have been if the court
had looked at a 35-year period? What if the court
had used a variable discount rate -- 10% during
the first 5 years, 12% for the next 10 years,
and 15% thereafter?
In 2002, the Federal Claims Court addressed another
case involving a takings issue under SMCRA. In
Stearns Co. v. United States, 2002U.S.
Claims LEXIS 206, the court employed the DCF method
in part of its valuation, closely following its
earlier ruling in Whitney Benefits.
|