To: Probity Investments
CC: Alan C.
Palmiter
From: Christopher
Alan Jennings; Diaz, Pyle, and Jennings
LLP
Date: November
22, 2000
Re: Deficiencies
in PE
Corporation’s prospectus, offering shares of
its Celera Genomics Group stock, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 28, 2000 (registration no. 333-95771).
“What can be
said at all can be stated clearly,
and whereof one cannot speak thereof, one must remain
silent.”
- Ludwig
Wittgenstein
Tractatus: Logico
Philosophicus
“[T]he most common problem [with disclosure documents
filed with the SEC]
is that a well intentioned and informed writer simply
fails to get the message across
to an intelligent, interested reader. In that case,
stilted jargon and complex
constructions are usually the villains.”
- Warren E. Buffet
Preface to “Writing in Plain English: how to
create clear SEC disclosure documents.”
Introduction
In “Writing in Plain English: how to
create clear SEC disclosure documents” the
SEC turns its regulatory eye from the substance of disclosure to the form of
presentation. The SEC’s “Plain English”
movement does not seek to "dumb down" its disclosure regime by
draining substance from documents.
Rather, by focusing on the form of disclosure, the movement seeks to
give interested and intelligent readers, like Warren Buffet, the best possible
chance of understanding the complex information contained in disclosure
documents. Indeed, when poor writing obscures a document’s meaning, when
baroque style clouds its truth, the author may as well remain silent. Poor writing undercuts the policy of
compelled disclosure when it prevents the message from getting across to an
intelligent audience. Applying norms of
plain English, the SEC seeks to improve the quality of disclosure by
encouraging tight sentence structure, word economy, direct tone, active voice,
logical document structure, and appealing design. In short, disclosure documents should be “easy to read and look
like they are meant to be read.”
This
memorandum evaluates PE
Corporation’s prospectus as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 28, 2000 (registration no.
333-95771) against the SEC’s benchmark of precision and clarity for disclosure
documents. On balance, the prospectus
scores high under the SEC’s standards for prose, but the clarity and force of
the prospectus is severely undermined by its disinterestedness in organization
and design. Couching the prospectus in
a more inviting and informative format would markedly improve the
document. In this memorandum, I
critique PE Corporation’s February prospectus under the SEC’s plain language
initiative, suggest revisions, and unearth useful investment information not
found in the prospectus. Additionally,
I augment my discussion with links to sources on the world wide web.
Compliance with the
SEC’s “Plain English” Initiative.
PE
Corporation’s prospectus is out of step with
the SEC’s “Plain English” norms. The
“Plain English” initiative is not merely aesthetic, but responds to the
inextricable relationship of substance and form in the production of meaning. For decades, the SEC’s ignored this
interdependent relationship by focusing merely on substance (i.e. what
information should be disclosed). Now,
formal considerations inform the SEC’s regulatory regime. The SEC encourages
reform in three general areas: (1) organization, (2) prose, and (3)
design. The prose of PE Corporation’s
prospectus is outstanding–it speaks in an active voice, uses simple and direct
sentences to convey complex ideas, avoids legalese and jargon, employs concrete
terminology to communicate abstract ideas, and omits superfluous words. A good start, but the document fails to
comply with the SEC’s standards for design and organization.
Design: the aesthetics of disclosure
The
SEC’s encourages design reform in four general areas: (1) outlining, (2)
typography, (3) Layout, and (4) Graphics.
Outlining a document's hierarchy visually distinguishes different levels
of information, and thereby distinguishes big picture information from minutia. Typography strongly defines the aesthetic
character of a document, and can be used to emphasize text containing important
information. Layout considerations such
as white space, column width, linespacing, and use of sidebar paragraphs can
make a document easier to read and use.
Relative to a narrative description of information, use of graphics,
such as a graph, chart, matrix or tables, can often illustrate information in a
clearer and more efficient way (particularly with financial information). PE Corporation’s prospectus needs revising
in all four areas, but I will critique the prospectus’ non-use of
graphics.
In an
attorney’s design arsenal, graphics are a powerful tool. Aside from some token charts, PE Corporation exclusively relied on narration to convey its prospectus
information. This design decision
renders the document cold, uninviting, and ultimately less informative. For instance, a graphic would help a reader
understand the anatomy of PE Corporation’s capital structure. PE Corporation conducts its business through
Celera Genomics Group and PE Biosystems. Its capital
structure has two classes of common stock, each intended to reflect the performance
of each business. This is a fairly sophisticated capital structure. Using a chart or schema is superior to a
textual description of Celera’s interface with PE Biosystems viz. PE
Corporation. In fact, one is displayed
on PE Corporation’s website.
Organization:
the metaphysics of disclosure
Three
principles inform the SEC’s standards for “good organization”: (1) start with
the big picture, (2) use descriptive headings and subheadings, and (3) group
related information together. Starting
with the big picture adds significance to an individual piece of information by
linking it to a master narrative. Using descriptive headings and subheadings
presents prospectus information in bite-size pieces, making the document easier
to comprehend and manage. Grouping
related information together streamlines disclosure, rendering the document
more efficient and its meaning less disjointed. In essence, “good organization” implies that a prospectus should
read like a coherent whole.
PE
Corporation’s prospectus reads like a Chinese menu. Little thought, beyond following the SEC’s substantive guidelines
for disclosure, went to organization.
For instance, the prospectus’ discussion of investment risk factors pays
cursory attention to the SEC’s principles of organization. The prospectus parcels out the risk factors
under two broad categories: (1) “Risks Relating to the Celera Genomics Group,”
and (2) “Risks Relating to a Capital Structure with Two Separate Classes of
Common Stock.” (One class of PE
Corporation’s common stock is Celera Genomics Group, the other is PE
Biosystems. Its prospectus only offers
shares in Celera.) Categorizing risks in this way places discrete pockets of
information in a logical order, as the first category speaks to investment
risks relating to the Celera Genomics Group’s mission, and the second category
speaks to risks relating to Celera’s structural relationship
with PE Biosystems viz. PE Corporation. However, the prospectus presents the
specific risk factors under each category as laundry lists, rendering it
disjointed, hard to digest, and wanting for a master narrative. The prospectus needs reforming–I will
demonstrate how.
Application
of the SEC’s organizational norms is context dependant–there is no magic
formula for creating a prospectus that reads like a coherent whole. However, a few generalizations guide a
drafting attorney. Every prospectus
tells a story of telos, method, utility and risk. That is, a prospectus describes the corporation’s design, i.e.
its exploitation of order for a purpose; explains how management translates
that design into ends (structurally), and how it purports to obtain those ends
(practically); suggests why those ends are useful to a marketplace; and,
highlights environmental conditions that could frustrate those ends. A master narrative weaves these elements together
to convey the corporation’s essence, and is the starting point for creating a
well organized document. The master narrative raises basic themes relating to a
company’s struggle to fulfill its corporate mission, and these themes
constitute the logical framework of the document as a whole. Headings and subheadings signify these themes
and thus embody the prospectus’ logical framework. Once the logical framework is understood, an attorney may extend
the master narrative’s basic themes with specific information and risk factors
under the relevant heading. In this
way, use of headings and subheadings allows the prospectus to simultaneously
delve into minutia and keep the reader tethered to the master narrative. After laying this groundwork, principles of
logic and rationality compels related information to be grouped together.
Buried
in the PE Corporation’s prospectus and other public information, a master
narrative exists, waiting to emerge. I
will focus on that portion of the narrative relating to risks facing the Celera
Genomics Group. This narrative tells
the story of Celera
Genomics Group’s mission to become the
“definitive source of genomic and related medical and related agricultural
information” for the biotech, medical, and health industries. Competing chiefly with the “Human Genome Project,” a publically funded, international consortium of
scientists and research institutions, sequencing and mapping the human genome
is essential to its mission. Ranking
this endeavor among the historic feats of scientific discovery, it is on the
order of magnitude of debunking the heliocentric view of the earth’s position
in the universe, the theory of evolution, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,
Eienstein’s theory of relativity, splitting the atom, the discovery of DNA, and
landing on the moon. Celera (a play on
the word “celerity,” meaning swiftness or speed) proposes to produce, present,
and extend this knowledge more efficiently than the traditional academic model
employed by the Human Genome Project.
With the elements of telos, method, utility, and risk in mind, this
narrative uncovers three basic themes relating to the Celera Genomics Group
mission: (1) using a corporate form for academic ends, (2) the quality and
usefulness of Celera’s science, and (3) legal and political risks. These themes constitute the logical
scaffolding of the prospectus’ discussion of the Celera Genomics Group (and
essentially the prospectus as a whole).
After sketching this story, I will recommend a system of headings and
subheadings that should transform the prospectus’ discussion of risk factors
from a disjointed laundry list into a coherent whole.
Theme
One: Employing a Corporate Structure for Quasi-Academic Ends. Unlike its
scientific antecedents and its competitors at the Human Genome project,
Celera’s raison d’etre is not just pure knowledge, but pure knowledge for
profit. Indeed, Celera’s telos blurs
the lines between pure science research institutions, like Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (a leader in
revolutionary and foundational science), and science-for-profit institutions,
like Pfizer (a leader in applied and extensional science). In other words, its telos exploits the
ordering principles of a corporate entity for purposes traditionally pursued by
public institutions supported by public dollars. Structurally, Celera must resort to America’s capital markets to
amass the resources necessary to take on the inherent power of the academy’s
ordered collective action and the Human Genome Project’s tremendous material
resources, and return a profit to its investors. Though Celera’s ambition is worthy of
admiration, an investor should recognize that Celera has made a management
decision to define the Human Genome Project as a competitor rather than a
public-private partner. And, in general,
an investor should note that Celera is testing the science-for-profit corporate
model in uncharted territory, and should ask whether a private institution
acting unilaterally is equipped to tackle such a monumental task.
Theme
2: The Quality and Usefulness of Celera’s Science. As information is Celera’s
only commodity, the utility of its science is essential to profitability. After Celera pieces together its genome map,
using its own gene-isolation system, it plans to sell access to its databases
to drug makers (like America Home
Products), researcher institutions (like Harvard
University), even curious individuals.
Currently, Celera has deposited its ''90
percent complete'' map on a database that is
available only by subscription, and for which some drug companies are paying a
reported $5
million a year. By contrast, the Human Genome Project claims to have mapped out
75 percent of the data, which it posts, free of charge, on a Web site called GenBank . This spring,
there
was a push for the rivals to post their data
on the same database, but that fell apart when Celera demanded exclusive rights
to market any such database for several years. In another parry, Celera
announced its intention to publish
conclusions based on both its proprietary data and GenBank data. (In the genome business, what makes
''publication'' significant is not the data, but the authors' interpretations,
which must undergo peer review before receiving validation by the scientific
community.) Once Celera completes it database, Celera plans to expand its
services to enter into new markets, including functional genomics (the understanding of gene and protein function and
expression) and personalized
health/medicine (tailoring medical
diagnostic and treatment strategies to address genetic variability among
individuals). Positioning itself to be
“definitive source of genomic and related medical information,” Celera aspires
to be the Bloomberg of biotechnology. As such, the ability of Celera to obtain
its ends turns on the quality, speed, and utility of its science, and the
management and marketing of that information.
From this framework, a number of factors are essential to obtaining
Celera’s ends, such as (1) the timely completion of sequencing and mapping the
human genome, (2) beating the Human Genome Project to the finish line, (3)
medical application of genomic information, (4) the viability of its
extensional products, like functional genomics, and (5) outstripping the value
of GenBank’s free database by providing value added information and services
from its database.
Theme
Three: Political and Legal risks.
Political risks abound. First, critics of genomics argue that it is
unethical for companies to treat the genetic code as a commodity, and are pushing for all the information to be made free to the
public.
Second, genetic testing has raised issues regarding confidentiality and the
appropriate uses of the resulting
information. For example, concerns have
been aired about
insurance company use of genetic information
to screen its customers. Concerns like
these could trigger political pressures to limit the use of genetic data, and
thereby limit the potential market for genomics data. The use of Celera’s genomics’ products and services may be
subject to heightened government regulation.
For example, within the field of personalized health/medicine, current
and future patient privacy and health care laws and regulation issued by Congress or the FDA may limit the use of polymorphism data. Aside from political risks, Celera faces
many legal risks. Celera’s competitive
position may depend on patent and copyright
protection, which may not be sufficiently
available (Can you
copyright a gene?). Aside from the ability to copyright, public
disclosure of genomics sequencing data could jeopardize Celera’s intellectual
property in the first place. Moreover,
Celera could incur liabilities relating to hazardous materials that it uses in
it research activities, or product liability claims.
These
themes compel a logical structure. PE
Corporation’s initial organizational split is a good starting point: (1) “Risks
Relating to the Celera Genomics Group,” and (2) “Risks Relating to a Capital
Structure with Two Separate Classes of Common Stock.” But this is not sufficient.
Based off of my sketch of Celera’s master narrative, a much more
coherent structure follows. Though
incomplete, my suggested changes would markedly improve the document.
BEFORE:
Risks Relating to Celera
Genomics Group.
[Laundry List of Risks]
Relating to a Capital
Structure with Two Separate Classes of Common Stock.
[Laundry List of Risks]
AFTER:
Risks Relating to the Celera Genomics Group
Employing
a Corporate Structure for Quasi-Academic Ends
Celera’s Relationship with the
Human Genome Project: competitor or partner?
The Institutional Competency to
Map and Sequence the Human Genetic Code
Celera’s
Science
Academic v. Corporate Process
Sequencing and Mapping the Human
Genome
Celera’s Celerity
Scientific Process and Method
Interpreting Genetic Information
Extending and Using Genetic
Information
Functional Genomics
Personalized Health/Medicine
Presentation of Genetic Information
Database technology
Legal
and Political Risks
Legal Risks
Protecting Celera’s Intellectual
Property
Products Liability
Political Risks
Freedom of Information
Regulation of Genetic Information
Rights of Privacy
Risks Relating to a Capital
Structure with Two Separate Classes of Common Stock.
[An
attorney should use my “master narrative” analysis to this section and develop
a system of themes to map out a logical structure.]
More Useful Investment
Information Not Found in the Prospectus
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CRA&d=1yLast November, researchers were surprised to find
Celera and the Human Genome Project in talks to collaborate on mapping the
human genome. As indicated above, these
talks fell through, because Celera demanded five years of exclusive rights to
the data. This information was not
included in the prospectus. This
omission is now the subject of a law suit.
On March 14, President Clinton and
Prime Minister Blair said research into the
human genetic blueprint was
"one of the most significant scientific projects of all time . . . To
realize full promise of the research, raw fundamental data on the human genome
__ including the human DNA sequence and its variations __ should be made freely
available to scientists everywhere.”
Celera's stock price dropped 19 percent on the day of the Clinton/Blair announcement.
Celera’s
Investor Relations
provides links to its SEC filings, annual and quarterly reports, and other
financial information.
Yahoo’s
finance web page
provide links to news events
involving Celera..