- Submitted to Probity Investments
- By Candice E. Williams
- 1111 Crowne Oaks Circle
- Winston-Salem, NC 27106
I recommend that Probity Investments submit the
following proposal for inclusion in Protective Life
Corporation's proxy materials for the corporation’s 2000 Annual
Meeting. This proposal must be submitted by December 28, 1999 to
be included in the April 2000 proxy materials.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
WHEREAS, Protective Life Corporation is a
leader in the field of life insurance, and
WHEREAS, the Financial Modernization Bill has
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and thereby allows
banking institutions to sell insurance products, and
WHEREAS, one of the missions of the
corporation is to "rank at the top of the industry in long-range
earnings growth and return on equity", and
WHEREAS, life insurance companies will become
attractive takeover targets because of the Financial
Modernization Bill, therefore
BE IT RESOLVED, that the shareholders
recommend the corporation adopts a Rights Plan to preserve
values of the stockholders, in the event of a takeover.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
SUPPORT STATEMENT
Protective Life Corporation (hereinafter called the
corporation) is a holding company whose subsidiaries provide
financial services through the production, distribution and
administration of insurance and investment products. The
corporation’s principal subsidiary is Protective Life Insurance
Company. (see
website).
The corporation prides itself on its A+
(Superior) rating by A.M. Best. Also, the corporation has strong
ties with its shareholders and one of its missions is to insure
them a profit. The corporation’s symbol is a triangle, which
symbolizes the three constituencies that it serves: customers,
the corporation’s own people and stockholders.
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton
signed into law a bill that has now become known as the
Financial Modernization Bill. This bill rewrites the current
banking law. It effectively repeals the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933. Now, banking institutions will be able to sell insurance
products. All of this is culminating into predictions that life
insurance companies will become attractive takeover targets.
(see
"New Rules for Financial Services").
Since the corporation is one of the top-rated
insurance companies and has shown its dedication to its
shareholders, it should adopt a Rights Plan to preserve its
shareholders’ values in case of a takeover.
Our goal is not to prevent future mergers,
but only to insure that the corporation will be given fair
negotiating power and fulfill its promise to its shareholders
that it will return to them a profit on their investment. Since
the current takeover regulation favors a "raider", the
corporation should protect itself through a Rights Plan.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
To: Probity Investments
From: Candice E. Williams
Date: November 16, 1999
- Re: Protective Life Corporation Shareholder
Proposal
-
- Probity Investments is the nation’s largest
mutual fund group. Probity has achieved this status by carefully
investing in companies throughout the United States who have
proven themselves to be committed to their goals and
shareholders, such as Protective Life Corporation.
-
- Reason for Proposal:
- The proposal is that the corporation should
adopt a Rights Plan to insure shareholders’ stock value. With
the enactment of the new
Financial Modernization Bill, life insurance companies have
become prime takeover targets. The new law now permits banking
institutions to provide life insurance services.
- Rights Plans were popularized in the
mid-1980’s by the New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz. They are commonly called "poison pills." A Rights Plan
gives various rights to shareholders entitling them to
securities of the company on the happening of some event,
usually a takeover attempt. They are one of the most popular
defenses for management of corporations that are seeking to
deter a hostile takeover.
-
- There are two types of Rights Plans. One is
a "flip-over" plan and the other is a "flip-in" plan. This
proposal would best be suited for a "flip-in" plan. In this
plan, the directors would cause the corporation to issue
"rights" to shareholders. The rights have little value when they
are issued, however, their value increases upon a "triggering
event", such as a "raider" who acquires 20 percent of the
corporation’s shares or the announcement of a tender offer for
the corporation’s shares. Upon the occurrence of a triggering
event, each shareholder has the right to purchase additional
shares for less. For example, a shareholder could purchase
$500.00 of stock for $250.00. Therefore, the raider’s stock will
be diluted, since he is excluded from the right.
-
- Anticipated Procedural and Substantive
Pitfalls:
- There are no anticipated procedural
pitfalls. Pursuant to
SEC
14a-8, Probity has held over $2000.00 in market value of
Protective’s stock for over a year. Probity will continue to
hold the stock through the date of the meeting. The Proposal is
under the 500-word limit imposed by Rule 14a-8. Furthermore, a
qualified representative will represent Probity ‘s proposal at
the meeting.
-
- Pursuant to Rule 14a-8, the corporation may
still exclude the proposal under a list of reasons found in the
rule. The two most common are (1) the proposal relates to
operations which account for less than 5 percent of the
corporation’s total assets for the year, less than 5 percent of
net earnings and gross sales for the year, and is not otherwise
significantly related to the corporation’s business and (2) the
proposal relates to the conduct of the corporation’s ordinary
business operations. These exclusions, as well as the others,
are not anticipated to qualify to exclude the proposal.
- Assuming the proposal is included in the
proxy materials, the primary anticipated pitfall is getting the
shareholders to vote for the proposal. There is a popular
misconception that a Rights Plan makes the corporation
acquisition-proof. Indeed, early studies from 1988 showed poison
pills had a negative effect on stock prices. Malatesta &
Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth,
Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347
(1988). It is likely that shareholders will have a misconception
that adopting a Rights Plan will actually drive away possible
acquisition opportunities and drive the price of their stock
down.
-
- However, studies from 1994 and 1995 have
shown that there is no real effect on stock prices. A 1995 study
showed that poison pills do not deter takeovers and are in fact
related to high takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both
unconditionally and conditional on a takeover. Furthermore, the
study showed anti-takeover measures in general increase the
bargaining power of target companies and do not prevent most
transactions. Robert Comment & William Schwa, Poison or
Placebo? Evidence on the Wealth Effects of Modern takeover
Measures, 39 J.FIN.ECON. 3 (1995).
-
- A 1994 study showed there could even be a
positive price effect after the adoption of a rights plan, when
the majority of the board of directors are outside directors.
James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, and Rory L. Terry,
Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J.
FIN.ECON. 371, 1379 (1994). Eight of eleven of the corporation’s
directors are outside directors. (See
website).
-
- In summary, our key to having shareholders
approve this proposal will be through shareholder education
concerning the positive effect of a Rights Plan. Again, we must
stress that we are not trying to prevent acquisition
opportunities concerning the corporation, but we only want to
preserve shareholder stock value.
-
- For further information about Protective
Life Corporation, please see
Articles of
Incorporation and
Bylaws.
|
|