Constitutional Convention of 1787
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Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis
Cliometrica forthcoming
Abstract. Charles Beard ([1913] 2004) argued that the U.S. Constitution was created to advance the interests of people who owned personalty, particularly those at the Constitutional Convention. Because delegate votes on individual clauses at the Constitutional Convention were not publicly recorded, prior empirical analyses have been limited to inferred votes on a specific set of unrelated clauses. We extend this inquiry by inferring votes related to currency and debt issues which Beard put forth as the prime issues for those who owned personalty. Our analysis on these votes generates little support for a narrow version of the Beard thesis, which states that all personalty groups voted in a unified coalition at the Convention and supported the Constitution. Our analysis provides some support, however, for a broader interpretation that personalty and realty interests affected delegate voting behavior at the margin.
Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention
AWARDED GORDON TULLOCK PRIZE FOR BEST ARTICLE IN PUBLIC CHOICE BY YOUNGER SCHOLARSPublic Choice 136:293-313, 2008
Abstract. This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate’s personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.
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An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited
Journal of Economic History 67: 829-848, 2007
Abstract. Empirical studies of delegate voting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This paper re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various sub-samples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, personal interests were indeed important but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed.
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A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention
American Political Science Review 100: 297-302, 2006
Abstract. Robertson (2005) argues that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the constitutional convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was indeed a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. However, we also demonstrate that if the votes were tallied by delegates individually, rather than grouping them by home state, then Sherman would have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the constitutional convention may have affected Sherman’s ability to get his interests enacted. Such institutions might have been more responsible for making Sherman influential than his legislative abilities.