ECN 271: Theory of Social Choice
Spring 2009
Dr. Jac Heckelman
Carswell 110
x5923
heckeljc@wfu.edu
http:\\www.wfu.edu\~heckeljc\jac.htm
Social choice theory focuses mainly on the incentives voters face under alternative voting arrangements. When individuals form groups, conflicts naturally occur, and decisions must be reached as to how these conflicts will be resolved. In a democratic environment, voting is the main avenue for deciding how to proceed. The issues may involve selecting representatives or specific proposals. But if the entire group cannot agree, how should consensus be determined?
In this course, the implications of various voting rules will be considered both in terms of individual voting incentives and aggregation to group decisions. Social choice analysis is designed to determine how well a given voting rule will lead to outcomes which best represent the desires of the group members. However, group members as voters may not reveal their true preferences if they determine that voting differently would better their chance for a more preferred outcome. Voting rules will therefore be considered for their impact on voting incentives, by making comparisons under “sincere” versus
“strategic” voting.
TEXTS
Mathematics and Politics, by Alan D. Taylor and Allison M. Pacelli (2nd edition)
Analyzing Politics, by Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek
(additional readings available through Blackboard)
EXAMS
- Midterm 1 (20%)
- Midterm 2 (20%)
- Final (30%)
PAPER (20%)
- Due April 14
- Each student will write a 4-8 page paper developing a new voting procedure. This can be either an existing vote procedure not discussed in class, or a newly created voting rule of the student's own design. The paper should discuss both pros and cons of the proposed rule, in terms of properties and incentives, and contrasted against one or more standard rules. Examples of voting outcomes should be used for illustrative purposes. Papers will be presented in class (10 minutes each) beginning April 14.
HOMEWORK AND PARTICIPATION (10%)
Students are to prepare typed answers for each set of readings questions. They are to be brought to class on the reading day and used as a guide to discussion. They should be turned in at the end of class. Late answers will not be accepted. If you are absent on the day of a scheduled reading, it is your responsibilty to ensure the homework is turned in before the end of that class - either by hard copy or email. Master sheet for all homework questions listed here. Homework questions separated by their specific readings are also posted to Blackboard.
All students will be expected to stay up to date on the class readings
and be prepared to discuss individual readings in class and contribute
positively to the overall classroom environment. Absences on reading discussion days will incur penalties unless validly excused with official notification. Each reading day is listed below and posted to the Blackboard calendar, but updates to the schedule may be announced as the semester progresses.
READING SCHEDULE - Note changes made due to snow day - further adjustments possible
1. Introduction
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 2, 3
Johnson, “Constitutional Economics” {1/22}
Taylor and Pacelli, ch 1, pp 1-10
Dahl, “Majority Rule and the Democratic Process” {1/29}
2. Median Voter Spatial Models
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 5, pp. 82-91, 103-115; ch 4 (skip pp. 60-77)
Fiorina, “Do Voters Choose Divided Government?” {2/10}
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 5, pp. 91-103
3. Strategic Voting
Taylor and Pacelli, ch 4
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 6
Dixit and Nalebuff, “The Strategy of Voting” {2/19}
EXAM 1 (sections 1-3) {2/26}
4. Alternative Voting Procedures
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 7, pp 166-185
Taylor and Pacelli, ch 1, pp 10-35
Brams and Fishburn, “The Mixed Success of Approval Voting” {3/19}
Mueller, “Probabilistic Majority Rule” {3/24}
5. Impossibility Theorems
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 4, pp 63-77
Taylor and Pacelli, ch 7, pp 205-222
Hammond, “Rank Injustice?” {3/26}
Bonner, “Liberty and Welfare” {3/31}
EXAM 2 (sections 4-5) {4/2}
6. The Calculus of Voting
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 9 (skip pp. 233-250)
Heckelman, “Bribing Voters Without Verification” {4/9}
7. Comparison of Economic vs Political Approach
Shepsle and Bonchek, ch 17
Buchanan, “Public Choice: Politics without Romance” {4/28}
FINAL EXAM - May 1, 9am (sections 1-7)