Social choice theory focuses mainly on the incentives voters face under alternative voting arrangements. When individuals form groups, conflicts naturally occur, and decisions must be reached as to how these conflicts will be resolved. In a democratic environment, voting is the main avenue for deciding how to proceed. The issues may involve selecting representatives or specific proposals. But if the entire group cannot agree, how should consensus be determined?

In this course, the implications of various voting rules will be considered both in terms of individual voting incentives and aggregation to group decisions. Social choice analysis is designed to determine how well a given voting rule will lead to outcomes which best represent the desires of the group members. However, group members as voters may not reveal their true preferences if they determine that voting differently would better their chance for a more preferred outcome. Voting rules will therefore be considered for their impact on voting incentives, by making comparisons under “sincere” versus “strategic” voting.

TEXTS

Mathematics and Politics, by Alan D. Taylor and Allison M. Pacelli (2nd edition)

Analytical Politics, by Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger

(additional readings available through Blackboard)

• Midterm 1 (20%)
• Midterm 2 (20%)
• Final (30%)

PAPER (20%)

• Due April 13
• Each student will write a 4-8 page paper developing a new voting procedure. This can be either an existing vote procedure not discussed in class, or a newly created voting rule of the student's own design. The paper should discuss both pros and cons of the proposed rule, in terms of properties and incentives, and contrasted against one other standard rule. The conclusion should then explain favoring one of the rules over the other based on the comparisons made. Examples of voting outcomes should be used for illustrative purposes. Duplication of the same two rules for comparison by different students will not be allowed. Papers will be presented in class (10 minutes each) beginning April 13.

HOMEWORK AND PARTICIPATION (10%)

Students are to prepare typed answers for each set of readings questions. They are to be brought to class on the reading day and used as a guide to discussion. They should be turned in at the end of class. Late homeworks will not be accepted. If you are absent on the day of a scheduled reading, it is your responsibilty to ensure the homework is turned in before the end of that class - either by hard copy or email. Master sheet for all homework questions listed here. Homework questions separated by their specific readings are also posted to Blackboard.

All students will be expected to stay up to date on the class readings and be prepared to discuss individual readings in class and contribute positively to the overall classroom environment. Absences on reading discussion days will incur penalties unless validly excused with official notification. Each reading day is listed below and posted to the Blackboard calendar, but updates to the schedule may be announced as the semester progresses.

1. Introduction

2. Median Voter Spatial Models

3. Strategic Voting

EXAM 1 (sections 1-3) {2/16 - TENTATIVE}

4. Alternative Voting Procedures

5. Impossibility Theorems

EXAM 2 (sections 4-5) {4/1 - TENTATIVE}

6. The Calculus of Voting

7. Comparison of Economic vs Political Approach

FINAL EXAM (sections 1-7) {5/4, 9am - SET IN STONE}