Beyond Clinton: How To Use the Politics Section

Adrienne Brovero, Wake Forest University

1997 - Renewable Energy : A Sustainable Debate

If you have glanced at the outline or the evidence in the Politics section, you may have found yourself asking, "Hey, where is the rest of the disad?" In past years, the DRG has included impacts to the various political disads which have appeared in the book. However, those impacts are rarely useful by the time the debate season starts in the fall. This year, instead of striving to find a timeless impact, we have chosen to focus on the link and internal link debate. With some impact research on your part, the evidence in this section can be used to create a variety of political disads.

In order to make the best use of the evidence in this section, it helps to ask yourself a series of questions when preparing to run a political disad. Your answers to these questions can help you choose the evidence best suited to your link story. At their most basic level, the majority of political disads are linked off the popularity or unpopularity of a component and/or outcome of the affirmative's plan with some portion of the population. Link evidence about the popularity of the affirmative is primarily located in sections IH and IV. The first question you need to ask yourself is what parts of the affirmative can be described as popular or unpopular. To determine this in an actual debate, you would want to look at the I AC. Both the plan and the evidence can provide potential links. When reading the plan, you should consider what agent(s), mechanisms, mandates, and enforcement measures are used. Action by particular agents, such as the EPA (E104-5, E13940) or the states (EIOO-2), may be popular or unpopular. Similarly, certain mechanisms, such as dismantling command-and-control measures in favor of market-based approaches (E92-99, E 133-8), can be used to say the plan is or is not popular. Specific mandates, such as binding targets and timetables for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (E I 1 1 -20, E 141-50), can also be used to link political disads. Finally, enforcement measures, such as the type of funding (El32), can also be used to construct a link story.

The rest of the IAC is also a source of links. Attitudinal and structural inherency evidence often contain assessments of the relative popularity of the plan, as either a reason it is not being done, or as a reason it should be done. The same may be true with solvency evidence, which may suggest political obstacles that must be overcome or will be overcome with the passage of the plan. The harm area can be useful too, as cases that claim to save the whales (E 106-8) or protect our air and water (E4-5) may also be spun as popular or unpopular with various parts of the population. There are also generic links and link boosters regarding energy policy and environmental policy (E68-90, E121-32) which can be used to construct a link story absent specific evidence about the a

The second relevant question when constructing a link story is: With whom is the plan popular or unpopular? There are several potential answers: the public (E68-120), the Congress(EI21-150), the Senate, the House(EI32),the GOP (EI47), the Democrats, particular politicians, particular bipartisan coalitions, lobbies such as environmentalists or wise use groups (E66-7), and/or the media (E65). These links are not mutually exclusive plan may be linked based on its level of popularity with any combination of these groups. At times, you may be forced to choose between two link stories. For example, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be extremely popular with the public (E I 1 1-6), binding targets and timetables maybe extremely unpopular with the Congress (E 145-150). Which story you choose is contingent on at least two factors. First, which internal link works better with your impact popularity internal link or the political capital internal link? These two internal links will be discussed shortly. Second, which story has more intuitive appeal? In this example, you may want to opt for the public link because Clinton can spin the plan to the public as a measure to protect us and future generations against the catastrophic impacts of global warming. To answer the affirmative's turn that politicians would backlash, you could argue that: (1) The public sentiment overwhelm politicians would be hard pressed to criticize a plan which is so popular; (2) A carbon tax is the likely solution to global warming coming down the pipe, so the plan would be a more popular compromise solution with politicians; and (3) In order to solve, industries must comply with the plan. Politicians would have no motive to backlash if industries like the plan. In this example, the public link story may be more compete since it is using the

affirmative's claims against them. The affirmative is probably claiming a big catastrophic impact, which can be used to prove the spin. They may claim a carbon tax is coming to turn other disads, such as protectionism. And, they must claim industries like the plan in order to solve, removing the motive for politicians to backlash.

When considering which segment(s) of the population the plan is popular or unpopular with, you should also ask yourself how the segment(s) of the population would find out about the plan. Think about why anyone would care or notice if the affirmative were to pass. Again, you should think about the I AC. Does the plan pass via congressional debate? If so, it might be perceived by all of the potential segments of the population mentioned above. Or, if the affirmative is attitudinally inherent, its passage might cause a political uproar, facilitating perception of the plan. The affirmative solvency may be contingent upon various segments of the population perceiving the plan; for example, in order to solve, industry must perceive tradable emissions permits. Some of the link evidence in sections III and IV can be used to prove the plan is perceived by various portions of the population.

The generic evidence in section H, "The Spin," can also be used to prove the plan would be perceived. If the plan deals with a salient issue such as the environment, the public is more likely to notice it (E57).

It can also be argued that implementing agencies or the media will publicize the plan (E62-67). One way to help construct such link stories is to try to imagine what the headlines of the major newspapers would look like the day after the plan passed. What component of the plan would the media latch on to? How would they spin it? Who would they blame or credit for the plan? For example, after a climate plan, the newspaper might read, "Clinton saves planet from climate catastrophe." Or, perhaps it might read "Clinton slaps restraints on industry." You can even use such soundbites in the debate to help lend credibility to your link story.

You should also give consideration to the political context in which the disad is situated. For example, the NDT criminal procedure topic was debated in the fall of 1994, following an intense congressional debate over that year's crime bill. It was relatively easy that year to link affirmatives by arguing that they would be perceived as strengthening or weakening the crime bill. Other more commonplace events, like the State of the Union address can also be used to publicize the link. In debates shortly prior to the State of the Union, you can argue that Clinton would propose the plan during his address. After the State of the Union takes place, you can try to portray the plan as fulfilling or breaking, promises Clinton made in that speech.

Once you have determined whether the plan is popular or not, with whom, and how/why, you need to decide who gets the blame or credit for the plan. Internal link evidence addressing credit and blame can be found in section V. Most political disads assume that the president gets the blame or credit for the plan (EI51-5). The media and the public primarily focus on the president. Because it is much easier to hold one person accountable, the president is more likely than the Congress to be held accountable. For example, when a bill is passed, news stories will frequently include a visual of Clinton signing, the bill into law, focusing on the Chief Executive.

Environmental policies in particular, may be uniquely attributed to the president given that many plans will require action by executive branch agencies. Whether responsible for every minute detail of executive branch policy or not, the president, as its head, is the most visible, and therefore most accountable, individual in the executive branch bureaucracy. Clinton has also been a politically adept president in the last couple of years, mastering the ability to spin policies in his favor. He has taken credit for popular GOP policies. He has also managed to point the blame at Congress for unpopular policies. These "Teflon Clinton" link stories should be used with caution, however, because if you describe Clinton as too invincible, you may have a hardtime proving the disadvantage is not inevitable.

Or, you might want to argue that Congress gets the credit or blame (EI56-163). They do, after all, pass laws, therefore making, them to some degree accountable for most affirmative plans. For example, Congress has the final say on much of regulatory policy (El57). Also, special interests target congresspersons to lobby because congresspersons are more susceptible to interest group pressure. Congresspersons are responsible to much smaller constituencies than the president, enabling interest groups to exert more effective pressure because it is not as hard to compete for a congressperson's attention as it would be to reach the president's ear (EI58, El 63) Because their numerical superiority in Congress, the GOP can also try to spin popular environmental policies to their credit (EI59-62).

Once you have decide who gets the credit or blame, you should consider the uniqueness of the link story. You need to prove the actor who gets the credit or blame has not done anything analogous to the affirmative plan recently. Uniqueness evidence specific to Clinton and the GOP with regard to energy policy and environmental policy is mc in section I. Recall the congressional link to the permits case described above. Uniqueness for such a link might argue that Clinton has been compromising on targets and timetables now in order to appease industry and the Congress (El 45). The link is unique because Clinton hasn't angered industry or Congress yet, the plan, however, would provoke them.

Finally, you need to decide which internal link story to tell. The evidence in section VI provides you with the basic cards needed to construct several different internal link stories. During the year, you will want to strengthen these arguments with more evidence from political journals and textbooks.

The public opinion internal link can be used to create a few potential stories. First, the plan is popular with the public, popularity helps the president's agenda (E 164), and the president's agenda is bad. Or, the plan is unpopular with the public, popularity is critical to the president's agenda (E 1 64), and the president's agenda is good. In addition to the evidence in this section, you can find evidence that popularity with the public helps the president's agenda in the Immigration, China, and Juvenile Crime DRGS. You can also flip the popularity internal link around -you can argue that attempts by Clinton to appeal to the public to support the plan reduce Clinton's negotiating flexibility and anger Congress, making it more difficult for Clinton to pass his agenda (E 1 68), and his agenda is good . Or, you could argue that Clinton is using public support against Congress now, the plan is unpopular, and that makes Congress more willing to go along with a more flexible Clinton, thereby helping Clinton's agenda (El68), and his agenda is bad.

If the plan were popular or unpopular with Congress, you would want to use the political capital/comity links (EI6872). The basic premise of these links is that the legislative process is akin to negotiating at the bargaining table. The general climate of the negotiations (such as hostile or friendly) and the resources available to the negotiators influence the outcome of the negotiations. In order to successfully negotiate with the Congress, the president must be aware of the political climate and use his resources skillfully. Angering those he is negotiating with by pushing unpopular policies or retreating on a past political promise alters the climate of the negotiations. Raising controversial policies or issues can spark intense debate, hampering or foreclosing compromise. Presidents also need to be frugal with their political resources, such as time, energy, staff, strategies, and favors. Time spent to pass one bill typically trades off with time spent on another bill. Favors cashed-in as an effort to win support are no longer available to be cashed-in later. To a certain extent these political resources are finite. For example, if Clinton pushes for binding targets and timetables for greenhouse gas reductions, it will hurt his chances of passing other agenda items. First it will anger Congress, altering the negotiating climate-why would a senator do Clinton a favor on another agenda item when Clinton just stabbed the senator in the back? Second, it would force Clinton to use his resources to gain support for the greenhouse proposal at the expense of -amending support for other agenda items. If the plan were popular, it might help Clinton's position at the negotiating table by producing comity, enabling you to nm the disad the opposite way, based on the same internal links.

These same internal link stories can also be used to construct versions of the disad which do not rely on any particular agent taking the blame for the policy. The comity story is frequently argued using evidence which says that there needs to be bipartisan cooperation to pass a certain policy. Plans which are controversial, sparking massive partisan debate, destroy bipartisan cooperation, dooming the particular policy. It doesn't matter if the plan is popular with some, or even most politicians, as long as there is a vocal opposition which can disrupt the negotiating process. For example, even if reducing coal consumption is popular with most of Congress, it would not be popular with vocal Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who might hold enough sway to stymie the debate, breaking down comity. Similarly, you can frequently find evidence which says Clinton and/or Congress need to focus all their political resources on a particular agenda item which needs to be dealt with soon. For example, when a foreign policy crisis comes up, pundits will argue Clinton needs to devote all his attention to the crisis. A recent example is the CWC. As various deadlines associated with the treaty neared, evidence would pop up saying that Clinton or the Senate needed to devote all attention to the treaty, or it would falter. You can strengthen this internal story using the evidence in section VI to explain how political resources trade-off.

In order to run one of these "focus" versions of the disad, you need to give consideration to the type of flat you want to defend. These links assume that the affirmative cannot flat away the typical debate which takes place when passing a law. You would want to argue that while the affirmative can fiat the outcome, they cannot fiat the process. The affirmative already gets to "pretend" their plan, which in the real world wouldn't be done, gets done. Should they also be allowed to claim fiat means all those who oppose the plan in the status quo suddenly love the plan and send it sailing, unanimously through Congress without debate? You could argue that the affirmative gets to use the least amount of persuasion necessary to pass the plan-a debate occurs, and the plan passes by close margins. This is a more "real world" interpretation of flat, because the scenario in which all politicians suddenly love the plan is extremely unrealistic given the inherency, some debate about the plan would likely occur, and some politicians would probably vote against the plan. At minimum, to run the "focus" version of the disad, you need to defend an interpretation of fiat which ensures a debate occurs in order to win that political capital is spent on the plan.

Which version of the disad you ultimately run will also be constrained to an extent by the impact scenario you research. At the beginning of the year, it is wise to peruse articles outlining political parties agendas to find potential impacts. Given the modular nature of political disads, virtually any item on either party's agenda could potentially be an impact or impact turn. While you may not want to cut every card on a particular impact, you probably want to have a few cards handy to fend off the impact in the event it is used as an impact turn. Beyond that, though, you should focus the majority of your energy developing impact areas for which their are good internal links. Ideally, you want an impact which will be debated in Congress relatively soon and will be the subject of a relatively close vote. More specifically, you should also try to find evidence which suggests Clinton or the Congress needs to be popular in order to pass or stave off a particular agenda item. You also want evidence which says Clinton and Congress need to persuade or bargain with each other to pass or prevent a particular agenda item. Even absent such impact-specific internal link cards, the evidence included in the Politics section can be used to create such stories.

Most of the evidence included in this section is either theoretical or indicative of general trends in the political environment. It is up to you to fill in the political context when you research it and debate it. All it will take is some impact work and an awareness of the political context to get these disads up and running. So, now I ask you, "Hey, where is the rest of the disad?"

Note: I would like to thank Judd Kimball, Brian Prestes, Clay Rhodes, and Paul Skiermont for their invaluable ideas and suggestions.