

## **Chapter 2: Forceful Displacement, the Construction of Collective Identities and State Formation**

### **Banishment as a Colonial Portuguese Practice**

A tradition of territorial banishment, of institutional exclusion, by *degredo* (decree) existed in Portugal since the Middle Ages. It was used by power holders to get rid of criminals by sending them to the borders of the kingdom, while Portugal was involved in regional wars. The establishment of border landholdings (*coutos*) under the legal and administrative jurisdiction of noblemen in charge of defense created both places of absorption of individuals unwanted at the core of that society, as well as a tradition of displacement, later used in America. For certain crimes, such as homicide, displacement was the only option to escape the death penalty. The king also used displacement out of Portugal sometimes, as an alternative punishment to death and other heavy penalties, for serious crimes, including charges of treason.<sup>1</sup>

The development and history of Brazil as a Portuguese colony seems marked by the use of displacement (*degredo* and *desterro*) by the Portuguese since their first arrival to the coasts of America. When Pedro Alvares de Cabral accidentally reached Brazil in 1500, his fleet included two men condemned to *desterro*, whom he left behind in the continent, charged with the task of learning the languages of the indigenous peoples. This event marked the starting point of banishment in Brazil, reinforced during the rule of Joao III, the Colonizer King, who increasingly deported

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<sup>1</sup>Geraldo Pierone, *Os excluidos do Reino*. Brasilia: Editora da Universidade Nacional de Brasilia, 2000, pp. 25-7; Marcelo Caetano, *Historia do Direito Portugues*. Lisboa: Verbo, 1981, pp. 251-2.

unwanted individuals to that land, instead of earlier destinations such as the Island of São Tomé, and other territories in Africa and India.<sup>2</sup>

During the 16<sup>th</sup> century a series of royal decrees institutionalized the deportation of criminals from Portugal to Brazil instead of other parts of the Maritime empire. Most probably, the reasons for this policy were rooted in the size of Brazil, as well as with the dearth of self motivated colonizers for such unattractive territories as those of Brazil in the early colonial period (when the lands in the East constituted the center of Portuguese administrative and economic colonial endeavor). The General Council of the Inquisition also used banishment from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, with nearly four fifths of all *deterrados* during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, 49 percent of all being sent from Portugal to Brazil (with Angola in second place, receiving 26 percent of those banished during these centuries). Local authorities and clergymen in Brazil complained from the start against this policy of banishment that brought people of criminal background, suspected of continuing their criminal activities in the colony.<sup>3</sup>

## **Spanish Americas: Practices of Expulsion**

Since the inception of the Spanish empire in the Americas, the legal figure of displacement, translocation and banishment (*destierro*) was established by the *Consejo Real de Indias* to deal with offenders. Mainly, it was conceived as a means against those who were identified as a cause of social disturbances and were seen as a menace to the social or political order. According to Spanish colonial law, *destierro* was one of the possible punishments for crimes committed in America. Researchers of Spanish America indicate that the use of punishments was far from being

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<sup>2</sup>Geraldo Pieroni, *Vadios e ciganos, heréticos e bruxas – os degradados no Brasil colonia*. Rio: Bertrand, 2000, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup>Pieroni, *Vadios e ciganos*, pp. 31-3

systematic. Displacement, for instance, was variably applied to different misdemeanors and crimes, and its use varied according to circumstances, the social position of the indicted, the potential consequences of the verdict, and the feasibility of application of the punishment.<sup>4</sup>

Attempting to identify patterns in this varied and shifting field of jurisprudence and law enforcement, we tentatively see that such expulsions were initially enforced in order to prevent unemployment and vagrancy in the Americas. These were cases of individuals accused of misdemeanors, who were not able to find a place in a community by practicing a trade and working. Similarly, clergymen or soldiers who left their mission were prone to be sentenced to *destierro*, and sometimes to the galleys, after being flogged. Any Spaniard or foreigner trading in the Indian villages without license was also prone to be expelled. If a nobleman transgressed the law in these counts, the possibility of confiscation of half of his possessions and sentencing him to up to ten years of *destierro* was contemplated. All of these possible ways of punishment were detailed, among others, in the *Ordenanzas de la Casa de Contratación* of 1552.<sup>5</sup>

The highest crime, according to Spanish jurisprudence, was treason against the king, to be punished with permanent expulsion from the Americas and loss of honor.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, Spanish legislation also contemplated death and slavery as possible punishments for those who revolted against the king and broke the loyalty oath that bound them to the monarch.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Héctor José Tanzi, "El derecho penal indiano y el delito de lesa majestad". *Revista de Historia de América*, 84 (1977): 51-62.

<sup>5</sup>Ernesto Schäfer, "La Casa de la Contratación de las Indias de Sevilla durante los siglos XVI y XVII". *Archivo Hispalense*, 13-14 (1945): 149-162.

<sup>6</sup>Ismael Sánchez Bella, Alberto de la Heray, Carlos Díaz Rementería, *Historia del Derecho Indiano* Madrid: Mapfere, 1992, pp. 390-4.

<sup>7</sup>Tanzi, "El derecho penal indiano", pp. 54-5.

The measure of displacement was to be used in a selective way, provided that the reason for punishment was serious enough, and that both the banished person (*desterrado*) and the authorities in Spain were informed about the precise reasons for this procedure. Reflecting a situation of unrest in Perú, the king issued in 1568 a *cédula*, in which he granted Francisco de Toledo, viceroy of Perú in the “city of kings” Lima, power both to pardon or to displace to Spain “all those who committed any crime” and as the local authorities may see fit to “pacify the land.”<sup>8</sup> Yet, the High Court of Mexico was instructed in 1530 to expel from the Indies to Spain only those found liable to cause unrest, but only on the basis of sufficient and very serious evidence (“*no sea sin muy gran causa*”).<sup>9</sup>

With the consolidation of Spanish rule and the establishment of new administrative jurisdictions, *destierro* was increasingly used to displace individuals within and across American lands, sending people who were perceived as endangering social peace into marginal or far away lands. In 16<sup>th</sup> century Quito, the figure of *destierro* was used on a temporary – month-long – basis against those who perpetrated minor offences.<sup>10</sup> In the 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> century Quito sentences of *destierro* were given for longer periods, from two to 20 years, in cases of violent crimes, or cases of stealing by Indians and slaves.<sup>11</sup> In the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century people were expelled from Quito and Peru to Chile, and by the end of the century they were kept in the prison of Valdivia.<sup>12</sup> Others were sent intermittently to Guayaquil, and

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<sup>8</sup>Diego de Encina, ed. *Cedulario Indiano*. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1945, p. 267.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 266.

<sup>10</sup>Ricardo Descalzi, *La Real Audiencia de Quito. Claustro en los Andes*. Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1978, p. 87.

<sup>11</sup>Tamar Herzog, *La administración como un fenómeno social. La justicia penal de la ciudad de Quito, 1650-1750*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995, p. 18 on the basis of the Archivo Histórico Nacional of Quito.

<sup>12</sup>Personal communication, Professor Fred Bronner, 14 January 2001.

until 1750 many were placed in the Isla de Piedra, where they were subjected to forced labor.

Under conditions of lack of manpower, translocation served both the function of sending the offender far away from his or her community, and providing remote and unattractive areas with costless labor sources. Borderlands such as Chile, where war was waged against the Indians, benefited from the forced displacement of individuals who reinforced the military defense of the Spanish settlers.<sup>13</sup>

From Mexico individuals were mainly sentenced to forced labor in the Philippines and various regions of Spanish America, particularly Puerto Rico and Havana, where they were enrolled in the construction of fortresses and other public services. In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century *desterrados* were also forcefully enrolled in the colonial army, which suffered from an acute lack of manpower.<sup>14</sup>

Michael Scardaville has conducted a statistical analysis of crime and the urban poor in Mexico City in the late colonial period, finding that the sentence of *destierro* was mainly used against those found guilty of *incontinencia*, i.e. lack of sexual restraint, and of violation of the night curfew. There was a positive correlation between young and bachelor offenders and the use of *destierro*. In addition, displacement was used particularly against people originally from beyond the city boundaries, i.e. migrants from the provinces. Furthermore, many more Indians and *mestizos* were punished than whites, thus indicating once more that the *destierro* was

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<sup>13</sup>The usual sentence was of six years of service in the war of Chile. José María Mariluz Urquijo, *Ensayo sobre los juicios de residencia indianos* Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1952, pp. 208-9.

<sup>14</sup>Gabriel Haslip, "Crime and the Administration of Justice in Colonial Mexico City 1696-1810." London: University Microfilm International, pp. 203, 208, 227.

reluctantly applied to people well connected and firmly established in the community.<sup>15</sup>

In relation to the Indian populations, since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, many sentences of displacement originated from within the Church, being issued especially by those clergymen charged with the extirpation of idolatry in the Andean region. In the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, as the Church established a routine practice and mechanism of *visitas de idolatrías* (control of idolatry), the sentence was applied for long periods to punish those involved in the maintenance of former Andean religious beliefs and practices. Many *kurakas* and religious experts of both genders were sent either to work under the custody of city families or as prisoners and forced laborers in convents (e.g. the convent of Descalzos de San Francisco de Huara and the prison of Santa Cruz in Lima).<sup>16</sup>

There are indications that in cases of severe gravity, such as rebellions, people expected displacement rather than the death penalty if those involved were not Indians. The failed movement of Túpac Amaru in 1780 provides a good indication of the different punishments reserved for individuals of ‘ethnic’ backgrounds. As the prosecution opened the case in January 1781, it charged the leaders with the crime of ‘treason to the king’ and asked for the death penalty, on the basis of Castilian laws. The defense argued for lenient penalties on the basis of the preferential treatment that Spanish laws granted Indians, invoking Indian [Spanish-American] laws, according to which natives were considered minors and ignorants. Such distinction had precedents in a 1550 law, included in the *Recopilación* of laws of 1680 (II, XV, 138). In the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, the bishop of Quito, Alonso de la Peña Montenegro, explained that the

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<sup>15</sup>Michael C. Scardaville, *Crime and the Urban Poor. Mexico City in the Late Colonial Period*. London: University Microfilms International, 1977, pp. 327-350.

“rustic and simple nature of the Indians force the judges to use all possible piety in punishing their crimes.”<sup>17</sup>

On the basis of materials from the Audiencia of Quito between 1650 and 1750, Tamar Herzog reflected on the significance of *destierro*, indicating that the sentence was used to “translocate the problem (the prisoner) to another jurisdiction with the idea that far away from home and from the land of origin, he could be better controlled, as the community of destination would be less scrupulous in punishing him as a stranger, and therefore could freely use the whole spectrum of punishment measures.” Displacement reinforced an image of swift and efficient administration, achieved with little investment and at low costs.<sup>18</sup> In parallel, the use of displacement as a tool also shows that justice was conditioned by the nature of small and closely knit communities, which were unable to punish their transgressors *in situ*, and found it easier to transfer the ‘problem’ to another area. Far away, social networks would not stand in the way of justice. This tradition has its roots in Europe and has been prominent in situations of fragmentation of political authority developing into a common framework of shared language and culture, as was the case of Italy at least since the 12<sup>th</sup> century, and particularly in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, as studied by Christine Shaw. It is worthy to quote Shaw at length:

The tradition that those who held power in a commune had the right to exclude and expel their rivals was widespread and firmly rooted (even if it might be contested, in the case of subject towns, by their superiors). If political differences appeared irreconcilable, not amenable to compromise, the exile of

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<sup>16</sup>Pierre Duviols, *Cultura andina y represión: Procesos y visitas de idolatrías y hechicerías. Cajatambo, siglo XVII*. Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Rurales y Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas, 1986, pp. 387-90; idem, *La destrucción de las religiones andinas* Mexico: UNAM, 1977, p. 244.

<sup>17</sup>Tanzi, “El derecho penal indiano”, pp. 59-60.

<sup>18</sup>Tamar Herzog, *La administración como un fenómeno social. La justicia penal de la ciudad de Quito (1650-1750)*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995, p. 252.

those worsted in the contest was the usual way of removing them from the scene. Long-term imprisonment was rare in Renaissance Italy. Locking up large numbers of political opponents for lengthy periods was not an option, though small groups might be incarcerated by a confident regime with secure prisons at its disposal. Political executions of those found guilty of political crimes were infrequent too and regarded as shocking, unless it was for an act such as an assassination attempt. Political executions for which there was less obvious justification were regarded as vindictive, and harmed the reputation of a regime at home and abroad. Exiling political opponents might be regarded as injudicious, or even in some cases unjust, but would not attract anything like the same adverse comment.<sup>19</sup>

Displacement (*destierro*) was a mechanism devised as a trade-off between the will to punish and the limited capacity of the social and administrative system to do so rigorously and in harsh terms. From the start it left wide space for personal decisions, and it created a tradition in which local authorities enjoyed discretion to send individuals away who endangered local stability.

The use of displacement was widespread and permeated local culture, establishing a strong precedent for political exile. In many cases, *destierro* left no cultural imprint. In spite of the problematique of individual incorporation into a new social and cultural environment, most of the displaced individuals dealt with these issues in a pragmatic, ad hoc, private manner.

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<sup>19</sup> Christine Shaw, *The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 6.

## Constructing Collective Identities from Afar

Displacement had wider significance on collective identity when the combination of distance and high intellectual capacity brought these personal concerns into the public sphere. Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this dynamic is that of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, the son of Garcilaso de la Vega, a leading conqueror and *corregidor* of Cuzco and of the Inca princess Isabel Chimu Occllo, a granddaughter of the emperor Túpac Inca Yupanqui. Gómez Suárez de Figueroa arrived in Spain in 1560, at the age of twenty-one, and failed to be accepted socially either by his distant relatives or the Court, because of his mixed Indian origins. He went as a soldier to Granada, but again failed to win any social recognition. As he retired in Andalusía, he adopted the respected name of his father and wrote among other works the *Comentarios reales de los Incas* (Lisbon, 1609) and the *Historia General del Perú* (Córdoba, 1617).

Feeling himself a victim of spiritual exile, far away from his land of origin and his people, he elaborated what David Brading considers “the primordial image of Perú, the starting point of all inquiry into the history and reality of his country.”<sup>20</sup> Garcilaso portrayed the Spanish wrongdoing in Perú, centering on the persecution of the Incan royal family and on the subsequent *destierro* from Cuzco of many of the mestizo offspring of the conquerors and Inca noblewomen, such as himself. In Garcilaso’s view, neither miscegenation nor Spanish destructive policies contributed to yield the promise of a hybrid and united society. “The creation of a Holy Inca empire, based on the marriage of conquerors and Inca noblewomen, governed by a mestizo *encomendero* class, Christian in religion, ruling a native peasantry in accordance with the principles of Inca legislation, had failed to emerge.”<sup>21</sup> As he died

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<sup>20</sup> David Brading, *The First America, The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State, 1492-1867*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 272.

<sup>21</sup> Brading, *The First America*, p. 271 and 255-72.

in 1615 a recognized literary figure in Córdoba, his individual drama was projected into texts that suggested a collective identity, the full implications of which would become worked out during the failed rebellion of Túpac Amaru II in 1780.<sup>22</sup>

In 1759, the Portuguese chief minister Marquis of Pombal and the Portuguese crown decided to expel the Jesuits from their domains. Eight years later, on 20 August 1767, Carlos III replicated the order of expulsion for the Jesuits in the Spanish empire. The authorities used large army forces to implement the decision in Spanish America. For instance, Francisco Bucareli y Ursúa organized a force of 1,500 soldiers in Buenos Aires to overcome any possible resistance in the area of Misiones. Such resistance in Guanajuato and San Luis de la Paz in New Spain was met by forceful repression.<sup>23</sup>

Over five thousand Jesuits found themselves expelled from the American lands, banished to Italy, where most lived, pursuing scholarly work and writing. Fourteen percent of them left the Order until 1773, as a first step to be able to return to their homeland.<sup>24</sup> Homesick, other individuals in this cultured elite – with scholarly training and access to important libraries and to the Indian codices brought from America – were enmeshed in intellectual debates, prompted by scholars who denigrated the image of the Americas. Such writers as Corneille de Pauw, William

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<sup>22</sup> David Cahill, “After the Fall: Constructing Incan Identity in Late Colonial Cuzco”, in Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, eds. Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American Paths Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998, pp. 65-99.

<sup>23</sup>The background, character and consequences of the expulsion are beyond the focus of this study. The reader can consult, among others, Christopher Hollis, The Jesuits. A History New York: Macmillan, 1968; Magnus Moerner, The expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965; and Enrique Gimenez Lopez, ed. Expulsión y exilio de los Jesuitas españoles Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1997.

<sup>24</sup> See Enrique Gimenez Lopez ed. Expulsion y exilio de los jesuitas españoles . Universidad de Alicante, 1997.

Robertson and Guillaume- Thomas Raynal portrayed the Americas as a feeble replica of Europe.<sup>25</sup>

Facing such intellectual climate and perceiving the partiality of these ideas, Jesuit scholars exiled in Europe wrote works in which they attempted to unravel the richness of their home traditions, history, antiquities, fauna, flora, climate and geography.<sup>26</sup> Some of the most well known works are those by Juan de Velasco, an Ecuadorian Jesuit who during his exile in 1788 wrote *La Historia del Reino de Quito*; Juan Ignacio Molina, a Jesuit from Chile, who wrote the *Historia Geográfica, Natural y Civil del Reino de Chile* (1782-7); and Francisco Javier Clavijero, author of the *Historia Antigua de México* (1780-1).

While these works were ordered by the Jesuit superiors, they led to the expression of distinct feelings of patriotism. Clavijero dedicated his work to the University of Studies of Mexico, lamenting the distanced separation from his homeland (*patria*) and claiming it was “a history of Mexico written by a Mexican.”<sup>27</sup> Velasco launched a fierce attack on “the modern sect of anti-American philosophers” and their “chimerical systems.”<sup>28</sup> These Jesuits, who professed love of the *patria* they left behind, were deeply influenced by the revolution in science, history and philosophy from the Enlightenment, and had access to the archival sources and libraries in Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Rome, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples and Venice. While they were not the first Jesuits to write on America (*vide* Alonso de Ovalle in the mid 17<sup>th</sup> century), their exile in Europe contributed to a shift from purely

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<sup>25</sup> Antonello Gerbi, *O novo mundo. Historia de uma polemica (1750-1900)* Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996.

<sup>26</sup> Eva Maria St. Clair Segurado, *Expulsión y exilio de la provincial jesuitica Mexicana 1767-1820*. Universidad de Alicante, 2006, pp. 408-423.

<sup>27</sup> Francisco Javier Clavijero, 13 July 1780, in Bologna. *Capítulos de Historia y Disertaciones Mexico*: Imprenta Universitaria, 1943, p. 3

<sup>28</sup> Juan de Velasco, *Historia del reino de Quito en la América Meridional* Caracas: Biblioteca de Ayacucho, 1981; Brading, *The First America*, pp. 447-64, especially p. 447.

scholarly endeavors with locality in the Spanish empire, to particularistic patriotism, reflecting the early crystallization of the territorial collective identities.

A few of the members of the order went a step further. In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century they attempted to convince the British to lend their support for the cause of Spanish American independence. The best known cases were those of Juan Godoy, a Jesuit born in Mendoza, then part of Chile and later on, of Argentina, and Juan Pablo Vizcardo, a natural from Peru.

According to Guillermo Furlong, Godoy stayed in England from February 1781 until August 1785, where he tried – together with other Jesuits – to convince high officials of the feasibility of their plan to create an independent state that would include Chile, Peru, Tucuman and the Patagonia.<sup>29</sup> Godoy planned a revolution in Chile, Paraguay and Peru. Harassed by the Spaniards in London, he moved to Charleston in North America in 1785. Once there, he was lured to move to Jamaica, where he was promised a position as a clergy. Instead, the ship carrying him arrived in Cartagena and Godoy was delivered to the Inquisition and later was sent to Spain via Havana where he was imprisoned.<sup>30</sup>

Both in Leghorn, Italy, in the 1780s, and in London, where he moved in 1789, Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán tried to convince British officials that Spanish America was ripe for revolt, on the background of Túpac Amaru's uprising in 1780. English support was needed. He elaborated a plan according to which the British would send an army to the Pacific coast of South America to precipitate the revolt against Spain and thus secure American independence, to be proclaimed in Arequipa, his home town. Despite early expectations, the plan failed. Nonetheless, the English continued their contacts with Viscardo, and even paid him a pension while he lived in

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<sup>29</sup>Guillermo Furlong, Los Jesuitas y la escisión del Reino de Indias Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1960, p. 88

London. In 1791 Viscardo authored a “Carta dirigida a los espanioles americanos por uno de sus compatriotas.”<sup>31</sup> In 1799 the letter, translated into French, was published with the support of Francisco de Miranda, one of the early leaders of the struggle for independence in Venezuela and Spanish America. The letter became widely known among Spanish Americans as it was published in Spanish in London shortly thereafter. Its incendiary rhetoric lit the imagination of many youngsters in the Americas a generation later.

These cases were exceptional among the thousands of Jesuits expelled from the Americas, in that they translated patriotism into conspiracy, as typical of later political exiles. In the other cases discussed above, patriotism remained the work of those focusing in the realm of culture, contributing to the construction of collective identity.

We would like to stress that we do not support the 20<sup>th</sup> century interpretation that seeks a linear connection between the political philosophies of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez, the writings of the Jesuits, and Latin American modern national identities.<sup>32</sup> The patriotism of the expelled Jesuits preceded nationalism, and was geared to achieving recognition of the richness of the cultural identity and the nature of Mexico, Quito, Chile and the other “kingdoms” of the Americas. With the exception of the few individuals who followed a conspiracy strategy, most of the Jesuits were far from any national program. They did not articulate modern national ideas towards the development of sovereign statehood and the homogenization of different sectors under the aegis of the states. There is a wide

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<sup>30</sup> Furlong, pp. 89-91.

<sup>31</sup> Literarily, a letter written to Spanish-Americans by a person of their fatherland.

<sup>32</sup> We refer here mainly to Furlong, Los Jesuitas y la escisión del Reino de Indias. In his history of the Jesuits, David Mitchell refers to them, in a more modest way, as “literary nationalists.” (The Jesuits. A History New York: Franklin Watts, 1981, p. 204). For an excellent analytical discussion of patriotism as distinct from modern nationalism see David Brading, “Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish

difference between the richness of particular collective identities and the adoption of clear emancipation principles leading to political rebellions and independence from Spain in the form of modern Latin American political states. Nonetheless, it is true that 20<sup>th</sup> century Latin Americans, particularly – but not only – those of a Catholic background, have often referred to these Jesuits as national heroes. Illustrative is the case of Rafael Landívar, former rector of a seminary in the city of Guatemala, who became a parish priest in Bologna and wrote an epic poem in Latin, *Rusticatio Mexicana* (Mexican country scenes). In 1950, his remains were moved from Bologna to an imposing tomb in Antigua, the Guatemalan ancient capital. In Guatemala, Landívar is considered a national poet and hero.<sup>33</sup>

## **Expatriation and the New States**

Reading backwards from the experience of political nationalism and the configuration of a world system of nation-states, late nineteenth and early twentieth century years ago researchers tended to accept the vision of national constructivism about the early nineteenth century emergence of national statehood and identity. When most Iberoamerican states reached a certain measure of stability and managed to curtail civil wars, their political and intellectual elites elaborated national histories and education programs that projected the idea of national existence back to the early independence period. In this sense, these intellectuals created imaginary communities, to use Benedict Anderson's term, and projected them backwards, as if they had existed in their current format from at least the inception of the independent states. Driven by later processes and challenges such as modernization, the need to

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America", in Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, eds. Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American Paths Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998, pp. 13-45.

<sup>33</sup> Mitchell, The Jesuits, p. 204.

integrate immigration, and the drive to incorporate local and indigenous populations into more or less homogeneous political frameworks, they essentialized collective identities around the revolutionary myth of independence.

This interaction between politics and the manipulation of history is not peculiar to Latin America, but has been particularly salient there, since the rewriting of history according to modern political constructions served to accelerate the processes of nation building in these societies.

Departing from the analysis of political exile, a different scenario emerges, that is, one consistent with developments in Latin American political historiography. According to the works of Francois-Xavier Guerra, Antonio Annino, Brian Loveman and José Carlos Chiaramonte among others, it is recognized that the establishment of new states in the former Spanish American areas was neither the result of proto-national movements nor the consequence of the diffusion of new social and cultural carriers<sup>34</sup>. The process of independence of Spanish America was the long and unintended consequence of the implosion of the Spanish empire from within its center in the Iberian Peninsula. The processes of disintegration that led to the wars of independence were followed by civil wars and protracted political violence, with no clear national definitions emerging with independence. On the contrary, the main terms of reference towards the establishment of the new states remained plural,

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<sup>34</sup> Antonio Annino, "Soberanías en lucha", in A. Annino, Luis Castro Leiva and Francois-Xavier Guerra, eds. De los imperios a las naciones – Iberoamérica. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994, pp. 229-253; José Carlos Chiaramonte, El mito de los orígenes en la historiografía latinoamericana. Universidad de Buenos Aires: Cuadernos del Instituto Ravignani, 1991; idem, "Modificaciones del pacto imperial", in A. Annino, Luis Castro Leiva and Francois-Xavier Guerra, eds. De los imperios a las naciones – Iberoamérica. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994, pp. 107-128; Chiaramonte 1994, Francois-Xavier Guerra, "The Implosion of the Spanish Empire: Emerging Statehood and Collective Identities", in Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog eds. The Collective and the Public in Latin America. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000, pp. 71-94. While patriotism and local-patriotism existed, they differed in terms of discourse and symbolic representation from the ideology of nationalism that would be fostered toward the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. See David Brading, "Nationalism and State-Building in Latin American History", Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, 20 (1994): 83-108; and idem, "Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish America", in Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder

ranging from early Spanish administrative jurisdictions, emerging royalist and patriotic strongholds, and especially regional spaces with strong local identities and an aspiration for political autonomy.<sup>35</sup> In Portuguese America, it was the displacement of the ruling House of Bragança and its entourage to Brazil – under the protection of the British and escaping the Napoleonic invasion – that contributed to the growing importance of Brazil, and the subsequent crystallization of a consciousness of collective identity. On the one hand, the translocation of the Bragança imperial rulers to the New World made possible the preservation of monarchical rule through independence in 1822, and up to imperial demise in 1889. On the other hand, it created a dynamic of territorial expansion and control that, in turn, generated a long series of rebellions, many of them of a regional character against the central government and its bureaucratic-absolutist policies. Among them stood out the rebellions of the Inconfidência Mineira in 1789, the Conjuração Baiana of 1798, and a long series of minor revolts in the 1810s and 1820s. Often, after an initial wave of brutal punishment which may include the combination of hanging, beheading, and dismemberment of leaders, especially if they came from lower-class and artisan backgrounds, royal decrees of pardon and amnesties were declared, aimed to project the image of benevolence of the rulers and create a sense of reconciliation.<sup>36</sup> In punishing the rebels, banishment (*banimento*) was often used, mainly to remote areas in Africa or in Amazônia and Mato Grosso, the latter indirectly helping expand the presence of the Portuguese-speaking peoples in the vast territory of Brazil.

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eds., Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998, pp. 14-45.

<sup>35</sup>Federica Morelli, “Territorial Hierarchies and Collective Identities in Late Colonial and Early Independent Quito”, in Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog (eds.) The Collective and the Public in Latin America. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000, pp. 37-56.

<sup>36</sup> Roberto Ribeiro Martins, Liberdade para os brasileiros. Anistia ontem e hoje. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizacao Brasileira, 1978, 2nd. Edition.

Congruent with this understanding, we focus hereafter mainly on Hispanic America, emphasizing how translocation, itself a product of the weakness of national definitions and blurred state boundaries, played a formative role in shaping these definitions and identities, as the leaders of the independence movements moved across regions as if all those regions were part of the fatherland they were trying to recreate in the Americas.

### **Forceful Translocation as Tactical Movement**

Relying on the colonial tradition of displacement (*destierro*), used against those who, through their action, disturbed public peace or were perceived as a menace to their community, many of the patriots could leave their countries through expulsion, or were allowed to escape, after defeat.

This possibility was open to those rebels who were part of the upper strata and denied to those who belonged to the popular classes and lower ethnic groups. Thus, for example, neither José Gabriel Condorcanqui (Túpac Amaru) nor José Antonio Galán were granted the privilege or ‘doubt’ of exile, as were granted to Bolívar and Sucre. Both Galán and Túpac Amaru were executed after their rebellions failed in the early 1780s in Peru and New Granada, respectively. Similarly, in Brazil, after the failure of the 1789 rebellion known as the Inconfidência Mineira, six leaders were sentenced to death by ‘hanging, decapitation and dismemberment.’ The sentence was commuted in 1792 to banishment by Queen Maria in five of the cases, being enforced only in the case of Tiradentes, the most humble and firm of the rebellious leaders. Interestingly enough, Tiradentes’ martyrdom turned him over a century later into a figure of proto-national projection under the First, “Old” Republic (1889-1930). In the imagery and representations fostered in this period,

the image of Tiradentes was stripped of his anti-systemic potential and made into the martyr-like figure of a hero who prematurely invoked the Republic, and died, sacrificing himself for an idea that would fructify in due time.

Tiradentes' reconstructed image was appealing where other images failed to connect with the prevailing cultural representations. Tiradentes was portrayed with a Christ-like look, his fall was due to treason by his co-plotters (again resembling Jesus), he seemingly refrained from recurring to violence (in fact, the movement he participated in aborted before reaching such a stage) and he forgave his executioners. All this served to ease the paradoxical promotion of his plebeian figure as the most prominent hero in the bloodlessly installed Brazilian conservative ("Old") Republic.<sup>37</sup>

Probably the same grounds may explain why the Portuguese authorities showed no clemency toward the rebels of the 1792 Bahia rebellion. Many of them were of lower-class background, in sharp contrast with the mostly upper-class and middle-class background of the Minas rebels:

The attorneys, magistrates and middle-age clerics of Minas Gerais, the rich merchants and their dependents, the majority of whom were masters of slaves and members of rather exclusivist trade unions, were in marked contrast with the mulatto artisans, the soldiers, landless sharecroppers and salaried professors involved in the Bahian plot. Resentful and anticlerical, the mulattos in Bahia had in mind both the Portuguese rule and the Brazilian rich as targets [of their rebellion].<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Luis Roniger, "Citizenship in Latin America. New Works and Debates", *Citizenship Studies*, 10, 4 (2006). In this excerpt Roniger analyzes José Murilo de Carvalho's *La formación de las almas. El imaginario de la República en el Brasil* Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1997, pp. 81-112.

<sup>38</sup> Kenneth R. Maxwell, *A Devassa da Devassa: a Inconfidência Mineira: Brasil-Portugal - 1750-1808*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1985, p. 245, quoted from Ribeiro Martins, *Liberdade para os brasileiros*, p. 29.

In Hispanic America, in the early years of the nineteenth century, moving away from the native homeland was perceived as a tactical move within the anti-royalist struggle. The cases of Simón Bolívar, Antonio José de Sucre and many others in the northern part of South America are paradigmatic.

In 1812, following his participation in the rebellion led by Francisco Miranda, the royalist authorities initiated a *causa de infidencia* (trial for rebellion) against Simón Bolívar, with the penalty of loss of properties in favor of the public treasury. After going underground between August 2<sup>nd</sup> and August 26, 1812, Bolívar managed to meet Captain Domingo Monteverde, the royal authority, through the mediation of Francisco Iturbe, an individual highly respected in loyalist circles and an acquaintance of the fugitive rebel. Monteverde was willing to agree to let Bolívar leave the country for Curaçao, a Dutch island held by the British since 1807. Monteverde was grateful to Bolívar for his help in capturing Miranda and handing him to the royalists, after Miranda was suspected by the patriots of planning to escape and defect the cause of independence. Bolívar managed to leave for Curaçao, and there he continued to play a central role in the struggle that eventually led to independence. His fate in Curaçao was that of many other exiles. In his case, he suffered from the seizure of his belongings by the British authorities.<sup>39</sup>

Escaping persecution, imprisonment or harsher punishment was sometimes a path adopted by entire groups. Another independence leader, Antonio José de Sucre escaped the Royalist siege of Margarita Island in early 1815, together with other officers and troops, such as José Francisco Bermúdez, Justo Briceño and Pedro María Freites. Their ship brought them to Grenada, from there they moved to French Martinique, and then to the British island of St. Thomas. After three months of

wandering about, Sucre reached Cartagena de Indias. Bolívar, Mariño and others had reached this city before, planning to launch a new offensive from there. The typical divisive dynamics of communities of exiles developed among them. As Bolívar found strong internal opposition to his leadership in Cartagena, he and some of his friends left for Jamaica in May 1815.

The development of communities of exiles was difficult in this period. First of all, they came on a temporary basis, hoping to return as soon as the situation allowed it. Second, their position as strangers placed them in dire prospects of accommodation to their host environment. Many pressures then came to the fore. As the exiles were usually part of the upper classes at this stage in the history of their countries, they tended to see themselves as prospective leaders. As such, they often got into conflict about leadership, goals and sectional and personal animosities and sympathies. This made the possibility of accomplishing necessary unified political action much more difficult than if they had remained in their home country.

We see here a pattern that will recur time and again throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The unraveling of social and political groups produced by exile, combined with pressures in alien environments, deepens previous political differences and creates new rifts, thus weakening political capabilities.

The attitude of the host country is crucial in shaping the fate of the exiles. In many cases, suspicion and persecution were the usual lot of translocated individuals. As Bolívar left Venezuela headed to Jamaica, penniless, his intention was to gain support abroad to resume the struggle for independence.

...the events in my homeland, the *Costa Firme* [Venezuelan mainland], forced me to come to this island with the goal of reaching England, in order to make

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<sup>39</sup> He was helped by a local Sephardic Jew, Mordechai Ricardo, probably motivated by his recognition of the ills of exile. See Roberto J. Lovera De-Sola, Curacao, escala en el primer destierro del

efforts to get support for America, the kind of support that will create an obligation to repay its debts in an advantageous manner for its benefactors.<sup>40</sup>

Jamaican authorities gave him a cold treatment. The governor refused to meet him or answer his letters. Spanish agents tried to kill him. Bolívar then left for Haiti.

The fall of Cartagena made many take refuge in Haiti. Antonio José de Sucre left Cartagena under Royalist siege in 1815, together with other independence leaders such as José Francisco Bermúdez, Mariano Montilla and Manuel Carlos Piar, and military troops and civilians who escaped hunger and the unavoidable defeat. After a long sail, where many died or were captured by the Spanish fleet, Sucre and Bermúdez reached Haiti in January 1816. In contrast, Haiti provided a haven for those escaping the wrath of Spanish authorities. Bolívar was already there, organizing a new expedition with the support of then Haitian president, Alexandre Pétion, to resume fights in Venezuela. Pétion supported him on the expectation that Bolívar would abolish slavery in the territories he intended to liberate. This expedition set sail with 250 men on April 1816.<sup>41</sup>

Dissent within the group was a persistent trend, however. Many internal disputes rose in this period, as General Bermúdez and Mariano Montilla both aspired to lead the expedition. With dismay, Sucre decided to move to Trinidad instead. He might have wanted to spare himself the necessity of committing himself openly to one side or the other.<sup>42</sup> In Trinidad, Sucre received a cold treatment by the British authorities, which underestimated the eventual victory of the patriotic cause. Sucre's

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Libertador. Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1992, pp. 23-36 and 67-68.

<sup>40</sup>Letter to the Governor of Jamaica, May 1815, in Cartas del Libertador, Tomo I, Caracas: Banco de Venezuela and Fundación Vicente Lecuna, 1964, p.189.

<sup>41</sup>Moacir Werneck de Castro, El Libertador. Vida de Simón Bolívar, Caracas: Instituto de Altos Estudios de América Latina, Universidad Simón Bolívar, 1990.

<sup>42</sup>John P. Hoover, Admirable Warrior: Marshal Sucre, Fighter For South American Independence, Detroit: Blaine Ethridge Books, 1977, pp. 23-24.

family was by then dispersed throughout the Antilles and Cuba. When Sucre got notice of Bolívar's fleet arriving to Venezuelan shores, he set sail to join the fight.<sup>43</sup>

These early examples of *tactical translocation* and proto-expatriation illustrate how strongly host countries conditioned the subsequent development of actions on the part of exiles. The possibility to move away from their places of origin in order to tactically prepare for sustained fighting was conditioned by the attitudes of the host countries. This attitude, ranging from hostility to lack of support and indifference on the part of the British, was rooted in the latter's ambivalent positions towards Spain's role as a foe of the French in the Napoleonic war. Very different was the attitude of Alexandre Pétion, whose republican and anti-slavery ideas favored support for the fellow Americans' patriotic enterprise.

Exile tended to develop in this period through a tri-factorial structure. The interests of the translocated individuals interplayed with the interests of the host countries vis-à-vis the pressures exerted by the home countries. This triangular structure of exile changes in detail from case to case, but its formal physiognomy persisted as a major structure as long as the nation-states were the major players in the international arena. It will partially undergo a core transformation in the twentieth century, once a fourth increasingly important element enters the exile equation: a global arena preoccupied with humanitarian international law, human rights, and political freedom.

## **Territorial Identities in Undefined Boundaries**

The early stages of struggle over the status of the Spanish American territories reveal the confrontational yet undefined nature of territorial politics and the cultural

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<sup>43</sup>Carlos Hector Larrazabal, *Sucre, Figura Continental*, Buenos Aires: Talleres de Juan Pellegrini,

underpinnings of banishment, especially with regards to those cases when the conspirators belonged to the local elites in the early independent period.

An analysis of the case of the Carrera brothers in Chile clearly reveals how personal rivalries, ambitions and local allegiances played a major role in the configuration of translocation as a *marker of new boundaries and identities*, while it functioned as well as a dissolvent of older ones. In the early nineteenth century, political networking shaped a rapidly changing scenery, highly unstable and rather anarchic, which led to countervailing attempts of coordination, under the dictatorship of José Miguel Carrera, who headed the government in 1811-3 and 1814, a period known in Chilean historiography as the “Patria Vieja” period. Part of an aristocratic family of Santiago, Carrera and his brothers, Juan José, Luis and Javiera, soon found themselves opposed to Bernardo O’Higgins and other patriotic figures, who held different views for the future of Chile. The Carrera brothers had a localized vision of Chile and saw themselves as fit to lead as part of the ‘crème’ of local aristocracy. Contrastingly, O’Higgins and his allies conceived Chilean independence as a step to be taken in the framework of a comprehensive movement aimed to get rid of the Spanish presence on a continental basis, beginning from Cuyo, liberating Chile and heading toward the liberation of Perú.

With the disintegration of the Carrera governments as a result of the loss to the royalists in the battle of Rancagua in 1814, various anti-Spanish patriotic groups crossed the Andes into Cuyo. The patriots hoped to continue fighting and hopefully to regain control of Chile, while the menace of a Spanish invasion of Cuyo from Chile was perceived as a real threat. In Cuyo, they were received by the local governor, colonel José de San Martín. Cuyo, later divided into the Argentine provinces of

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1950, pp. 61-65.

Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis, had been part of the *Capitanía General* of Chile until 1778, when it was transferred to the recently established Virreynato of the Río de la Plata.

Consequently, the Chileans, especially those with an aristocratic background such as the Carreras, thought of themselves not as exiles but as forced *emigrés* whose destiny was to return to a free Chile as rulers. They viewed San Martín as a plebeian governor, a clerk in the service of the government of Chile (as in the old times) and expected him to defer to his dethroned head, José Miguel Carrera. The contempt with which they addressed him, led governor San Martín to suspect Carrera's plans and the latter's lack of political capacity and strategic understanding. This confrontation with San Martín clearly divided the Chilean patriotic forces. Whereas O'Higgins and others subordinated themselves to San Martín and the *Ejército de los Andes*, the Carreras and their followers recognized neither jurisdiction nor borders. For them, San Martín's authority was recognized only conditionally, as long as it served their own status and objectives. This dynamic reflected the disintegration of former boundaries and the protracted development of new ones in what will soon become the new independent republics of the Spanish-speaking Americas.

As San Martín and O'Higgins managed to consolidate their military forces and to cross the Andes, so as to liberate Chile from the Spaniards, the Carreras and their supporting allies in Chile and Buenos Aires increasingly found themselves on the defensive. Although they continued to oppose the Supreme Director of Chile, Bernardo de O'Higgins, they were forced to live abroad, and their political machinations were constrained by the authorities of Buenos Aires and their provincial representatives in Mendoza, themselves allies of O'Higgins.

In mid 1817, they tried to organize a plot against O'Higgins, believing they counted with powerful allies who were affected by the anti-aristocratic policies of the new Chilean rulers, or those offended by the arrogance of the Argentine commanders in Chile, as well as with the support of former royalists, who saw their lives and properties threatened. The plot was discovered, and the brothers Luis and Juan José were brought to trial both in Chile and in Mendoza. Whereas a conciliatory approach was adopted in Chile, the Carrera brothers were imprisoned in Mendoza, with the intention of sending them to a distant land to neutralize them. As the other brother and sister tried to liberate them from prison, a new trial for treason against the local authorities in Mendoza and in Chile was initiated, which led to the capital punishment of Luis and Juan José Carrera. Until 1821, when he himself was executed, José Miguel Carrera led a relentless war against O'Higgins and those responsible for the execution of his brothers.

The death of the Carrera brothers was a measure that San Martín and others initially tried to avoid. It was an extreme measure with unforeseen consequences. According to what was taken for granted at the time, it was more convenient to avoid a spiral of violence that such a measure could trigger. A good counter-example that brings this understanding into relief is the case of Manuel Rodríguez, an uncontrolled guerrilla fighter according to his own description, who conspired together with the Carreras against O'Higgins. Even after they came to know his indomitable personal character, San Martín and O'Higgins opted to spare him punishment and preferred to co-opt him, nominating him to high administrative positions under their command.

Before the August 1817 plot by the Carrera brothers, nobody thought the reaction against the plotters would be any different from the treatment given to

Rodríguez and others under similar circumstances. In the words of historian Francisco Encina,

Doña Javiera, while throwing her brothers into the unsuccessful plot...believed that in the worst of the cases, they risked prison or a *destierro* to Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro, which would be easy to evade. The concept of political crime was not yet born. To conspire against a government, in a war situation, was unacceptable for the members of the same polity. Also, [conspiracy] was a right linked to the concept of freedom, and from the perspective of Andalusian mentality, an act of bravery. Moreover, the Carreras were part of Santiago's aristocracy, which in opposition to what was taking place in the rest of America, showed itself inimical to the political scaffold. ...The execution of its members, whatever could be the political distance or the crime committed, was not even conceived as possible.<sup>44</sup>

The typical way of punishing conspiracies in Chile was prison or *destierro* to a place from which the conspiring agents would be unable to remain politically active. Still, beyond the norm inherited from Spanish colonial times, a new concept was being introduced. This new concept, related to the absolute authority of the new republican state, would place physical elimination of plotters as a ready-made though extreme alternative to political exile in the early nineteenth century, as in other Latin American states.

Paradoxically or not, the execution by firing-squad of José Miguel Carrera in Mendoza on September 4, 1821 precipitated Chilean Supreme Director O'Higgins' downfall from power. For years Chile's aristocracy, malcontent with O'Higgins, supported him as a bulwark against the peril of a military dictatorship by Carrera.

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<sup>44</sup>Francisco Antonio Encina, *Historia de Chile* Santiago de Chile: Editorial Nascimento, 1947, volume 7, pp. 530-1.

While O'Higgins was totally committed to the cause of pan-American independence, widening groups of Chilean society felt tired of the continuing war beyond Chilean boundaries and capabilities. Forced by circumstances, O'Higgins abdicated power in 1823, and left for Valparaíso, and ultimately to Peru, where he settled down in land donated to him by the Peruvian government.<sup>45</sup>

O'Higgins' party in Chile became disorganized with the leader's expatriation to Peru. Some of his supporters also left the country, such as José Ignacio Zenteno who remained in Peru between 1823 and 1826. If a few were still loyal and awaited his return and restoration to power, their influence was very limited.<sup>46</sup> During the 1830s Diego Portales, the father of the 1833 Constitution and the leading political figure of the period, would eliminate the last vestiges of loyalty to O'Higgins, notwithstanding their favorable rally to the Conservative Party. Portales even denied O'Higgins a permit to visit the homeland, because his presence was considered disturbing for the political order.<sup>47</sup>

Only with the death of Portales, the end of the war against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, and the stabilization of a constitutional regime in Chile, the greater part of the army officers deposed in 1830 were restored to their rank and honors. Special attention was given to O'Higgins. Besides being reestablished in the military rank of Captain General previously taken from him, he was allowed and invited to return to the country.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> While the Peruvian government treated him with great deference as a hero, the Chilean authorities suspended the payment of his wages and dues.

<sup>46</sup> Luis Galdames, *A History of Chile*, New York: Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 232.

<sup>47</sup> Galdames, *A History of Chile*, p. 239.

<sup>48</sup> O'Higgins could not take advantage of this invitation, for, when he was preparing to do so, he died in Lima in 1842.

## **Confrontational Politics and Expatriation**

The expatriation of central political figures following independence – and their identification as icons of political exile – starts a tradition in which the absent leader becomes the pole of attraction and political consultation for actors in the home society. Exile kept the leader away from the localized public spheres and projected his figure as the incarnation of an alternative vision that cast a constant shadow on the way in which political actors conducted politics back home. The ‘absent leader’ used the political capital he amassed in the past to keep aloof of real-politics as well as the political prices to be paid by dealing with daily politics. It also created a situation in which the return of the leader remains an open item in the political agenda. The case of O’Higgins and San Martín set this model very early on.

O’Higgins can be considered an expatriate as he left Chile voluntarily, having understood that his presence was a source of internal political strife. While he preferred to leave his homeland in order to contribute to political pacification, the presence of his supporters as an opposition force within Chile transformed him into an exile. The Chilean authorities (basically Portales) would not allow him to return to his homeland. Only shortly before death, were his rights returned. Economic hardship was then the lot of the person who was once the Supreme Director of Chile. The impossibility of returning home did not preclude him from following the Chilean political scene. His followers kept him well informed and visited him from time to time. The eventual economic success of O’Higgins did not diminish his will to return to the homeland, even if only for a short visit.

The other leading figure of pan-American independence in this region, José de San Martín, would opt to leave the countries he had liberated and end his days far away from his homeland, in Europe. He became the prototypical figure of an exile, in

spite of leaving the Americas as an expatriate, in what historians defined as a self imposed ostracism.

The reasons for San Martín's decision have been debated exhaustively in Latin American historiography, and seem to be related to the failed meeting between San Martín and Simón Bolívar in Guayaquil in July 1822. Commanding an army of Argentinean, Chilean and Peruvian troops, San Martín had managed to occupy great parts of Peru and the capital of Lima, where the independence of Peru was proclaimed on July 28, 1821. San Martín was invested with the highest rank of Protector of Perú, the highest political and military position in the country. In that function, he sent a Peruvian-Argentinean division that assisted General Antonio José de Sucre in the battle of Pichincha, Ecuador (May 1822), which opened the gates of Quito to the independence party. Nonetheless, a large royalist force of 19,000 veterans retained control of parts of Peru and the whole territory of Alto Perú. This army was more than twice as large as the army supporting the independence side. Its presence could menace the independence of Peru and cast doubts on the viability of the whole enterprise of creating an independent South America.

San Martín's success in Peru concerned Bolívar, who was interested in winning the final victory over the Spaniards himself. In early 1822 San Martín, as the Protector of Peru, could not complete the liberation of Peru without help from external sources, which meant help from Bolívar's intervention in Peru. Motivated by this aim, San Martín sailed to Guayaquil to a summit with Simón Bolívar, who had completed the liberation of Great Colombia and occupied Guayaquil. While San Martín wanted the immediate support of the Colombian forces in the final liberation of Peru, Bolívar was reluctant and suspicious of the former's agenda. According to his own testimony, San Martín offered to put his forces and himself under the command

of Bolívar and, upon the lack of agreement, decided to return to Peru and once there, renounce his positions of high commander and Protector of Peru. The versions surrounding the Guayaquil meeting and the reasons for San Martín's expatriation from the Americas remain to a large extent a matter of speculation and debate.<sup>49</sup>

Beyond the different interpretations, the move of a supreme leader that opted for exile instead of retaining positions of power at all costs became paradigmatic of the noble and often martyred images associated with the exile of cherished leaders in Iberoamerica.

San Martín returned to Peru and then left for Chile, finding waves of animosity inspired by the enmity of Lord Thomas Cochrane, while being received with high honors by the Supreme Director of Chile, his former companion-in-arms Bernardo O'Higgins. After retiring to his Mendoza house, San Martín was constantly harassed by a suspicious government that saw in his presence a permanent threat to stability, and his name was used by the opposition without his approval. The opposition thought that San Martín was the only figure able to organize the state and

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<sup>49</sup> Bolívar's account differs notably from San Martín's. In several letters he wrote to his closest allies immediately after the meeting, Bolívar tells that San Martín complained to him about the latter's companions-in-arms in Lima and about internal enemies, all drawn by ambition and a rebellious spirit. Bolívar reports that San Martín came to see him without any clear agenda, just to get assurances of friendship, and that he seemed to have had already made his mind on leaving his positions in Peru – which he wanted to be ruled by a scion of a monarchical European family – and retiring to Mendoza. Bolívar did not believe San Martín was sincere in both accounts. The Liberator thought that the Protector of Peru wanted to keep the throne ready for himself. Bolívar, a person who 'resigned irrevocably' and retired so many times only to come back again and again as the savior, did not take seriously his rival's intentions to leave power and retire to private life. The incompatibility of characters, between Bolívar's extrovert and power-oriented personality, and San Martín's introvert ways and resent of factionalism, precluded each leader from taking his peer's declarations on their face value. The mismatch of personalities, expectations, interests and ambitions will decide the future of South America, and be the trigger of San Martín's decision about exile. According to his own account, Bolívar was highly satisfied after the meeting, as he had attained several important aims, namely, the incorporation of Guayaquil to Colombia, while keeping San Martín's and Peruvian friendship toward Colombia, and the possibility of sending a Colombian army to Peru, where it would gain glory and the gratitude of Peruvians. All these were instrumental to his 'great plan': the unification of South America. Letters to the Secretary General of the Republic of Colombia and to the Intendente of the Quito Department, General A.J. de Sucre, both dated 29 July 1822, signed by J.G. Pérez and dictated by Bolívar; letters to General F. de P. Santander, on 29 July 1822, and to General Sucre, on 30 July 1822, both signed by Bolívar, in *Cartas del Libertador* Caracas: Banco de Venezuela and Fundación Vicente Lecuna, 1965, volume III, pp. 254-69.

reunite the country, whereas the government highly resented the potential danger that his presence represented. Spies surrounded him; his letters were opened. According to his own vision

In those circumstances I was convinced that, to my lack of fortune, I have played a more prominent role than the one I wished for myself in that revolution. That precluded me to keep a distanced impartiality between the rival parties. As a result and in order to disipate any idea about my ambition to any kind of power, I sailed for Europe...<sup>50</sup> It was impossible to live in peace in my homeland as long as emotions run high. It was this lack of certitude which brought me to decide on my departure to Europe.<sup>51</sup>

Following his wife's death in August 1823, isolated and averse to political and military conspiracies in Buenos Aires, San Martín decided to take his daughter with him to Europe to educate her, thinking of distancing himself from his country's turbulent politics.<sup>52</sup> On French territory he was not allowed to go ashore by the police and the authorities. He stayed in England for a few months, but finally settled down in Brussels, motivated by the low cost of living and dreaming of returning one day to his homeland and to his farm in Mendoza.<sup>53</sup> The General had entrusted his funds to a friend, who, uncunningly, lost most of it in the London stock exchange. San Martín was reduced to poverty.

In February 1829 San Martín decided to try to return to Buenos Aires. The move was prompted by the insistent advice of several friends who wanted to see him back, and by the assurances of order and tranquility of the Buenos Aires government. Upon arrival, he realized that reality had changed, and that the country was again in a

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<sup>50</sup>Ricardo Rojas, El Santo de la espada Buenos Aires, Ediciones Corregidor, 1993, p. 399.

<sup>51</sup> Letter to O'Higgins, in Samuel W Medrano, El Libertador José de San Martín, Buenos Aires: Instituto Nacional Sanmartiniano, 1995, p. 128.

<sup>52</sup> Letter to Federico Brandsen, Feb. 10, 1824 - in Rojas, El santo de la espada, p. 309.

process of civil war between Unitarians and Federalists. Despite the acts of sympathy of some old friends, he met a cold and suspicious reception, and decided to go back to Europe, after a short foray in Montevideo.

San Martín's decision to leave America was based on the incompatibility between his harsh judgment of the political situation and his sense of honorable duty. On the eve of his departure, he said:

The situation in our country is such that the man in command has no alternative but to rely on one faction or resign command. The latter is my option. ...There will be those who will claim that the fatherland has the right to demand the sacrifice of life and interests, but not of one's honor.<sup>54</sup>

After his failed visit to Buenos Aires, San Martín established his residence in Paris in 1831. An old companion of arms who became a rich banker, Alejandro Aguado, helped him buy the property of Grand Bourg, in which he lived between 1834 and 1848. There his daughter joined him, after having finished her years of studies. His home became a point of attraction for Latin American personalities passing through Paris.

San Martín died in France in August 1850, after 26 years in exile. In spite of his dislike of politics and tyranny and his grateful attitude towards French hospitality,<sup>55</sup> San Martín remained a Spanish American patriot, committed above all to the independence of the countries he had so much fought for. Between 1845 and 1849 France and Great Britain were in conflict with the Argentinean confederacy and its ruler, Juan Manuel de Rosas. In his will of 1844, San Martín left his sword to Juan Manuel de Rosas, who had resisted the French-British siege of Buenos Aires:

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<sup>53</sup> Letter to O'Higgins, Feb. 8, 1825 - in Rojas, *El santo de la espada*, p. 311.

<sup>54</sup> Rojas, *El santo de la espada*, p. 338

<sup>55</sup> Enrique Mario Mayochi, *El Libertador José de San Martín* Buenos Aires: Instituto Nacional Sanmartiniano, 1995, p. 73.

The sabre that was my companion in all the war of independence of South America, as a proof of satisfaction for me – as Argentinean – in witnessing the firm manner in which General Rosas stood by the honor of the Republic against the unjust demands of the foreigners who tried to humiliate it.<sup>56</sup>

San Martín's move tilts between self-imposed expatriation and exile. It was his own decision to leave the American shores for Europe, but it became an experience of exile on two grounds: in connection with his attempted return in 1829, as well as due to the ways his presence in Peru and Chile had raised strong animosities, forcing him to leave for political reasons.

In terms of political history San Martín became a Latin American icon of the uncommon victorious leader who decides that his involvement in politics would be extremely detrimental for the cause he had fought for. His military campaigns were mostly successful, in spite of a lack of resources, and sometimes, a lack of solid political support. But it was the tendency of the new polities to drift into factional violence – civil strife, militarization of politics and civil war – which prompted his decision to leave the countries he had fought so heartily to liberate, for the isolation of the self imposed exile in Europe.

At stake were not only issues of personal inclination and character, but rather political visions and ideals. San Martín favored the kind of parliamentary monarchy that seemed unacceptable to most of the Latin American patriots. His reluctance to assume dictatorial powers was evident in the leniency with which he treated conspirators and political foes throughout the war of liberation (e.g., his treatment of the Carrera brothers and of Manuel Rodríguez). Similarly, it was also shown in his

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<sup>56</sup>From San Martín will, in Bartolomé Mitre, Historia de San Martín y la emancipación latinoamericana Buenos Aires; Editorial Ateneo, 1950, p. 984. Rosas will also be forced to leave Argentina in 1852 for an exile in Southampton, UK, where he passed away in 1877. See Juan Manuel de Rosas, Cartas del exilio. Buenos Aires: Rodolfo Alonso Editor, 1974.

willingness to pacify Peru and reach an agreement with the royalist forces instead of looking for a total confrontation. This attitude contrasted with the more Jacobine spirits, which proliferated in the wars of independence.

San Martín did not find his place in post-independent political life and did not dare to stay as he felt he would be unable to retire from the power struggles and remain neutral *in situ*. After playing a central role in the struggle for independence, he feared he would not be able to maintain an unbiased position in politics, but that rather his name and prestige would be drawn against his will into internecine fights. Therefore, it seemed natural that a widower and father of a school-age daughter would move as far away as possible, to Europe.

## **Factionalism and Elites**

Factionalism within closely-knit elite networks can be seen as one of the most immediate factors in triggering political exile. A ‘thick analysis’ of early independent Iberoamerican cases of translocation indicates that dissent within the ranks of both established elites and countervailing forces was a major factor of centrifugal dispersion across the incipient boundaries of the emergent Latin American polities. The case of General Francisco de Paula Santander in Colombia can be used to further portray the activating role of this factor.

The political system that crystallized in Cundinamarca, Colombia following independence was conflict-ridden, divided between two major factions. One supported President Bolívar, while the other stood behind Vice-President Santander, one of the leading commanders in Bolívar’s independence army. The dominant sector behind Bolívar included large landholders and the traditional aristocracy, who endorsed a strong centralized government, a vision akin to the project of the Liberator

who decried de-centralization as a source of anarchy. Supporting Santander were the Federalists and liberals, who endorsed the primacy of Congress as the sovereign representative of the People.

The relations between the two leaders reached a critical point by 1827, when Bolívar was in Caracas after leaving the Colombian troops under the command of officers loyal to him, so as to restrict Santander's powers. Although Santander insisted on subordinating the troops to the constitutional rule of Congress, in July 1827 Bolívar decreed Páez's jurisdiction in Venezuela was dependent directly and exclusively on Bolívar himself.<sup>57</sup>

In September Bolívar was back in Bogotá to officially assume office as constitutional President, and many Santanderists fled the capital fearing persecution. Among them were Senators Francisco Soto, Juan N. Azuero and Miguel Uribe, who returned after being assured that Bolívar would not persecute them. Nevertheless, in this period many liberals were harassed in public places by Bolívarists, with no steps being taken by official agents to stop it. The press of the Liberal newspaper was violently dismantled, and copies of the paper were burnt publicly.

The estrangement between the two leaders was growing. Vicepresident Santander was not invited to government meetings, although he was constitutionally entitled to. In February 1828, as rumors were spreading about a Royalist expedition arriving to Venezuelan shores, Bolívar decreed a state of emergency, suspending all sorts of constitutional guarantees. He departed from the capital with his troops, leaving in charge a Council of Government to perform all administrative functions, thus bypassing Santander's prerogatives. There was a climate of exaltation in the country during the debates of the National Constituent Convention in Ocaña. A

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<sup>57</sup> In his letters Bolívar harshly attacked Santander and "the immoral administration that has reigned in this Bogotá using theft and plunder." Pilar Moreno de Angel, Santander. Bogotá: Planeta, 1989.

military group in Cartagena planned to revolt under calls of death to the Convention and to Santander<sup>58</sup>. The situation reached a point where the vice-president came to fear for his life and decided to leave Colombia. He wrote to Bolívar asking to be allowed to leave the country:

In case the government could not guarantee my personal rights against certain aggressions [vías de hecho], I implore your Excellency to give me a passport to exit Colombia with guarantees for me, three servants and my luggage, since the natural law dictates me to seek a safe place, in spite of the law and my destiny as vice-president, rather than expose myself to become a fruitless victim of ill will and vengeance.<sup>59</sup>

The personalist character of confrontational politics was fully at work in these settings. Bolívar was unwilling to make things easy for Santander. In a letter to Daniel Florencio O’Leary, he confided that “the General Santander asked me for guarantees and even a passport. I won’t let this opportunity pass without having him feel his misery”.<sup>60</sup>

Bolívar officially assumed the dictatorship in August 1828, after his men ensured the Constituent Assembly’s failure to adopt a new constitution. The vice-presidency of Colombia was then voided. On September 11, the Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to Santander that he had been appointed Ambassador to the United States. Upon Santander’s departure, the opposition would be necessarily weakened. Historian Moreno de Angel comments that, at the same time, the appointment had the goal of appeasing Santander, after he had been arbitrarily

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<sup>58</sup> Moreno de Angel, Santander, p. 149.

<sup>59</sup> Letter to the President of the Republic. Ocaña, March 17, 1828. In Cortázar, Roberto, Cartas y Mensajes de Santander, Tomo VII, p. 403, in Moreno de Angel 1989: 419.

<sup>60</sup> Bucaramanga, April 13, 1828. In Lecuna, Vicente, Cartas del Libertador, Tomo VII, p. 224, in Moreno de Angel, Santander, p. 419.

deposed from office.<sup>61</sup> Santander had been longing for this post since 1826, and accepted it, albeit not without hesitation, as he was well aware of the nature of the appointment:

This is a political decision. Be it that the government considers me harmful here or would like to give me guarantees, the truth is that after eighteen years of continuous services in seeking [to establish] the fatherland, I am forced to leave it. A harsh condition for a citizen always faithful to his duties and principles.<sup>62</sup>

Before he was able to leave, a failed coup d'état took place on September 26 1828. Even though Santander did not participate, he was imprisoned and sentenced to death on November 7, in a clearly political trial. Notwithstanding the move, it was not an easy task to get rid of Santander, as he enjoyed high prestige and had friends and supporters at all levels of society. The public and the Church raised their voices in an intercession for Santander. The Archbishop of Santa Fé wrote to Bolívar:

We decided to ask Your Excellency [...] to alleviate the prison and liberate General Francisco de Paula Santander. This petition notwithstanding, if it fits the public peace, you may [order] that he will not remain in the territories of the State, following the destination conferred upon him before or that he exits Colombia.<sup>63</sup>

The Council of Ministers deliberated on the issue and issued a statement, advising to spare Santander's life:

It will be in the interest of the government to commute the death penalty into the cancellation of employment and the translocation [*extrañamiento*] from

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<sup>61</sup> Moreno de Angel, *Santander*, p. 440.

<sup>62</sup> Letter to José Fernández Madrid. Bogotá, September 18, 1828. *Archivo Santander*, Tomo XVII, pp. 380-381.

<sup>63</sup> In *Archivo Santander*, Tomo XVIII, p. 96. Quoted from Moreno de Angel 1989: 464-5.

the Republic, prohibiting him from entering back the territory without a special permit from the Supreme Government; under the condition that if he fails to abide by the terms of this prohibition, any judge or military chief could apply him the death penalty in the place of his capture; and that his properties should be kept as deposit, without any possibility of selling or mortgaging them, to function as a security bond so that he will not break the prohibition and to be confiscated in the future, in case he breaks the prohibition [...] The Council is of the opinion that, by taking this road, the vengeance of justice [sic] will be satisfied, while the government will get the love, admiration and respect of the governed and thus attain the needed peace and trust of the citizens.<sup>64</sup>

The pressure was effective, and Bolívar commuted the death penalty into exile. Santander was given three days to arrange his departure, under armed custody, to the Atlantic coast. However, upon arriving in Cartagena he was imprisoned for seven months under harsh conditions in the fortress of San Fernando de Bocachica. Protesting, Santander wrote to Bolívar a letter in which he fully acknowledges the background of the rift with the Liberator:

I beg you to order the implementation of my departure outside Colombia, since once far away from the country, I will no longer belong to factions [*partidos*] and only live in peace and my name will not serve as a pretext to hamper public order.<sup>65</sup>

Santander enjoyed high prestige in the United States, and the high circles of that

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<sup>64</sup> Rodríguez Plata, Horacio, *Santander en el exilio*, pp. 77-79. Quoted in Moreno de Angel 1989:467.

<sup>65</sup> Letter dated December 13, 1828. Roberto Cortázar, *Cartas y Mensajes de Santander*, Tomo VII, pp. 447-461. Quoted by Moreno de Angel 1989: 475. See also José M. De Mier, *Complemento a la Historia Extensa de Colombia: Testimonio de una Amistad*, Vol 2, Colombia: Plaza & Janés, 1983, p. 131.

country resented the unjust sentence against the former vice-president of Colombia.<sup>66</sup> Antonio José de Sucre also interceded in favor of Santander, asking Bolívar to release the prisoner and send him to the United States or Europe. Bolívar decided, instead, to transfer Santander to another prison in Venezuela, where he would be more isolated. Santander was accompanied by his brother in law Colonel José María Bricero Méndez, a loyal and good friend of his; an aid and three servants. The same day of his arrival to Puerto Cabello, Santander notified José Antonio Páez, Venezuela's civil and military commander in chief, of his situation, asking him for a passport to leave the country or, if unable to issue it himself, to intercede with the Liberator in that sense.<sup>67</sup> Páez acceded, extending him a passport to leave for any place in Europe.<sup>68</sup>

In societies with deep social cleavages and relatively narrow elite circles, the rulers increasingly adopted exile among commonly used means of political exclusion. The existence of a tradition of colonial translocation and the hierarchical background of these societies were important factors in shaping this tendency. As early as 1951, John Johnson observed that

One of the earliest grounds for upholding asylum and exile stem from the rigid caste system, carried over from the period of Spanish domination. The jails and prisons – poorly constructed and with few provisions for sanitation and comfort – were unfit, or so it was thought, for the elite of society; and it was this group for whom diplomatic

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<sup>66</sup> Santander had personally notified President Andrew Jackson of his situation in a letter dated May 19, 1829.

<sup>67</sup> Archivo Santander Tomo XVIII, pp. 125-6, in Moreno de Angel 1989, p. 486.

<sup>68</sup> The terms of the passport were the following: "PASAPORTE. José Antonio Páez, Jefe Superior Civil y Militar de Venezuela, etc. De orden del Gobierno Supremo de la República, concedo franco y seguro pasaporte al señor Francisco de Paula Santander, para que pueda transportarse a Europa en el buque y al punto que más le convenga. Puerto Cabello, August 20, 1829. PAEZ Archivo Santander Tomo XVIII, p. 130, in Moreno de Angel 1989: 486-7. Santander was instructed not to disembark at all, but rather to remain on board the ship that had brought him to Venezuela until the ship that would take him to Europe arrived. Finally it was a merchant boat, licensed I Hamburg, which took him on board on August 26.

asylum was almost wholly reserved... Coincidental with these considerations was the more widely used defense of saving the most capable manpower... In ensuing struggles for power, diplomatic asylum and exile served to offer the surest and most economical means of conserving the ruling class. The loser, whether morally right or wrong, was assured a place of retreat so long as asylum was respected.<sup>69</sup>

Elites were interested in avoiding, as long as possible, a situation of total war that could weaken their hold over the whole social matrix. This possibility could become a reality either by launching a cycle of mutual retaliation, creating long term blood feuds, or by forcing the elites to open the political game to growing numbers of supporters from the lower strata. These developments could endanger the entire position of the elites in the medium and long range. Concurrently, as the conditions for imprisonment were seen as unsuitable for members of the elite, a prison sentence was used as a harsher measure than exile, and as such was used as a threat. Social networks, friendship, family ties and clientelistic entourages played into the above system of power in favor of a non-totalistic solution: political exile.

The thesis of the elitist roots of translocation as a political mechanism and its selective use as a means of punishment of political rivals is further reinforced by looking back at the racial bias of its implementation, which was projected in a continuous line from colonial to independent times. Perhaps paradigmatic is the case of Bolívar dealing with two of his leading opponents in the framework of Great Colombia, the *pardo* (mulatto) General José Padilla and General Santander. Whereas as in the latter case, Bolívar would reluctantly acquiesce to the intercessions of elite

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<sup>69</sup> John J. Johnson, "Foreign Factors", in Hugh M. Hamill, ed. Caudillos. Dictators in Spanish America. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992, p. 198 (this article was originally

sectors on Santander's behalf, in the case of Padilla, Bolívar opted for his execution. José Padilla was the leading figure of the independence camp in the predominantly Afro-Caribbean city of Cartagena, an individual who had enjoyed the dual patronage of Bolívar and Santander. In 1828, when the rift between the two patrons was evident, Padilla sided with Santander and launched a constitutionalist coup. Bolívar accused him of inciting to a racial war, a frightening reminder of the Haiti revolution, and had him executed.<sup>70</sup>

In November 1828, a month after the execution, Bolívar confided in a letter to Páez his uneasiness about the different treatment he had reserved for Santander and *pardos* such as Piar or Padilla:

Things have reached a point that keeps me wrestling with myself, with my ideas and with my glory... I already repent for the death of Piar, of Padilla and the others who have died for the same cause; in the future there will be no justice to punish the most atrocious murderer, because [by saving] the life of Santander [I have pardoned] the most scandalous impunities... What torments me even more is the just clamor with which those of the class of Piar and Padilla will complain. They will say with more than enough justice that I have been weak in favor of this infamous white [Santander], who did not have the record of service of those famous [*pardo*] servants of the fatherland. This exasperates me, so that I don't have what to do with myself.<sup>71</sup>

One should look beyond the apologetic tone to ground his fears of being accused of racism in the context of Bolívar's attempts to preclude the disintegration of Great Colombia into Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia) and Ecuador, which eventually

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published in *Pacific Historical Review*, 20, 2 (1951).

<sup>70</sup> Aline Helg, "Simon Bolivar and the Spectre of *Pardocracia*: Jose Padilla in Post-Independent Cartagena". *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 35 (2003): 447-471.

<sup>71</sup> Quoted from Helg, "Simon Bolivar and the Spectre", p. 470.

took place in 1830. Concomitantly, Bolívar is fully aware of the social context of race, class and status, which conditioned the differential use of displacement and translocation among other means of political regulation.

## **Transregional Political Dynamics**

In early independent Latin America, under a situation of fragmentation of political authority and undefined borders, exile was not conceived in terms of modern political asylum. Rather, individuals forced to move to other regions conceived it as a tactical escape of the sphere of influence of their persecutors, the rulers of their home society.

While beyond these rulers' sphere of control, the translocated individuals did not perceive themselves as foreigners, but as 'patriots' moving within the borders of the Great American fatherland, or as expatriates waiting to return to the homeland.<sup>72</sup>

With the passing of time, the translocation of 'political enemies' beyond the areas directly controlled by the new state became a factor related to the effective definition of borders between the newly formed states.

An outstanding case of such transregional dynamics conditioning translocation and the emergence of exile is that of Perú, Bolivia and Chile in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Connections between Perú and Alto Perú (later Bolivia) had existed since Inca and colonial times. Similarly, in the colony, territorial links connected Peru and Chile, with many instances of individuals from Peru being relocated in Chile, which constituted the outer frontier where the Lima authorities sent troublemakers. The links between Perú and Alto Perú were weakened between 1776 and 1809, when Alto Perú was incorporated into the newly created Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with its

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<sup>72</sup> David Brading, "Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish America", in Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, eds. Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American Paths Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998, pp. 13-45.

capital in Buenos Aires, but became relevant again with independence. While the centralist Peruvian constitution of 1828 required that the President be a Peruvian by birth, in fact, many of the figures who shaped Peruvian history from the 1820s to the 1860s were native of other regions in what are now Ecuador and Bolivia. Such were Andrés Santa Cruz, Juan José Flores, and José de la Mar, the leading caudillos who fought, plotted, expelled each other from power and ruled Peru during that period<sup>73</sup>.

This trans-regional political dynamic was reconstituted during independence. In July 1809, a junta in La Paz issued a declaration of independence in the name of the deposed Spanish king Fernando VII. Following repression by the royalist forces of Cuzco, the leaders were executed and more than a hundred ‘rebels’ were banished from the land.<sup>74</sup> Royalist forces continued to struggle to keep control of the urban centers, while “bandits” and guerrilla forces controlled the countryside.

The Peruvian royalists, the supporters of independence in Peru, and the independence movement of Buenos Aires all considered Alto Perú part of their administrative jurisdiction, thus turning the region into a battlefield. It was the royal commander there, Pedro Olañeta, who chose not to collaborate with the royalist army of Peru, which was led by liberals, whom the *criollo* general despised. Once General Antonio José de Sucre defeated the royalists in Ayacucho in December 1824, he managed to also defeat Olañeta’s royalist forces a few months later, opening the way for Alto Peruvian elites who chose the route to independence in 1825. Simón Bolívar was acclaimed as president of the newborn republic of Bolivia. He spent only a few months there, and returned then to his headquarters in Lima, promising the formal

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<sup>73</sup> “Se advierte con sumo interés el hecho de que Santa Cruz se mueva entre Bolivia y Perú como Pedro por su casa, como si no tuviera noción de su nacionalidad. Lo mismo ocurre con el general Lamar.” Jorge Alejandro Ovando Sanz, “El Surgimiento de la Nacionalidad Charquina y la Formación del Estado Boliviano”, in Rossana Barragán, Dora Cajías and Seemin Qayum, eds., El Siglo XIX: Bolivia y América Latina, La Paz: Coordinadora de Historia e I.F.E.A, 1997, p. 236.

<sup>74</sup> Herbert Klein, Bolivia Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 90-2

recognition of the new state by the Peruvian Congress, without which no Bolivian state could safely exist, since its establishment was opposed by most Peruvian oligarchies. From Lima, Bolívar named General Sucre as president of Bolivia, and the decrees and laws issued by them in regard to Bolivia would still keep the heading “Republic of Peru”<sup>75</sup>.

In turn, as is well known, Peru, the royalist stronghold, was liberated from beyond its boundaries, as part of a continental movement in two stages: first, by the combined efforts of General José de San Martín Cuyo’s forces and the Chilean and Peruvian forces that landed by the sea, and second, by the Colombian forces of Generals Sucre and Bolívar, who defeated the last wave of royalist opposition to independent rule in South America.

After independence, both Peru and Bolivia were ruled by short-term dictatorships led or inspired by Bolívar, followed as in other parts of Spanish America by instability, constitutional debates, turmoil and civil war. These conflicts revolved over the issue of the relative authority of the executive and parliament, the role and control of the military, personal sympathies and antipathies, and the extent of states of emergency prevented the disintegration of the republics. These dynamics were common to most Spanish-speaking territories. Nonetheless, the lack of national consciousness added its own flavor to the regions under consideration. When in 1828 General Agustín Gamarra invaded Bolivia, claiming it indivisible from Peru, his job was made easier by many Bolivians who defected to his camp.

Since the Bolivian nationality was recently established and there were old ties and sympathies between Lower and Upper Peru [i.e. Peru and Bolivia], nobody thought with guilt nor considered it treason to belong to Peru if the

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<sup>75</sup> Ovando Sanz, “El Surgimiento de la Nacionalidad Charquina y la Formación del Estado Boliviano”.

invasion eventually had that aim, or remain in the new Bolivian Republic. The masses in particular ignored the political question stirred by the quarreling parts.<sup>76</sup>

The political game was dominated by caudillos who attempted to unite Bolivia and Peru, to append part of Bolivia to Peru or vice versa, as in the attempt by General Andrés Santa Cruz to establish a Peruvian-Bolivian confederation. The governments of Peru and Bolivia were deeply involved in each other's domestic politics for decades. Many of these "national" leaders expelled each other or fled from Peru or Bolivia, mainly to Ecuador or Chile, and back. Once abroad, they sought a temporary stronghold from where they planned a return to power, supported or opposed by the political forces in the host societies.<sup>77</sup>

These trends were reflected in wave after wave of translocated individuals in the Andean area. In 1833 a struggle opened in Peru over the presidential succession to the caudillo-president General Agustín Gamarra. His designated successor, General Pedro Pablo Bermúdez made a *pronunciamiento* to preempt a plan by the liberals in favor of the rule of General Santa Cruz over a confederated Bolivian-Peruvian state. When Gamarra's term ended, the parliament named General Luis José de Orbegoso president, in place of Bermúdez, who was Gamarra's choice.

Violent confrontations ensued, and the temporarily prevailing party deported many of the leaders of the defeated party, to be translocated in turn once the other faction took power. To give but a few illustrations of such hectic dynamics, when the Gamarra-Bermúdez party prevailed, many of the prominent liberal leaders were deported in 1833-4, among them vice-president Armando La Fuente, and the speaker of the Senate, Tellería. In May 1834, Gamarra was defeated and escaped to Bolivia.

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<sup>76</sup> Luis Mariano Guzmán, *Historia de Bolivia*, Cochabamba: Imprenta del Siglo, 1983, p. 78.

<sup>77</sup> Ronald B St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp.23-43.

When General Felipe Salaverry was defeated in the north, he sought refuge in Ecuadorian territory. There he mobilized some resources, and in January 1834 he was back on Peruvian shores to resume fighting. He seized power in Lima, now having to deal with both Orbegoso and La Fuente, who returned from a previous banishment to Chile. In January 1835, La Fuente would have to exile himself again with Salaverry's victory and subsequent assumption of the Peruvian presidency.<sup>78</sup>

In the 1830s, as measures were taken to consolidate the states along territorial boundaries, political exile crystallized in its modern sense of banishment from state boundaries rather than a mere translocation across traditionally defined administrative territories. Illustrative of this transformational process are a series of legal provisions promulgated in Peru. In June 1834 Orbegoso issued an edict, forever prohibiting the return to Peruvian territory all those of whom had taken part a few months earlier in an insurrection against his election as president (the main targets of said edict were Gamarra, Miguel de San Román and Bernardo Escudero). In case of returning, they would be denied any legal protection and face execution.<sup>79</sup> In nearly simultaneous fashion, that same month he issued a law sanctioning the death penalty to any official – be it a Minister or the President himself – that would attempt to change the existing form of government, or act “against national independence.” In case of incurring in these offenses indirectly, the sentence would be “to banish the culprits forever from the territory of the Republic.” Permanent banishment would also ensue to a Minister or President that caused the death of a Peruvian. Another law prohibited the expatriation of any citizen without a proper sentence issued by a competent judge.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Modesto Basadre y Chocano, *Diez Años de Historia Política del Perú*, Lima: Editorial Huascarán, 1953, p. 7-20.

<sup>79</sup> Evaristo San Cristóval, 1941: *El Gran Mariscal Luis José de Orbegoso*, Lima: Gil S.A. Editores 1941, p.54.

<sup>80</sup> Idem, pp. 272 and 275.