ECONOMICS

Sylvain Boko

• with Alexandra Kurepa, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University
  Project 1: Decentralization, Reform, and Local Governance in Africa; Project 2: Modeling and Estimating Technical Progress and Endogenous Growth in Africa
  Awarded $9,105 for the period 12/1/04 to 7/31/05
  Source: WFU Social, Behavioral, and Economic Science Research Fund

Project 1 will collect the preliminary data necessary to follow up a successful National Science Foundation planning grant with a full, multiyear proposal. The research examines the impacts of decentralization on local community development in Africa. Project 2 will respond to critiques of a declined NSF proposal, “A Mathematical Model of Endogenous Economic Growth and Application to African Countries,” developed with NC A&T Mathematics Professor Alexandra Kurepa. This project examines the role of human capital and technical progress in determining endogenous growth in Africa.

• Democratic Reforms and the Transition to Market Economy in Africa
  Awarded $25,000 for the period 9/1/01 to 8/31/02
  Source: National Science Foundation (NSF)

  Decentralization ö the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and functions to subnational entities ö has become a lynchpin in Africaâs reform process. Yet given the simultaneous implementation of both political and economic reform programs in nations throughout the continent, the impact of the devolution of powers and functions to the local level on the central governmentâs ability to carry out the macro-level structural reforms necessary for a rebound in economic activities must be understood. This first rigorous analysis of the interplay between democratic and economic reform in Africa is a timely effort to aid policy-making.

  The pilot study will focus on four African countries to test the hypothesis that if fiscal decentralization is enacted in the context of a strong, transparent, and credible institutional and political framework, it need not derail national structural reforms. The first aim will be to analyze selected indicators, ranking each countryâs reform process on a spectral continuum between the two extremes of absolute centralization and absolute decentralization. The second will use a nonparametric approach to assess correlations between decentralization and macroeconomic indicators. This study will lead to a more comprehensive research proposal, covering more countries.

Jac C. Heckleman

• Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention
  Awarded $29,536 for the period 2/2/10 to 2/28/11
  Source: NSF/University of Georgia

  History, law, economics, and political science scholars have extensively studied the Constitutional Convention, but few hypotheses about delegate voting behavior and preferences have been evaluated empirically, primarily because only state votes were recorded. This project aims to recover individual delegate votes from statements made in debate coupled with attendance records, state-level votes, and the formal rule that a majority of its delegates determined a state’s vote. Estimates will be used to test three hypotheses: 1) whether delegates were influenced by their economic interests (the Beard thesis); 2) whether the Great Compromise altered delegate preferences; and 3) whether a few key delegates were persuaded to change their positions. Results will inform theories about representation, the constitutional process, and development of institutions, and legal interpretations of original intent. If the framers voted according to the interests they were supposed to represent, then deliberative settings may be adequate for constitutional reform. However, if they voted to promote their own economic interests, or their preferences were contingent on the adoption of major institutions, referenda or other forms of direct democracy may be better for constitutional reform.

• American Founding: Motivation of the Framers at the Constitutional Convention
  Awarded $27,777 for the period 9/1/04 to 6/30/05
  Source: NSF

This project seeks to determine the motivation of the framers of the US Constitution and framers generally. For the last century, scholars have debated the motives of delegates to the 1789 Constitutional Convention. Some argue that they voted according to their personal economic interests (McGuire and Ohsfeldt 1986; McGuire 2003; Beard 1913); others, that they voted according to national interests or political ideologies (Brown 1956; Wood 1969; Roche 1961; Diamond 1981). If framers vote according to the interests that they are supposed to represent, then deliberative settings like constitutional conventions may be adequate for reform. However, if they vote to promote their own interest or that of a constituency, then referenda or other forms of direct democracy will be needed.

The project will expand current understandings of the constitutional convention in three ways. First, using state roll call votes, letters, debate notes, speeches, and newspaper submissions that were unavailable when McDonald (1958) originally inferred 16 delegate voting patterns, it should at least double the data. Second, it will test more precisely Beard's thesis and theories about ideology and rational self-interest. Third, it will analyze the types of constituent interests that may have affected voting behavior: who elected delegates to the convention, who the delegates allegedly represented, and who might elect delegates to future posts. Results will have important implications for political science, economics, and law.

Michael Lawlor
Look AHEAD
Awarded $22,150 for the period 5/1/08 to 4/30/09
Source: National Institutes of Health (NIH)

Look AHEAD is a longitudinal weight-loss trial for obese and overweight subjects, focusing on cardiovascular events. Dr. Lawlor serves as one of 7 Co-Principal Investigators on the Economic Committee, charged with estimating the cost and cost-effectiveness of this large, randomized, multisite national study, which will continue until 2011.