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Education
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B.A., Westminster College, PA, 1997 |
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Ph.D., Indiana University - Bloomington, 2007 |
Major
Area:
Social Psychology
Research
Interests:
I am an experimental social psychologist who approaches understanding social behavior, attitudes, and decisions from a social cognitive perspective (e.g., what we perceive and how we interact with others are determined by the information that is in our heads – how we process and organize that information). The common theme that ties my research interests together is the focus on social/cognitive processes that influence several social psychological domains, including decision making, attitudes, resistance to persuasion, and inter-group emotions.
- Reactions to General and Specific Cases
Some people will go to great lengths to provide unsolicited aid (directly, or in the form of financial support) to assist a specific girl who happened to fall in a well or to “save” a few beached whales, but react very differently when they encounter general “save the hungry children of the world” or “save the whales” charities. “NIMBY” (not in my back yard) syndrome is a term used to characterize instances in which some people demand economic developments (as well as the building of more prisons) but later reject any specific plans that may emerge in their own neighborhoods. Many people reacted to tragedies such as the “Columbine Incident,” but pay little attention to “kids killing kids” three blocks from a school.
The data of my more recent studies have suggested that such differences to general and specific events appears to be mediated by the frequency of upward counterfactual thoughts found in response to specific undesirable events (e.g., would have, could have, should have statements that improve upon reality). Essentially, when reacting to events in which specific event information is provided, counterfactual responses appear to shape evaluations and decisions (even when nothing “abnormal” occurs). However, when general outcome information is known about the same events, pre-event expectancies appear to shape reactions. Most of my studies in this area of study have employed a sports-oriented or game-oriented task, such as playing blackjack, watching horse races, watching a tennis match or responding to trivia questions. Providing research participants with experimental tasks that engage their attention and interest seems to enhance the likelihood of collecting valid and reliable data.
This work has implications for many domains of decision-making, such as leadership, management decisions, court room procedures, policy making, risk-taking, health-related behaviors, and interpersonal relationships. More recently, I have focused on how a model of reactions to general and specific cases can be employed in medical decision making (i.e., diagnosis and treatment selection). A particular medical surgery may have a 5% chance of death – doctors and patients (and their families) seem willing to accept this. However, in almost each and every case of death, it is not acceptable. That is, they’ve got more specific information that they can counterfactualize and conclude that the death should not have occurred, and might not have occurred had something else been different. I am interested in how my model, as well as other social cognitive and decision making models, apply to medical decision making over the course of a physician’s training and career.
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Petrocelli, J. V., & Sherman, S. J. (2007). A dual-process account of reactions to
general and specific events: The roles of counterfactual thinking and pre-event expectations. Manuscript in preparation. |
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Petrocelli, J. V., Hall, E. P., & Tormala, Z. L. (2007). “I knew I should have” vs. “Maybe I
should have”: The impact of counterfactual thought confidence on judgment. Manuscript in preparation. |
- Attitude Strength and Persuasion
I am also interested in how the various components of attitude strength (e.g., attitude certainty, attitudinal ambivalence, and attitude accessibility) are relevant to attitude change and resistance to persuasive attempts. I am particularly interested in dissecting these attributes and determining how they influence the attitude-behavior link, attitude stability, persistence, and resistance to persuasive attempts.
My work in this area has suggested that attitude certainty is composed of two types of certainty. In the future, my colleagues and I plan to determine if this relation to resistance is a reliable outcome, as well as investigate additional antecedents of these two types of attitude certainty (such as awareness of explicit/implicit incongruence and self-generated consensus information) and their impact on multiple consequences that have been of importance to traditional attitude research. This research is relevant to persuasion techniques and inoculation procedures. A better understanding of the complexity of attitude strength variables (their antecedents and consequences) is likely to benefit any individual with the intentions to persuade or inoculate attitudes against persuasive attempts. The knowledge gained from this research could be employed to improve programs that promote healthy living behaviors, (e.g., cancer and AIDS prevention programs).
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Petrocelli, J. V., Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Unpacking attitude certainty:
Attitude clarity and attitude correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 30-41. |
Some of my work has focused on the relationship between group-based emotions and the attributions that people construct regarding their group's status. My earlier research showed that Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory can be extended to predicting and explaining group-based emotions. My focus in this area of study has shifted to how group-based emotions may provide a deeper understanding of implicit inter-group approach/avoid action tendencies. Currently, my colleagues and I are using a minimal-groups paradigm to focus on the cognitive processes that underlie these tendencies. We are currently formalizing new ways to more effectively manipulate basic emotions so that we may study these effects more efficiently. This work is likely to have important implications for inter-group relations, stereotypes, and prejudice.
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Petrocelli, J. V., & Smith, E. R. (2005). Who I am, who we are, and why: Links betweencemotions and causal attributions for self and group-discrepancies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1628-1642. |
Courses
taught:
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Research in Social Psychology |
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