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Part I

The roots and theoretical underpinnings





1 US hemispheric hegemony and the descent into genocidal practices in Latin America¹

Luis Roniger

This chapter aims to provide a long-term perspective on the rise of the US to hemispheric hegemony in the Americas, and to discuss some of the consequences of such a rise in the second half of the twentieth century, in particular, those consequences which resulted in the genocidal repression by military and authoritarian rulers of their own countrymen in the Southern Cone during the 1970s and 1980s, and in Central America in the 1980s and early 1990s. While providing such a background, this chapter aims to be synoptic and not exhaustive. For further information and to test the general arguments presented here, readers are referred to an extensive literature that follows ¹ continental scope of analysis,² and monographs devoted to the study of relationships between the US and other countries in the Americas.³

The rise of the US to hemispheric hegemony

By the onset of the twentieth century, President James Monroe's address made on December 1823 seemed ominous. Voiced under the protective maritime umbrella of Great Britain, the clear-cut line it predicated between Europe – and its remaining colonies in the New World – and the independent republics of the Western hemisphere could be seen as a foreboding doctrine, when perceived from the perspective of its corollary by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. According to that corollary, the US would be forced to intervene in the Western hemisphere when chronic unrest and political corruption would demand it. In the interval between Monroe's address and Roosevelt's era, the US had expanded its territory through a series of successful wars, most notably the incorporation of Texas, the defeat of Mexico in the 1846–8 war, and the defeat of Spain in the so called Spanish–American War of 1898. Immediately following the Spanish–American War, Cuba was occupied and had to accept the terms of the Platt Amendment that conditioned its sovereignty until the early 1930s. Also since 1898, Puerto Rico has remained dependent on and connected to the US. By the late 1890s, the US had also managed to curtail or contain German and French inroads in Central America and the Caribbean. Moreover, by 1901, Britain tacitly accepted – in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty signed with the US – that Central America was already within the US sphere of influence. By 1903, the



US supported Panama's independence from Colombia, in return for the exclusive rights to build the Panama Canal and control the Canal Zone.⁴

The twentieth century witnessed further reinforcement of US hemispheric hegemony, sustained by policies aimed at controlling access to resources deemed strategic by the US's investments in the Americas. The US took an active role in the "liberation" of Panama from Colombia, and established control through pacts and military occupations. The pursuit of US interests and investments often implied influencing or controlling the destinies of other states and nations in the hemisphere, initially in Central America and the Caribbean. According to Jan Knippers Black, "gunboat and dollar diplomacy helped to keep other Central American states submissive, and the owners of United Fruit and other companies openly boasted of buying and selling presidents."⁵ Increasingly, such strategy was followed also in the Andean region and the Southern Cone.

The first three decades of the twentieth century were characterized by the recurrent and in some cases permanent US presence in the Caribbean and Central America. This is what has come to be known as Big Stick interventionism, which was practiced in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and for years by marines occupying Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Such interventionism cannot be attributed exclusively to the expansionist drive of the US. The weak institutionalization of national states generated a situation in which domestic contenders called the US to serve as the transnational actor that could intervene, supporting them in their power struggles. As Robert H. Holden indicates, under such situations of hollow legitimacy and fragmented authority, the US easily became

a kind of transnational *patrón* who distributed favors and bought clients by playing on divisions within and among the governments of Central America. As early as 1911, Adolfo Díaz, the US-installed president of Nicaragua, offered the US *chargé* in Managua a treaty that would permit Washington "to intervene in our internal affairs in order to maintain peace."⁶

It is this complementarity of interests that brought about the recurrent direct intervention of US forces in Central America and the Caribbean in the early twentieth century. Following three decades of interventionism, the US elaborated on a strategy for containing or controlling political change by leaving behind well-trained local forces to protect the claims of US corporations and the governments and political leaders favored by US policy-makers.⁷

The 1930s and early 1940s were thus a hiatus in direct intervention, dictated by Franklin D. Roosevelt's idea of the 'Good Neighbor' policy. This model contributed paradoxically to the growth of US trade and direct investments in the region, as well as to the alignment of most Latin American elites and armed forces with the US. The principle of nonintervention was strongly supported by the Inter-American system, which saw in it a delayed recognition of the Bolivarian principles that set the major norms of the Latin American international regime. Promulgated by Simón Bolívar in the early 1820s, they included the norms of equality of sovereign states, non-recognition of territorial gains follow-

ing wars, the peaceful settlement of international disputes by mechanisms of arbitration, and a system of collective security, including mutual defense and neutrality. Since the 1820s, Bolivarianism could be seen as a generalized expression of Latin American transnational commitment, which was affected by the launching of the Pan-American movement after 1889, which recognized the leading role of the US in shaping the agenda and establishing the continent's common norms.⁸ While the new US policy did not obliterate the memory of earlier interventions, it was perceived as a more egalitarian recognition of Latin American national sovereignty.

During the course of the two world wars, the influence of Great Britain, France, Germany, and other European countries diminished. In the 1930s, sympathy with Germany and the Axis countries was still widespread, along with distrust of the US. A process of alignment with the US took place, however, before and during World War II, even in countries such as Mexico, which sent troops to the front.⁹ The process accelerated in Brazil, a country that sent soldiers to fight alongside the American Fourth Army in Italy during World War II, and that received US support in the form of equipment and military training and in establishing military academies. Countries in the Western hemisphere granted air and naval bases to the US. World War II put aside the former pattern linking Latin American armed forces to European armies. The cooperation during the war – reflected in the Inter-American Defense Board (1942) – led to multilateral cooperation and optimism, as expressed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and the launching of the Organization of American States in Bogotá, Colombia, the following year. By then, Latin America was firmly locked within the US sphere of influence, as the nuclear standoff of the Cold War led the US and the USSR to accept each other's established spheres of influence.¹⁰

By the end of World War II, the US had established strong bilateral military ties and had acquired a near monopoly of training and equipping Latin American armed forces. Since 1951, a series of bilateral agreements for military assistance had been signed. These agreements defined grants and credits for the acquisition of US military equipment, the stationing of US military missions in Latin America, and the training of Latin American officers in military schools both in the US and in the Panama Canal Zone. In tandem with the move of the political pendulum towards authoritarian and military governments in the 1950s throughout most of the region (exceptions being Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and somehow also Cuba), the US placed increasing emphasis on ties with the Latin American military, police, and national guard forces. By 1960 nearly 7,000 officers had been assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Latin America and police forces were trained in counterinsurgency methods. In the early 1970s military grants and credit sales more than tripled to over \$218 million, while the size of the Latin American armed forces grew exponentially, especially in those countries in which the military had seized power.¹¹

The agreements of military cooperation were originally set within the framework of the multilateral arrangements, with the US reassuring Latin American

countries that the new format of assistance neither was intended to trigger an arms race between these countries, nor would it lead to US intervention, e.g. in the form of entrenching dictatorships.

Respecting the national sensibilities of the military was key to enabling such a rise in military relationships. Latin American military professionals saw themselves as the heirs of the founding fathers of their states as they had engaged in the construction of national identity during independence. Like many officers elsewhere – and most civilian leaders in their societies – they believed in their vocation for leadership. In some countries, perhaps most notably Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Panama, they felt committed by vocation to fight against their societies' underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty, and national fragmentation.¹²

In the context of the Cold War, this vision focusing on their society's unity and development became an increasing concern with national security and a need to fight internal enemies. Gradually, the latter became identified as leftist groups who, with their revolutionary discourse and activities, were destabilizing the political arena and colonizing public spaces and culture in a detrimental and anomic way. This of course was seen as inimical to the "true" values of the nation. Their professional training added to their corporate consciousness and gave them a sense of alienation from these disorderly civilians and their foreign ideas.

In order to fully assess the impact of the US backing of the military that would take power during the 1960s, one should take into consideration the progressive decline of alternative models of US influence in Latin America. In conjunction with military cooperation in the 1950s and early 1960s, US policy tried to project its model of development onto Latin American countries. This was a model that promised modernization and political development once economic change was achieved. It also claimed to lead to an eventual decline of inequality and polarization, and to the promotion of democracy. Bolivia stands out among the countries where this model was attempted. As stressed by Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia had been a favorable place to test these premises since the April 1952 revolution by the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) managed to bring to power leaders who, in spite of their rhetoric, were genuinely interested in modernization along capitalist lines. Motivated by ideological visions that were more liberal than Marxist, the new elites sought US assistance as the driving force of this change. Increasingly, the US provided the desired assistance on conditional terms, demanding that Bolivia should become open to private initiative, foreign investment, and the logic of free markets. Unable to operate such changes in the short term and with both Bolivians and Americans disappointed, the US came to recognize by the early 1960s the increasing importance of state regulation, as envisioned in the Alliance for Progress.¹³

Similarly, following the military coups that started with the CIA-orchestrated removal of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the Cuban revolution of 1959, and Che Guevara's commitment to create as many Vietnams as he could, the US moved to condone and often support authoritarian rule in the name of national security.¹⁴

1 If Latin American countries were unfit to follow the US model of develop-
2 ment and, in the context of the Cold War, were on the brink of political break-
3 down and the threat of revolution, perhaps it was time to make room for a
4 renewed domestic model of “order and progress” resembling that which, in the
5 late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had been successfully adopted by
6 the followers of positivism in Latin America.

7 From a geopolitical perspective and in terms of resources, small countries
8 depended heavily on US decisions. Partnerships however were rather unequal.
9 While it is true that in the early 1960s leaders such as Victor Paz Estenssoro of
0 Bolivia used their connections with Washington to try to maneuver domestic
1 political forces, the US relied even more strongly on the result of local cohorts
2 of power struggling to dominate the political and public arena. In some cases,
3 confrontations occurred between factions of the armed forces, foreshadowing the
4 rise to power of the military, for example, the confrontations in Argentina in the
5 early 1960s, which eventually led to military dictatorships spanning 1966–73
6 and 1976–83.

7 In the early 1960s, President Kennedy increased US support for hemispheric
8 security forces in parallel to the Alliance for Progress. President Johnson contin-
9 ued that orientation. In early April 1964 this shift in emphasis became evident as
0 the US supported the Brazilian coup that deposed João Goulart. Paradigmatic of
1 the ever-increasing US shift to support military options, too, is the case in neigh-
2 boring Bolivia on the eve of General René Barrientos’ deposing of Bolivian
3 president Paz Estenssoro in November 1964. Both the US embassy and the State
4 Department moved to support military intervention, motivated by fears that Paz
5 could be assassinated and vice-president Juan Lechín, a leftist, made president.¹⁵

6 So ended a period in which the US had supported the reformist option, which
7 – despite idealistic perceptions – failed to trigger democracy and capitalism in
8 the client states. In the case of Bolivia, the shift to military rule and the provision
9 of US military training paid off, at least in the short term. General Barrientos,
0 through the use of populist and paternalist means, built broad support among
1 Bolivian peasants and succeeded in isolating Che Guevara’s guerrilla forces, and
2 subsequently capturing and executing the revolutionary leader in October 1967,
3 in a joint CIA–Bolivian operation.

4 Starting in the 1960s, the impact of US hemispheric policy combined with
5 domestic trends, primarily the increasing socio-economic mobilization and
6 polarized political arenas. Having the supportive vision of being on the frontline
7 of defense of Western civilization, as led by the US and encoded in doctrines of
8 national security, Latin American governments slipped into a renewed use of
9 regimes of exception, military interventions in public life, and suspension of
0 constitutional freedoms and guarantees, with severe consequences in the realm
1 of human rights. I turn now to analyze these dimensions, which along with the
2 role of the US as hegemonic power, were crucial factors in the descent to geno-
3 cidal practices in the region.
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Domestic trends and polarized political arenas

Latin American societies shared a dual cultural dynamic. On the one hand, there was a substratum of respect for hierarchy, authority and order, of Roman Catholic origins, with corporatist leanings. On the other hand, from an early stage, elites looked to the centers of world development, absorbing secular Western ideas and ideologies and adapting them as part of their models of nation-building, though only as far as they befitted their views and local realities. From early on, elites, both liberals and conservatives, interpreted their societies in terms of a struggle between civilization and barbarism. This legitimized their policies of annihilating indigenous populations, repressing rural social forces, and privatizing communal lands and releasing them to the markets, where lands were appropriated mostly by large landholders, thus creating a spiraling concentration of lands along with a multitude of minifundia peasants and landless rural workers.

With the adoption of formal models of constitutional liberal democracy, the elites interpreted them in ways which stressed their authority and endorsed formal equality only as long as this did not affect the hierarchical structure of society. For instance, while they responded to popular pressures by widening the scope of suffrage laws, elites organized the electoral processes in ways which were tainted by fraud, patronage, and vote-buying. This ensured the elites' continued control over the polity, its institutions, and resources. The political realm was organized in a republican presidentialist way, with electoral systems that allowed greater electoral participation and generated popular mobilization among substantial sectors of the middle and lower classes. The models incorporated by the political classes formally ensured the recognition of basic rights and liberties, according to the European and North American pattern, and yet for many decades politics were accompanied in practice by fraud, clientelism, and the manipulation of the electorate by the political elites.¹⁶

In most Latin American countries, institution building was supported by the development of an agro-export economic model, which was sometimes coupled with financial markets, e.g. in Uruguay, or, as in the cases of Chile or Bolivia, with a mineral-export model. The agro-export and mineral-export models provided the resources for the growth of state bureaucracies and sometimes the expansion of state benefits, which in cases such as Argentina and Brazil had strong populist characteristics. By the mid-twentieth century these societies underwent processes of modernization and late industrialization, massive rural-urban migration and a rise in unfulfilled expectations, which led to increasing socioeconomic mobilization and political polarization.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War and the inability of ruling elites to lead their countries to peaceful coexistence and more equal development, a growing sense of support for radical change dominated intellectual circles and the younger generations. Many in the latter group supported the feeling, expressed by Eduardo Galeano in one of the most widely read essays in that period, that Latin American should be radically transformed, if necessary by force:



1 There is much rottenness to be thrown to the sea in the way to the recon-
2 struction of Latin America. The deprived, the humiliated, the damned, they
3 have this task in their hands. The Latin American national cause is, before
4 anything else, a social cause. In order that Latin America should be reborn,
5 there is a need to throw down the lords of the land, country by country.
6 Times of rebellion and change are beginning. There are those who believe
7 that destiny rests on the knees of the gods, but the truth is that it works, as a
8 constant challenge, in the conscience of men.¹⁷

9 The potential for violence was imbued in the ideological polarization between
10 public spheres and civil society. As Ana Pizarro observed, for the Left, the 1960s
11 and early 1970s were years of practicing “criteria” in the social sciences, of dis-
12 cussing the theory of dependency as opposed to development approaches, criti-
13 cism and counter-criticism, of launching a dialogue with Africans who were
14 emerging from decolonization processes, of assessing the significance of the
15 Cuban revolution and the prospects of Caribbean and Latin American integra-
16 tion.¹⁸ Influencing the political climate during this epoch were anti-imperialist
17 feelings, the spread of liberation theology, demands to protect the rights of
18 minorities, and the rise of feminism.

19 The messages contained in the elaborations of the Left were rejected by
20 others who held diametrically opposed visions of their society, and who were no
21 less passionate in their own views and positions.¹⁹ The very principled positions
22 of these circles and the semi-sacredness with which they cognitively structured
23 and evaluated the forces of society contributed to the clash that tore apart these
24 societies in the period leading to the military takeovers.

25 Formal democracy broke down and was replaced by military rule in a domino
26 effect that originated in Brazil in 1964, where it signaled the defeat of the legacy
27 of populist mobilization and radicalization. Historian José Murilo de Carvalho’s
28 research shows, contrary to accepted truism, that two factors were detrimental to
29 sustaining democracy. First, the breakdown of civilian rule was not the result of
30 the lack of democratic support by the citizens as reflected in voting patterns, but
31 rather the lack of democratic conviction in the elites. The elites were undermin-
32 ing democracy by precluding any compromise and negotiating arrangements in
33 Congress and in the parties. Second, the lack of communication between the
34 masses and the politicians failed to capture the popular mood. That is, the elitist
35 and hierarchical character of political articulation in these societies was detri-
36 mental to the health and continuity of democracy during this period.²⁰

37 The biggest move toward the revolutionary option and its subsequent sup-
38 pression took place in Salvador Allende’s Chilean “peaceful road to socialism,”
39 which could have been seen as the radicalization of Frei’s program of “revolu-
40 tion in liberty.” Allende attempted what turned out to be impossible in the frame-
41 work of the Cold War: to move a country in the Western hemisphere toward
42 socialism by constitutional and legal means. This was thought as ridiculous by
43 radical leftists such as Castro and was unacceptable to the US. Already in 1970,
44 following Chilean elections and foreseeing the probable nomination of Salvador



Allende as president by the Chilean Congress, the US attempted to prevent it by supporting military plotters who eventually assassinated General René Schneider, the top commander of the Chilean armed forces. During Allende's administration, the US, under the leadership of Henry Kissinger, who served first under Richard Nixon as national security advisor and later as secretary of state, encouraged and supported destabilizing maneuvers by parties opposed to Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition and by the military plotters who, under the top command of General Augusto Pinochet, ended the unique experience of the Chilean move towards socialism on September 11, 1973.

The coup in Chile gave credence to the claim by the revolutionary Left that only violence would open the door to socialism in Latin America. With the election of Juan D. Perón, Argentina became a haven for political exiles and revolutionary organizations. Uruguayan Tupamaros, Bolivian ELN (National Liberation Army), Paraguayan groups within the Colorado party, and Chilean MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) joined Argentinean Montoneros and ERP (Revolutionary Popular Army), convinced that they would trigger a process leading to an irreversible path towards socialism. With mass mobilizations at their peak, these groups thought they could galvanize public opinion and bring about either insurrection or a military takeover of the country. Engaged in a partially successful series of kidnappings of corporate CEOs for huge ransoms, and some military actions in remote areas such as the rural hinterlands of Tucumán in Argentina, as well as terrorist attacks on military personnel, the revolutionary groups passed from an initial phase of euphoria to being decimated by paramilitary networks and later on by the military in power. The August 1973 decision by such groups to coordinate their actions and provide mutual logistical, financial, and military support across borders through a Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) augmented the concern in military circles and further enabled the latter to use their actions to taint the nonviolent opposition with the violent tactics of the guerrilla groups.²¹ The military in Brazil, Paraguay, and the various countries of the Southern Cone managed rather early on to marginalize the radical Left, after launching their own network of counterintelligence coordination and following the capture of some key Southern Cone activists in Paraguay. However, they continued to use the actions of the radical revolutionary Left as central to their own discourse of salvation of their nations from the threat of international communism and moved to coordinate transnational repression in the framework of Operation Condor.²²

Within a shared process of the breakdown of democracy and the transition to military rule in much of Latin America, each country entered the authoritarian period in a different way, which is beyond the purview of this chapter. Many factors influenced the breakdown of democratic rule, foremost the character of political struggle and polarization; the high levels of mass mobilization; the increasing political violence and the perceived menace of leftist onslaught; the prevailing doctrines of national security diffused during the Cold War; and the relative capacity of the political classes to confront the ongoing crises.²³ All these factors affected the specific timing and road to authoritarianism, as they



1 were played out against the background of distinct political paths and patterns of
2 civil–military relationships. These factors would affect the patterns of repression
3 and massive human rights violations followed by the various governments as
4 well.

5 Yet, beyond these differences, there was coordination in the war against “sub-
6 version,” most significantly spearheaded by Operation Condor, which was
7 launched by then Colonel Manuel Contreras of the DINA, Chile’s state security
3 agency. While preparing such a move, Contreras traveled to the US to ask for
) training, and subsequently, the Chileans benefited from US military advisors in
0 counterintelligence. Secluded from the public eye, Operation Condor was
1 designed to coordinate the exchange of intelligence and the launching of com-
2 bined operations against political activists in exile, many of whom were
3 abducted, assassinated, or transferred for interrogation and later disappeared,
4 with the most complete secrecy and lack of accountability.²⁴

5 It may be claimed that, in the short term, some top US officials and agencies
6 welcomed the initiative of Chile and its partners in Operation Condor, overlook-
7 ing the genocidal policies adopted, at least before its agents struck in Washing-
8 ton, DC, assassinating former Chilean Foreign Minister, Orlando Letelier and his
9 secretary Ronni Moffitt, a US citizen. Yet, in the view of several Latin American
0 high officers, the US was passive and not aggressive enough in the fight against
1 communism during the Cold War. I would accordingly claim that, even taking
2 into account the training and support of the US, one should look for a no less
3 fundamental source of conviction of the military commands in their shared,
4 albeit nuanced, belief in doctrines of national security.

Doctrines of national security

8 These societies, which in the 1960s and 1970s had experienced processes of
9 massive popular mobilization and increased (disordered and almost “anarchi-
0 cal”) participation, were forcefully demobilized under military rule. In many
1 cases, political parties were banned or their activities frozen by decree; educa-
2 tional systems were regimented and disciplined after major military interven-
3 tions in the universities and school programs were reshaped according to the new
4 ideological parameters; heavy censorship was imposed upon the media and cul-
5 tural expression was “purified” of any leftist orientations; trade unions were
6 attacked, with many of their activists jailed and assassinated; professional and
7 entrepreneurial associations were co-opted, “cleansed” of hostile elements; and
8 self-censorship crystallized as the result of a highly repressive situation. Policies
9 of annihilation of the radical Left and its supporters were carried out both
0 domestically and beyond the national borders.²⁵

1 Because of their functional role, their formation, and their professional train-
2 ing, the military saw themselves as guardians of the nation’s values and tradi-
3 tions, especially in times of crisis. The National Security Doctrines, shared by
4 the military establishments of the Latin American countries in the framework of
5 the Cold War, posited a link between the concepts of nation and state, and the



central role of the armed forces in connection to both. Military leadership considered itself the most qualified and perhaps the only capable institutional actor for achieving the defense and promotion of national interests. Under the political and institutional challenges posed by the generation dreaming of accomplishing a Socialist Revolution, with groups of armed radical leftist guerrillas using violent means to bring about a revolution, the armed forces believed they had the right and obligation to redefine and organize their nations according to the guidelines of the doctrines of national security.²⁶

According to that doctrine, the basic values of a nation are anchored organically within Western civilization (interpreted in terms of Christian values), the defense of private property and initiative, and opposition to communist and Marxist ideas. As Manuel Antonio Garretón indicated, national unity was sought and interpreted in terms of a tradition or “soul,” consisting of “freezing certain historical facts or universalizing particular features that are defined outside the freely expressed collective will.”²⁷

The military leaders thought they were most qualified to channel the “true” national spirit through the state machinery, safeguarding the nation. Paradoxically enough, this state-centric vision that centralized the role of the state in shaping the direction of society was also shared by the revolutionary Left.²⁸

The organic conception of the nation implied a binary view of the world that resembled the categories of the Cold War. Eliminating the enemy was the only option, since these individuals were considered to be beyond redemption due to their irreparable ideological and flawed political views (a concept denoted in Spanish as *irrecuperabilidad*). By exterminating these “contaminated” cells or organs, both physically and ideologically, society could manage to retain its basic parameters of national values and traditions. If necessary, the armed forces would extirpate the threat, following the ideological visions they incorporated from the French theorists of counterinsurgency developed in the Algerian war and reinforced by the strong anti-communist visions taught in the School of the Americas and other US training centers of anti-guerrilla warfare attended by Latin American officers. The local idioms of organicism gave further credibility to the doctrines of national security that stressed the primacy of national well-being over individual rights. According to this logic, individual rights, including the most basic human rights, should be subordinate to national aims and goals whenever necessary.²⁹

In Argentina, this vision was a guideline for eliminating the enemies of the nation; the terms used were organic in nature and projected a medical discourse that demanded the “extirpation of ill tissues” from the national body. This hinted at the genocidal practices adopted to decimate a generation and its dreams of radical political change, as indicated by writer Ricardo Piglia.³⁰

On the basis of the doctrines of national security, the top commanders of the armed forces thought their society was penetrated by a secluded enemy that aimed at destroying the moral values of the nation. It is precisely from these doctrines that confrontation arose that made use of genocidal practices and a systematic technology of terror and repression aimed not only at physical destruction but also at eradicating its memory from the annals of the nation. This

led to the dehumanization of those detained or abducted. These individuals were denied the most basic needs and brutally tortured, with thousands summarily executed and “disappeared.” In almost contradictory terms, the enemy was defined in ambiguous terms that could be elastically broadened to include not only active supporters but even remote sympathizers or citizens apathetic enough not to support the policies of the military governments, as in the famous threat launched by the then military governor of the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina during the first junta regime, Ibérico Saint-Jean: “First we kill the subversives; then we kill their collaborators; then ... their sympathizers; then those who remain indifferent; and finally we kill the timid.”³¹ In a binary world such as the one envisioned by the military, there was no room for indecision or lack of full commitment.³² In such a binary and extreme definition of the situation, all means were deemed legitimate in the fight against subversion. Flagrant human rights violations were ignored, while the armed forces claimed to have saved their countries from being destroyed from within.³³

The genocidal turn and US influence

The confrontation with communism and with the vernacular forms of radical socialism generated policies that condoned genocidal practices whenever they could be justified in terms of saving the national soul and structure of society. As a result, this confrontational vision, supported by the National Security Doctrine and its related counterinsurgency methodologies, led to the denial of individual rights and the killing of thousands of individuals, including many completely unrelated to any armed movement but only concerned with improving life conditions or attempting to promote social justice, agrarian reform, healthcare, education, or fair working conditions.

In Argentina 30,000 persons were abducted and later vanished without a trace. Chile has officially recognized a death toll of over 3,000 as the result of state and politically motivated violence. Other countries in the Southern Cone made use of long-term imprisonment, torture, and forced exile as was typical of Uruguay and Brazil. In Nicaragua the National Guard was responsible for some 40,000–50,000 murders before the fall of Somoza. Due to the mounting pressure in international and transnational fora in Europe and North America, the actions of the military governments were under scrutiny starting in 1976 and became increasingly so under the Carter administration.

Yet, the pendulum shifted again to counterinsurgency support when President Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981. With communist Cuba just to the south, and the recent triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979, the new administration envisioned a Soviet–Cuban campaign aimed at generating a domino effect throughout Central America and the Caribbean. The Reagan administration began combating the perceived threat by developing interventionist policies, which claimed to be promoting democracy in Central America. The primary focus of these policies was the destabilization of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the consolidation of anti-communist political

forces in El Salvador, a country where the entrenched elites were unwilling to compromise with the moderate opposition and the rebels had begun to seriously challenge the authoritarian regime.

The Reagan administration swiftly resolved that it would stand firm in El Salvador against "Soviet expansion," by supporting a substantial military and economic assistance program that would prevent the communist rebels from seizing power as they had in Nicaragua. The second part of Reagan's plan involved removing the Sandinistas from power. He terminated all economic aid to Nicaragua and supported the formation of counterrevolutionary guerilla groups, the Contras, with a base of logistic support in neighboring Honduras. Reagan initially rationalized the use of such groups as a means of preventing arms shipments to El Salvador, and later promoted their image as a pro-democracy force that sought to topple the Sandinista regime. Reagan's Cold War policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua resulted in massive violence and violations of human rights in both countries. In El Salvador, the US funneled hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to fund a repressive military government's bloody war against communism; and in Nicaragua, the United States' Contra guerillas engaged the government in a war that cost thousands of lives and ruined the country's infrastructure. In El Salvador, during the civil war, state forces were responsible for killing an estimated 75,000 civilians, or well over 1 percent of the total population. The conflict spilled over also to Guatemala, where guerrillas had been in existence since the 1950s. The civil war lasted until 1996 with over 250,000 persons assassinated, including up to 50,000 *desaparecidos*, and hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals, either at the hands of the armed forces or of the militarized civilian units known as the PACs.³⁴

Since many of those responsible for launching such genocidal practices and massive human rights violations had some training at US academies, we need to address the issue of US influence and responsibility in such atrocities against humanity. While the issue of direct influence is rather clear for the case of Central America under the Reagan administration, the picture is more complex when assessing the US impact on the genocidal practices carried out in the Southern Cone, and reflecting on the impact of US military training. Of course, the US had economic, military, and diplomatic leverage over many of the countries of the Americas, and was confident of its capacity to dictate the course of history south of the Rio Grande. In a recent article, Steven Volk mentions a paradigmatic instance of such self-perception among policy-makers in the US:

Henry Kissinger once famously lectured Gabriel Valdés, Chile's Minister of Foreign Relations to the United States, on the direction of history. "You come here speaking of Latin America," he chided Valdés, "but this is not important. Nothing important can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South."³⁵

In the cases of Chile and Argentina, however, the US discovered to its dismay the limits of its power. During the Nixon and Ford terms, the administration

refrained from joining those countries who criticized Pinochet, maintaining cordial relations with the military regime, while circumventing the US Congress's limitations on economic assistance by ordering its delegates to support loans from international banks to Chile. By late 1976, when Chilean repression and blatant abuse of civil rights gained awareness in US public opinion, the US tried to pressure Pinochet to change Chile's domestic policies, to no avail.³⁶

Nonetheless, the image of the Pinochet regime was seriously tarnished following international campaigns of denunciation led by a strong network of Chilean activists and committees of solidarity. These campaigns led to the disclosures of international terrorist actions led by DINA agents in cooperation with the intelligence and security units of sister countries against the democratic opposition in exile, such as the assassination of General (retired) Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires, the attempted assassination of Bernardo Leighton, a prominent Christian Democrat exile, in Rome and last but not least the murder of Allende's former ambassador to the US and minister of Defense, Orlando Letelier in Washington DC. Progressively, these had an impact on the US. In the words of Peter Kornbluh,

In the United States, Chile joined Vietnam as a catalyst for national debate over the corruption of American values in the making and exercise of US foreign policy. During the mid 1970s, events in Chile generated a major political reevaluation of human rights, covert action, and the proper place for both in America's conduct abroad. The Kissingerian disregard for Pinochet's mounting atrocities prompted an outraged Congress to pass precedent-setting legislation curtailing foreign aid to his regime, and to mandate human rights criteria for all US economic and military assistance. Public revulsion of Washington's ongoing association with Pinochet's brutality prompted a widespread political effort to return US foreign policy to the moral precepts of American society – creating a groundswell that helped elect Jimmy Carter as the “human rights president.”³⁷

For the Southern Cone, the ascent of Jimmy Carter to the presidency in 1977 projected human rights as a centerpiece of US foreign policy. Carter supported various UN declarations condemning Chile for its curtailment of human rights, the State Department invited many of the General's foes for briefings, and the US accepted a large number of political exiles. Once in the country, these exiles energized public opinion against their repressive home government. Following this, Carter temporarily withdrew his ambassador and reduced the embassy's staff. Military assistance was stopped, and the Chilean navy was not allowed to participate in maneuvers with the US fleet. The US canceled credits destined for Chile, refused to insure private investments there, and vetoed Chilean loan applications. The pressure led to some cosmetic concessions, such as the release of a few political prisoners, and the promise to return Chile to democracy by 1991. While this was a major step, Pinochet planned his way out in a way that would institutionalize core aspects of its regime. In 1980 Chilean citizens approved a

new constitution devised by Pinochet's legal advisors, which created a series of authoritarian mechanisms that ensured the irreversibility of some of the main institutional and structural transformations established under the military regime. Moreover, US pressure had its own limitations: as William Sater stresses, General Pinochet proved to be capable of sidestepping Carter's human rights stance. Moreover, Washington's efforts to isolate Chile achieved its goals in antagonizing General Pinochet. After a while, the Pinochet regime criticized Washington for "not taking the lead in a world crusade against communism."³⁸

Under Reagan, many of Carter's actions were annulled, as Reagan advocated a quiet diplomacy toward Chile. By the late 1980s, the domestic and international pressure against Pinochet contributed to the acceleration of the protracted yet planned transition back to democracy, yet under the constitutional terms of the 1980 charter that secured authoritarian enclaves and the maintenance of the economic model in the democratic period starting in 1990.

In the case of Argentina, the pressures of the Carter administration in the 1970s only marginally impacted the junta's genocidal practices. First, Kissinger gave his support for the goals and methods of the "dirty war," without criticizing its repressive methods, at the very same time that the US administration was praising the economic direction of the *de facto* government. Second, the military junta moved to project a false international image of respect for human rights in Argentina, in the belief that they could overcome its critics, that Cold War optics would prevail, and that Carter meant only a temporary shift in US policy. Third, while Argentina supported the US on disarmament issues, it reinforced international relationships with Cuba, Yugoslavia, and other non-aligned states. The Cubans claimed to understand the need for military intervention in Argentina and the Soviets did not put pressure on Argentina due to their own human rights record. A series of miscalculations – the last of which was the Malvinas/Falklands war – served to undermine the capacity of the Argentine regime to institutionalize itself on lines resembling the Chilean success story. It is, however, unclear whether the end of military training programs in Argentina in 1977 and of sales of military equipment by the US had a serious impact on human rights policies. Although the figures of vanished individuals declined by 1978, it was also clear by then that the radical Left had been annihilated and the Argentinean junta continued to pursue its repressive policies, including the mission of military advisors training counterinsurgency forces in El Salvador and Central America between 1978 and 1982.³⁹

Equally important to consider is the training received by Latin American high officers and soldiers at the School of the Americas, or SOA. The School was originally established in the Panama Canal Zone by the US in 1946, catering since 1949 to Latin American students. The US opened the door to Latin American alliances by modernizing outdated military equipment and offering courses on US weaponry. In this way, Latin American militaries became dependent on replacing and purchasing weapons from the US, guaranteeing Latin American allies and also an increased market for the US weaponry industry. After the Cuban revolution, the School changed into the School of the Americas, which

opened in 1963. It moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1984 and operated there until its replacement by the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in 2001. The objective of the SOA included the discouragement of any type of leftist power in Latin America, particularly power inspired by the Soviets or the Cubans. Increasingly, the SOA launched witch-hunts to expel and punish left-leaning civilians who were supposed communist threats. Accordingly, the curriculum of the SOA centered on counterinsurgency operations. Officially, the school was attempting to “create professional soldiers,” while encouraging Latin Americans to learn from the modern, professional US forces. Similarly, the SOA taught courses that encouraged values such as a free democracy and a stable economy in a “well organized society.”⁴⁰ In practice, the SOA indoctrinated the military studying there to repress left-leaning civilians who were supposed communist threats. Accordingly, the curriculum of the SOA centered on counterinsurgency operations. A review of training manuals prepared by the US military and used between 1987 and 1991 for intelligence training courses in Latin America and at the SOA reveals, according to a first-hand analysis, that they advocated:

tactics such as executing guerrillas, blackmail, false imprisonment, physical abuse, use of truth serum to obtain information and payment of bounties for enemy dead. Counterintelligence agents are [were] advised that one of their functions is “recommending targets for neutralization,” a term which is defined in one manual as “detaining or discrediting” but which “was commonly used at the time as a euphemism for execution or destruction,” according to a Pentagon official (*Washington Post*, September 21, 1996). What is *not* included in these excerpts, however, is the larger context. The seven army manuals train[ed] Latin American militaries to infiltrate and spy upon civilians, including student groups, unions, charitable organizations and political parties; to confuse armed insurgencies with legal political opposition; and to disregard or get around any laws regarding due process, arrest and detention.⁴¹

The training manuals did not differentiate between guerilla insurgents and peaceful civilian protestors. Ambiguity was ensconced in the SOA training manuals, according to which a target was “someone that could be hostile or not.” Furthermore, there was explicit instruction on the art of “wheedling,” the SOA term for an inhumane set of interrogation techniques. Other torture mechanisms recommended by the manuals were “prolonged constraint, prolonged exertion, extremes of heat, cold, or moisture, deprivation of food or sleep, disrupting routines, solitary confinement, threats of pain, deprivation of sensory stimuli, hypnosis, and use of drugs or placebos.”⁴²

Graduates of the SOA have been implicated in massive human rights violations. In El Salvador, more than half of all officers cited for human rights violations in a major massacre, including 83 percent of those implicated in the massacre of El Mozote, were graduates of SOA. The UN Truth Commission

report of March 1993 found that two of the three assassins of Archbishop Oscar Romero – also implicated in other human rights abuses, including the organization of death squads – had been graduates of the SOA. In Nicaragua, Father Fernando Cardenal indicted 26 members of the Nicaraguan Guardia with human rights violations including torture, the use of electric shock, and rape. Of the 26 accused, 25 were graduates of the SOA. Among renowned graduates of SOA were General Hugo Banzer who ruled Bolivia between 1971 and 1978; Colombian General Hernán José Guzmán Rodríguez, about whom it is claimed that he protected and aided a paramilitary death squad, MAS, between 1987 and 1990, responsible for the deaths of nearly 150 individuals; Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega of Panama, Rafael Videla, Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina, Humberto Regalado Hernández of Honduras, and Manuel Antonio Callejas of Guatemala. Some of these graduates and others were inscribed in the Hall of Fame of SOA, leading critics of the school to claim that “if the SOA held an alumni meeting, it would bring together some of the most unsavory thugs in the hemisphere.”⁴³

Members of the Latin American armed forces were attracted to the SOA for various reasons. Many considered traveling abroad a valued perk or attendance at the School a *sine qua non* for rising in the ranks once back in the home country. Students did not attend SOA because of their desire to further human rights or promote democracy in their home nation. In fact, students had a poor understanding and lack of regard for human rights, considering it a nuisance or focus of jokes.⁴⁴ Due to the sharing of experiences with fellow military officers, the mutual reinforcement of attitudes predicating the use of violent means was probably reinforced. One should conclude that the SOA experience probably increased the likelihood of human rights violations being followed by its graduates as part of the campaign against the radical Left and its supporters.

Conclusion

Students of international relations have observed with perplexity that during the Cold War period, US leaders were “trying to reconcile the irreconcilable by embracing repressive and corrupt elites while simultaneously attempting to foster democracy and social justice.”⁴⁵ This was not a story of deceit. It rather reflected a crucial contradiction in US policy during the Cold War. Interested in curtailing the advance of the revolutionary Left and radical insurgency in the Americas, the US interest was to find allies interested in supporting the same liberal democratic principles dear to American citizens, starting with the rule of law and individual rights. However, US policies of backing, training, and strengthening the armed forces in Latin America encouraged the forceful takeover of power and the adoption of counterinsurgency methods that tore apart these societies, undermined the rule of law, and produced some of the most atrocious records of crimes against humanity.

In recent decades, democracy has been restored in all these nations. The restored democracies have not been able to undo the long-term effects of such

genocidal practices not only on the victims, their relatives, friends, and peers, but also on these societies and cultures at large. Latin American societies will likely continue to struggle with the grim legacies of their past genocidal practices, and face challenges in a widespread spectrum of issues: from acknowledgment and the construction of collective memory, through psychological healing and reparations, to truth and a sense of unmet justice.⁴⁶ With the progressive declassification of secret documents, the US will likely continue to confront its role and accountability as a hegemonic power responsible in part for the descent of Latin American state rulers into the use of brutal and often even genocidal practices against their own citizens during the last phases of the Cold War.

Notes and references

- 1 I am grateful to Melissa Velarde for her editorial assistance.
- 2 See, among others, P. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; B. Loveman and T. Davies Jr (eds), *The Politics of Anti-Politics*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997; B. Loveman, *Constitution of Tyranny*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993; F. M. Nunn, *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective*, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992; G. Weeks, *US and Latin American Relations*, New York: Pearson, 2008; and notes below.
- 3 See, for example, the outstanding monographs in the series on the United States and the Americas, directed by Lester D. Langley and published by the University of Georgia Press.
- 4 R. H. Holden and E. Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- 5 J. K. Black, *Sentinels of Empire: The United States and Latin American Militarism*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp. 27–8.
- 6 Illustrative also is the following case, mentioned by Robert Holden:

When the *jefe máximo* of Guatemala, Manuel Estrada Cabrera, began to see night fall on his 22 years in power in 1920, he summoned the US minister to his office and, in the latter's words, "placed the entire situation and the fate of the country in our hands and would agree to abide by any decision which we make."

See R. H. Holden, *Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 27.
- 7 Black, *Sentinels of Empire*, p. 4.
- 8 A. M. Kacowicz, "Latin America as an International Society," *International Politics* 37, 2000, pp. 143–62.
- 9 The belated exception is Argentina, which did not break diplomatic relations with the Axis until 1944 and only declared war in 1945 as an implicit condition for joining the United Nations. Similarly, Argentina remained economically attached to the UK longer than other sister-nations, as exemplified in a 1933 preferential commercial agreement known as the Roca-Runciman Agreement.
- 10 Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, p. 121.
- 11 P. García, *El drama de la autonomía militar*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1995.
- 12 F. Nunn, "The South American Military and (Re)democratization: Professional Thought and Self-Perception," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 37, 2, 1995, pp. 7–9.
- 13 K. D. Lehman, *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999.



- 14 The US did so especially since the discourse that attributed corruption to the civilian administrations in Latin America struck a chord in the minds of decision-makers in Washington. J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980.
- 15 Lehman, *Bolivia and the United States*, p. 141. Juan Lechín (1914–2001), a leftist political figure of Trotskyist leanings, was head of the Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers from 1944 to 1987 and served as vice-president of Bolivia in 1960–4.
- 16 This was either in the form of a political system centered on parties, or in the form of contention between an elitist pattern and a populist mobilization pattern. The pivotal force in the political system has been traditionally the executive, which has often overridden the formal powers of the legislature and has exercised strong influence on the judicial system, often curtailing the autonomy of the latter. See L. Roniger and C. H. Waisman (eds), *Globality and Multiple Modernities: Comparative North American and Latin American Perspectives*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002. See especially the chapters by S. N. Eisenstadt, L. Whitehead, and L. Roniger, pp. 7–28, 29–65 and 79–105.
- 17 E. Galeano, *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*, Montevideo: Ediciones del Chanchito, 1987, pp. 435–6.
- 18 A. Pizarro, *De ostras y canibales. Ensayos sobre la cultura latinoamericana*, Santiago: Editorial Universidad de Santiago, 1994, p. 173.
- 19 G. V. Correa, “Otros rasgos históricos de la derecha,” *La Segunda*, Santiago, February 27, 1966.
- 20 J. M. de Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil: O longo caminho*, São Paulo: Civilização Brasileira, 2001.
- 21 J. Dinges, *The Condor Years*, New York: The New Press, 2005. See especially pp. 41–81.
- 22 The initiative was Chilean. See letter by Manuel Contreras, head of National Intelligence in Chile, inviting South American police and intelligence delegations to a secret meeting aimed at coordinating cross-national intelligence, to be held in Santiago on November 25–December 1, 1975. M. Contreras, *Document 00143F0011–0022*, 1975. Online, available at: www.pj.gov.py/cdya (accessed September 26, 2008).
- 23 These factors have been thoroughly studied by political scientists and Latin Americanists such as Giovanni Sartori, Laurence Whitehead, Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan.
- 24 According to J. Patrice McSherry,
- Condor employed complex infrastructures and covert elimination mechanisms (such as burning bodies or throwing them into the sea). . . . The Condor apparatus bypassed the official state judicial and penal structures that remained functioning during the military regimes. . . . Top US officials and agencies, including the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Department, were fully aware of Condor’s formation and its operations from the time it was organized in 1975 (if not earlier). The US government considered the Latin American militaries to be allies in the Cold War and worked closely with their intelligence organizations. US executive agencies at least condoned, and sometimes actively assisted, Condor ‘counter-subversive’ operations.
- See J. P. McSherry, “Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System,” *Social Justice* 26, 4, 1999, pp. 144–5; and see also J. P. McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
- 25 There were differences in the way de facto rulers carried out policies in tandem with a lack of political freedoms and civil rights. In Brazil, authoritarian rulers did not obliterate all the formalities of democracy, such as the Congress and political parties, in order to retain legitimacy. Instead, they carried out intermittent repression along with



- attempts to enlarge social rights while restricting political rights (the suspension of habeas corpus, violation of privacy, censure of media, etc.). In addition, there were exceptions to such visions, as in the case of the Peruvian developmental military rule by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, especially in the first years following the 1968 coup. L. Roniger and M. Sznajder, *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- 26 J. T. Valdés, *El terrorismo de estado*, México: Nueva Sociedad, Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1980; D. Pion-Berlin, *The Ideology of State Power*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989.
- 27 M. A. Garretón, *The Chilean Political Process*, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 70.
- 28 See the declarations of Colonel Juan Deichler Guzmán in P. Politzer (ed.), *Fear in Chile: Lives under Pinochet*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, pp. 20–39; and A. J. Letelier, “Los intelectuales-políticos chilenos,” in W. Hofmeister and H. C. F. Mansilla (eds), *Intelectuales y política en América Latina*, Rosario: Homo Sapiens Ediciones, 2003, pp. 171–98, especially pp. 171–9.
- 29 M. Sznajder, “Entre autoritarismo y democracia: El legado de violaciones de derechos humanos,” in L. Senkman and M. Sznajder (eds), with the cooperation of E. Kaufman, *El legado del autoritarismo*, Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1995, pp. 16–17; and L. Roniger, “Sociedad civil y derechos humanos: Una aproximación teórica en base a la experiencia Argentina,” in *ibid.*, pp. 37–54.
- 30 Piglia has concluded that,
- During the dictatorship, a ‘medical’ story circulated: the country was ill; a virus had corrupted it; a drastic intervention was needed. The military state defined itself as the only surgeon able to operate without delays and without demagoguery. To survive, society had to endure major surgery. Some parts had to be operated on without anesthetic. That was the kernel of the plot: a sick country and a group of physicians ready to save its life. In fact, the story covered up a criminal reality of mutilated bodies and bloody operations. But at the same time the story referred to that reality explicitly. The structure of the terror story conveyed and secluded everything [at the same time].
- See R. Piglia, “Los pensadores ventrílocuos,” in R. Angel, *Rebeldes y domesticados*, Buenos Aires: Ediciones el Cielo por el Asalto, 1992, p. 32.
- 31 J. Simpson and J. Bennett, *The Disappeared: Voices from a Secret War*. London: Robson Books, 1985, p. 66.
- 32 D. Feierstein, “Political violence in Argentina and its genocidal characteristics,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 2, 2006, pp. 149–68. On the ambiguity of defining the enemy and its genocidal consequences in Argentina see G. Levy, “Considerations on the Connections between Race, Politics, Economics and Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 2, 2006, pp. 137–48.
- 33 Nunn, *The Time of the Generals*, p. 201; J. Simpson and S. Bennett, *The Disappeared*, London: Robson Books, 1985, p. 66. In recent years, the armed forces left behind this narrative of saving the nation and their views of society’s collective blame. Their sustained effort to project blame onto others was reflected in their attempt to assume a new narrative according to which they too had been victims of terrorism, a fact often overlooked by society and which determined an unpaid public debt due to their contribution to society at large. See V. Salvi, “Memoria y justificación. Consecuencias de la auto-victimización del ejército Argentino,” paper presented at the Second International Congress on Genocidal Practices, Buenos Aires, Universidad Tres de Febrero, November 2007.
- 34 C. Menjivar and N. Rodríguez, *When States Kill*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005; and especially A. Lauria-Santiago, “The Culture and Politics of State Terror and Repression in El Salvador” and R. Sieder, “War, Peace and Memory Politics in Central America,” both in A. B. de Brito, C. Gonzalez-Enriquez, and P. Aguilar

- (eds), *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 85–114 and 161–89 respectively.
- 35 S. S. Volk, “Chile and the United States Thirty Years Later: Return of the Repressed?,” in S. Nagy-Zekmi and F. Leiva (eds), *Democracy in Chile: The Legacy of September 11, 1973*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005, pp. 24–40.
- 36 Accordingly,
- Henry Kissinger declared that Santiago’s human rights abuses strained Chile’s diplomatic relations with the United States. If the Moneda’s policy failed to change, Kissinger warned, the damage would be considerable. By then, however, Washington had lost much of its leverage on Chile. So much foreign private capital – nearly three billion dollars from 1974 to 1978 [*sic*] – had flowed into Santiago that Pinochet not only did not require American economic assistance, but he even publicly belittled the American offer of twenty-five million dollars in aid. Nor did the US arms embargo discommode Santiago.... Santiago encountered little difficulty in replacing American weapons [with German, British, French, Spanish and Brazilian acquisitions].... Increasingly Santiago manufactured its own weapons as well as assault and armored vehicles.
- See W. F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990, pp. 191–2.
- 37 P. Kornbluh, “Finding the Pinochet File: Pursuing Truth, Justice, and Historical Memory through Declassified US Documents,” in Nagy-Zekmi and Leiva, *Democracy in Chile*, p. 16. See also P. Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, New York: The New Press, 2003.
- 38 Much to Carter’s dismay, Brady Tyson, an aid to UN Ambassador Andrew Young, publicly apologized for America’s supposed role in upending the Allende regime. Since such statements complicated Washington’s foreign relations, the State Department ordered Tyson to resign.... [T]he White House [also] discovered that the international community, contrary to public statements ... opposed Carter’s attempt to mix morality and assistance.... Washington’s abortive attempt to isolate Chile succeeded only in antagonizing General Pinochet ... after flaying US imperialism, the Moneda then criticized Washington for not taking the lead in a world crusade against communism.
- (Sater, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 194–5).
- 39 D. Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained*: Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006, pp. 150–80.
- 40 National Security and International Affairs Division, *School of the Americas US Military Training for Latin American Countries*, Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 1996 (by N. Toolan, M. Forster, K. Handley, F. J. Shafer, and N. Ragsdale). Online, available at: www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/gao96178.pdf (accessed on January 30, 2008); L. Gill, *The School of the Americas*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004, especially pp. 71–3.
- 41 L. Haugaard, “Declassified Army and CIA Manuals Used in Latin America: An Analysis of Their Content,” Latin American Working Group, February 18, 1997. Online, available at: www.lawg.org/misc/Publications-manuals.htm (accessed on January 30, 2008).
- 42 Gill, *School of Americas*, p. 212; Haugaard, “Declassified Army and CIA Manuals.”
- 43 B. Brown, “School for Scandal,” *Commonwealth* 22, 125, 1998, pp. 10–11; K. E. McCoy, “Trained to Torture? The Human Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of the Americas,” *Latin American Perspectives* 32, 6, 2005, pp. 47–64.
- 44 Gill, *School of Americas*, p. 152.
- 45 D. E. Schulz, “Ten Theories in Search of Central American Reality,” in D. E. Schulz and D. H. Graham, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the*



Caribbean, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 55. See also M. Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 79–105.

- 46 On some of these lasting problems in the Southern Cone see, among others, M. Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; Roniger and Sznajder, *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone*; A. C. G. M. Robben and M. Suárez-Orozco (eds), *Cultures under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. On Central America see M. Esparza, ‘Post-war Guatemala: Long-Term Effects of Psychological and Ideological Militarization of the K’iche Mayans,’ *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, 3, 2005, pp. 377–91; R. Sieder, *Guatemala after the Peace Accords*, London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1999; Menjivar and Rodríguez, *When States Kill*. On the long-term impact of ostracism in the region, see M. Sznajder and L. Roniger, *The Politics of Exile*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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