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Political Exile in Latin America

by

Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger

Political exile is a major constitutive feature of Latin American politics. It has contributed to the establishment of the rules of the political game on a transnational basis, both before and after the consolidation of states. It is linked to the tension between the hierarchical structure of these societies and the political models that predicated participation, the process of fragmentation and conflictive territorial boundaries, and the evolution of factionalism into modern politics, spurring civil wars, political violence, and polarization. This article analyzes exile as a selective elite mechanism, its transformation into a mass phenomenon, and the creation of communities of Latin American exiles and expatriates, influential in the framework of transnational politics.

Keywords: *Translocation, Transregional and transnational politics, Sites of exile, Exile communities*

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, exile was an important political practice everywhere in Latin America. Historically, the roots of this phenomenon go deep into colonial times, when translocation and expulsion were widely used against social offenders, outcasts, rebels, and criminals. It was in the early nineteenth century, after independence, however, that it began developing the special political profile and role that persisted, with modifications, into the twentieth century. Translocation and expulsion, instrumental in dealing mainly with social offenders in colonial times, came to be used and abused in the realm of politics, serving as a supplement to incarceration and execution. In the collective imaginary and in the public spheres of these countries, exile became a central mode of conducting politics.

Exile could not be ignored either by those involved in political action or by scholars, but most of these politicians and scholars addressed it in the framework of the national histories of individual countries.¹ In contrast, this article addresses the question on a continentwide basis. Exile is only one of various possible mechanisms for dealing with opposition. As put by historian Félix Luna in his analysis of Juan Manuel de Rosas's dictatorship in Buenos Aires in 1829–1852, the opposition faced prison, exile, or burial after execution—*encierro*, *destierro*, or *entierro* (Luna, 1995: 202). Why, under conditions of mounting violence and authoritarian state rule, did exile become a major political tool? And how did exile evolve into a recurrent feature of Latin American politics?

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POLITICAL EXILE AND ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION

Research has delineated exile as the removal of opponents in a state framework as a result of confrontational politics. The political theorist Judith Shklar analyzed exile in terms of the severed political obligations of governments toward their citizens and the parallel ties of loyalty, fidelity, and allegiance that the exiles may maintain away from their home. In works published posthumously (1998a; 1998b), Shklar suggested a research program on the public implications of exile, indicating that its singularity derives from the existential reflexivity and shattered political obligations of those expelled or forced abroad by their governments: "Exiles cannot do what most people do—accept their political obligations and loyalties as simple habits. Displaced and uprooted, they must make decisions about what sort of lives they will now lead. As political agents they must at the very least think about these decisions and sort out their various and incompatible political duties and ties" (Shklar, 1998b: 57–58).

In the domain of comparative politics, Yossi Shain has studied political exile in the framework of the nation-state, suggesting that exiles move the frontier of loyalty abroad, interacting both with their countrymen in the diaspora and inside the home country and with the international community (1989; 1995; see also Simpson, 1995). While basically correct in portraying the dynamics of expulsion, ostracism, and translocation, these studies view exile as a dependent variable and pay little attention to the shaping of a "culture of exile" and the establishment of the ground rules of politics, which took place in parallel on a continental, transregional basis. An exception in the area of Latin American studies is Brian Loveman's analysis of *de facto* regimes, in which he shows how political exile is related to emergency legislation aimed at excluding the opposition from the political game throughout the continent (Loveman, 1993; 1999).

Beginning with the example of the founding fathers of these states, exile became an important political practice and a permanent factor in the political culture of Latin America. While stemming from earlier practices and resulting from the social and political constraints of early independent life, exile was instrumental in establishing the emergent rules of the political game. In the early nineteenth century and for a long time thereafter, political exile had a regional and transnational dynamic, linked to the birth pangs of the various independent states. Accordingly, exile is to be seen as rooted—in addition to confrontational politics, as emphasized in the literature—in unclear national definitions, fuzzy territorial boundaries, and a shared cultural and institutional background.

In what follows we try to unravel this development, focusing on several analytical axes: the tension between the hierarchical structure of these societies and the political models that predicated participation, the tension between ideas of continental unity and the realities of fragmentation and conflictive territorial boundaries, and the evolution of factionalism into modern politics, spurring civil wars, political violence, and polarization. With the advent of mass participation, exile evolves from a selective and elitist phenomenon into one affecting the lives of the middle and lower classes. This shapes a new dynamics for communities of exiles and expatriates and confers a different kind of political projection on the phenomenon in the international arena.²

SOCIAL HIERARCHY, COMMUNITY, AND POLITICS

The practice of translocation has existed since colonial times. Known as *destierro* in the Spanish realm and expulsion by *degredo* or *desterro* among the Portuguese, it was used against those who disturbed the public peace or were perceived as a menace to their community. The most serious crime according to Spanish jurisprudence was treason against the king, to be punished by death and slavery (Tanzi, 1977: 54–55) or by permanent expulsion from the Americas and loss of honor (Sánchez Bella, de la Heray and Díaz Rementeria, 1992: 390–394). In the Portuguese realm, Brazil soon turned into a destination for deportees. During the sixteenth century a series of royal decrees institutionalized the deportation of criminals from Portugal to Brazil instead of to other parts of the maritime empire. The General Council of the Inquisition also used banishment from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, with nearly four-fifths of all individuals being translocated during the seventeenth century, 49 percent of them being sent from Portugal to Brazil (with Angola in second place, receiving 26 percent of those banished). Local authorities and clergymen in the New World complained from the start against this policy of banishment, which brought to Brazil people of criminal background who were suspected of continuing their criminal activities in the colony (Pieroni, 2000a; 2000b: 31–33).

Translocation from the Americas was to be used selectively, depending on the seriousness of the reason for punishment, and both the translocated person and the authorities in the metropolis were required to be informed about the precise reasons for this procedure. Reflecting a situation of unrest in Peru, in 1568 the king issued a decree granting Francisco de Toledo, viceroy of Peru, power either to pardon or to translocate to Spain “all those who committed any crime,” as the local authorities might see fit in order to “pacify the land.” Yet the High Court of Mexico was instructed in 1530 to expel from the Indies to Spain anyone found liable to commit crimes on the basis of sufficient credible evidence (Encina, 1945: 266–267). With the consolidation of Spanish rule and the establishment of new administrative jurisdictions, *destierro* was increasingly used to translocate individuals within and across American lands, sending people who were perceived as endangering social peace to marginal or distant places (Descalzi, 1978: 87; Herzog, 1995: 18). In the mid-seventeenth century people were expelled from Quito and Peru to Chile and by the end of the century were being held in the prison of Valdivia. Others were sent intermittently to Guayaquil, and until 1750 many were placed on the Isla de Piedra, where they were subjected to forced labor.

Under conditions of lack of manpower, translocation thus served both the function of sending the offender far away from his or her community and providing marginal areas with labor. Borderlands such as those of Chile, where war was being waged against the Mapuche, benefited from the forced translocation of individuals who reinforced the military defense of the Spanish settlers (Urquijo, 1952: 208–209). In Brazil, too, forced translocation was used to push the frontier farther into the interior (Pieroni, 2000b). From Mexico individuals were mainly sentenced to forced labor in the Philippines and other regions of Spanish America, particularly Puerto Rico, where they were drafted into the construction of fortresses and other public services. In the late eighteenth

century *desterrados* were also forcibly enrolled in the colonial army, which suffered from an acute lack of manpower (Haslip, 1982: 203–208, 227).

In parallel, translocation served as a social escape valve. Michael Scardaville, in a sociological analysis of crime and the urban poor in Mexico City in late colonial times, finds that the sentence of translocation was used mainly against those found guilty of *incontinencia* (lack of sexual restraint) and curfew violation. There was a positive correlation between young and bachelor offenders and the use of translocation. In addition, translocation was used particularly against people originally from beyond the city boundaries—migrants from the provinces (Scardaville, 1977: 304–350).

Translocation was originally used within the boundaries of the Spanish and Portuguese empires as part of the administration of justice. It reinforced the image of swift and efficient administration at little cost. Justice was conditioned by the nature of small and close-knit communities, which were unable to punish their transgressors *in situ* and found it easier to transfer the “problem” to another area. Faraway social networks would not stand in the way of justice (Herzog, 1995: 252). Translocation provided ample opportunity for personal decisions and created a tradition in which local authorities enjoyed the discretion to banish individuals who endangered local stability. The use of translocation was widespread and permeated local culture, and it established a strong precedent for political exile.

In the process of disintegration of the Spanish empire, this possibility remained open to those rebels who were part of the social elite and was denied to those belonging to the popular classes and nonwhite ethnic groups. The failed movements of Túpac Amaru in 1780 and the Comunero Rebellion of 1780–1781 provide good indications of the different punishments reserved for individuals of ethnic background. Thus, in the early 1780s, neither the mestizo José Gabriel Condorcanqui (Túpac Amaru) nor the mestizo (or perhaps mulatto) José Antonio Galán was granted the privilege or “doubt” of exile granted to members of the social elite. Both Galán and Túpac Amaru were executed after their rebellions failed in New Granada and Peru, respectively.³

As political struggle permeated society with the wars of independence in Spanish America and, in 1820s–1840s, in Brazil, the option of translocation was projected into the political realm, turning into expatriation and exile. In this transitional period, it was mainly a privilege granted to—or taken by—rebels of upper-class background and activated through the mediation of networks within the context of local hierarchical lines of distinction. Illustrative are the cases of Simón Bolívar in Venezuela, the Carrera brothers in Chile, Francisco de Paula Santander in Colombia, and Agustín de Iturbide in Mexico. Moreover, in the context of factionalism, the alternatives were to get involved in strife or leave. Many other central political actors took the road of expatriation or self-exile. Paradigmatic is the case of José de San Martín, who opted to leave and to end his days far from his homeland, in Europe. The case of Bernardo O’Higgins further illustrates the passage from self-imposed expatriation into exile.

Even though some of the most striking cases of translocation resulted from the wish of political actors to avoid the dangers of exacerbated factionalism’s degenerating into civil war, most exiles were forced to leave their home countries by those in power. The political history of the Andean countries, on the

one hand, and of the Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata, on the other, is pervaded by forced exclusion through exile. Forced exile was the fate of communities of exiles such as those who fled to Uruguay and Chile during Rosas's rule in Buenos Aires and of countrywide leaders such as Artigas, José Fructuoso Rivera, Manuel Oribe, Juan Antonio Lavalleja in Uruguay, and Pedro II, the second and last emperor of independent Brazil.⁴

The case of Bolívar exemplifies how some of the patriots, on the basis of status and social hierarchy, were allowed to leave their countries after defeat instead of facing more severe punishment. In August 1812, Bolívar managed to meet Captain Domingo Monteverde, the royal high authority, through the mediation of Francisco Iturbe, a community member highly respected in loyalist circles and a distant friend of Bolívar, and was allowed to leave for Curaçao in spite of his previous participation in the revolt against the Spaniards (Lovera De-Sola, 1992: 23–36 and 67–68).

The case of the Carrera brothers in Chile further illustrates the social underpinnings of banishment and merits analysis. José Miguel Carrera was one of the central figures of early struggle for Chilean independence. In 1811–1813 and 1814 he led two governments of what became known in Chilean history as the "Patria Vieja" (Old Fatherland). Prominent members of an aristocratic family from Santiago, Carrera and his siblings Juan José, Luís, and Javiera soon found themselves opposed to Bernardo O'Higgins, the commander of the patriotic forces in 1813–1814 and later Supreme Director of Chile, as well as other patriotic figures. As San Martín and O'Higgins managed to consolidate their military forces and to cross the Andes in 1817, liberating Chile from the Spaniards, the Carreras and their allies in Chile and Buenos Aires increasingly found themselves on the defensive. They continued to oppose O'Higgins and were forced to live abroad, as exiles.

In mid-1817, the Carrera brothers hatched a plot against O'Higgins in the belief that they would be backed by powerful allies who were affected by the antiaristocratic policies of the new Chilean ruler or offended by the arrogance of the Argentine commanders in Chile. They also assumed that they enjoyed the support of former royalists, whose lives and properties were under threat. The plot was discovered, and the brothers Luís and Juan José were brought to trial both in Chile and in Mendoza. Whereas in Chile a conciliatory approach was adopted, in Mendoza the Carrera brothers were imprisoned with the intention of sending them to a distant land to neutralize them. But when their siblings José Miguel and Javiera tried to liberate their imprisoned brothers and lead a rebellion against the local authorities in Mendoza and in Chile, a new trial for treason was initiated, and the two prisoners were sentenced to death.

On the eve of the August 1817 Carrera plot, nobody thought the reaction against the plotters would be execution. The Chilean historian Francisco Encina (1947: 530–531) describes the prevailing frame of mind on the eve of the rebellion:

Doña Javiera, while throwing her brothers into the unsuccessful plot . . . believed that in the worst of cases they risked prison or a *destierro* to Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro, which would be easy to evade. The concept of the political crime was not yet born. To conspire against a government in the face of the enemy was a reprehensible act for the partisans of that government. For the rest, it was a right

linked to the concept of freedom and, from the perspective of Andalusian mentality, a gallant act of bravery. Besides, the Carreras were part of Santiago's aristocracy, which . . . showed itself inimical to the political scaffold. . . . The execution of its members, whatever the political interests or the crime committed, was not even conceived as possible.

The physical elimination of the conspirators was an extreme measure, a step to be avoided if possible. A worthwhile comparison is the case of Manuel Rodríguez, an uncontrolled guerrilla fighter who had conspired with the Carreras against O'Higgins. When his role in the affair was discovered, he was made to sign a declaration of repentance. Later, he was even nominated to high administrative positions by both San Martín and O'Higgins. The usual way of punishing conspirators was prison or translocation to a place from which they could no longer act politically.

The tensions between the old aristocratic expectations of translocation and the pressures due to the opening of politics to participatory models exploded, shattering the norm inherited from colonial times. Until 1821, when he was executed by a firing squad, José Miguel Carrera led a relentless power struggle against O'Higgins and those responsible for the execution of his brothers. Nonetheless, exile continued to be widely used in the following decades, since the death penalty for leaders of opposing parties could be a stepping stone on the way to civil war.

A common way of bridging over political confrontations and thus avoiding tragic results was the mediation of social networks. We have mentioned the case of Bolívar's leaving Venezuela through the intercession of Iturbe with Captain Monteverde. Toward 1827 Bolívar found himself, as president of Colombia, confronting his vice president, Francisco de Paula Santander, and deciding his fate with social networks interceding on the latter's behalf. The situation reached a point where the vice president came to fear for his life and wrote to Bolívar asking to be allowed to leave Colombia (Cortázar, 1953–1956, vol. 7: 403):

In case the government cannot guarantee my personal rights against certain aggressions, I implore your excellency to give me a passport to exit Colombia with guarantees for me, three servants, and my luggage, since natural law requires me to seek a safe place, in spite of the law and my destiny as vice president, rather than expose myself to become a fruitless victim of ill will and vengeance.

After a failed coup d'état in September 1828, Santander, who did not participate, was nonetheless sentenced to death in a clearly political trial. Members of the elite and the Church raised their voices interceding on his behalf (Archivo Santander, n.d: 96). The Council of Ministers deliberated on the issue and issued a statement advising that Santander's life be spared (Rodríguez Plata, 1976: 77–79, in Moreno de Angel, 1989: 467; and see Santander, 1963):

It will be in the interest of the government to commute the death penalty into the cancellation of employment and translocation [*extrañamiento*] from the Republic, prohibiting him from reentering the territory without a special permit from the Supreme Government; under the condition that if he fails to abide by the terms

of this prohibition, any judge or military chief could give him the death penalty in the place of his capture; and that his properties should be kept as deposit, without any possibility of selling or mortgaging them, to function as a security bond so that he will not break the prohibition and to be confiscated in the future in the event that he violates the prohibition. . . . The Council is of the opinion that, by taking this road, the vengeance of justice [*sic*] will be satisfied, while the government will get the love, admiration, and respect of the governed and thus attain the needed peace and trust of the citizens.

Bolívar commuted the death penalty to exile, but Santander was imprisoned again for seven more months in Cartagena, and only after the intercession of José Antonio Páez in Venezuela was he able to leave for Europe and the United States.

Exiles could never be sure of the possibility of returning to the homeland. In these personalistic polities much hinged on power shifts—the loss of power or the death of rulers. Such shifts could transform exile into a springboard back to power. Santander returned to Colombia in October 1832, after Bolívar's death, as elected President of the Republic, following the restitution of all his military honors.

Return from exile in circumstances in which the political scenario did not change radically could produce a tragic end. This was the case of Agustín Cosme Damián de Iturbide (1783–1824), the ruler of the short-lived independent empire established in Mexico. Soon after he was declared emperor in May 1822, Iturbide faced growing opposition from those coveting greater political powers. Republican elements led by General Antonio López de Santa Anna and buttressed by federalist forces representing regional interests rebelled. A tug-of-war ensued as these forces tried to impose new parliamentary elections to force the legal dethronement of the emperor. In March 1823 Iturbide resigned and was allowed to leave Mexico for Europe, with an entourage of 27 members that included his family, secretary, and servants. He explained his decision as a way to maintain social peace and avoid civil war (Anna, 1978: 189–215). Once on the Old Continent, he was treated as an exiled monarch. In Mexico rumors abounded about Iturbide's planning to come back as the head of an army provided by the Holy Alliance. The government enacted regulations allowing the state to send to exile without trial any person suspected of conspiring against the republic. In parallel, as he moved from Livorno to England, the Mexican Congress blocked his pension payments and ordered the death penalty in the event of his return to Mexico. In May 1824, unaware of the latter decision and rejecting José de San Martín's advice not to return, because an act of this kind would probably trigger a civil war, Iturbide decided to come back. As soon as he arrived, he was taken prisoner and summarily executed.

Gradually, the return of exiles became linked to policies of amnesty and pardons aimed at achieving "national reconciliation." This trend opened up the issue of political and administrative reincorporation of exiles into society and sometimes even into the ruling coalitions and inner circles of power. Interesting but far from exceptional is the case of Chile, where under conditions of early state consolidation the state sought to diminish the friction provoked by civil strife by reinstating the privileges, pensions, and ranks of formerly translocated individuals (Loveman and Lira, 1999: 85–95).

In this transitional period exile functioned as a mechanism regulating tensions in polities in which the presence of strong opposition leaders could lead

almost by default to a zero-sum political game and civil war. Political factionalism, while widespread, was perceived as extremely dangerous. The social closeness of elites and the traditional forms of exclusion of wider strata conditioned the forms of politics, with exile evolving as an alternative to imprisonment and execution. The latter had greater social costs and could lead to civil war and a zero-sum game in politics (Earl, 2000). By sending away those who led the defeated faction—what would be considered the opposition in a more developed political context—rulers could claim to be moving in a lenient way toward the organic unity that they claimed to embody.

Ideas and interests could not be detached from a politics of leadership, and exclusion became a ruling principle. The opposition could be demonized and stigmatized as a divisive force conspiring to destroy society while the rulers claimed to be reestablishing its cherished and broken unity. Thus exile, a mechanism of political exclusion, could be represented as a source of harmony. All these processes were carried out without opening windows to a more pluralistic vision of politics. While they were in exile, the lives and even the excluded leaders' properties were respected, but when they attempted a comeback, the risk of a zero-sum game was so high that many of them paid with their lives.⁵

In societies with deep social cleavages and relatively narrow elite circles, rulers preferred political exile to other means of political exclusion. The existence of a tradition of colonial translocation and the hierarchical background of these societies were important factors in shaping this tendency. As early as 1951, John Johnson (1992: 198) observed that

one of the earliest grounds for upholding asylum and exile stems from the rigid caste system, carried over from the period of Spanish domination. The jails and prisons—poorly constructed and with few provisions for sanitation and comfort—were unfit, or so it was thought, for the elite of society; and it was this group for whom diplomatic asylum was almost wholly reserved. . . . Coincidental with these considerations was the more widely used defense of saving the most capable manpower. . . . In ensuing struggles for power, diplomatic asylum and exile served to offer the surest and most economical means of conserving the ruling class. The loser, whether morally right or wrong, was assured a place of retreat so long as asylum was respected.

Elites were interested in avoiding, as long as possible, a situation of total war that could weaken their hold over the whole social matrix. This possibility could become a reality if they launched a cycle of mutual retaliation, creating long-term blood feuds, or were forced to open up the political game to growing numbers of supporters from the lower strata. At the same time, because the conditions for imprisonment were seen as unsuitable for members of the elite, a prison sentence was a harsher measure than exile and as such was used as a threat. Social networks, friendship, family ties, and clientelistic followings played into the above system of power in favor of a nontotalistic solution: political exile.

TRANSREGIONAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS

In early independent Latin America, in a situation of undefined borders, exile was not conceived in terms of modern political asylum. Rather, individuals

forced to move to other regions conceived it as a tactical escape of the sphere of influence of their persecutors, the rulers of their home society. While they were beyond these rulers' sphere of control, translocated individuals perceived themselves not as foreigners but as "patriots" moving within the borders of the Great American fatherland or as expatriates waiting to return to the homeland (Brading, 1994; 1998). With the passage of time, the translocation of "political enemies" beyond the areas directly controlled by the new state became a factor in the effective definition of borders between the newly formed states.

An outstanding example of the transregional dynamics conditioning translocation and the emergence of exile is that of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile in the nineteenth century. Connections between Peru and Alto Peru (later Bolivia) had existed since Inca and colonial times. Similarly, in the colony, territorial links connected Peru and Chile, with many instances of the relocation of individuals from Peru in Chile, which constituted the outer frontier for the Lima authorities. The links between Peru and Alto Peru were weakened between 1776 and 1809, when Alto Peru was incorporated into the newly created Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with its capital in Buenos Aires, but became relevant again with independence (Klein, 1982). While the centralist Peruvian constitution of 1828 required that the president be a Peruvian by birth, in fact many of the figures who shaped Peruvian history from the 1820s to the 1860s were natives of other regions in what are now Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. These include Andrés Santa Cruz, Juan José Flores, and José de la Mar, the leading caudillos who fought, plotted, expelled each other from power, and ruled Peru in that period (Barragán, Cajías, and Qayum, 1997). There was a lack of any separate national consciousness. When in 1828 the Peruvian General Agustín Gamarra invaded Bolivia, claiming it indivisible from Peru, many Bolivians defected to his camp and made his job easier (Guzmán, 1983: 78):

Since the Bolivian nationality was recently established and there were old ties and sympathies between Lower and Upper Peru, nobody thought with guilt, or considered it treason, to belong to Peru if the invasion eventually had that aim, or to remain in the new Bolivian Republic. The masses in particular ignored the political question stirred by the quarrelling parts.

The political game was dominated by caudillos who were attempting to unite Bolivia and Peru—to append part of Bolivia to Peru or the other way round, as in the attempt by General Andrés Santa Cruz to establish a Peruvian-Bolivian confederation. The governments of Peru and Bolivia were deeply involved in each other's domestic politics for decades. Many of these "national" leaders expelled each other or fled from Peru or Bolivia, mainly to Ecuador or Chile, and back. Once abroad, they sought a temporary stronghold from which they planned a return to power, supported or opposed by the political forces in the host societies. In the context of internal strife and translocation, those in power established the rules of the game of exile and return. In general, the sanctuary offered by host countries was respected, while attempts to return were severely punished, often with death (Basadre y Chocano, 1953: 7–20 and 272–275; San Cristóval, 1941: 54; St. John, 1992: 23–43; Walker, 1999: 124–128).

Since the crystallization of the new states did not preclude overlapping territorial claims, the political class of each region continued to exercise extensive

influence on the neighboring countries (Guerra, 2000; Morelli, 2000). The case of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile is not unique. During the dictatorship of Rosas in Buenos Aires and as federalist caudillos ruled the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (later Argentina) and the Banda Oriental (later Uruguay), individuals favoring centralization and liberalism and members of the young intelligentsia went into exile in both Uruguay and Chile (Katrak, 1996). Many of the leaders of Uruguayan independence, starting with José Gervasio Artigas, went into exile to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Political exiles moved between Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador as well as within the Caribbean area, Central America, and Mexico.⁶

We identify at this stage a three-tiered structure in which displaced individuals and communities of exiles played an increasingly important role in the plans of regional hegemony of the host countries and within their home countries' strategies and pressures on the states hosting them. Political classes intervened in the configuration of the other country's political factions, according to their own interests. When the faction they sided with was defeated, they often hastily accepted the vanquished political actors in their territory, hosting them and even supporting their plans for return—still playing regional politics in spite of defeat. They acted in this way so as to regain control of the neighboring political scene or at least exercise their influence by strengthening sympathetic political allies. When the defeated faction was inimical to their political script or design, they could still host the expelled individuals and control their freedom of action, thereby curtailing the possibilities of plotting against their ally, the ruling government in the neighboring country.

The presence of exiles was tolerated and even fostered as a political tool to be used by the host country in relation to the political scene in the exiles' home country. This attitude not only impinged on the country of origin of the exiles but also contributed to the establishment of rules of membership in the host political community. While exiles were used in transregional power games, they were often precluded from intervening in the local politics of the host country. Liberals such as the Argentine political exiles who settled in Chile lived under the conservative and authoritarian presidential regime without being able to influence local politics according to their ideological visions. Exiles were welcome as long as they did not interfere in internal politics or sided with the rulers in power. When they took positions contrary to the government, they were immediately expelled (Halperin Donghi, 1980: 500).

While abroad, the exiles and émigrés continued to be deeply divided into factions that struggled with one another, claiming to represent the collective will and seeking to gain the support of the host governments as they drafted plans for the invasion of their home country. For their part, hosts were willing to support such military campaigns whenever they coincided with their geopolitical interests and supported their control of the exiles' leadership.

The exiled leaders were heads of clientelistic networks of followers that accompanied them into exile. Once back in power, the returning leaders rewarded those who had taken the road of exile with them. When Gamarra was reinstated in power in July 1838, he gave eminent posts to those exiles who had accompanied him in Chile. The new government declared the Peruvians who had lived in exile "meritorious in the highest degree" (Basadre, 1968). Prone to suffer the consequences of deep factionalism, these networks

demanded personal allegiance, reinforcing a dichotomous view of political forces, which were thought of as divided into friends and foes.

Exile thus became in this period a major feature of political life. When the polities reached higher levels of institutional consolidation, exile as part of an exclusionary politics of exit was already internalized in their political tradition, prevailing over what Albert Hirschman (1970) has called the more open and pluralistic politics of voice.

Because political exile had become a recurrent aspect of their political life, Latin American countries began to debate the right of asylum. Delegates of these countries discussed asylum for the first time in the 1860s and 1870s, and this led in the late 1880s and 1890s to early drafts of a South American corpus of norms of international private law and international civil and penal law (Díaz and Rodríguez de Ita, 1999: 68). The first document in this legal corpus was produced by the First South American Conference on International Private Law in Montevideo in 1889. In 1911 the Andean countries reached agreement on extradition in a congress in Caracas. The Central American countries reached a parallel agreement in Guatemala in 1934.

Inter-American treaties on asylum and political refuge were signed in Havana (in 1928), in Montevideo (in 1933), and in Caracas (in 1954). The 1928 treaty denied the right of asylum to common delinquents, while the 1933 agreement clearly defined the legal framework of political asylum. Most American nations adhered to the treaty and ratified it; Venezuela, Bolivia, and the United States were exceptions. In 1939 in Montevideo these understandings found their way into a comprehensive regional treaty. The Tenth Inter-American Conference produced an agreement on political asylum in 1954, declaring in its Article 2 that "every state has a right to concede asylum but cannot be forced to concede it, or to explain the reasons it denies it" (Unión Panamericana, 1961; Franco, 2001; Díaz and Rodríguez de Ita, 1999: 63–82; Yundt, 1988). This reflected the consensus shaped in the interwar period in Europe and elsewhere concerning the perception of asylum as a prerogative to be granted by states depending on the gravity and nature of the political crime committed (Larousse, 1928: 324). While the 1928 and 1933 treaties dealt with asylum mainly in diplomatic terms, the 1954 treaty devoted parallel attention to the territorial aspect of asylum. The Caracas congress dealt with this aspect explicitly after the renowned case of Víctor Raúl Haya de La Torre, founder of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance—APRA) in Peru. With his party outlawed in 1948, he had spent five years practically imprisoned in the Colombian embassy in Lima (Luna, 1962: 39–40).

The issue of asylum was a focus of concern in Latin America even before it reached global attention. Internationally, it was only in the 1960s and specifically with the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1967 that Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was enforced, as the Declaration recognized that the grant of asylum by a state "is a peaceful and humanitarian act and . . . , as such, it cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other state" ("Declaration," 1967).

In the 1980s and 1990s, following the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees in Central America, a series of Latin American congresses

organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) brought together government officials, UN agents, professional experts, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss the humanitarian and legal problems of asylum and refugees. The major events were those in Tlatelolco in 1981, the declaration of Cartagena in 1984, the conference in Guatemala in 1989, the meeting in San José de Costa Rica in 1994, and the meeting in Tlatelolco in 1999 (Franco, 2001: 176–177). The Latin American countries were ahead of others in developing mechanisms of institutionalization of asylum in the international arena. The persistent elaboration of these treaties reflects the recognition of political exile as a continental and transregional problem. And yet it reflects as well the consolidation of the nation-state as both the expeller and the host of the local troublesome oppositions of its sister countries.

The incorporation of new groups into politics, especially in the twentieth century, with the enlargement of the franchise came to dilute the character of exile as a phenomenon of elites and its replacement by exile as a phenomenon affecting members of all classes and strata and thus merging and becoming blurred with the widespread phenomenon of refugees, increasingly recognized by the international community. While the older types of expatriates and exiles, related somehow to strife at the centers of political or economic power, persisted, this experience became part of the lives of wider groups affected by cycles of violence, repression, and persecution and thus opting to take the road of exile.

Thus political exile became radically transformed and intensified. The entry of the masses into politics and their mobilization with populism and in its aftermath, during the cold war, magnified the extent and costs of political polarization, leading to massive political escape from harsh repression. As polarization increased and local national security doctrines were enforced through military dictatorships, the phenomenon of political exile and translocation spread beyond the boundaries of the political class and became a mass phenomenon. From the mid-twentieth century on, tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of Chileans, Uruguayans, Argentines, Brazilians, Paraguayans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Cubans, among others, felt forced to leave their home countries as a result of political repression and fear of persecution, in addition to other personal and economic considerations.⁷ Once abroad, these larger groups formed communities of exiles and refugees in the host countries.

EXILES AND EXILE COMMUNITIES

Some locations attracted more exiles than others. A central question about those locations concerns the interplay between personal choices and opportunities and the receptiveness of the host countries. These choices concern, first, how individuals interpret and react to physical, material, and social constraints under pressure; second, the relative attractiveness of the host countries in terms of distance, climate, language, institutional support, and economic, professional, and educational opportunities; and third, the relative importance of communities of exiles that may facilitate the integration of the newcomers. And yet what ultimately shapes the fate of these individuals is (*a*) the personal resources, human and social capital, of the persecuted individuals (for example, the networks they

have abroad and their capacity for enacting them in dire times), (b) the policies of possible countries of asylum and their variable implementation by diplomats on the spot, and (c) the support or lack of support provided by different networks, including transnational organizations, ideologically related groups, and various NGOs.

The arrival of successive waves of exiles turns a host country into a pole of exile. Once there is a community of exiles interacting with the local society, coming to understand its cultural practices and ideas, and learning how to move around vis-à-vis employers and the local authorities, how to go to the market, and how to interact socially, it is easier for further waves of fellow exiles to find their way around. The old-timers may also become a bridge for the newcomers. One of the crucial factors is the formation of a critical mass of exiles in terms of numbers and continuity in residence, which can create among the locals an image and ethos of reception of exiles. For the newcomers, the presence of old-timers, both prior exiles and other fellow countrymen forming a community and a diaspora, can help to lessen alienation and create a certain sense of normalcy. A facilitating factor is the sense of shared interests or complementary visions between the political exiles and the host society.

Among the major poles of attraction were Santiago and other Chilean cities (such as Valparaíso and Copiapó) and Montevideo in the early nineteenth century, Caracas, Mexico City, and San José de Costa Rica in the twentieth century, Buenos Aires and Argentina in general for Paraguayan and other exiles, Montevideo and La Paz for the Brazilian exiles of the 1960s, and the United States for those coming mainly but not only from Cuba, Mexico, and Central America. Among the European exile locations, Paris exerted a special attraction throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with other centers in twentieth-century Spain, the UK, Italy, and Sweden (Estrade, 1984; Guerra, 1998).

Political stability was a basic factor in transforming the above sites into places of exile. Even when the host country would not qualify as a liberal democracy according to Western standards, several factors conditioned the flow of exiles there, among them the combination of the political will and capacity of the host country to receive exiles, their exclusion from politics in the host country, and a relatively free environment to develop their own culture and activities related to their home countries. The case of Mexico became central as early as the Porfiriato and remained so for many decades after the Revolution. Under Porfirio Díaz entire groups such as the Yaqui Indians of Sonora were repressed and forcibly translocated. At the same time, political stabilization created a context favorable to the reception of political exiles, many of elite and upper-class backgrounds. The major wave of such exiles came from Cuba and to a lesser extent Puerto Rico, which were involved in their struggles for independence from Spain.

A second wave of exiles arrived in the 1920s, when political exiles fled Venezuela for Mexico as well as for other Latin American countries, the United States, Spain, and France. These individuals were fleeing from the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez, who was president of Venezuela intermittently between 1908 and 1935. Formerly exiled in Colombia, once in power Gómez used his country's oil wealth to effect infrastructural development while he built up a strong army and a secret police force to consolidate his rule. Serious dissent met

with swift punishment, exile or imprisonment. In that period, Mexico opened its doors to political exiles from all over Latin America, projecting an image of revolutionary progress and willingness to grant hospitality and asylum to other “progressive” forces and individuals. This image would reach its peak with the arrival of Spanish Republican political exiles in the late 1930s. During the years that followed Franco’s victory, tens of thousands of Spanish émigrés arrived in Mexico, while smaller contingents arrived in Buenos Aires and other Latin American cities (Fagen, 1973: 24).⁸

Mexico ratified all the Latin American treaties and held three conventions on asylum, becoming one of the eight states in the region to have done so (Melgar Bao, 1997). In contrast, its general immigration policies were restrictive, especially concerning access to citizenship. Hans Wollny, who has studied asylum policies in Mexico, identifies a basic tension there between the rationale for these policies and the interests of the refugees themselves. He observes that Mexico’s asylum policy was never exclusively humanitarian but heavily influenced by political affinity, employment policies, national development strategies, and even racial prejudice, as in the case of the Jewish refugees who were denied entry during World War II (Wollny, 1991: 223).⁹ The impact of these regulations on immigration is illustrated by German immigration to Latin America. Between 1933 and 1945, about 110,000 German refugees, of whom more than 90 percent were of Jewish origin, resettled in Latin America; at least 45,000 went to Argentina, some 25,000 to Brazil, and some 12,000 to Chile, while Mexico admitted only around 2,250.

And yet the Mexican Revolution had created an ethos of solidarity that prompted the reception of the Republican refugees and, later on, of other persecuted groups and individuals of progressive leanings. The Spanish exiles were the first group to be offered the right of unlimited immigration and almost automatic citizenship following arrival in Mexico, and most of them opted to become Mexican citizens. The integration of the Spanish exiles was facilitated by the shared linguistic and cultural background and the professional qualifications of the newcomers.

After the late 1940s a formal distinction was made between political refugees from countries in the Americas and those fleeing persecution in other countries and continents. Mexico maintained a strict immigration policy toward refugees from Europe even after the war. While more than 32,000 individuals went to Argentina, 28,000 to Brazil, and 17,000 to Venezuela, the number in Mexico was less than 1,000. The migration laws introduced at the end of 1947 and the implementing act of 1950 gave clear preference to immigrants from the American continent. And yet being granted refugee status did not really guarantee better legal standing than that of any other alien in Mexico. For all migratory categories, even the simple exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights remained explicitly under permanent danger of being expelled from the country by the authorities (Wollny, 1991: 219–236).

In the 1950s, a period of political turbulence throughout Latin America, Mexico received a host of exiles escaping from the dictatorships of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, François “Doc” Duvalier in Haiti, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Carlos Castillos Armas in Guatemala, and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Rooted in the postrevolutionary tradition, Mexico granted hospitality and political

asylum to the persecuted antidictatorial and progressive forces of Central and South America.

For Latin Americans fleeing repression in the 1950s, Mexico's proximity to their homelands could be turned into an asset as they tried to regain power in their countries of origin. Paradigmatic is the case of the Cuban exiles, who used Mexico as a point of access to the United States, a source of arms and financial support, and the place from which they envisioned and eventually succeeded in overthrowing the Batista dictatorship in 1959 (Morales Pérez and Alizal, 1999: 179–186).

Following the failure of the attack on the Cuartel Moncada in July 1953, many members of various opposition groups suffered persecution and left Cuba for Mexico. After their release Fidel Castro and other political activists went into exile in Mexico in July 1955. In Mexico Castro joined his brother Raúl and other exiles and met Ernesto Guevara ("Che") for the first time. In the late 1950s Castro's Movimiento 26 de Julio became one of the most active organizations of the exile. Many other organizations were formed or flourished in Mexico, among them the Organización Auténtica, the Directorio Obrero Revolucionario, the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), the Juventud del Partido Revolucionario Cubano, and the Club de Exiliados José Martí. The exiles enjoyed their image as fighters for freedom in the homeland. Castro and others traveled to the U.S.A. and raised money for their anti-Batista activities. Back in Mexico, they initiated a series of military training programs, enrolling both Cubans and Mexicans in the cause. Through the intercession of lawyers and local public figures (including former president Lázaro Cárdenas, who contacted Mexican President Adolfo Ruíz Cortínes on their behalf), pressure from the Cuban diaspora in the U.S.A., and the wide coverage in the Mexican and American press, the exiles were allowed to remain in Mexico. The government of Batista continued to put pressure on Mexico, presenting formal complaints and spreading misinformation, throughout the whole period in an attempt to curtail the activities of the exiles. Nonetheless, the latter managed to continue their underground activities, buying a small ship—the *Granma*—with which Castro and 81 followers launched their invasion of Cuba in late November 1956 (Morales Pérez and Alizal, 1999: 210–222, 179).¹⁰

In the case of other exiles, asylum was granted by Mexican diplomatic missions on the continent. Some of the best-known cases of this "diplomatic asylum" occurred in Guatemala in 1954, where 318 persons were granted asylum in the Mexican embassy after the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz, and in Brazil in 1964 after the coup d'état that deposed President João Goulart, when more than 100 individuals were able to leave the country after being granted diplomatic asylum. In postrevolutionary Cuba, especially after 1964, when the Mexican delegation became the only one of all the Latin American countries that remained open, Mexico granted asylum even to those who had sought refuge in other Latin American embassies, whose governments had severed their diplomatic relations with the island. Thus, a substantial number of Cuban exiles reached Mexico. However, for the majority Mexico was an intermediate stop on the way to their final destination: the United States. The experience of the Mexican authorities with this type of exile activity and some international considerations led to changes in the law on asylum aimed at better controlling the political activities of exiles (Ley General, 1987).¹¹

During the military repression of the 1960s and 1970s, the phenomenon of Latin American exile assumed massive proportions. After the 1964 military coup thousands of Brazilians fled their country for Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and, later on, Argentina (Rollemberg, 1999: 61–88).¹² According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, there were between 8,000 and 10,000 refugees from Bolivia and more than half a million each from Chile and Argentina after these countries' coups d'état in 1971, 1973, and 1976, respectively. The number of those who left Uruguay after 1973 was estimated at half a million, although not all cases were politically motivated.

Many South American exiles had to change asylum countries several times, especially after the military takeovers in Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, when their personal safety was no longer guaranteed against secret-police activity from their home countries in association with the security forces of the local dictatorship, in the framework of the Condor Operation.

For those settling in Mexico, the most reliable figures seem to be those of the 1980 population census, which speaks of 5,479 Argentines, 1,106 Brazilians, 3,345 Chileans, and 1,553 Uruguayans (Yankelevich, 2001: 233). These numbers coincide with those provided by the UNHCR, according to which at the beginning of the 1980s there were about 10,000 South American refugees in Mexico. However, estimates vary widely. Unofficial sources report the presence of ca. 11,000 Argentines, 10,000 Chileans, and 2,000 Uruguayans in Mexico (Wollny, 1991: 225–226). Carlos Ulanovsky (1983), employing unofficial statistics, estimates the number of Argentines alone at over 5,000 (he also mentions 12,000) in Mexico City in this period. Mario Margulis (1987) puts their number between 8,000 and 8,800. Of this number, about 800 Chileans, 400 Uruguayans, and 65 Argentineans were granted political asylum. Mexican diplomatic missions played an important though variable role in the rescue of those persecuted by the military regimes of South America.¹³

The wave of armed conflict that destabilized Central America in the late 1970s and early 1980s sparked a severe refugee crisis. Civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador and major counterinsurgency operations by the Guatemalan military created an unprecedented flow of refugees. For the first time, Mexico was confronted with a major refugee crisis in its territory. Salvadorans made up the largest group, followed by Guatemalans and Nicaraguans. The number of these refugees in Mexico was estimated to be at least half a million.¹⁴ Nevertheless, only 46,600 had received UNHCR assistance by the end of 1987. Beginning in 1983, the Mexican government stopped recognizing Salvadorans as refugees. The authorities claimed that Salvadorans were economic migrants and refused to grant them asylum status or any other way to legalize their presence in Mexico. If caught, Salvadorans had to provide documented proof of employment or face deportation. Although they were, by and large, well-educated young people belonging to the urban middle classes, government officials portrayed them as a problematic and undesirable population (Yundt, 1988: 139).

Mexican immigration authorities saw the mass of Central American refugees as economic migrants rather than as victims of political persecution and implemented a policy of deportation and—at times—harassment. Between 1980 and 1982 at least 70,000 Salvadoran refugees were deported from Mexico to Guatemala or directly to El Salvador. Some estimates put the number of Central

Americans deported annually to their home countries at over 46,000 (Wollny, 1991: 231). The reasons for this included the country's economic situation, its complex relationship with the United States, and not least the fear that Mexico itself might become involved in the political turbulence of the region.

Guatemalan refugees confronted even greater obstacles: members of an indigenous rural population that had been the subject of discriminatory policies in its native country, they were mostly illiterate and poor. Moreover, even though Guatemalans shared an ethnic background with the inhabitants of southern Mexico, many of them spoke not Spanish but their own languages, and this greatly impaired their ability to fit in. Most of them entered Mexico as refugees, fleeing the counterinsurgent campaigns of the Guatemalan army and paramilitary groups. They tended to settle in improvised camps near the border, mainly in Chiapas and to a lesser extent in Campeche and Quintana Roo, hoping to return as soon as it was possible and sharing cultural and linguistic ties with the local population. Mexico, a country with a traditional policy of asylum, confronted in this case a unique situation in which, in a relatively short time, more tens of thousands of Guatemalan peasants crossed the border. The fact that these refugees were of lower-class origin added pressures to preexisting problems of access to land. As a result there was a change in foreign policy in this period. Mexico pursued the pacification of Central America to stop the flow of refugees and facilitate the return of the refugees in its territory. At the same time it expelled illegal migrants by the thousands while granting asylum to only 58 individuals. In a survey of Guatemalans in Mexico City conducted in 1984, 80 percent of the sample said that they had left their country for political reasons, while 73 percent did not possess any kind of document, 13.6 percent had tourist visas, and 3 percent had received political asylum. In Chiapas, the Mexican government implemented a policy of resettlement to neighboring states but by 1987 had managed to persuade only about 18,200 peasants to move. The government granted the remainder documents as border visitors or agricultural workers, and the diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas and UNHCR provided them with support (O'Dougherty, 1987: 213–217).

Mexico became the prototypical place of exile in the twentieth century but was far from being the only such place. In the Caribbean area Venezuela emerged as a pole of attraction for exiles after its democratization in 1958. In this case the image of a stable and pluralistic political system was important to politically persecuted individuals from countries ruled by dictatorships. Venezuela's oil prosperity made possible the relatively swift incorporation of the newcomers into the labor force. Revolutionary Cuba officially received activists from the left escaping repression in other countries, as did Nicaragua under Sandinista rule. After the 1964 coup, Brazilian politicians and activists found shelter in Uruguay and Chile. Allende's Chile became a pole of attraction for left forces between 1970 and 1973. After the military takeovers in Uruguay and Chile, Argentina received many exiles who later were forced to escape once again, after the Argentinean coup of March 24, 1976. Paraguayan exiles traditionally found shelter in Argentina, suffering the consequences of the military repression during the Operation Condor (McSherry, 2002).

In turn, the consolidation of the international arena, buttressed by cross-national NGOs and a range of networks, led to international human rights law and the recognition of political exile and right to asylum. The triangular structure

of exile analyzed above underwent a core transformation once a fourth increasingly important element entered the exile equation: a global arena preoccupied with humanitarian international law and human rights.

Redemocratization in the 1980s and 1990s opened up the possibility of the return of exiles to their home countries. This possibility transformed the exiles remaining abroad into members of more or less permanent diasporas far beyond what had existed before. Although predicting the disappearance of political exile would be premature, it seems that after almost two centuries of independent political life exile is on its way to becoming exceptional, as procedural forms of democratic contestation and participation become normative and are followed in political practice.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis indicates the framework in which exile crystallized as a major mechanism for regulating political conflict in the past two centuries. Under the prevailing conditions of incipient institutionalization of independent polities, exile became instrumental in establishing the changing rules of the political game. It was especially well suited to regulating the internal struggle of elites in the new polities. It reflected a trade-off between the desire to rule in an authoritarian way, excluding the political opposition, and the unwillingness to conduct such struggle through executions, which would lead to mounting violence in a zero-sum game of physical elimination. The very existence of the new polities could be endangered in the framework of escalating civil wars, repression, and dislocation. In this framework, exile both reflected processes of political transformation and was a constitutive factor in creating the new rules for Latin American politics.

When political systems broadened participation in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, exile was already an established feature in the political cultures, the imaginaries, and even the internal and interregional law of these countries. This broadened participation turned exile into a mass phenomenon, adding to the central political figures persecuted activists, union leaders, peasants, workers, students, professionals, and other members of the middle and lower classes. As thousands of individuals moved abroad to escape political persecution, communities of exiles developed throughout the continent as well as in Europe, and various places attracted successive waves of politically persecuted individuals and groups.

In the period preceding the consolidation of state boundaries and national identities, exile played into a three-tiered structure in which the translocated individuals and the communities of exiles were important in the definition of interregional politics, becoming political tools for both host and home countries and thus helping to define the boundaries of membership, loyalty, and political obligations. Along with the consolidation of national borders and identities, a series of norms and agreements about diplomatic and political asylum were developed in the region. This trend was strengthened when the international arena began to produce regulations and laws that became the basis of a fourth tier recognizing the right to asylum. Thus the triangular structure of political exile in early independent times shifted in connection with the

transnational dynamics of Latin America, contributing both to international awareness of the problem of exile and to the elaboration of new norms linked to international law and human rights.

This examination suggests that political exile is dynamic, hinging on political action, evolving and changing along with processes of political institutionalization and deinstitutionalization and the reformulation of political ground rules. It indicates as well that exile has been both the result of political processes and a constitutive factor of political systems in Latin America for most of the past two centuries.

NOTES

1. Recently a number of works have addressed exile in terms broader than national history or biography. Two trends can be discerned. One stems from the study of *lieux d'exil*, primarily Paris as a center of attraction for Latin Americans but also relating to poles of expulsion and attraction in the Americas (Yundt, 1998; Guerra, 1998; Fey and Racine, 2000). The other is literary and, although it refers to earlier periods, is mainly anchored in twentieth-century writings, reflecting the pronounced impact on exile of political repression and the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s. Many works in this line are strongly permeated by cultural criticism, multiculturalism, and postmodernist emphases (Da Cunha-Giabbai, 1992; Vázquez and Xavier de Brito, 1993; Rowe and Whitefield, 1997; Queiroz, 1998; Lagos-Pope, 1999; Naficy, 1999; Kaminsky, 1999; González, 2000).

2. Exile is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be analyzed from a sociological, psychological, historical, cultural, anthropological, economic, literary, artistic, and geographic point of view. It relates not only to expulsion from a country but also to reception by host countries, to a dynamics of longing for return, and eventually to the return itself. It involves processes of transnational, regional, and global acculturation and translocation of political, social, administrative, and cultural models from abroad to the home society. We are aware of these complexities but cannot deal with all of them within the limits of an article.

3. On Túpac Amaru, see among others Cahill (1998) and O'Phelan Godoy (1988: esp. 308–320). On Galán and the *comuneros* see Gómez Latorre (1973: 242–263) and McFarlane (1993: 248–271). The ethnic identity of Galán is unclear (Lynch, 1989: 34).

4. Whereas Brazil was somewhat exceptional in reaching early stability under the aegis of Emperor Pedro II and thus became a center of attraction for exiles escaping from persecution in the Spanish American republics, with the founding of the Republic the emperor and his family were banished and forbidden to own property in Brazil and in 1889 were forced into exile with a small entourage (Barman, 1999: 364–397).

5. A prominent example is that of Francisco de Morazán, president of the Central American Federation in the 1830s, who was executed in San José de Costa Rica in 1842 after returning from Panamá. His execution signaled the final death of the federation (see Zúñiga Huete, 1982; Bethell, 1991: 13–22).

6. The United States and Europe also became poles of attraction and asylum for Latin American exiles. European sites such as Paris attracted other migrants, businesspeople, students, and expatriates in addition to exiles as part of the diaspora community.

7. In this period it is often difficult to trace a clear-cut line between political exile and economic migration (Faist, 2000; Roniger and Sznajder, 1999). In earlier periods, the distinction was rather sharp, with political exile distinguished from the broad movements of migrant workers settling in neighboring regions in search of a livelihood (Vallejos and Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, 1997).

8. Figures run between 15,000 and 40,000.

9. Mexican immigration laws from the 1920s onward acquired a strong xenophobic character. The immigration regulations of June 1932 emphasized the preference for foreigners likely to be easily assimilated to the Mexican human environment, described in the document as those of Latin or Western European origin, belonging to the white race, excluding Slavs, Jews, Gypsies, Africans, Mulattos, Hindus, Asians (besides Japanese, Filipinos, and Hawaiians), and any other

mixed color. The regulations passed in 1933 and 1934 were even more extreme in their discouragement of the immigration of "undesirable foreigners" (see Carreño and Zack de Zuckerman, 1998: 87).

10. The departure of this expedition from Mexico led to new formal complaints by Batista that forced the Mexican authorities to advise the Cuban exiles to be careful not to violate the laws of asylum. Still, material support for the rebels continued to be mobilized in the country, and the authorities were forced to expel one exile to Miami and reprimand the others.

11. The legal limitations that regulated the presence of foreigners in Mexican territory were in existence already in the Mexican Population Law of 1947 (*Ley General de Población*), which, in its Article 33, allowed for the expulsion of foreigners whose presence was "inconvenient" to the national interest.

12. Typical among the exiles fleeing repression were prominent figures of the political and intellectual left. Most of the popular leadership met again in Montevideo under the leadership of the deposed president João Goulart, former governor Leonel Brizola, and the anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro, among many others.

13. One of the best-known cases was that of the Argentine former president Héctor J. Cámpora, who entered the Mexican embassy with his son and the Peronist politician Abal Medina in April 1976. Cámpora remained in the Mexican embassy for more than three and a half years because of the refusal of the military government to grant him safe-conduct. He was allowed to leave only after the terminal nature of his illness was established. His son left a year later to attend the funeral of his father. Abal Medina was allowed to leave only in May 1982, after spending more than six years in the embassy.

14. In 1987 the number of Salvadorans residing illegally in Mexico was estimated by the Mexican coordinator for Salvadoran refugees to be at least half a million. More than 110,000 Guatemalans and a few thousand Nicaraguans must be added to this number. UNHCR estimates for May 1986 indicated that at least 1 million and perhaps twice that many had been displaced by the generalized violence afflicting the region (Yundt, 1988: 135, 139). According to Wollny, the number of refugees alone surpassed 1.3 million. Of these, Salvadorans made up more than 1 million, while the numbers of Guatemalans and Nicaraguans were estimated to be around 200,000 and 63,000 respectively. However, he warns that all estimates need to be handled with reservations (1991: 228).

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