

**Review Article**

**Political Clientelism, Democracy and Market Economy**

Luis Roniger

Jean-Louis Briquet et Frédéric Sawicki eds. *Le clientélisme politique dans les sociétés Contemporaines* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).

Javier Auyero, *Poor People's Politics. Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita* (Duke University Press, 2000).

Simona Piattoni, ed. *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Clientelistic practices and patronage-ridden politics are widely found in many contemporary societies, in post-Communist settings, emerging markets and in some of the oldest democracies. In the 1960s and 1970s an interpretive approach dominated the studies in this field, which assumed that clientelism was a vestige of early modern development and that political and economic modernization would render it obsolete and, ultimately, end it. Since the 1980s the systemic persistence of clientelism – and the patronage associated with it – has been recognized. And yet, only in the current third wave of research, analysts have begun research on the institutional sequences and valid indicators of political clientelism, tying in their concerns with issues of interest to political science such as democratic governance and interest representation. Thus, even when scholars of the current wave returned either to historical studies or to studying the "third world", as well as in their studies of developed democracies, they brought new convictions, concerns and tools to these studies.

Defining Clientelism

Historian Richard Graham characterized clientelism as an action-set built upon the principle of “take there, give here”, enabling clients and patrons to benefit from each

other's support as they play in parallel at different levels of political, social and administrative articulation.<sup>1</sup> Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange - a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and markets from which others are normally excluded. This access is conditioned on subordination, compliance or dependence on the goodwill of others. Those in control – the so called patrons<sup>2</sup>, sub-patrons and brokers – provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their favour. Their partners – the so-called clients – are expected to return their benefactors' help, politically and otherwise, by working for the patron at election times or boosting the patron's prestige and reputation.

In the political realm, clientelism is associated with the particularistic use of public resources and with the electoral arena, and entails votes and support given in exchange for jobs and other benefits handed over by incumbent and contesting power-holders as favours. It can become a useful strategy for winning elections and building political support, e.g. in the form of majorities in Congress, through the selective release of public funds to supporting politicians and associates or the acceptance of political nominees as personnel in state-related agencies. As such, it is a strategy of partial political mobilization, which differs from more universal patterns such as programmatic appeals or mobilization motivated by parties' achievement records.

Vincent Lemieux claimed that clientelism triggers a 'double transformation' in the statuses of individuals: as the client renounces his/her autonomy as a citizen, the patron leniently weakens the hierarchical controls s/he possesses *de facto*. As a result, the client gains a measure of dominated power and the patron gains a position of dominating authority.<sup>3</sup> Even when binding, the resulting arrangements are not fully legitimate and remain open to attacks by countervailing forces stemming from competing networks, from the mobilization of alternative organizations in civil society or from among central elites willing to undermine clientelistic controls in the political arena, the administration and the access to economic markets.

Beyond this general understanding – and despite nearly four decades of work in this domain – researchers still differ in their assessment of clientelism and in the approach chosen for the study of this multifaceted phenomenon, at the crossroads of politics and administration, economy and society. Is it a form of patrimonial

corruption of public agencies, evident for instance when politicians and officials distribute public services and jobs as a personal patrimony, in a restricted, arbitrary, secretive and unchallengeable way that is particularly important when people tend to assiduously cultivate personal connections (in horizontal cliques or vertical clientele entourages) within a context of low institutional trust?<sup>4</sup> Is it the cause or the result – or both – of biased institutional reliability? Should it be studied in the framework of networks, friendship and exchange or as part of rent-seeking and corrupt strategies of government functions' 'colonization'?

Researchers also differ in their view of the institutional viability and significance of clientelism in late modernity. Many students of clientelism stress that it neutralizes the system of representation and entitlements, by placing associates and 'friends' in strategic positions of public power and control. From this perspective, clientelism is inimical to the institutionalization of public accountability and to mechanisms of administrative control, creating situations of over-employment and under-qualified personnel in the public administration, of biased bidding for public works and over-pricing. Secluded negotiations and private deals involving public resources are typically mentioned by researchers pursuing this analytical line.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast, other scholars emphasize the pragmatics of social action, stressing that clientelism is an important mechanism for obtaining transactional benefits, in resource allocation and for providing local-regional-national mechanisms of articulation. While clientelism and patronage run counter to universalistic standards, scholars following this second analytical perspective have claimed that it is nevertheless sensitive to local sentiment, may solve existential problems, provide access for migrant populations, and serve political entrepreneurs. In this sense, they have pointed out that clientelism and patronage practices (in the form of favours, jobs or selective development projects) may adjust to post-modern logics and civil society more than is usually expected. As Public Administration Professor Ayşe Güneş-Ayata pointed out:

Although in principle postmodern forms of participation are vastly different from their pre-modern counterparts, both stand in sharp contrast to modern institutional forms. Both search for flexible solutions oriented toward individual needs, taking private concerns into consideration and integrating everyday concerns as public issues.<sup>6</sup>

In this paper I shall reassess these issues by reviewing new works on clientelism, stemming primarily from political science but also from history, anthropology and sociology.<sup>7</sup> The discussion addresses the wider implications of these analyses within the framework of current trends in civil society, democracy and market economy.

### The New Wave of Works on Clientelism

In the late 1990s and early 2000s there has been a new upsurge of works on clientelism, a kind of third wave of research and production, carried out beyond and based upon a first strong outflow in the late 1960s-early 1970s and a second wave in the 1980s and early 1990s.

The first wave involved case studies along with important attempts in conceptualization, carried out particularly by anthropologists and political scientists. Among the pioneer works are ground-breaking analyses by René Lemarchand, Luigi Graziano, Keith Legg, James Scott and Carl Landé.<sup>8</sup> However, most studies assumed that clientelism and patron-client relationships would eventually disappear, in the course of development or with the establishment of ‘well-functioning’ democracy. Part of this misconception was due to the perception of clientelism as an archaic phenomenon particular to traditional and agrarian settings and to the conflation of changes in clientelism with its eventual demise. Indeed, many studies described traditional patron-client relations in peasant societies and among recent migrants to the cities, in situations of extreme scarcity and lack of empowerment that favored the formation of agrarian and urban captive clienteles. In parallel, research soon identified a second type of clientelism that entailed the distribution of state resources (jobs, contracts and services) in exchange for political support associated with various forms of patron-brokerage and organizational brokerage. Alex Weingrod conceptualized in sharp lines the contrast between traditional dyadic patronage and modern party-directed clientelism by focusing on the degree of segmentation or integration of local sectors within nation-states. Weingrod was one of the first to allude to explicit variables in his distinction between these different forms of clientelism (e.g. the scope of exchange, forms of resource control and the balance between power and instrumental considerations).<sup>9</sup> This approach reflected and buttressed the typological convictions and developmentalist concerns of his time. Perhaps due to its clear-cut developmental emphasis, this work was a major influence

on leading case study research in anthropology, history and political science for many years after.<sup>10</sup>

The second research wave expanded the range of studies worldwide and involved major attempts by social scientists at systematization of the field, in addition to historical works tracing back clientelism to early modernity and even antiquity.<sup>11</sup> The implicit assumption of the earlier studies – that clientelism is typical of peripheral and semi-peripheral settings – gave way to greater awareness of its ubiquity also in parts and sectors of the developed democratic and communist polities.<sup>12</sup> In terms of analytical advances, research identified clientelism as a model of social exchange and a specific strategy of political mobilization and control.<sup>13</sup> The research community gained a rather comprehensive set of understandings on clientelism, in terms of coalitional strategies, center-periphery relations and clientelistic exchanges. Among these we may indicate that clientelism involves complex (often pyramidal) networks of patron-brokerage selectively reaching different strata, sectors and groups, and selectively pervading political parties, factions and administrations; that, in many cases, clientelism assumes an addendum-like character, ancillary to democratic institutions, and only seldom does it become a major organizational mechanism, as it did in the decades-long one-party rule of the PRI in 20<sup>th</sup> century Mexico. Also, clientelist strategies are affected not only by immediate considerations of power and instrumentality, but often encompass longer evaluations of reciprocal benefits and commitment as the prerequisite for the maintenance of ongoing relationships. Clientelist bonds involve the exchange of instrumental, economic and political resources interwoven with expectations and promises of loyalty and support, in a type of ‘package-deal’ - i.e. none of these resources are exchanged separately at their simple market value, but rather in a combined deal which imbues them with broader social and political meaning.<sup>14</sup>

The interest of the profession in the workings of civil society, informal institutions and citizens-politicians linkages rekindled the interest in clientelism in the 1990s and early 2000s, in a sort of third wave of research. Conferences are convened and publications appear which try to address the seemingly anomalous character of clientelism in late modernity from new vantage points. Indeed, clientelism runs against the ideal model of democratic life and autonomous civil society, as it has been intensively discussed in the last twenty years.<sup>15</sup>

Among the books of the current wave, the collective volumes edited by Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (*Le clientélisme politique dans les sociétés contemporaines*), by Simona Piattoni (*Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*) and case studies such as Javier Auyero's *Poor People's Politics* stand out. Auyero's analysis is rooted in ethnography and builds a bottom-up portrayal of the practical, performative and symbolic aspects of clientelistic relationships that developed between Peronist political activists and their constituencies in contemporary Argentina.<sup>16</sup> The books edited by Piattoni and by Briquet and Sawicki bring together works by political and social scientists, government and organization researchers and some historians, and aim explicitly (Piattoni) or implicitly (Briquet and Sawicki) at reaching generalizable arguments on the institutional hold of political clientelism. Country-wide studies such as Rigby's and Afanasiev's analyses of the Russian Communist and post-Communist system,<sup>17</sup> and regional studies as Susana Corzo Fernández's analysis of Andalucía or Michella Morello's study on the Mezzogiorno are of great interest as well.<sup>18</sup> Mario Caciagli's short theoretical excursus on clientelism, corruption and organized crime is important owing to its synthetic review of the literature, but its publication in Spanish restricts its potential impact.<sup>19</sup> Also worth mentioning are various other studies of clientelism in Spain and France,<sup>20</sup> Latin America<sup>21</sup> and Islamic societies.<sup>22</sup> Beyond their different approaches, ranging from micro-analysis to comparative political studies, most of these books share a concern with clientelism's systemic resilience and its parallel change of format in the contemporary scene.

The new studies suggest moving analysis beyond the realm of formal principles and ideals - be they those of universal citizenship, of procedural or bottom-up participative democracy - towards the real workings of democracy, citizenship and civil society. For example, they suggest focusing on patronage practices through tracing identifiable parameters such as the political use of public jobs ("political jobbery") or the biased use of developmental projects as a means of patronage.<sup>23</sup> Some of these works, particularly those dealing with contemporary cases, address the issue of the changing role of political clientelism along with recent transformations in the workings of civil society, democracy and market economy. They share the widening understanding that, together with other forms of particularistic engagements, clientelism is an enduring feature of politics and that the rising tide of neoliberalism has only increased its presence in many contemporary societies, while

in others it may be leading to a more marginal role. These works emphasize that political studies should distinguish between changes in clientelism and the actual demise of clientelism. They suggest moving analysis beyond an either/or conceptual framework – phrased in terms of presence versus absence of clientelism – to research on patterns of clientelism and patronage amid changing trends in civil society, political institutions and market economy. In this fashion, they search for concrete institutional contexts favoring or constraining clientelism in liberal democracies, post-authoritarian polities and historical societies.

### Paradigmatic Shifts and Views

As any other key concept in the social sciences, clientelism is open to conceptual disputation, paradigmatic disagreement and empirical debate.

In the last decade and a half it has become increasingly accepted that clientelism is not doomed to disappear, and, yet, that it has changed and continues to change, at times in radical ways. Part of this change is due to the transformed climate of democratic empowerment and discourse of civil society. On the basis of studies of Brazilian politics, Robert Gay has recently called attention to an interesting phenomenon that is taking place nowadays. As the new social movements revolutionize politics, establishing alternative discursive arenas, challenging dominant practices and achieving at the very least a measure of symbolic power, new constituencies committed to the ideal of rights emerge. This in itself does not eliminate the reliance on clientelism, yet it reshapes the terms in which relationships are expressed as well as the tactics employed by those using them, from ‘favors’ in a patrimonial sense to public services that clienteles demand as their own right. According to Gay, in Brazil and probably in other settings as well, clientelism seems to be increasingly

a means to pursue the delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods. This means that political clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and administrations. In other words, contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical and relational elements *and* elements of collective organization and identity.<sup>24</sup>

Piattoni too, in her introductory chapter to *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic*

*Representation*, indicates that individuals – at least in Europe – are no longer forced to enter a clientelist deal by material and political circumstances, but rather may choose to do so in order to gain privileged access to public resources.

Moreover, they increasingly do so as members of broader categories of individuals with ground for claiming publicly allocated resources. The patrons, in turn, are no longer secure of their power basis, as this depends on the political consensus that they muster. Nor can they be sure that the “clientelistic deal” will be honored... Once these trends are taken into account – that clientelism is becoming more and more bureaucratized and impersonal and tends to involve entire categories of persons in the role of both patrons and clients, and that enforcement becomes more and more difficult – it becomes increasingly clear that clientelism is but a variant of particularistic politics – “politics as usual,” we would be tempted to say – and that singling it out as cultural pathology and developmental distortion is wrong.<sup>25</sup>

In this sense, while more personalized and less structured on a formal level, clientelism is more akin than expected to interest groups, political influence and the use of lobbying techniques adapted to a democratic context. And, as such, it can be subject to analysis with tools successfully applied to the latter, e.g. goal-oriented and cost-benefit approaches or methodologies designed to study competitive market environments, as in Barbara Geddes’ *Politician’s Dilemma* or in Carolyn Warner’s *Confessions of an Interest Group*. For instance, Geddes attempts to bridge structuralist arguments with intentional (rational-choice) arguments, by analyzing how institutions shape individuals’ incentives in government and how individuals choose policies and actions against this background. More specifically, she tries to understand the politician’s dilemma in patronage-ridden politics: whether to engage in reform or turn posts into political plums. Her study, based on a projection of the prisoner’s dilemma onto the political realm, identifies a tension or contradiction between the politicians’ short-term need for political survival in these settings and the long-run collective interest in economic performance and the improvement of state capacity. The analytical framework then allows for the conducting of cost-benefit studies on how this tension is played out empirically in various institutional contexts.<sup>26</sup> Luis Fernando Medina and Susan Stokes have recently used this approach in trying to assess, in the case of Argentina, “why might people voluntarily take part in an exchange that most authors claim is bad for them,” instead of supporting more

programmatic appeals regarding either prospective policy or past performance by parties.<sup>27</sup>

Being a political practice, clientelism is profoundly marked by the codes of signification of different political and administrative systems and public cultures. Briquet and Sawicki, in *Le clientélisme politique dans les sociétés contemporaines*, associate the systematization and adaptation of clientelistic practices with the changing capacity of negotiation by political actors and the discourses of public legitimacy that empower voluntary forms of association in the contemporary world. As an intervening variable between institutional arrangements and political outcomes, clientelism is sensitive to both the democratic-electoral logic and the bureaucratic logic. Consequently, the interplay and sometimes tension between these two logics is reflected in its enactment.<sup>28</sup>

Another issue derives from clientelism's susceptibility to contradictory interpretations. In the past, debates - in which scholars took sides - emerged about its relative emotional or coercive character.<sup>29</sup> Today, scholars are more willing to contemplate the parallel coexistence of multiple vantage points on clientelistic attachments, partially determined by the institutional matrix and the contrasting interests of patrons and clients. In other words, as it is an informal practice rooted in the interface between the socioeconomic and the political, and at the same time influenced by current discourses, clientelism can be simultaneously represented (and others may claim, disguised) in contradictory ways. It can be portrayed as lopsided friendship and a control mechanism, as commitment or investment, as a favor or as functional to the advancement of rights and popular demands. As an analyst of Brazilian society puts it:

[T]he problem is that we have become so accustomed to thinking of clientelism as a mechanism of institutional control – often referred as corporatism – or the product of ‘false consciousness’ – often referred to as populism – that we have failed to consider the possibility that clientelism might be embraced as a popular political strategy. ...Under such circumstances, clientelism has less to do with the exchange of votes for favors, than with the exchange of votes for what political actors would like to present as favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim as rights.’<sup>30</sup>

This brings into new light the logics of subordination that James C. Scott identified in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, based upon earlier analyses of forms of control and subordination. In the settings Scott studied, e.g. rural Malayan society, the shared critique of domination crystallized in hidden transcripts, which were typical of social arenas sequestered from the immediate control of the dominant.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, in contemporary Western polities many individuals entering a clientelistic network enjoy greater leeway and legitimacy to express demands and interests in terms of the powerful idiom of political and civil rights. And, yet, some of the ambiguity, tensions, contradictions and plural meanings attributed in the past to the structures of domination, as analyzed by Scott, remain in the new forms of clientelism. Studies of clientelism should pay increasing attention to linguistic disguise, ritual codes, trust and distrust and widely accepted images of appropriate behavior. These symbolic dimensions are crucial as they affect political practice, impacting upon the struggle for power, the forms of subordination and mobilization, the use and abuse of networks, and the prospects of resistance and rebellion. As clientelism is open to constant challenges and imbalances, renegotiation and change, research must take into account these dimensions of symbolic construction and struggle. Auyero's book is an important contribution in this direction, because it shows how clientelist networks are constructed, maintained, and "performed" publicly. His work indicates that, objectively, while these networks attempt to structure an exchange of votes for favors, they are often subjectively experienced as part of a brokers' performance that "explicitly and emphatically deny the political content of their actions."<sup>32</sup>

The new studies of clientelism are related also to a widespread trend of reflection on the shortcomings of Western-style parliamentary democracy. Many ask themselves whether parliamentary democracy is the best achievable form of governance. Others decry its erosion, wondering whether the introduction of direct democratic procedures such as citizens' initiatives and referenda could help reduce public apathy and dissatisfaction with politics and politicians, and perhaps encourage the growth of committed participation in public life.<sup>33</sup> Many of these analytical approaches and criticisms derive from a widespread drive to measure the realities of any political process against the ideals of democracy, universalism and citizenship.<sup>34</sup> Clientelism and its study are part of a parallel attempt, which should be encouraged, to avoid conflating the political process with the ideas and formal guidelines of

democracy or any other political system. Reaching toward the middle ground of effective political processes, studies of clientelism reflect a rising interest in “real” politics and the actual workings of civil society.<sup>35</sup>

### Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation

The collective volume edited by Simona Piattoni attempts to reconsider the literature on clientelism within the framework of interests and democratic representation, analyzing the European experience from a historical and comparative perspective. The authors consider that “*politics is inherently particularistic* and that what makes the difference is how particular interests are presented, promoted, and aggregated”, thus recognizing that “a certain degree of particularism in politics cannot be suppressed.”<sup>36</sup>

[T]he relationship between accepted political ideologies and forms of particularistic politics is not that of an ideal to its corruption, but rather a dialectical relationship between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically possible. Clientelism is just one of the historical forms in which interests are represented and promoted, a practical (although in many ways undesirable) solution to the problem of democratic representation.<sup>37</sup>

By following the lead of Martin Shefter’s work, the contributors of this collective volume attempt to identify both the formative experience of more or less clientelistic settings and the issue of the conditions of transformation and possible demise of clientelism. In *Political Parties and the State*, Shefter emphasized, as central explanatory variables, the relative timing of bureaucratization and democratization as affecting the likelihood of political parties employing patronage or making programmatic appeals to the public. While the avenue of patronage is blocked for “externally mobilized parties”, i.e. for parties that do not occupy positions of power in the prevailing regime and thus opt for programmatic appeals, “internally mobilized parties” with a grip on state resources can choose between strategies. According to Shefter, the strategy the latter parties adopt is conditioned by the structure of broader coalitional politics, which in some cases underwrites either a ‘bourgeois autonomy’ or a ‘bureaucratic functional autonomy’, limiting the appeal of patronage in such cases. Nonetheless, so goes the argument, once in existence, clientelism creates a strong

path-dependence in those settings in which it flourished during the formative period of their political system.<sup>38</sup>

This analytical line is tested by the contributors to *Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation*, leading to a nuanced and rich reading of single case studies or chapters built upon two cases. While the reader may object to the small-N methodology used, the case study approach is here at its best, taking into account institutional design and historical timing.

Illustrative is Apostolis Papakostas' analysis of the dearth of clientelism in Scandinavia, based upon a comparison of Sweden and Greece. Strongly committed "to avoid the tendency of Western intellectuals to contrast idealized political *models* with corrupt political *practices*," the author suggests that it is the development and maintenance of universalistic state practices that has to be explained as much as the development of particularistic state practices. From a contemporary perspective one is tempted to talk of historical legacies. Papakostas prefers to indicate that looking at Greece and Sweden from the range of possible paths of development in early modern times, "these societies were more similar historically than has been assumed. They have become more different as this spectrum of alternatives was gradually narrowed down to the established alternatives".<sup>39</sup> He analyzes in detail how both clientelistic and universalistic practices result from different historical sequences and ways of drawing up organizational boundaries between the state, political parties and social interests and classes. Specifically, his analysis indicates that Greece adopted modern Western institutions at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and expanded political representation throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, including electoral reforms, universal male suffrage in 1844 and parliamentary institutions in the 1870s. Borrowing blueprints from Western Europe gave the state a highly legal-formalistic character. The state was slow in its vertical incorporation of peripheries, whereas partisan mobilization and mediation by parties led by local hierarchies became of paramount importance. This in turn made it impossible to depersonalize issues and define them as bureaucratic cases. Patronage and political clientelism displaced bureaucratic autonomy along the entire social ladder and sealed the centrality of politics as an entrenched feature of this country's political culture.

In Sweden the expansion of the state and the extension of franchise followed a different institutional sequence. A strong state predated the creation of modern democratic practices, well-equipped with a capacity to collect information and control

mass education, taxation and regulation. State and political parties remained differentiated and separated. As the Swedish state integrated local interests, respecting social hierarchies, the lower classes were insulated, and the role of the political parties in mediating between state and society was reduced. Patronage remained restricted to the upper classes and did not expand over the entire society. Political representation, as well, excluded the vast majority of proletarianized peasants and industrial workers. Toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a whole range of independent political and social movements organized the excluded strata, aggregating citizens' interests.

Later on, when these social organizations became part of the welfare administration, they transmitted the popular proximity that they had already acquired into the welfare state, making for a bureaucracy that was sensitive to popular feelings and yet implemented welfare policies impartially. ...Citizens' multiple, and in many ways exceptional, demands and needs could thus be transformed into routine cases with few exceptions.<sup>40</sup>

In the case of Sweden, this sequential process shaped differentiation, popular proximity and bureaucratic impartiality toward the citizens. In Greece, a patronage-ridden polity crystallized as the realms of state and politics became intertwined with strong political and social ties. This generated the state organs' selective approach toward the citizens and gave political entrepreneurs "the opportunity to mediate between the citizen and the indifferent bureaucracy and thus exact a clientelist fee". As a result, "the universalistic tendencies in the Greek state, for long periods, look like islands in a sea of particularistic networks."<sup>41</sup>

In his contribution, Frank O'Gorman challenges truisms on path-dependence that classify societies into those geared toward and those free from patronage and clientelism. Rather than following the lead of an initial institutional setup as a blueprint for path-dependence, the author presents as an alternative – at least for the English case – a long-term analysis of progressive transformations in the uses and abuses of patronage until that polity effected a transition to meritocracy by the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>42</sup> O'Gorman shows that the change in the use of budgets by politicians as means of rewarding followers and winning 'friends' was gradual, that it began within the governing establishment itself, as a kind of political response to public outcries against the perceived corruption that accompanied the loss of the

American colonies in the 1770s. As such, it preceded the emergence of mass politics and mass political parties. Within a context of growing concern with information, in the rapidly multiplying clubs of England, the reform of the state administration was adopted

to placate a wider public opinion and, by doing so, maintaining the confidence of the public in the social and political elite (...) By the middle of the nineteenth century the governing establishment was satisfied that political stability could be maintained by a range of alternative strategies, including extensions of the electoral franchise, the mobilization of mass political parties, the modernization of local government, and, not least, the meritocratic system of appointment to and promotion in the public administration.<sup>43</sup>

The timing and sequencing of processes thus seem to be crucial in the articulation of clientelism, by creating a certain balance between broad and limited access to politics and public spheres, between centralization and decentralization of decision-making and, especially, between the relative empowerment of political forces opposing and supporting clientelism.<sup>44</sup>

Drawing upon dense case studies or upon the comparison of contrasting experiences, the contributions in *Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation* are hardly generalizable by themselves. Nonetheless, as the authors achieved publication following a series of conferences and meetings, during which they developed a common vocabulary and shared approach to the study of clientelism, the book maintains coherency and adds important hind-sights on a wide spectrum of cases and counter-cases of clientelism in Europe. Included in the book are Sweden, the Netherlands, France or Iceland, along with more commonly analyzed case studies of clientelism in Italy, Spain, Greece, and of its curtailment in the UK.

The authors reject the culturalist argument that clientelism is peculiar to certain societies and cultures, an argument they associate with Robert Putnam in *Making Democracy Work*.<sup>45</sup> Those in favor of the culturalist position stress that certain groups and societies have developed, to a greater extent than others, an ethic of particularism, which legitimates clientelist politics, thus increasing government staff and state spending. In contrast, Piattoni and her colleagues endorse a neo-institutionalist analysis based on the economic aspects of clientelist exchange. And while Shefter relies on the supply side of clientelism (as controlled and used by political parties), these authors suggest paying equal attention to the demand side of

clientelism (as a strategy for those willing to accede to resources). Nonetheless, without even noticing, they bring culture back into the analysis, since the structure of demands is grounded on individual and group preferences, which are far from contingent and vary across polities and sectors.

With this qualification in mind, their institutionalist perspective is important for future studies of clientelism, as it stresses the existence of a demand side in clientelism, which has been hitherto downgraded in favor of an emphasis on the strategies of actual and potential patrons and brokers. As the authors indicate, instead of contrasting clientelism to civil society, the former can be viewed as one of the various strategies stemming from within the latter. While in Weberian ideal-typical terms, liberal society and clientelism stand apart in terms of citizenship and distribution barriers, real-world situations may be rather different, with various identifiable patterns of patronage and clientelism, as indicated in the case studies and summed up in the table in page 204:

[Insert Table 1 about here]

While comprising an advance when compared to earlier dichotomies of traditional and modern patronage, the typological bias of this approach needs to be approached critically, as it condenses rich histories of clientelism into Weberian ideal types, which are constructed impressionistically. Future studies could overcome this bias by disaggregating the component facets of clientelism and tracking for analysis selected aspects, such as its impact on the ballot box or the particularistic use of public budgets.

### How Do We Conduct Politics

Another major line of research concerns political practice and is illustrated by Auyero's book and the one edited by Briquet and Sawicki. The latter is both less ambitious and more widespread in its global span than Piattoni's. According to the editors, their book aims to relate existing theoretical approaches on clientelism, elaborated mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s, to middle-range explanations of clientelistic practices in different societies. The contributors took it upon themselves to study clientelistic practices within the concrete and singular historical situations in which they are established. The book's scope includes works spanning both European and non-European cases. Its chapters focus, among other things, on the political trends in France under the Third Republic and on French political parties, on

popular practices and democratic transitions in Benin and Brazil, on the associations supporting Japanese politicians and on localism and political practices in Italy.

These contributions point out an important facet of politics; namely, that personal political ties remain a central aspect of conducting politics in contemporary societies, based on a rationale that blends rational calculation with the logic of gift-giving and receiving, personal commitments and seduction. While being on the verge of de-legitimization and becoming foci of moralistic attacks, these practices may flourish nonetheless, especially under the impact of administrative ineffectiveness and the persisting hold of personalization in politics.

In parallel, while in 19<sup>th</sup> century France, notables could register and quantify their distributive *largesse* toward clients and political brokers, and boast of their prominence in terms of patronage (as traced through archival work by Alain Garrigou)<sup>46</sup>, toward the 20<sup>th</sup> century clientelism has become more concealed and blurred. In developing countries such as Benin, analyzed by Richard Banégas, clientelistic practices are shown to constitute a complex interlink between the moral economy of power and the logic of apprenticeship of negotiation and experimentation with the rules of pluralism.<sup>47</sup> Within the framework of re-democratization and electoral pluralism, Camille Goirand indicates how clientelism became a chosen avenue for Brazilian individuals opting between alternative patrons increasingly prepared to supply the rising demands of citizens, in what Christopher Clapham once characterized as “clientelism of representation.”<sup>48</sup> In societies such as Benin and Brazil citizens are willing to accept some ‘corruption’ as long as the rising patrons and brokers stand by their word to deliver services, both on an individual and collective basis. Electoral politics in these contexts thus continues to expand the conception of the personal generosity of the political person.<sup>49</sup>

In this context, Frédéric Sawicki’s study of party clientelism in France highlights the shortcomings of many analyses that sought to identify the presence or absence of clientelism. Sawicki indicates that the scant research on clientelism in France<sup>50</sup> (e.g. when compared to research on Italy) is less due to actual processes than to the moralistic imagery shaped by the French State, which was comparatively successful in projecting its étatist logic upon society. According to the author, the normative view led to the lumping together of clientelism and party financing with banditry, political clans and corruption, impeding a more distanced analysis of what

Sawicki and Briquet call “*pratiques officieuses* (i.e. informal practices reaching out to the formal frameworks of state power).”

In addition, Sawicki calls attention to the need to conduct a nuanced research onto the fate of different forms of clientelism, some of which may flourish while others decline. He shows that while the French setting has been less prone than Italy to exhibit clientelism by notables or by parties, a third pattern of institutional clientelism has developed, at least since the 1880s. This pattern is characterized by political mobilization at the sub-national level, the personalization of political competition, connections between majors and the administration, and personalized personal appointments. Such a form of clientelism derives its logic from an institutional matrix favoring an ambiguous trade-off between the increasing autonomy of public functions at the national level and the control of local appointments and promotions in a framework of territorial de-centralization.

Sawicki adds that, under the 5<sup>th</sup> French Republic, a parallel and huge source of patronage has been placed in the hands of the President and the ministers.<sup>51</sup> That is, instead of looking for the rise and decline of patronage and clientelism as a litmus-test for modernization, the new publications constitute a call for research on the ways patronage and clientelism are patterned and research on their relative reinforcement or weakening under different contextual circumstances affecting the way we conduct politics.

This line of analysis is fine-tuned in the book on clientelistic networks among shantytown dwellers, in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Analyzing the life-experiences of these shanty dwellers, anthropologist Auyero shows how clientelistic problem-solving is sustained by a structure of feeling and a state of mind tied to Peronist brokerage. For the residents of the shantytowns, personalized political mediation is one means among others to provide acute subsistence needs. Other means include salaries (extremely low or part-time), networks of reciprocity, church charity and underground activities such as drug dealing, shoplifting or crime. The author points out that the distribution of material resources is a necessary but in itself insufficient condition for the smooth operation of the clientelistic link.

The material benefits distributed by acts of giving and local brokers’ caring actions are experienced as supporting a long-term commitment, within an ethics of cooperation, companionship and solidarity. In parallel, these relationships have been

imbued in the ideological environment of Peronist imagery with its populist mythology and pantheon of heroes and saints, primarily Evita. For this reason, the networks themselves have become legitimate “independent of this or that particular broker or patron.”<sup>52</sup> One of the central claims of the book, rooted in a symbolic performative perspective inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, is that actual practice and mental frames of mind are mutually constitutive:

The social and mental structures of political clientelism are ‘interlinked by a twofold relationship of mutual constitution and correspondence’ (Wacquant 1998:27). Within inner circles, the distribution of material resources is important. Clients are, undoubtedly, interested actors. But interest cannot be taken as the actual cause – the generative principle – of clients’ behaviors. Reciprocity and calculation exist, but demands for recognition within the inner circle are more significant. The emphasis that inner-circle members place on their “friendship” with their brokers and on the affective ties so contracted hints at the meanings that emerge and sustain these ties: clients’ desires to be cared for and recognized should be considered the central cause of their behavior.<sup>53</sup>

Democratic polities leave room and new opportunities for political articulation, negotiation and public positioning. The politics of identity and the decline of ideological mobilization can provide a favorable ground for clientelistic articulation. In this sense, there is no contradiction between personalized politics and a politics of collective identity, e.g. as shaped under the Peronist banner.<sup>54</sup> Still, on a macro level, the clientelistic networks depicted by Auyero did not promote public goods and the collective wellbeing of the shantytown’s residents. Rather, clientelism maintained the general skewed structure of income and opportunities open to these lower-class citizens, perpetuating poverty, underdevelopment and dependency.

### Clientelism’s Institutional Viability

Researchers differ in their assessment of the institutional viability and significance of clientelism and patronage in contemporary polities. On the one hand, political mediation and brokerage, whether of a more open and generalizable nature or of a

more closed and individualized character, should be expected to continue to play a major role in contemporary political institutions. On the other hand, debate continues on how to conceptualize the presence of clientelist mediation and patron-brokerage. Specifically, the debate focuses on whether the particularistic distribution of benefits is or is not compatible with the manifest principles of modern constitutional democracy and mass party politics.<sup>55</sup>

A recent World Bank position paper brings the issue into full relief. While it acknowledges the negative connotations of the word patronage, it concedes that it may serve positive functions, and nonetheless it states that it is hard to draw the exact line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ appointments and find an appropriate balance. In its words:

Patronage suggests the transgression of real or perceived boundaries of legitimate political influence, the violation of principles of merit and competition in civil service recruitment and promotion. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that governments the world-over accept that some political appointments are fully legitimate. A small number of these appointments are justified as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of government policymakers and managers who share a common agenda. Patronage is clearly a problem...<sup>56</sup>

Meritocratic principles need to be reconciled with a political logic, particularly but not only in multi-party, pluralist or multi-ethnic governmental coalitions. The problem is not merely the entry or promotion of unqualified individuals in the public administration. In contemporary polities, most clientelistic intercessions operate above the fulfillment of minimal capacity requirements for entry into the administration. The issue is neither merely the danger of institutional ineffectiveness due to staffing changes, which may have “a crippling effect on institutional memory”, as suggested in the World Bank document. A clientelistic organizational environment hampers institutional learning and sedimentation, as it may generate high turnover rates of personnel. However, we should stress that patronage is not necessarily conducive to wider turnover rate of personnel than other institutional setups such as PR-coalitional rule. We should likewise avoid conflating clientelism with inefficiency and be prepared to trace varied forms and degrees of efficiency and inefficiency in different cases of clientelism.<sup>57</sup> Beyond these institutional consequences, important

as they are, the principled issue to assess the full implications is whether clientelism and patronage affect the principles of modern constitutional democracy, e.g. by sliding into what could be defined as “systemic corruption,” crippling institutional trust and public confidence in the political system and in projects that otherwise could empower citizens.<sup>58</sup>

The defining line seems to lie with the effectiveness of those institutional mechanisms through which citizens can press for their rights and entitlements in terms of a ‘general interest,’ against institutional discrimination. For instance, mechanisms such as non-partisan public systems, civil service effective guidelines especially in selection procedures, controls over party fundraising, recognized charters of rights, non-partisan state comptrollers particularly in auditing practices, and ombudspersons can operate as trustworthy branches of government in removing institutional discrimination and enhancing public accountability.

Future research will have to trace the exact fine-tuning that makes these mechanisms effective, as their mere existence does not dictate how they are implemented. Indeed, works on clientelism reveal that the ‘modernization’ of these institutional mechanisms may merely lead to their use in power struggles, e.g. by enforcing guidelines selectively against those falling out of favor or by discrediting rival political forces while still playing a clientelistic game. Studies on the modernization of the news media have shown that in countries such as Spain, Italy and Mexico changes in technology and organizational frameworks have not diminished the politicization of the media, which continues to be associated with a selective enforcement of the law and with public defamation in clientelistic settings.<sup>59</sup>

Research has indicated that clientelism may be resented, criticized, and opposed by social forces and coalitions wishing to curtail its presence alongside bureaucratic universalism and market rationality, but it also has found that sectors benefiting from clientelistic brokerage and patronage see it as a pragmatic avenue, useful for advancing in competitive social, economic, and political domains.<sup>60</sup>

This duality reflects a major tension of modern democratic polities, which are built on citizenship and political equality but leave the economic domain open to inequalities and substantial socioeconomic gaps. This may explain the paradoxical flourishing of clientelistic networks under macro-economic adjustment and restructuring. Liberalization, reduction of state intervention in favor of market mechanisms, privatization of state-owned and state-supported services and

curtailment of union power further fragment society and heighten the need for support networks.

Under these parameters, clientelism proves to be highly adaptive to changing market logics, individualistic strategies and capitalistic considerations, while at the same time it can be tuned to the agenda of politicians, brokers and citizens willing to make claims on other grounds than their only partially realized citizenship. This is why, when projected as a strategic political tool by brokers and political agents, clientelism has remained important during periods of political and economic revamping in societies such as Russia, Poland, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina.

Brazil is a good example of “re-clientelization” - a major avenue for future studies of clientelism elsewhere. During the years of the military rule, between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, the political arena was relatively closed and politicians were forced to join one of the two umbrella parties, which were recognized by the military rulers. This reduced the leverage of individual political mediation and informal negotiation. Under the transition back to democracy, governors were empowered and local political machines became once again a centerpiece of politics, following elections at the states’ level in 1982.

The full impact of clientelism was felt with the return of civilian rule in 1985, as the rise in political jobbery and the allocation of state budgets became a means of amassing political support and negotiating political agreements, especially among the executive and the parliamentarians. As long as Brazilian presidents did not over personalize the use of patronage resources, as demonstrated by the case of Fernando Collor de Mello who was the first Brazilian president ever to be impeached on charges of corruption in 1992, the system continued to work effectively.<sup>61</sup> Interactions between the federal, state and municipal levels allowed clientelistic networks to flourish alongside more innovative avenues of empowerment of civil society. The latter were conducted within the framework of the reformed Constitution of 1988, which led to restructuring in the provision of public services and to local initiatives of participatory budgeting, e.g. in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. The federal government and federal agencies were forced to intervene in the sub-national arena only where evidence of administrative malfunctioning were extreme, e.g. in some of the state banks. But in general, ‘new’ and ‘old’ political styles coexisted and served as the basis of federal coalitional stability for most of the 1990s. Even President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who made major moves towards the

institutionalization of ear-marked delivery of state resources to communal levels and towards citizen participation in the supervision and use of public resources in the areas of health and education, admitted he spent much time in negotiations with parliamentarians and allowed the maintenance of personal budgeting open to the latter's control, as a long-term means of being effective in law-making and administration.<sup>62</sup> Public budgets continued to be appropriated and delivered selectively by politicians in various Brazilian states, turning some of them into political fiefs, albeit under varied leadership styles and political orientation.<sup>63</sup>

### Future Directions

The field of clientelism research is vast, and the forms of clientelistic networks diverse and secluded from public eyes, thus prompting the need for a combination of comparative politics and field-studies. Moreover, being at the cross-roads of politics, administration, markets and society, the study of clientelism poses a challenge for cross-disciplinary cooperation and a varied disciplinary, geographic and historical expertise.

Despite substantial analytical advances since the first wave of clientelism studies, debate still continues on its place and significance in contemporary and historical polities. Further research will be necessary to resolve some of the issues at hand. The systematic analysis of the contextual variables associated with clientelism and patronage in modern democracies is, perhaps surprisingly, still in its beginnings. Illustrative are a series of issues still in need of rigorous analysis:

- What are the boundaries for analyzing clientelism? Should its study be confined to state limits or broadened to account for trans-national trends? Is it worth tracing a vertical axis through political levels and reaching out beyond the boundaries of states and nation-states? “When UK Ministers go to Brussels and lobby for UK fishermen, aren't they playing clientelist politics in supra-national institutions?”<sup>64</sup> Most studies of clientelism concentrated their analysis on intra-state levels of political and administrative articulation. Perhaps political science should devote more systematic attention to trans-national forms and networks of dependency in terms of clientelism.<sup>65</sup>
- Is it worth establishing a continuum based on the size of the recipient, from individuals through groups to classes? Peter Flynn indicated once that even

though clientelism has often been described as curbing and discouraging class mobilization, they may coincide and coexist in terms of power, control and benefits.<sup>66</sup> David Coates suggests that in class terms, behind the facade of democratic politics, there is much class clientelism. “There is indirectly - in the form of excluding policies that, say, equalize incomes; but there is also directly, in the form of tax breaks and the like. And of course there are huge patronage networks inside military-industrial complexes, revolving door systems of appointment and so on... That seems to be a horizontal axis, on which it might be possible to map out a range of relationships labelled 'clientelistic', while showing that they are not qualitatively different in kind from other forms of class-power linkage (lobbying, Bonapartism and so on).”<sup>67</sup>

- What is the current structural location of clientelism? Robin Theobald observed that in post-industrial societies, patronage becomes more “classified”, that is, it tends to proliferate among those with professional and business qualifications in the upper strata, rather than remaining a phenomenon typical of individuals of the lower classes in search of a benefactor.<sup>68</sup> This brings to awareness that clientelism cannot be confined to politics in a restricted sense. It proliferates as well in the arts, academia, religious congregations, the media and business – whenever we are dealing with the power of appointment and the granting of access to benefits, goods, services, influence and honors.<sup>69</sup>
- Why does patronage – as measured through politically-geared nominations in the public administration – seem to dwindle under personalist styles of presidentialism? Despite the widespread presumption that clientelism and personalism are positively correlated, Jorge Gordin’s analysis of patronage in Latin American polities between 1960 and 1994 suggests that personalist leaders are less compelled to divide up state resources and jobs as partisan spoils, perhaps as their support is more generalized than that of supporting clientele.<sup>70</sup>
- How does clientelism affect political competition? There are suggestions, still unsubstantiated by systematic research, that clientelism depresses electoral

competition and increases the chances of incumbent patrons winning by wide margins or losing by a narrow margin.<sup>71</sup>

- How are patterns of clientelism related to different political systems? How do proportional representation and consociationalism vs. majoritarian systems affect the use of patronage? How do parliamentary systems compare with presidentialist systems in this context?
- How do federal and unitary countries differ in their patterns of clientelism and patronage? Common sense indicates that federal systems leave greater leeway for political clientelism than unitary systems, since such networks can play a role in connecting different levels of political, social and administrative articulation. This seems intuitively to occur in federal countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Argentina vs. unitary countries such as Costa Rica and Uruguay in Latin America. However, this trend does not apply to Chile and Ecuador in that continent<sup>72</sup> and may not hold in Europe, e.g. in Germany vs. Portugal or Greece.<sup>73</sup>
- Are the dimensions of a country – and its correlated administrative structure – factors of importance for clientelism? In large federal countries, alternative political styles are likely to crystallize concomitantly. This plurality in itself is a constraining factor on any one of these styles, as shown in studies of clientelism in Canada and the USA, as opposed to clientelism in more compact polities, be they rather authoritarian as is Taiwan or more democratic, such as Jamaica, even if defined as democratic “by default”, to use Carlene Edie’s term.<sup>74</sup> Both in Jamaica and Taiwan the consolidation of dominant political patterns had a strong component of deep-seated clientelism, with a weak presence of countervailing systemic forces and alternative styles of doing politics.<sup>75</sup> By contrast, in Canada and the USA, clientelism was one political style among many others, such as those of the traditional left, traditional conservatism, new fiscal populism, reform-minded politics, etc. As such, it remained a ‘minority’ or ‘marginal’ political culture that reached salience only in certain periods, regions (e.g. Nova Scotia and other Maritime provinces in Canada), cities (Chicago was paradigmatic for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) and social sectors (e.g. clientelism in the USA was often supported by Catholics and recent immigrants but opposed by many Protestants).<sup>76</sup>

- How does clientelism affect policy preferences? The inflationary character of expectations in patronage-ridden polities seems connected to fiscal liberalism, i.e. an expanding approach in public expenditure, as opposed to fiscal austerity. Data collected by Terry N. Clark and his associates in the FAUI project seems to confirm this connection,<sup>77</sup> but despite the huge effort at systematization led by these scholars, they admit clientelism has proved elusive to measure accurately. Clark recently suggested measuring the impact of functional responsibilities (some governments do more functions than others) and the structure of demands (e.g. city size, density, poverty, crime) as affecting the patterning of clientelism.<sup>78</sup>

To do systematic work on these and similar issues is a necessary step forward. Research on the quantifiable impact and correlates of clientelism should be combined with qualitative analyses of its operational enactment, its ambiguities and the political strategies led by the forces working for and against clientelism in different contemporary polities.<sup>79</sup>

---

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Richard Graham, “Clientelismo na cultura política brasileira. Toma lá dá cá” (Sao Paulo: Braudel Center Papers No. 15, 1997).

<sup>2</sup> The terms used originated in ancient Republican Rome, where relationships of *patrocinium* and *clientelae* proliferated during the Republic and into the Empire (later on, they were subsumed under what historians of late medieval times called *bastard feudalism*). These terms found their way into the vernaculars of Mediterranean and Latin American societies. Other terms are used elsewhere. This is a source of dissonance and some ambiguity in the English-speaking world, even though by now the terms of ‘clientelism’, ‘patron-client relationships’ and ‘patronage’ are widely accepted.

<sup>3</sup> Vincent Lemieux, “Le sens du patronage politique”. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 22, 2 (1987), 5-18; and idem, *Le patronage politique. Une étude comparative* (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 1977). A similar characterization was suggested by N. Miranda Ontaneda in a little-known book published in Colombia at the same time: *Clientelismo y dominio de clase. El modo de obrar político en Colombia* (Bogotá: CINEP, 1977).

<sup>4</sup> An interesting case of continuity through change in these terms is that of Russia (Imperial, Communist and post-Communist), as analyzed in the superb paper by TH Rigby, “Russia’s Clientelism, Cliques, Connections and ‘Clans’. The Same Old Story?”, presented at the International Conference on Communist and Post-Communist Societies, held at the University of Melbourne, July 7-10, 1998; see also

---

John P. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>5</sup> Leonardo Avritzer, *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, “Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern”, pp. 19-28 in Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 26; and see also Tatiana Vorozheikina, “Clientelism and the Process of Political Democratization in Russia”, *ibid.* pp. 105-120; Graham, “Clientelismo”; and Javier Auyero, *Poor People's Politics* (2000).

<sup>7</sup> The study of clientelism is typical of cross-disciplinary stimulation and specialization. See Mattei Dogan, “Specialization and Recombination of Specialties in the Social Sciences”. *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2001, vol. 22: 14851-5, esp. p. 14853.

<sup>8</sup> On this stage see among others Robert Paine, ed. *Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic* (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1971); Luigi Graziano, “A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelistic Behavior”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 4 (1976): 149-174; Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds. *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977); S. Schmidt et al. eds. *Friends, Followers and Factions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Shmuel N Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand, eds. *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development* (London: Sage, 1981). The latter two books contain extensive bibliographies on the works produced in this stage.

<sup>9</sup> Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties”. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7, 2 (1968), 377-400.

<sup>10</sup> Works are numerous. Merely as illustrations see Jean Francois Medard, “Le rapport de clientèle, du phénomène social à l’analyse politique”, *Revue française de science politique*, 26 (1978), 103-131; E. Ozbudun, “Turkey: The Politics of Clientelism, in SN Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand eds. *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development* (London: Sage, 1981), pp. 249-268; Robin Theobald, “The Decline of Patron-Client Relations in Developed Societies”. *European Journal of Sociology*, 136-147.

<sup>11</sup> See for instance Chistopher Clapham, ed. *Private Patronage and Public Power* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Clients and Brokers in Seventeenth Century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Eduardo Díaz Uribe, *El clientelismo político en Colombia* (Bogotá: El Ancora Editores, 1986); A. Wallace-Hadrill, ed. *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989).

<sup>12</sup> John P Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, eds. *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

---

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Clapham, *Private Patronage and Public Power*; S.N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Eisenstadt and Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends*, pp. 43-165; Roniger, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 159-178, on the various dimensions of clientelism, as assessed in that stage.

<sup>15</sup> Conferences and panels on clientelism were held among others in Trømso (1998), London (1998), at the IPSA World Congress in Quebec in 2000, at Chicago (2000), Duke (2001), Stanford (2002) and Harvard (2002).

<sup>16</sup> Equally challenging is another recent case study on Argentina by Pablo José Torres, *Votos, chapas y fideos. Clientelismo político y ayuda social* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2002).

<sup>17</sup> TH Rigby, "Russia's Clientelism" (1998), following his *Political Elites in the USSR. Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); and M.N. Afanasiev, *Klientelism I Rossiskaia Gosudarstvennost* (Moscow: Center of Constitutional Studies, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> Michela Morello, *Mezzogiorno in bilico. Aspetti sociali nell'identità culturale e politica della società meridionale degli anni novanta* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino Editore, 1997); Susana Corzo Fernández, *El clientelismo político. El plan de empleo rural en Andalucía: Un estudio de caso* (Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2002).

<sup>19</sup> Mario Caciagli, *Clientelismo, corrupción y criminalidad organizada* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1997).

<sup>20</sup> Antonio Robles Egea, ed. *Política en penumbra. Patronazgo y clientelismo políticos en la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996); Ramón Maiz, "Estructura y acción: elementos para un análisis micropolítico del clientelismo" *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 8-9 (1994), 189-215; Frédéric Sawicki, *Les réseaux du parti socialiste. Sociologie d'un milieu partisan* (Paris: Belin, 1997).

<sup>21</sup> Marcos PD Lanna, *A dívida divina. Troca e patronagem no Nordeste Brasileiro* (Sao Paulo: Editora da UNICAMP, 1995); Tulia Falleti and Fabián Sislian, *Dominación política, redes familiares y clientelismo* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Universitario, 1996); John D. Martz, *The Politics of Clientelism. Democracy and the State in Colombia* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997); John Sudarsky Rosenbaum, *El capital social de Colombia* (Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2001).

<sup>22</sup> D. Fairchild Ruggles, *Women, Patronage and Self-Representation in Islamic Societies* (New York: SUNY Press, 2000); Michael Johnson, *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and IB

---

Tauris, 2001). To all these one needs to add new historical studies on artistic patronage, e.g. David G. Wilkins and Rebecca L. Wilkins, eds. *The Search for a Patron in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996).

<sup>23</sup> Jorge P. Gordin, “The Political and Partisan Determinants of Patronage in Latin America 1960-1994: A Comparative Perspective”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41 (2002), 513-549; Daniel C Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, “Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective”. *Media, Culture and Society*, 24, 2 (2002), 175-196.

<sup>24</sup> Robert Gay, “Rethinking Clientelism: Demands, Discourses and Practices in Contemporary Brazil”, *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 66 (December 1998), 7-24, quoted from p. 14. See also Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino and Arturo Escobar eds. *Cultures of Politics. Politics of Culture. Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

<sup>25</sup> Piattoni, *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*, p. 7

<sup>26</sup> Barbara Geddes, *Politician’s Dilemma. Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Carolyn M Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group. The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

<sup>27</sup> Luis Fernando Medina and Susan Stokes, “Clientelism as Political Monopoly”, 2002 [<http://www.kellog.northwestern.edu>]. There is a problem with some of the assumptions in this otherwise interesting paper; namely, it confuses clientelistic control with a monopolist market situation. Characteristically, most contemporary forms of clientelist control are not monopolist and are fragile, due to pressures exerted by countervailing political forces operating in competitive market structures. See also Valeria Brusco, Marcelo Nazareno and Susan C. Stokes, “Clientelism and Democracy. Evidence from Argentina” Conference on Political Parties and Legislative Organization in Parliamentary and Presidential Regimes (Yale University, March 2002).

<sup>28</sup> Briquet and Sawicki, *Le clientélisme politique*, especially pp. 3-5

<sup>29</sup> Cf. for instance Michael Gilson, “Against Patron-Client Relations”, in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds. *Patrons and Clients* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 167-184; Michael Korovkin, “Exploitation, Cooperation, Collusion: An Enquiry into Patronage.” *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 29, 1 (1988), 105-126; Diego Gambetta, “Fragments of an Economic Theory of the Mafia”, *ibid.* 127-145.

<sup>30</sup> Gay, “Rethinking Clientelism”, pp. 14-15

<sup>31</sup> James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

<sup>32</sup> Auyero, *Poor People’s Politics*, p. 117.

---

<sup>33</sup> E.g. <http://www.hgdoe.de/ver/mdemok.htm>; and <http://www.peoplesproposal.democracyforum.net/>

<sup>34</sup> Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Dirty Politics. Deception, Distraction and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>35</sup> For a recent effort in this direction see Jeffrey Alexander, ed. *Real Civil Society*. (London: Sage, 1999).

<sup>36</sup> Piattoni, *Clientelism*, p. 3 (emphasis in the original) and p. 199, respectively.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), and see also Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England and Italy". *Politics and Society*, 7 (1997), 403-451.

<sup>39</sup> Papakostas, "Why is There No Clientelism in Scandinavia? A Comparison of the Swedish and Greek Sequences of Development ", in *Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation*, pp. 31-53. Quotation from pp. 32-36.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49 and 53, respectively.

<sup>42</sup> Frank O’Gorman, "Patronage and the Reform of the State in England, 1700-1860," in *Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation*, pp. 54-76

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 75-6.

<sup>44</sup> On this dynamics in a contemporary polity see Alfred P. Montero, "Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization and the New Brazilian Federalism" (electronic typescript, [www.aad.carleton.edu](http://www.aad.carleton.edu))

<sup>45</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>46</sup> Alain Garrigou, "Clientélisme et vote sous la IIIe République", in Briquet et Sawicki, *Le clientélisme politique*, pp. 39-74.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Banégas, "Bouffer l’argent. Politique du ventre, démocratie et clientélisme au Bénin", *ibid.*, pp. 75-110.

<sup>48</sup> Christopher Clapham, "Clientelism and the State" in idem ed. *Private Patronage and Public Power* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 22.

<sup>49</sup> C. Goirand, "Clientélisme et politisation populaire à Rio de Janeiro", in Briquet and Sawicki, p. 133.

<sup>50</sup> With the exception of some regions such as Corsica – see Jean-Louis Briquet, *La tradition en mouvement. Clientélisme et politique en Corse* (Paris: Belin, 1997) – and

---

the transitional period from the 15<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup> century - see Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford: OUP, 1986).

<sup>51</sup> F Sawicki, "La faiblesse du clientélisme partisan en France", in Briquet et Sawicki, pp. 215-49.

<sup>52</sup> Auyero, *Poor People's Politics*, p. 178.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.* pp. 180-1. Inner quote is from Loic Wacquant, "Negative Social Capital: State Breakdown and Social Destitution in America's Urban Core". *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 13 (1998), 25-39.

<sup>54</sup> This intermingling of personalized politics and collective banners is not peculiar to clientelism, as pointed out in studies on the politics of identity. In addition to works such as Taylor's or Kymlicka's see Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1995); Bikku Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy", in David Beethan ed. *Defining and Measuring Democracy* (London: Sage, 2000), chapter 9; and Brian Kneh-Paz, "Democracy and the Politics of Identity: Citizenship without Citizens?" in Theodor Barth and Magnus Enzell eds. *Collective Identities and Citizenship in Europe* (Oslo: ARENA, 1999), pp. 21-33.

<sup>55</sup> Luis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations", entry in Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes, eds. *The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (London: Elsevier, 2001), vol. 16, pp. 11118-11120.

<sup>56</sup> Jana Orac and Jeffrey Rinne, "Patronage", The World Bank Group, Governance and Public Sector Reform Sites, 24 July 2000 ([www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/patronage.htm](http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/patronage.htm))

<sup>57</sup> A good corrective is to look at the variable effects of clientelism worldwide. For example in Latin America, such bonds and connections have broadened the range of discretion played out by clients, while in the Japanese context a clientelistic obligation has customarily reduced discretion and reinforce task orientations. See Luis Roniger, "Coronelismo, Caciquismo and Oyabun-kobun: Divergent Implications of Hierarchical Trust in Brazil, Mexico and Japan." *British Journal of Sociology*, 38, 2 (1987), 310-330.

<sup>58</sup> John Sudarsky wrote a penetrating study on the failure of cooperatives in Colombia in the 1970s, tracing it to the struggle carried out by competing politicians, administrators and their clientelistic networks. He shows how this dynamics generated truncated projects of civil society empowerment, shaped an organizational culture of inaction and blockading of initiatives, and led to the undermining of institutional trust and the diffusion of public disillusion and cynicism. See *Clientelismo y desarrollo social. El caso de las cooperativas* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1988).

<sup>59</sup> See examples on Juan Villalonga in Spain, Berlusconi in Italy and the case of the journal *El Universal* in Mexico in Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, "Political Clientelism and the Media". *Media, Culture and Society*, 24, 2 (2002), 175-196.

---

<sup>60</sup> Indeed, in patronage-ridden settings, even those who benefit from patronage may criticize it in terms of formal principles such as impartiality and universalism, although they relegate the latter to the realm of ideals, of a ‘dream-world’. Richard Graham, “Clientelismo na cultura política brasileira” (1997).

<sup>61</sup> Leonardo Avritzer, *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America* (Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 117-123; Thomas E. Skidmore, *Brazil. Five Centuries of Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 189-221.

<sup>62</sup> Interview by the author and Mario Sznajder with President Cardoso, in the Alvorada Palace, Brasilia, 20 September 2000.

<sup>63</sup> Colombia is a parallel case of great comparative interest for analyzing processes of decline and renewal of political clientelism. See John D. Martz, *The Politics of Clientelism. Democracy and the State in Colombia* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997). The regional variations are particularly important there: See Francisco Leal Buitrago and Andrés Dávila de Guevara, *Clientelismo: el sistema político y su expresión regional* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1991); Rodrigo Losada Lora, *Clientelismo y elecciones* (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 1984); Junco Veloso, *Clientelismo en Boyacá, 1930-1990* (Bogotá: s/e, 1991); Cristina Escobar, “Clientelism and Social Protest: Peasant Politics in Northern Colombia”, in Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* (1994), pp. 65-86; and Escobar, “Bullfighting Fiestas, Clientelism and Political Identities in Northern Colombia”, in Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog eds. *The Collective and the Public in Latin America* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000), pp. 174-191.

<sup>64</sup> David Coates, personal communication, 20 March 2003, <[coatesd@wfu.edu](mailto:coatesd@wfu.edu)>

<sup>65</sup> Among the few works in this line are: Ernst Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 BC)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

<sup>66</sup> Peter Flynn, “Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control”. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies*, 12 (1974), p. 157.

<sup>67</sup> David Coates, *ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Robin Theobald, “On the Survival of Patronage in Developed Societies”, *Archives européennes de sociologie*, 33 (1992), 183-191..

<sup>69</sup> See e.g. Terry Nichols Clark, “Clientelism and the University. Was Columbia Sociology a Machine?”; and comments by Robert Merton, John Meyer, Immanuel Wallerstein and others [<http://www.src.uchicago.edu>], 2002 [c.1998].

<sup>70</sup> Jorge P. Gordin, “The Political and Partisan Determinants of Patronage in Latin America 1960-1994: A Comparative Perspective”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41 (2002), 513-549.

---

<sup>71</sup> Medina and Stokes, “Clientelism as Political Monopoly”, 2002.

<sup>72</sup> Arturo Valenzuela, *Political Brokers in Chile. Local Government in a Centralized Polity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977); Ton Salman, “Politico-Cultural Models and Collective Action Strategies: The Pobladores of Chile and Ecuador”, in Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog eds. *The Collective and the Public in Latin America* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), pp. 192-216.

<sup>73</sup> Piattoni, *Clientelism*, pp. 193-212; Samuel Morley and A. Silva, “Problems and Performance in Primary Education. Why Do Systems Differ?” (Washington: IDB, 1994); Wendy Hunter, “Human Capital Development in Latin America: Past Policies and Prospects for Change” (Paper presented at the conference on Current Policy Dilemmas in Latin America’s Foreign Economic Relations”, Tufts University, November 2000).

<sup>74</sup> Carlene J. Edie, *Democracy by Default. Dependency and Clientelism in Jamaica* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

<sup>75</sup> On Taiwan see Nai-The Wu, “The Politics of a Regime Patronage System: Mobilization and Control within an Authoritarian Regime” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, December 1987); and Fang Wang, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Clientelism in Taiwan”, in Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* (1994), pp. 181-206.

<sup>76</sup> Mark Fletcher, “Clientelism and Political Culture in the Provincial Politics of Canada,” in Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, pp. 145-166; T.N. Clark, “Clientelism, U.S.A.: The Dynamics of Change”, *ibid.* pp. 121-144.

<sup>77</sup> Terry N. Clark and Lorna Cowley Ferguson, *City Money* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 145 ff. (FAUI stands for Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation project).

<sup>78</sup> Terry Nichols Clark, personal communication, 5 November 2002, <[tnclark@midway.uchicago.edu](mailto:tnclark@midway.uchicago.edu)>

<sup>79</sup> Thanks are due to the participants of the workshop on Demokratie und Sozialkapital, Die Rolle zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure, organized by Arbeitskreis Soziale Bewegungen der DVPW, in cooperation with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, June 2002; Professors Mario Sznajder, David Coates, Ezra Suleiman and the reviewers of *Comparative Politics* for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.