

## **Chapter 8**

### **Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Argentina: Presidents and Governors (1983-2005)**

**Miguel De Luca**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Between 1983 and 2005 presidents and provincial governors have been key actors in Argentine politics. Due to the importance of those political positions it is essential to unravel their paths to power, because as this volume makes clear, these paths deeply affect post-electoral behavior. However, the processes of political recruitment and candidate selection for the presidency and provincial governments in post-authoritarian Argentina have not been studied in-depth until now. With a few exceptions (Jones 2002, Molinelli et al 1999, Serrafiero 1997, 1999), there is no empirical research exploring: Who in Argentina aspires to executive positions? Where do they come from? How are they selected? What are the consequences of selection methods for later political behavior?

This chapter fills part of this gap by paying special attention both “winners” (i.e. presidents and governors) and defeated candidates in the traditional Argentine parties – the Justicialist Party (PJ, Peronists) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, Radicals)- as well as other important parties, both at the national and provincial levels. Following Siavelis and Morgenstern (this volume) I identify some of the political consequences that result from the processes of political recruitment and candidate selection.

The central argument of this chapter is that in Argentina, the recruitment and selection process of presidents and governors is controlled by political parties and specifically, their provincial sections. In terms of recruitment and selection (R&S) as a dependent variable, the process functions this way due to a particular combination of key party and electoral variables: an institutionalized party system, moderate party identification among voters, party monopoly of candidacies, control by the provincial party leaders of the candidate selection process, and mixed and decentralized party financing.

With respect to R&S as an independent variable, this process produces leaders with the following features: they possess an established by a political career (generally centered in their province) and this career is built within the party. However, there are variations among leaders with respect to how intimately candidates are related to their formal party structures. In consequence, the

political leaders that are elected for these executive offices are, mostly *party insiders* or *party adherents* in Siavelis' and Morgenstern's terms.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section briefly describes the rules that govern the election of governors and presidents and the relations of power between them. In the second section I describe the main features of the party system and its constituent parties. The third, section analyzes the influence of party rules, organization and financing on R&S. In the fourth I describe the selection process of presidential and gubernatorial candidates. In the fifth I review the profiles of the presidential candidates, noting which are *party insiders* and which are *party adherents*. In the sixth, I analyze presidential campaigns and the behavior of different types of presidents. Though based on a few cases (presidents since 1983: Alfonsín, Menem, de la Rúa and Kirchner) I link these types to the behavior of these leaders, considering especially campaign style, cabinet integration, and the candidates' relationship to their party.<sup>1</sup> Conclusions are presented in the seventh section.

## **PRESIDENTS AND GOVERNORS IN ARGENTINA**

The Argentine presidency is quite powerful. In addition to extensive executive powers the president also has important legislative powers (the ability to initiate laws, a total and partial veto, and decree authority), authority to designate ministers and other high ranking government executives, and the power to intervene in any of the 24 provinces that integrate the Argentine federation.<sup>2</sup>

Following the 1853/60 constitution, in 1983 and 1989 the president was elected via an Electoral College requiring majority affirmation. Electors were selected from 24 multimember districts (the provinces) ranging in size from 4 to 144 members using the same type of closed party ballot, proportional representation (PR) formula and threshold employed for the election of chamber deputies. Failing a majority of the electoral votes, Congress in joint session elected the president from the top two candidates in the first round of voting. The president held the position for six years and could not be immediately reelected.<sup>3</sup>

The 1994 constitutional reform established three important changes. First, the president is now chosen directly by a two round system, requiring 45% of the valid votes or 40% with a margin

---

<sup>1</sup> Eduardo Duhalde's presidency (2002-2003) is not included given his atypical path to power via appointment by Congress to complete De la Rúa's term.

<sup>2</sup> The federal capital, the city of Buenos Aires, achieved a semi-autonomous status in 1994 and is considered one of the provinces here.

<sup>3</sup> The president is chosen with a vice-president on the same single party "ticket" called a *fórmula presidencial*.

of at least 10 %, for first-round victory. Second, the presidential term was shortened from six to four years. Third, one immediate presidential reelection is now allowed.

Every Argentine province has its own constitution and a directly elected governor and legislature. Each elects its governor for a four-year term, with all but few (three in 1983, two in 1987, three in 1991, three in 1995, and four in 1999 and 2003) employing the plurality formula for the gubernatorial election. The rules on re-election vary by province in Argentina, and have been the focus of considerable reform since 1983 (Corbacho 1998, Serrafiero 1997). In 1983 no provincial constitution allowed immediate gubernatorial re-election. Currently all but four of the 24 provinces provide for the immediate re-election of the governor (Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, Santa Fe). All but 4 of the 20 currently limit the governor to two consecutive terms (Catamarca, La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Cruz). The elections for president and governor were and are, with very few exceptions, concurrent with the elections for partial renewal of the federal chamber of deputies or the provincial legislature.

Several authors underscore the importance of governors in Argentine politics, both at the provincial and national level (De Luca, Jones & Tula 2002, Jones 1997; Spiller & Tommasi 2000). Their power derives from an important group of political and institutional resources, including control over jobs in the provincial public sector, the provincial budget and the provincial party organization. The governors' power is based on patronage, pork-barrel politics and clientelism, which are also present at the national level, and a two way relationship exists between provincial and national political influences. In fact, because the principal nucleus of electoral competition is at the provincial level, the governors also exercise a strong control over the selection of their party's candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (De Luca, Jones & Tula 2002, 2003, Jones 1997, Jones this volume) and therefore they can influence representatives' conduct once in office and provide valuable support for presidential candidates. In turn, the president can influence (or pressure) governors by distributing positions in the national government, influencing provincial budgets with discretionary federal funds, threatening federal intervention in the province in certain situations, or backing a rival candidate in the next gubernatorial election (at times even one of an opposing party).

Nevertheless, the power of the governors differs importantly according to their province. For historical and political reasons, there is an important division between the Buenos Aires region (the Province of Buenos Aires and Federal Capital) and the interior region (the other 22 provinces) (Botana 1977, Matienzo 1994).<sup>4</sup> The difference between regions (and between provinces) is

---

<sup>4</sup> Currently 46% of the population lives in the Buenos Aires region (16.5 million persons of a total of 36 million according to the 2001 national census), and it is the economic nucleus of the country.

fundamental to explaining the varying powers of governors and their relationship with the president. In addition, these presidential powers are most important when: 1) the population of a province is smaller, 2) the provincial budget is more dependent on federal remittances, 3) the provincial leadership of the governor's party is divided, 4) the governor cannot be immediately reelected.

## **PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM**

In the last several years, Argentine political parties have suffered deep political and electoral shocks. First, the 2001 legislative elections had the lowest turnout and highest vote-spoiling rate ever. Second, the country experienced an unprecedented institutional crisis in 2001-2002 (Torre 2002). Nevertheless, the 2003 legislative elections showed a rapid reconstitution of parties and the party systems to a pattern resembling that before the 2001-2002 shock. The Argentine party system remains, therefore, “institutionalized” according to Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria (1995).

In the post-1983 era, two major groups of political parties stand out: the traditional parties (the Partido Justicialista—PJ or Peronists and Unión Cívica Radical—UCR or Radicals), and minor national and provincial parties.

*Peronists and Radicals:* The PJ and UCR have dominated politics since World War II and have had a national presence (more extended in the case of the Peronists than the Radicals) backed by a dense network of provincial political machines based on clientelism and patronage relationships (Calvo and Murillo 2003, Levitsky 2003). In their national organizations these parties replicate the country's federal structure. Peronists and Radicals are organized in provincial units with plenty of autonomy from national party organizations, leading practically to a federation of parties within each one.

In its fifty years of existence, the PJ has been characterized by a strong collective identity, yet low levels of formal institutionalization, with few established rules for selecting leaders and candidates (Levitsky, 1998, 2001). On the other hand, the UCR is characterized by a relatively high level of organizational institutionalization, a strong respect for liberal democracy, and a party apparatus that operates relatively well with a considerable level of internal competition for selecting party leaders and candidates.

For the period under consideration the UCR and the PJ have generally been considered heterogeneous parties. For example, their principal leaders have demonstrated notable ideological

---

Other important provinces (with between 1.5 and 3 million inhabitants) include Cordoba, Santa Fe and Mendoza.

and programmatic differences (Manzetti, 1993; McGuire, 1995). However, while both the UCR as the PJ have experienced difficult internal struggles, these are usually related to personal conflicts or struggles over candidacies to particular offices.

The progressive dissolution of the deep division between Peronists and anti-Peronists (very strong between 1946 to 1983) and the pragmatism and programmatic flexibility displayed by both parties in the post 1983 era, has led to a decrease in voters' levels of party identification, though party labels remain essential to success in attracting voters and motivating the party base (particularly for the PJ).

**Minor national parties.** There are several minor parties that have achieved a national presence at some point since 1983. However, with the exception of three current minor national parties, all turned out to be "flashes in the pan." After obtaining a substantial number of votes in one or two elections (principally in the Buenos Aires region), a majority of these parties failed to consolidate an important base of support, and, eventually, effectively disappeared from the electoral map. The parties in this category (with the period they achieved some electoral success in parentheses) are: Partido Intransigente (PI, 1983-91), Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDé, 1983-93), Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (MODIN, 1991-95), Acción por la República (AR, 1997-2001), Frente Grande/Frente por un País Solidario (FG/FREPASO, 1993-03), Recrear para el Crecimiento (RECREAR, 2003) and Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (ARI, 2001-03).

**Provincial parties.** Argentina has a large number of parties that either solely or effectively compete in only one province (always in the Interior region), where they often are the dominant or main opposition party. The most relevant parties of this type are the "provincial parties" that have held the governorship in their respective province at some point in time since 1983: Acción Chaqueña (ACh), Cruzada Renovadora (CR), Fuerza Republicana (FR), Movimiento Popular Fueguino (MPF), Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN), Partido Autonomista (PA), Partido Liberal (PL), Partido Bloquista (PB), Partido Nuevo (PANU), and Partido Renovador de Salta (PRS). I also include in the analysis the most prominent provincial party that failed to win the governorship during this period, the Partido Demócrata de Mendoza (PD).

Provincial parties have two general characteristics: (1) lack of organizational structure (small membership and lack of physical presence at the neighborhood level), particularly compared to the PJ and UCR, and (2) a tendency to be dominated by a single person or small clique.

In the post 1983 period, the PJ and the UCR are the two only parties whose candidates have reached the presidency (either alone or in coalition with another party). In the struggle for this office, there has been intense internal competition in both parties. Provincial parties have not

generally presented presidential candidates, preferring to lend their support- directly or indirectly- to large party candidates or minor party candidates with national appeal.

Likewise since 1983, the PJ and the UCR have taken control of overwhelming majority of provincial governments, converting some of them (above all the PJ) into important electoral bastions,<sup>5</sup> and the two parties are dominant at municipal levels.

### **POLITICAL CANDIDACIES, PARTY ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING.**

The three most important independent party variables affecting R&S are: party control over candidacies, the organization and activities of parties, and party financing.

*Political candidacies:* Political parties hold a monopoly on political candidacies, and competition tends to be party based.<sup>6</sup> Thus any person who wants to obtain public office must join a party and follow a career within that party, a career path that implies the need to obtain a significant level of support from that party's members.<sup>7</sup>

*Organization and activity of political parties:* The organization and activity of political parties is governed at the national level by the 1985 Law of Political Parties. It requires parties to have a charter and to hold elections for intraparty leadership positions (but not to choose candidates for public offices).<sup>8</sup> It also requires the party charter to include guidelines for candidate selection, a list of requisites to be a candidate (e.g., party tenure, signatures of party members), and other general regulations such as norms for re-nomination.

The district-level party branches have their own charters which, while conforming to the broad outlines of the national party charter, vary considerably. These realities combined imply that 1) candidate selection is almost entirely an internal party matter, 2) parties decided how and when to open the doors to persons who are non-party members, or who recently joined 3) selection processes are formally decentralized.

---

<sup>5</sup> For the periods 1983-87, 1987-91, 1991-95, 1995-99, 1999-2003, and 2003-07, the PJ held 12, 17, 14, 14, 15 and 16 governorships. In contrast, during the same six respective periods the UCR held 7, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 6.

<sup>6</sup> The Ley de Partidos Políticos establishes this monopoly at the party level. The Supreme Court has also confirmed the constitutionality of this monopoly (CSJN, Case Antonio Ríos, Fallos 310:819, April 22, 1987).

<sup>7</sup> While there have successful non-party outsiders (e.g., artists, businesspeople, journalists, professional athletes), once elected they must pursue traditional party oriented careers and engage in party-oriented behavior if they wish their political career to continue.

<sup>8</sup> In 2002 congress passed a law (25611) obligating open and simultaneous primaries for all national posts, though it was suspended for the 2003 elections.

***Mixed and decentralized party financing:*** Since 1983 Argentina has relied on a mixed (public and private) and decentralized party financing system (Laws 25.064 and 25.600). Public funds are provided to every recognized political party that attains a minimum threshold of votes (generally 2%). Contributions are made in cash according to the percentage of votes obtained in the last legislative elections, or up to their abolition in 1992, by way of "franchises" (indirect financing such as free or reduced-cost access to public services like postage or television time). (Ciancaglini 1991, Ferreira Rubio 1997, Olivero 1994). These funds are granted by the national or provincial governments to the political parties and not to the candidates. Likewise the federal government distributes 80% of the funds to provincial party organizations and a 20% to national party bodies (Laws 25.064 and 25.600). The provincial legislation on party financing replicated closely the national system.

Though political parties do impose membership fees, they expect contributions from legislators and other elected officials (20% of salary in the case of the UCR and 10% for the PJ). However, public funds and contributions do not constitute the main source of funding, and are barely sufficient to maintain the party during electoral periods. Patronage is an important form maintaining parties on "their feet" during electoral periods, and campaign contributions come mainly from private financing.<sup>9</sup>

## **CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCESSES**

Between 1983 and 2003 political parties employed three methods of candidate selection for presidential and gubernatorial elections: elite-centered choice, direct primaries, and party splitting. A fourth method of candidate choice, the double simultaneous vote (DVS), was employed only for gubernatorial elections.

***Elite centered choice.*** This method includes a variety of elite arrangements, ranging from the imposition of a candidate by a national party leader or a provincial level caudillo (e.g., a powerful governor) to a candidate that emerges from negotiations among national or provincial party leaders. Choice is also elite centered where single candidates are presented to the party in an uncontested primary or where they are ratified as the winner without dissent in party assemblies.

---

<sup>9</sup> Since 1983 several presidential and gubernatorial candidates have received funding from various foundations and think tanks, which are created and organized individually candidates and are not subject to the regulations governing political parties. (Ferreira Rubio 1997). While purported to conduct "research," some spending is directed to activities related to elections such as polling and publicizing works carried out by candidates.

**Primary.** This second category includes cases where two or more candidates competed in a direct primary election. The electorate for these contests was either party members alone or party members and those not affiliated with any party (referred to as independents in Argentina). Political parties rather than the government run primaries, which are held on Sunday, and involve a considerable amount of mobilization (get out the vote) efforts by the competing intraparty candidates. Presidential primaries involve the open confrontation between the candidates' party machines. In turn, these national machines are backed by networks of provincial and local party machines built on the basis of patronage, pork barreling and clientelism. Success in primaries depends almost entirely on financial/material resources (for more details about Argentine primaries see De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002, 2003, and Jones, this volume).

**Party splitting.** This party splitting method allows opposing leaders within a party to present more than one presidential (or gubernatorial) candidate to the general electorate. This method is infrequent except in the PJ where it is not formally accepted (nor is it usually desired due to its risks), but is informally tolerated. In effect, party splitting in the PJ fits well with its tradition of considering the party as an electoral vehicle and minor appendage of the broader *Movimiento Justicialista*. Unlike in other parties, then, candidates can break with the official party leadership and present a non-official candidature without being expelled, because loyalty to the movement is what matters (Malamud 2003). Nevertheless, this method has not been used by Peronists in all elections, and tends to be employed during periods of power struggles (i.e. during the conflict between the "orthodox" and "renovadores" in the eighties, and the division between Menemists and non-Menemists in 2003).

**Double simultaneous vote.** Though it is used in no national election, since 1987 several provinces have employed the double simultaneous vote (DSV, also known as the "Ley de Lemas") to elect governors.<sup>10</sup> This method entails a simultaneous intraparty and general election. Under DSV parties (i.e., lemas) may present more than one candidate. Votes are pooled by party and the governor is the highest polling candidate of the party with the most votes.

The DSV, like party splitting has been adopted by several provinces as a means for the PJ to avoid severe intra-party conflict (so severe that intraparty primaries were not considered an acceptable mechanism of dispute resolution by one or more of the factions). At first glance the method proved successful for the PJ (of the 23 gubernatorial elections held using the DSV, the PJ has only lost two). However, because the DSV encouraged intraparty conflict and provided little incentive for consensus among disparate factions, governors were faced with fractionalized PJ

---

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the DSV in Argentina, see Tula (1995, 1997). See Moraes (this volume) and Buquet and Chasquetti (this volume) for a discussion of the similar Uruguayan system.

delegations in provincial legislatures, which created considerable governance problems. Over time Peronists recognized that the costs of the DSV outweighed its benefits, and its use has declined precipitously. The "Ley de Lemas" was eliminated in province after province (normally with the support of the UCR and other opposition parties) during the mid to late 1990s.<sup>11</sup>

Of the four methods of presidential and gubernatorial candidate selection, elite choice primaries are the most common. The decision regarding the method to employ is based on three factors: whether the party is in the opposition or in the government (national or provincial); if the governor or president is allowed to seek reelection; the size of the party (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002, 2003).

In effect, the party that occupies the presidency is more inclined to choose its candidate via an elite agreement (or via not very competitive primaries), while the opposition parties have had to use primaries to choose their presidential candidate (see table 1). In the cases where the president was prevented from seeking reelection (Alfonsín in 1983 and Menem in 1999) or decided not to run (as Duhalde in 2003), the President played a key role in the designation of his successor, either by promoting the nomination of his choice (i.e. an heir apparent) or by blocking the candidacy of his main rival.

Whichever selection method is used, parties attempt to balance their list (between president and vice-president) by naming one candidate from each of the two traditional regions ("Buenos Aires" and the "Interior") (Serrafero 1999).

**Table 1 about here.**

Whether a party is in the government or opposition also influences the selection process for governor. The presence of a governor reduces the probability of a provincial elite division, which often results in a primary. Powerful governors (who control the provincial administration) impose their successors, co-opt potential opponents, and/or else successfully negotiate an agreement with other party factions. Because governors bear a disproportionate share of the costs of divisive primaries, they have the incentive and means to arrange a negotiated choice of candidate. Governors only challenge comes from co-partisans who have access to the kind of resources necessary to construct and maintain their own machine and to withstand the governor's efforts to co-opt supporters.

---

<sup>11</sup> The percentage of provinces that used the DSV for gubernatorial elections is 1987-5%, 1991-40% 1995-38%, 1999-17% and 2003-8%.

Potential challengers with such resources are scarce, but could include mayors of large cities, some national senators and deputies, and particularly members of these groups supported by the party president (especially if the party president is also President of the Republic). In contrast, where the district level party is in the opposition at the provincial level, it is much less likely to have an undisputed leader or the kind of resources possessed by the governor. Opposition parties instead are generally characterized by several high-profile leaders, who possess important, but limited, machines.

Likewise, of the 43 times since 1983 that an incumbent governor (who had been elected) was eligible to seek immediate re-election the governor did so in all but five instances. In 32 of these 38 elections the incumbent was victorious. Given this success, these governors are likely to be influential because not only do they control the provincial administration, but it is also likely that they will continue to control it for the next four years. As such, these governors should be able to avoid the risks of primary elections to a much greater extent than other gubernatorial candidates.

Party size is the final relevant factor party's decision whether to choose presidential and gubernatorial candidates via the elite agreement or via primaries. Given their national scope and their predominance in a considerable number of provinces, the PJ and the UCR have been more inclined to choose candidates by primaries. On the other hand, the minor national and provincial parties, given their limited geographical scope, small size and cliquish leadership, have to use elite-centered methods.

## **PROFILE OF PRESIDENTIAL AND GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES<sup>12</sup>**

Who are presidential and gubernatorial candidates? What experience do they have? What relationship do they have with the political party that backs them? With the exception of a limited number of studies that provide some details (Jones 2002, Molinelli et al 1999: 519-535, Serrafiero 1997, 1999), systematic answers for these questions in post 1966 Argentina, do not exist.<sup>13</sup> In this section I show that the majority of the presidential and gubernatorial candidates have accumulated significant prior political experience in extremely party-oriented careers.

---

<sup>12</sup> The analysis is based on the recompilation of information from national newspapers (Clarín, La Nación, Página 12, Ambito Financiero), from biographic compilations (Argento and Gerschenson 1999, Barón 2002, Barón and Guerra 2000, Nogués 1989, Quirós 1986, Sanguiao 1998, Sinatra and Vélez 1994, Vélez 1997) and from interviews with political leaders.

**Presidential candidates.** By whatever means selected, all the UCR, PJ and the minor national parties' candidates have previously occupied an elected legislative position (municipal councilor, provincial legislator, national deputy, national senator), an elected executive position (mayor, governor or president), or held a post appointed by the president (minister), or in several cases, they held at least two of these three types of posts (see Table 2)

**Table 2 about here**

Presidential candidates tend to follow a *cursus honorum*, with a fairly well-defined direction, as evinced in Table 3. This *cursus honorum* has generally been within political parties and built on a territorial basis which is later projected on the national level. In the UCR and the PJ the positions of governor and national senator have been the most frequent launching pads for runs at the presidency. In the case of the minor national parties, these launching pads tend to be deputy or national senator.

**Table 3 about here**

**Gubernatorial candidates:** In the 1983-2003 era, virtually all the gubernatorial candidates had previously held or were holding an elective or appointive post or a party office. For example, 68% of the PJ's candidates had been or were governor, national senator, national deputy, provincial legislator or mayor. In the UCR, 75% of the candidates occupied or had occupied one of these positions, while for provincial parties this figure is 76% (see Table 4).

Table 5 shows the previous political experience of the 99 elected governors between 1983 and 2003. These 99 individuals generally had previously held an elected, appointive or party position, or several of these. Cases where a person obtained a candidacy without party or political experience are rare.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the post-gubernatorial political careers of former governors are more diverse, as suggested by Table 6. An important number run for reelection and obtain a second mandate (or up to a third and fourth mandate, if the provincial constitution allows for it), and a few conquer the presidency. At the same time, Argentina is notable for the significant number of

---

<sup>13</sup>Botana (1977) and de Imaz (1977) provide useful studies of the issue for the periods 1880-1916 and 1936-1961 respectively.

<sup>14</sup> These include businessman Jorge Escobar, the singer Ramón "Palito" Ortega and the F-1 car racer Carlos Reutemann. All three were PJ candidates and relied on strong personal support from President Menem to win.

governors who, after completing their mandates, obtain a seat in the national senate and aspire to return to provincial government (see Table 7). In this sense Argentina parallels the Brazilian case (Samuels, this volume), in that state/provincial positions are plum. In any case, the common denominator for all these governors is that to actively continue their political careers they must maintain a good relationship with the party, which means observing party rules and practices. However, there is variation among candidates with respect to how closely integrated they are into national and provincial party structures. This case shows that the presidents and governors political careers are strongly underwritten by the political parties that back them; however, *party adherents* presidents have successfully emerged from outside the central leadership core, and challenged formal leadership of parties. Consequently, following Siavelis and Morgenstern, nearly all serious candidates for president and for governor in Argentina are either *party insiders* or *party adherents*.

**Table 4 about here**

**Table 5 about here**

**Table 6 about here**

**Table 7 about here**

## **CANDIDATE CHOICE, CAMPAIGNS AND POST-ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR**

*Party insiders* or *party adherents*: does it make a difference? In this section I provide a preliminary answer to this question, analyzing an admittedly limited number of cases. I focus on how selection variables and candidate types affect campaigns and presidential behavior once in office. The section focuses on UCR presidents Alfonsín and De la Rúa and the Peronist presidents Menem and Kirchner, the four popularly elected presidents since 1983.

## The UCR presidents

**Raúl Alfonsín.** Raúl Alfonsín's career molded him into the perfect "*party insider*" type. He pursued a thirty year political career as one of the most prominent UCR leaders in the most important electoral district in the country, the province of Buenos Aires.<sup>15</sup>

In 1983 Alfonsín obtained an overwhelming victory in the elections for the leadership of the UCR, defeating Fernando De la Rúa, then leader of the traditional internal faction that had dominated the party for thirty years. This victory immediately provoked the suspension of the primaries planned to decide the presidential candidate. Alfonsín was proclaimed the undisputed UCR candidate. Despite this overwhelming victory, Alfonsín assured himself the backing of his internal adversaries in the electoral campaign through the distribution positions in the UCR party hierarchy and the awarding of legislative candidatures to cultivate support for him in the party (Malamud 2003).

In the campaign, Alfonsín maintained the programmatic lines of the UCR, but at the same time he gave the party a more fighting spirit and mobilization, which attracted a significant number of supporters who traditionally did not vote for the UCR. This new orientation helped break the iron law of Argentine politics: to defeat the Peronists in competitive and completely open elections—something that had previously never occurred. In the 1983 presidential elections the UCR garnered 50% of the votes, much higher than the 30% average that it usually obtained since Peronism appeared on the scene in the 1950s.

The victory over the PJ gave Alfonsín significant room to maneuver within the UCR and to govern. Alfonsín's initial cabinet was made up totally by members of the UCR. However, following his campaign strategy, Alfonsín appointed both his own followers as well as old internal rivals. Three criteria were applied for practically all cabinet posts, even for more technical ones like the Ministry of Economy and secretariat and sub-secretariat posts: "party membership," "internal equilibrium" and, "position reached within the party" (a well-established rule in recruiting and promoting UCR leaders) (de Imaz 1977: 197-218).

---

<sup>15</sup> Alfonsín was district committee president in 1955 and 1959, a delegate to the province of Buenos Aires Committee between 1961 and 1965, and served as president of this strategic party body. In 1972 he was a UCR National Committee presidential candidate (the maximum party authority) and a pre-candidate for national presidency, but in both cases he was defeated by the then party leader Ricardo Balbín.

Throughout his presidency, Alfonsín maintained *de facto* and *de jure* party leadership with little dissent. In 1984 the UCR modified the party statutes prohibiting simultaneous occupation of the presidency of the party and presidency of the Republic to allow Alfonsín to serve in both positions. He maintained the post of party president after UCR's defeat in the 1989 presidential elections and the subsequent hyperinflationary crisis.

Though this dual role violated traditional rules of the UCR, the party did not experience a generalized process of rule changes in its internal structure. Nor did its programmatic orientations change. Despite Alfonsín's efforts to formalize changes in the party's platform, constant economic crisis prevented him from any significant formal programmatic change, as the government ruled in crisis mode. From the arrival of Juan Sourrouille to Ministry of Economy in 1985, until his departure at the beginning of 1989, major economic decisions were taken by a small group of ministerial officials in consultation with the president, and other members of the UCR had very little to say about these decisions.

In congress, Alfonsín followed a cooperative strategy, above all relying on his own party and resorting to ad hoc agreements with PJ and provincial party deputies, mostly on non-controversial subjects (De Riz 1994, De Riz and Smulovitz 1991, Mustapic and Goretti 1992). The initiatives vetoed by the president were those proposed mostly by the Peronist opposition (Mustapic 1995) and the decrees of "urgent necessity" were employed to deal with economic crisis. (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1996).

*De la Rúa* Like Alfonsín, Fernando de la Rúa built an extensive political and party career in the federal capital, squarely within leadership positions, making him a *party insider* as well.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless his leadership never threatened Alfonsín's power, who as noted, had remarkable success in maintaining control of the party.

For 1999 presidential elections, UCR and FREPASO allied to form the Alianza, and agreed to support a common presidential candidate selected in a semi-open primary. De la Rúa ran as the uncontested leader of the UCR, defeating FREPASO federal deputy Graciela Fernández Meijide. With very high levels of participation, De la Rúa scored a substantial

---

<sup>16</sup> De la Rúa was president of the UCR in the capital and later president of the party's national organization. He was a three time national senator (1973-76, 1983-89 and 1992-96), one time national deputy (1991-92) and mayor of Buenos Aires (1996-99). While a national deputy he was the UCR parliamentary leader.

victory (64% to 36% of 2.327.567 voters), pitting the UCR's national party machine against FREPASO's more modest one (Castiglioni 1999). Despite his overwhelming victory, De la Rúa respected previous coalition agreements regarding the distribution of candidacies for governors and national deputies. The most important of these was for the vice-presidency, which went to Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez the leader of FREPASO. FREPASO also received the candidacies for the governorship of the Province of Buenos Aires and of the City of Buenos Aires, the two most important districts in the country.

The campaign was centered on De la Rúa's personal character, but also on the promotion of the Alianza as a novel electoral force in Argentine politics. In contrast, the electoral strategy of his principal adversary, the PJ's Eduardo Duhalde, was oriented toward mobilizing the traditional Peronist vote (Semán 1999). In October 1999 the Alianza obtained an overwhelming victory over the PJ and De la Rúa was proclaimed president of the republic.

Fernando de la Rúa's formed his first cabinet recognizing that his victory was a win for the Alianza electoral coalition as whole. He maintained a delicate equilibrium in the distribution of ministerial posts between the UCR and the FREPASO. Nevertheless, after a short period, De la Rúa broke away from this formula and established a more personalistic style of government, appointing relatives (in particular, his son), personal friends, technocrats and second tier party leaders. This style, contributed to the progressive abandonment of the original Alianza program and a distancing between the president and the coalition of parties that backed him.

The first large cabinet reorganization, undertaken without the consultation of FREPASO leaders, resulted in the resignation of Vice-President Alvarez, provoking a serious crisis in the Alianza. The second reorganization of the cabinet, in which De la Rúa also showed a great autonomy appointing as minister of economy first Ricardo Lopez Murphy, and later Domingo Cavallo, provoked an open conflict with his own party still headed by Alfonsín. Though a *party insider* De la Rúa's departure from the party oriented strategy we expect from this type of candidate is largely explained by the fact that he led a fractious and conflictive rather than homogeneous coalition (not to mention the severe economic and political crisis over which he presided).

These successive crises eroded De la Rúa's initial support. Despite a tense relationship between the president and his initial support coalition, De la Rúa's government obtained congressional approval for a number of his political initiatives, although this approval was, in many cases, motivated by the urgency of the economic crisis. In other occasions, De la Rúa also resorted to the use of decrees of urgent necessity and emergency powers to achieve his objectives.

## **PJ Presidents**

**Menem.** Before reaching the presidency, Carlos Menem's entire political career was centered in the province of La Rioja, one of Argentina's least important provinces.<sup>17</sup> He first attained national notoriety when in the 1980's he confronted party leadership then headed by a group of union leaders (called the "orthodox" sector). In this sense Menem fits the profile of candidate for whom formal party structures are important, but he led a somewhat peripheral provincial party, and challenged formal national party structures. In this sense, he can be considered a *party adherent*, but as will be seen by his later behavior as president, he had some *free-wheeling independent* tendencies. As a result of his challenge, Menem became a principal leader of a reform sector that became known as the "renovadores." After a series of struggles the "renovadores" gained the upper hand in 1988, and its two most important leaders Antonio Cafiero (then governor of the province of Buenos Aires) and Carlos Menem became president and vice-president of the PJ respectively.

A short time later Menem and Cafiero competed in a primary election for the national presidency. At the time of the primary, Cafiero attempted for the first time to transform the party into an organized force governed by clear and stable rules. He was the PJ president at the national level and formally had the overwhelming support of PJ governors and legislators and the principal party leaders aligned with the "Renovadores" majority.

On the other hand, Menem relied on a heterogeneous support base made up largely of union forces, the orthodox sector and a conglomerate of small groups of left and right-wing Peronists

---

<sup>17</sup> Menem was governor of La Rioja between 1973 and 1976 and, following authoritarian rule, between 1983 and 1989. Menem was head of the provincial PJ from the sixties forward. On Menem's political trajectory, see Cerrutti (1994) and Leuco and Díaz (1989).

(Leuco and Diaz 1989). With these forces behind his candidacy and brandishing a proselytizing, markedly personal and antiparty style Menem won a hard fought victory.<sup>18</sup>

After this internal victory, Menem relied once again on a proselytizing strategy to develop a clearly plebiscitary presidential campaign, in which he presented himself as a quasi-religious figure. He addressed voters directly and relegated the PJ's party structure and other leaders to a marginal position (Palermo and Novaro 1966: 202-223, Waisbord 1995). With this campaign he managed an overwhelming victory in the 1989 presidential elections.

Reflecting his *party adherent* status, Menem's inaugural cabinet was appointed largely on the basis of personal confidence bypassing old line Peronist leaders. Three of his eight ministers were not affiliated with the PJ and one was very recently affiliated. Of these four, the two who occupied strategic ministries (Foreign Relations and Economy) not only were not Peronists, but could be considered quite hostile to the party. Menem's rebuke of the party became clearer when he appointed Peronist heavyweights to second and third level civil service positions. Among his Peronist ministers, only a few could be considered important, and all of them were people personally linked to Menem from his years as governor of La Rioja.<sup>19</sup> Menem also appointed to his cabinet well known leaders of the center-right Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDe), a neo-liberal political party with decidedly anti-Peronist credentials.

Neither did Menem show much regard for including party input in governmental decision-making. In fact, he actively ignored the party, to a greater extent than one would expect even from a *party adherent* giving him some of the characteristics of a *free-wheeling independent* with respect to cabinet formation and his relationship with the legislature. A year after having reached the presidency and after Cafiero's resignation as party leader, Menem also assumed the PJ's presidency. Barely installed as the leader, he requested leave and provisionally delegated leadership to people in his confidence who lacked any significant leadership experience (including his brother Eduardo, a national senator for La Rioja, and his personal friend Cesar Arias).

During his ten and a half years of government Menem pursued an ambitious state reform policy, and oversaw economic deregulation and the privatization of state owned companies, flaunting the traditional statist and nationalistic orientation of the party. In all these areas, Menem governed unilaterally, sidestepping the Congress and using and abusing urgency decrees and partial vetoes. The strategies were employed both in times of crisis and stability. (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1996, Molinelli 1996, Mustapic 1995, Palermo and Novaro 1996).

---

<sup>18</sup> Of the million and a half votes cast, Menem obtained 53% and Cafiero 46%.

<sup>19</sup> Of the 49 ministers, secretaries or sub-secretaries in this first cabinet, only six were members of the PJ's highest leadership body (and two of these were from La Rioja) (Mc Guire 1997: 242).

Despite all of this, Menem transformed the party to serve his own objectives, and combining strategies of negotiation and imposition, converted it into a tool to advance his own interests. Although Menem could not fully achieve his goals, due to the internal power wielded by other party leaders (particularly the PJ provincial governors), he managed to govern with little interference from the Peronist party. However, somewhat ironically, he is also credited with re-making the electoral viability of the party by transforming it from a union based party to one based on a political machine (Levitsky 1997, 2001). Thus, though he had some *free-wheeling independent* tendencies in terms of behavior, his relationship with the party, his continued adherence to the party, and his efforts to challenge leadership and transform it from within make him more closely approximate the *party adherent* type.

**Kirchner.** Like Menem, until reaching the presidency, Néstor Kirchner's political trajectory was that of a peripheral Peronist leader. His career had strayed little from the limited reach of the relatively irrelevant province of Santa Cruz.

Kirchner's ascension to the presidency was similar to that of many of the governors elected in provinces administrated by the PJ with a divided party leadership, and Kirchner, like Menem fits the mold of a *party adherent*. Given his deep rivalry with Menem, Duhalde used all the tools of the presidency to impede Menem's return to power. Powerless to designate his own successor and conscious of the difficulty of winning a primary against Menem, Duhalde promoted the presentation of multiple PJ presidential candidates in the general election. The PJ, thus, went into the election divided, with three candidates, Menem and two candidates with national-popular and anti-liberal platforms, Rodriguez Saá and the one finally backed by Duhalde, Kirchner. I

In the first round, Menem finished first with 24 per cent of the vote. Nonetheless, his sure defeat by Kirchner, predicted by public opinion polls, led to Menem's withdrawal from the second round. Kirchner thus became the new president in an election in which he obtained 22 percent of the vote, and in which the three Peronist candidates combined won more than 60 percent.

In designating his cabinet, Kirchner attempted, above all, to reflect the party agreement that brought him to the presidency. Four cabinet posts were awarded to members of the president's intimate circle, three posts were reserved for functionaries of the Duhalde administration (all linked to the Buenos Aires PJ) and an equal number were distributed amongst other leaders with strong Peronist credentials. Cabinet candidates from northern districts were denied posts (nearly all these were Peronist bastions, but aligned with Menem in the presidential election), as were leaders who did not specifically back Kirchner (the appointment of which would have permitted Kirchner to extend his meager base of support).

Kirchner followed and deepened interim President Duhalde's policy program, a decisive programmatic turn from Menem's neo-liberal policies. This change of course signified the reorientation of the PJ towards its traditional statist tendencies. This reorientation was possible due to four factors. First, Kirchner had Duhalde's support, and Duhalde was the *de facto* leader of a significant number of members of congress. Second, once Menem was defeated PJ provincial leaders quickly abandoned support for his policies, even though they had previously backed them. Third, Kirchner's popularity in public opinion polls helped him to fortify his position. Fourth, Kirchner maneuvered to gain legislative support from outside of the PJ, especially on the center left.

## CONCLUSION

In Argentina, the process of recruitment of presidents and governors is concentrated in the parties, and within them, in the parties' respective provincial branches. The centrality of parties in the recruitment process is related to the combination of a key group of electoral and party variables: an institutionalized party system with moderate party identification among voters, monopolistic party control over candidacies, the power wielded by provincial party leaders, and a mixed and decentralized campaign finance system. As a consequence, the leaders that are elected to executive offices are mostly *party insiders* and *party adherents*. The evidence presented here concerning the behavior of the presidents in the post-1983 period shows notable differences between *party insiders* and *party adherents* with respect to behavior.

As a *party insider* Alfonsín mobilized the his party behind his presidential candidacy in the 1983 campaign, and afterwards he was inclined to integrate his cabinet with UCR members, making sure to maintain smooth relations with the party and to structure positive relations with the UCR contingent in Congress. Somewhat contrary to the theory set out by Siavelis and Morgenstern, *party insider* De la Rúa experienced serious difficulties in coordinating relations between his administration and the party coalition that supported it. However, the key difference was that he relied on a coalition of parties and could rely less on his party contacts to build these legislative contingents.

On the other hand, PJ *party adherents* such as Menem and Kirchner who built their careers on the periphery of the party are eloquent cases of attempts to move the incumbent party towards new directions without paying much attention to internal debate. They managed to appoint cabinet positions without major party considerations and to resolve coordination problems between the president and his legislative support base through other mechanisms.

The Argentine case, gives us interesting empirical grist to deepen the study of the relationships between different types of parties and the types of candidates they produce, and the performance of presidents. As expected, the more formally institutionalized UCR has had presidents of the "*party insider*" type, while the less formally institutionalized PJ has produced "*party adherents*" and that is partly the case because of the low level of formal institutionalization and lack of formalized rules that characterize the PJ. Also, the fact that both candidates came from outside of the inner circle of these parties' elites, and from the provinces, also reinforced their *adherent* status. However, what is intriguing is that "*party adherents*" like Menem or Kirchner were more successful in carrying out their policies than the "*party insiders*" commanding institutionalized parties (Alfonsín and De la Rúa). This is probably the case, because as noted in the conclusion to this volume, Menem and Kirchner demonstrated the type of authoritarian efficiency that often exacts a cost on representation. What is more, for the long term, the disaster that befell Argentine politics after the Menem period suggest that this type of authoritarian efficiency may not be optimal for the long term consolidation of democracy.

## References

- Argento, Analía and Ana Gerschenson. 1999. *Quién es quién en la política argentina*. Buenos Aires: Perfil.
- Barón, María . 2002. *Directorio Legislativo*. Buenos Aires: CIPPEC-FSK-FES-UNIBO.
- Barón, María and Guerra, Beatriz. 2000. *Directorio Legislativo. Quiénes son nuestros legisladores y cómo nos representan*, Buenos Aires: FSK-UNIBO, 2000.
- Botana, Natalio. 1977. *El Orden Conservador. La política argentina entre 1880 y 1916*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Castiglioni, Franco. 1999. "Le primarie aperte nell'alleanza dell'opposizione in Argentina". *Il Mulino*, 4, 737-752.
- Cerruti, Gabriela. 1994. *El Jefe. Vida y obra de Carlos Saúl Menem*. 16th. ed. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Ciancaglini, Sergio. 1991. "Cómo se financian los partidos políticos". In *Clarín* september 1, 1-4.
- de Imaz, José Luis. 1977. *Los que mandan*. Buenos Aires: El Coloquio, 11<sup>th</sup> edition.
- De Luca, Miguel, Jones, Mark and Tula, María Inés. 2002. "Back rooms or ballot boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 4: 413-436.
- De Luca, Miguel, Jones, Mark and Tula, María Inés. 2003. "Partiti e primarie: la selezione dei candidati in Argentina". *Quaderni dell'Osservatorio Elettorale*, 49: 59-95.
- De Riz, Liliana. 1994. *Radicales y Peronistas: El Congreso Nacional entre 1983 y 1989*, Buenos Aires: CEAL/Instituto de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-UBA.
- De Riz, Liliana and Jorge Feldman. 1991. "El partido en el gobierno: La experiencia del radicalismo 1983-1989", *Documento CEDES/64*, Buenos Aires: CEDES.
- De Riz, Liliana and Catalina Smulovitz. 1991. "Instituciones y dinámica política: el presidencialismo argentino". In Dieter Nohlen and Liliana De Riz, eds, *Reforma institucional y cambio político*, Buenos Aires: CEDES-Legasa
- Ferreira Rubio, Delia. 1997. "Dinero y partidos políticos en Argentina". In Delia Ferreira Rubio, ed., *Financiamiento de partidos políticos*, Buenos Aires: KAS-CIEDLA.
- Ferreira Rubio, Delia and Matteo Goretti. 1996. "Cuando el presidente gobierna solo. Menem y los decretos de necesidad y urgencia hasta la reforma constitucional (julio 1989-agosto 1994)", en *Desarrollo Económico. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, Nro. 141, IDES, Buenos Aires, april-june.
- Jones, Mark P. 1997. "Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983-1995". In Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Mark P. 2002. "Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Mark P., Saiegh, Sebastián, Spiller, Pablo and Tommasi, Mariano. 2002. "Amateur Legislators - Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System", Vol. 46 N° 3, 656-669.

Leuco, Alfredo and José A. Díaz. 1989. *El heredero de Perón. Menem, entre Dios y el Diablo*, Sudamericana-Planeta, Buenos Aires.

Levitsky, Steven. 1998. "Crisis, party adaptation and regime stability in Argentina: the case of peronism, 1989-1995". *Party Politics* 4, 445-470.

Levitsky, Steven. 2001. "An organized disorganization: informal organization and the persistence of local party structures in Argentine peronism". *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33, 2001, 29-65.

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America. Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leyes de la Nación Argentina 23.298 (Orgánica de los Partidos Políticos, 1985), 25.064 (Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos, 1999), 25.600 (Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos), 25.611 (Internas Abiertas, Simultáneas y Obligatorias, 2002), 25.684 (X).

López Echagüe, Hernán. 1996. *El Otro. Una biografía política de Eduardo Duhalde* (5th. ed.). Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. "Introduction. Party Systems in Latin America", in Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. (eds.), *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford (California), Stanford University Press, 1-34.

Malamud, Andrés. 2003. "Winning Elections versus Governing: A Two-Tier Approach to Party Adaptation in Argentina (1983-2003)". In Roberto Espíndola and Manuel Alcántara, eds., *Political Parties in Latin America*. Routledge (forthcoming).

Matienzo, José Nicolás. 1994. *El régimen republicano-federal*, Buenos Aires: Marymar (1917).

McGuire, James W. 1995. "Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina". In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 200-246.

Molinelli, N. Guillermo. 1989. *Colegios Electorales y Asambleas Legislativas. 1854-1983*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.

Molinelli, N. Guillermo, Valeria Palanza, and Gisela Sin. 1999. *Congreso, Presidencia y Justicia en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Temas Grupo Editorial.

Mustapic, Ana María. 1988. "Radicales y justicialistas frente al desafío de la renovación", en Revista *Plural* Nro. 10/11, Buenos Aires, July.

Mustapic, Ana M. 1995. "Tribulaciones del Congreso en la nueva democracia argentina. El veto presidencial bajo Alfonsín y Menem", Revista *AGORA* N° 3, Buenos Aires.

Mustapic, Ana M. and Matteo Goretti 1992. "Gobierno y oposición en el Congreso: La práctica de la cohabitación durante la presidencia de Alfonsín (1983-1989)", en *Desarrollo Económico. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, Vol. 32 N° 126, IDES, Buenos Aires, July-september.

Nogués, Germinal. 1989. *Diccionario biográfico de políticos argentinos*, Planeta, Buenos Aires.

Olivero, Roberto H. 1994. *El financiamiento de partidos políticos en la Argentina. Un problema de cultura política y valores sociales*, Buenos Aires: Instituto Internacional de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias.

Palermo, Vicente and Marcos Novaro 1996. *Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem*, Norma-FLACSO, Buenos Aires.

Quirós, Carlos. 1986. *Guía Radical*. Buenos Aires: Galerna.

Reato, Ceferino. 1991. "Cómo hacen política las fundaciones". In *Clarín*, August 19.

Sanguiao, Osvaldo J. 1998. *Diccionario de Ministros (de Urquiza a Menem)*, Editorial Dunken, Buenos Aires.

Semán, Ernesto. 1999. *Educando a Fernando. Cómo se construyó De la Rúa Presidente*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Serrafero, Mario. 1997. *Reelección y sucesión presidencial. Poder y continuidad: Argentina, América Latina y EE.UU.*, Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano.

Serrafero, Mario. 1999. *El poder y su sombra. Los vicepresidentes*. Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano.

Sinatra, Mauricio and Velez, Mónica. 1994. *Quorum: Perfil de los Legisladores*, Buenos Aires: Grupo de Comunicación.

Spiller, Pablo T., & Tommasi, Mariano. 2000. *Las Fuentes Institucionales del Desarrollo Argentino: Hacia una Agenda Institucional*. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA-PNUD.

Tula, María Inés. 1995. "La reforma electoral en los '90: algunos comentarios sobre la Ley de Lemas en la Argentina", in Ricardo Sidicaro and Jorge Mayer (eds.), *Política y sociedad en los años del menemismo*. Buenos Aires: UBA-Oficina de Publicaciones (CBC).

Tula, María Inés. 1997. "Ley de Lemas, elecciones y estrategias partidarias. Los casos de La Rioja, Santa Cruz y Santa Fe", *Boletín SAAP*, 3(5): 3-26.

Waisbord, Silvio. 1985. *El Gran Desfile. Campañas Electorales y Medios de Comunicación en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.



**TABLE 1. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SELECTION IN ARGENTINA, 1983-2003. PJ, UCR and minor national parties.**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Party or Coalition</i>	<i>Status (Govt. or Opp.)</i>	<i>Candidate choice</i>	<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Candidate type</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Votes (%)</i>	<i>Primary Challenger</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Votes (%)</i>	<i>Turnout (%)</i>
1983	PI	--	Elite centered	Alende	Party insider	--	--	--			
	PJ	--	Elite centered	Luder	Party insider	--	--	--			
	UCR	--	Elite centered <sup>1</sup>	Alfonsín	Party insider	--	--	--			
1989	ADC	Opp.	Elite centered	Alsogaray	Party insider	DEP	--	--			
	PJ	Opp.	Closed primary	Menem	Party Adherent	GOV	54	Cafiero	GOV	46	41
	UCR	Govt.	Closed primary	Angeloz	Party insider	GOV	89	León	SEN	11	26
1995	FREPASO	Opp.	Open primary <sup>2</sup>	Bordón	Free-Wheeling Indep.	SEN	51	Alvarez	DEP	49	2
	PJ	Govt	Elite centered	Menem	Party Adherent	PRES	--	--			
	UCR	Opp.	Closed primary	Massaccesi	Party insider	GOV	65	Storani	DEP	35	25
1999	ALIANZA <sup>3</sup>	Opp.	Semi-open primary	De la Rúa	Party insider	GOV	64	Fernández Meijide	DEP	36	12
	AR	Opp.	Elite centered	Cavallo	Free-Wheeling Indep.	DEP	--	--			
	PJ	Govt	Elite centered	Duhalde	Party insider	GOV	--	--			
2003	PJ (FV)	Govt <sup>4</sup>	Party splitting	Kirchner	Party Adherent	GOV					
	PJ (FL)	Opp <sup>4</sup> .	Party splitting	Menem	Party Adherent	--					
	PJ (MNP)	Opp <sup>4</sup> .	Party splitting	Rodríguez Saá	Party insider	--					
	ARI	Opp.	Elite centered	Carrió	Free-Wheeling Indep.	DEP					
	RECREAR	Opp.	Elite centered	López Murphy	Free-Wheeling Indep.	--					
	UCR	Opp.	Semi-open primary <sup>4</sup>	Moreau	Party insider	DEP		Terragno	SEN	*	*

Note I: The year corresponds to the presidential election year. Some of the selection processes took place during this year while others occurred in the preceding year.

Note II: PRES = President, GOV = Governor (including the elected Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires), SEN= National Senator, DEP = National Deputy, - the period prior to the selection was a dictatorship.

<sup>1</sup> In party leadership elections held earlier in 1983, Alfonsín had easily won the presidency of the UCR National Committee. These party leadership elections were determinants for a elite centered presidential candidate choice in 1983.

<sup>2</sup> All of the data listed for this primary are estimates, as the final results were never released.

<sup>3</sup> The Alianza was an alliance between the UCR, FREPASO, and several minor parties such as the Cruzada Renovadora, Partido Bloquista, Partido Demócrata Progresista and Partido Renovador de Salta. Both De la Rúa and Fernández Meijide were selected as their respective party's candidate by an elite arrangement.

<sup>4</sup>\*\*\*

**TABLE 2 POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (1983-2004)\***

YEAR	PARTY	PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE	GOVERNMENT OFFICES							PARTY OFFICES			
			EXECUTIVE OFFICES				LEGISLATIVE OFFICES			NAT	PROV		
			PRE	MIN	GOV	MAY	SEN	DEP	LEG			COU	
1983	UCR	<i>Raúl Alfonsín</i>							3**	4**	4**		1**
	PJ	Italo Luder						3**					
	PI	Oscar Alende			4**				3**	4**		3**	
1989	UCR	Eduardo Angeloz			6			3**		3**			3**
	PJ	<i>Carlos Menem</i>			6								*
	ADC	Alvaro Alsogaray		2**					6			6	
1995	UCR	Horacio Massaccesi			8				2	1			2
	PJ	<i>Carlos Menem</i>	6		9***								
	FREPASO	José Bordón			4		3	4				1	X
1999	ALIANZA	<i>Fernando de la Rúa</i>			3			10***	1			1	2
	PJ	Eduardo Duhalde			8	4					1**		X
	APR	Domingo Cavallo		7					4				
2003	UCR	Leopoldo Moreau						6	14				4
	PJ (FL)	Carlos Menem	10		9***							5	
	PJ (FV)	<i>Néstor Kirchner</i>			12	4							X
	PJ (MNP)	Adolfo Rodríguez Saá			20					3***			X
	RECREAR ARI	Ricardo Lopez Murphy Elisa Carrió		2						8			

\* In years. Only experiences under constitutional governments and with more than six months of duration are included.

Presidents are in italics.

\*\* Experience before 1983.

\*\*\* Three years of experience are before 1983.

Abbreviations: PRE = President, GOV = Governor (including the Chief of Government of the City of Buenos Aires), MAY = Mayor, MIN = Minister, SEN = National Senator, DEP = National Deputy, LEG = Provincial Legislator, COU = Municipal councilor

**TABLE 3: PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: POLITICAL CAREER AND REGION OF PROVENIENCE**

YEAR	PARTY	PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE	POLITICAL CAREER	VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE	POLITICAL CAREER	REGION PRE-VCPT-
1983	UCR	ALFONSIN	COU - LEG - DEP	MARTINEZ	LEG - MAY	BA-INT
	PJ	LUDER	SEN	BITTEL	GOV	INT-INT
	PI	ALENDE	LEG - DEP - GOV	VIALE	x	BA-INT
1989	UCR	ANGELOZ	LEG - SEN - GOV	CASELLA	LEG - DEP - MIN	INT-BA
	PJ	MENEM	GOV	DUHALDE	COU - MAY - DEP	INT-BA
	ADC	ALSOGARAY	MIN - DEP	NATALE	COU - DEP	BA-INT
1995	UCR	MASSACCESI	LEG - DIP - GOV	HERNANDEZ	COU - LEG - DEP	INT-INT
	PJ	MENEM	GOV - PRE	RUCKAUF	MIN - DEP - MIN	INT-BA
	FREPASO	BORDON	DEP - GOV - SEN	ALVAREZ	DEP	INT-BA
1999	ALIANZA	DE LA RUA	SEN - DEP - SEN - GOV	ALVAREZ	DEP	BA-BA
	PJ	DUHALDE	COU - MAY - DEP - VIC - GOV	ORTEGA	GOV - SEN	BA-INT
	APR	CAVALLO	DEP - MIN - DEP	CARO FIGUEROA	MIN	INT(BA)-INT
2003	UCR	MOREAU	DEP - SEN - DEP	LOSADA	LEG - DEP - SEN	BA-INT
	FL (PJ)	MENEM	GOV - PRE	ROMERO	SEN - GOV	INT-INT
	FV (PJ)	KIRCHNER	MAY - GOV	SCIOLI	DEP	INT-BA
	MNP (PJ)	RODRIGUEZ SAA	LEG - GOV	POSSE	MAY	INT-BA
	MFR	LOPEZ MURPHY	MIN	GOMEZ DIEZ	LEG - DEP - SEN	BA-INT
	ARI	CARRIO	DEP	GUTIERREZ	X DEPX	INT-INT

PRE = President, VIC = Vice-President, GOV = Governor (including the Chief of Government of the City of Buenos Aires), MAY = Mayor, MIN = Minister, SEN = National Senator, DEP = National Deputy, LEG = Provincial Legislator, COU = Municipal councilor

**TABLE 4: Percentage distribution of PJ, UCR, Provincial Parties and National Minor Parties gubernatorial candidates (1983-2003) by the position they held when running of office**

<b>Position held</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>PJ</b>	<b>UCR</b>	<b>Prov. Parties</b>	<b>Nat.Min.Par.</b>
National Deputy		12	34	29	50
Governor		23	9	19	8
Mayor		10	13	14	8
National Senator		20	9	14	0
Provincial Legislator		3	10	0	18
Prov. Party Pres.		1	2	3	8
Provincial Minister		1	1	7	0
Party Activist (second tier)		0	1	0	8
Amateur		3	0	0	0
Vice-President		1	0	0	0
Vice-Governor		3	0	0	0
Natl.Exec.Branch (second tier)		3	0	0	0
National Minister		1	0	0	0
1983		19	21	14	0
<b>Total Number</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>12</b>

**Table 5 Percentage distribution of PJ, UCR, Provincial Parties and National Minor Parties governors candidates (1983-2003) by all the previous positions they held when running of office**

<b>Position held</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>PJ</b>	<b>UCR</b>	<b>Prov. Parties</b>	<b>Nat.Min.Par.</b>
National Deputy		27	30	18	
Governor		22	26	18	
Mayor		12	26	25	
National Senator		22	17	25	
Provincial Legislator		12	43	6	100
Provincial Minister		12	13	18	
Party Activist (second tier)		10	5		
Amateur		5			
Vice-President		3			
Vice-Governor		7	9		
Natl.Exec.Branch (second tier)		5			
National Minister		5	4		
Municipal councilor		3	4		100
1983		8	8	6	
<b>Total Number</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 6 Position held by governors (1983-2003) after they finish their mandate**

Position held	Total	PJ	UCR	Prov. Parties	Nat.Min.Par.
National Deputy		10	22		
Governor		38	30	19	100
Mayor		2			
National Senator		10	13	19	
Provincial Legislator		2			
Prov. Party President		0			
Natl. Party President		0	4		
President		5	4		
National Minister		2	9		
2003		28	26	6	
Total Number	99	59	23	16	1

**TABLE 7: From governor to national senator and vice versa (1983-2003)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>
José Alperovich	Tucumán	PJ	Senator (2001-03)	Governor (2003-present)
Eduardo Angeloz	Córdoba	UCR	Governor (1983-95)	Senator (1995-2001)
Alfredo Avelín	San Juan	CR	Senator (1992-99)	Governor (1999-2002)
José O. Bordón	Mendoza	PJ	Governor(1987-91)	Senator (1992-96)
Leopoldo Bravo	San Juan	PB	Governor (1983-86)	Senator (1986-2001)
E. Brizuela del Moral	Catamarca	UCR	Senator (2001-03)	Governor (2003-present)
Jorge Busti	Entre Ríos	PJ	Governor (1987-91/95-99)	Senator (2001-2003)
Jorge Busti	Entre Ríos	PJ	Senator (2001-2003)	Governor (2003-present)
Antonio Cafiero	Buenos Aires	PJ	Governor (1987-91)	Senator (1992-2001)
Oscar Castillo	Catamarca	UCR	Governor (1999-2003)	Senator (2003-present)
Fernando de la Rúa	Capital Federal	UCR	Senator (1983-89/92-96)	Governor (1996-99)*
José M. de la Sota	Córdoba	PJ	Senator (1995-98)	Governor (1998-hoy)
Eduardo Duhalde	Buenos Aires	PJ	Governor (1991-1999)	Senator (2001)
C. Gómez Centurión	San Juan	PB	Senator (1983-87)	Governor (1987-91)
José Luis Gioja	San Juan	PJ	Senator (1995-2003)	Governor (2003-present)
Julio C. Humada	Misiones	PJ	Governor (1987-91)	Senator (1992-2001)
Carlos Juárez	Santiago del Estero	PJ	Governor (1983-1987)	Senator (1987-95)
Carlos Juárez	Santiago del Estero	PJ	Senator (1987-95)	Governor (1995-2001)
Carlos Juárez	Santiago del Estero	PJ	Governor (1983-87/95-2001)	Senator (2001)
Ricardo Leconte	Corrientes	PAL	Senator (1983-87)	Governor (1987-91)
Carlos Maestro	Chubut	UCR	Governor (1991-1999)	Senator (2001-present)
Carlos Manfredotti	Tierra del Fuego	PJ	Senator (1995-99)	Governor (1999-2003)
Rubén Marín	La Pampa	PJ	Governor (1983-87)	Senator (1989-91)
Rubén Marín	La Pampa	PJ	Senator (1989-91)	Governor (1991-2003)
Rubén Marín	La Pampa	PJ	Governor (1983-87/91-2003)	Senator (2003-present)
Horacio Massaccesi	Río Negro	UCR	Governor (1987-95)	Senator (1995-2001)
Julio Miranda	Tucumán	PJ	Senator (1992-1999)	Governor (1999-2003)
Julio Miranda	Tucumán	PJ	Governor (1999-2003)	Senator (2003-present)
Ramón Ortega	Tucumán	PJ	Governor (1991-95)	Senator (1998-2001)
Ramón Puerta	Misiones	PJ	Governor (1991-99)	Senator (1999-present)
Carlos Reutemann	Santa Fe	PJ	Governor (1991-95)	Senator (1995-99)
Carlos Reutemann	Santa Fe	PJ	Senator (1995-99)	Governor (1999-2003)
Carlos Reutemann	Santa Fe	PJ	Governor (1991-95/99-2003)	Senator (2003-present)
A. Rodríguez Saá	San Luis	PJ	Senator (1983-94/98-2001)	Governor (2003-present)
Juan C. Romero	Salta	PJ	Senator (1986-95)	Governor (1995-present)
José Romero Feris	Corrientes	PAL	Governor (1983-87)	Senator (1987-2001)
Ramón Saadi	Catamarca	PJ	Governor (1983-87)	Senator (1987-88)
Ramón Saadi	Catamarca	PJ	Senator (1987-88)	Governor (1988-91)
Ramón Saadi	Catamarca	PJ	Governor (1983-87/88-91)	Senator (2003-present)
Vicente L. Saadi	Catamarca	PJ	Senator (1983-87)	Governor (1987-88)
Pedro Salvatori	Neuquén	MPN	Governor (1987-1991)	Senator (2001-present)
Carlos Snopek	Jujuy	PJ	Governor (1983-87)	Senator (1989-91)
Guillermo Snopek	Jujuy	PJ	Senator (1992-95)	Governor (1995-96)
Roberto Ulloa	Salta	PRS	Governor (1991-95)	Senator (1995-2001)
Carlos Verna	La Pampa	PJ	Senator (1993-2003)	Governor (2003-present)