

Chapter 7

Why Factions? Candidate Selection and Legislative Politics in Uruguay

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Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed an outbreak of studies devoted to analyzing the determinants of candidate selection processes in industrial democracies and its most salient consequences for the internal dynamics of parties (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Norris 1997; Davis 1998). The unit of analysis for these important contributions has been almost invariably the party as a unified actor. In other words, the predominant view has been that political parties as such have the authority to select their candidates for different governmental offices (see: Cox and Rosenbluth 1996, and McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995 for an exception). The question guiding this paper is what occurs when the unit of selection is not the party but a set of factions within the party. In particular, the paper addresses the determinants of a faction-centered selectorate and the consequences for the behavior of parties in the legislature.

First, drawing from the Uruguayan case the paper shows how a set of electoral rules and partisan regulations structure the process for selecting representatives around factions rather than parties as unified actors. In particular, the study shows how the combination of the Double Simultaneous Vote (DSV) with Proportional Representation-closed list (PR) induces party leaders to have their own organizational basis with discretion to select who can be nominated for a seat in parliament.

Second, given that faction leaders centralize the nomination process within parties, *prima facie* individual legislators lack incentives to provide constituency service (Carey and Shugart 1995). Indeed, Uruguayan legislators can be clearly characterized as faction-loyalists according Siavelis and Morgenstern' typology (this volume). However, Uruguayan legislators are strongly oriented to provide services, allocating an enormous amount of personalized attention to voters of about 30 hours a week (on average). What

are the incentives to provide those services in the context of centralized control over nominations in the hands of faction leaders? This paper argues that despite the fact that the nomination control inhibits the provision of particularistic services, the internal party competition among factions and the career ambitions of individual legislators create incentives to provide those services. I conclude that given that Uruguayan factions are extremely disciplined in parliament (Buquet et al. 1998; Morgenstern 2001), largely because of the faction leader control over nominations, legislators are able to perform the double function of being loyal to their factions and being strong providers of constituency service.

The paper is divided in four sections. Section one reviews how factions have been understated as institutionalized units of selection within parties and how the Uruguayan case can contribute to this insufficiency in the literature. Section two shows how the electoral system and the party statutes and primaries shape the candidate selection process around factions, generating a strong leadership control over nominations. Section three tests the incentives to provide constituency service based on a survey research conducted with a representative sample of 58 Uruguayan legislators in 2003. Section four discusses the empirical evidence and concludes.

I. Where is the Faction?

The literature on candidate selection is not new in comparative politics. During the mid seventies, a generation of pioneer studies (Eulau and Czudnowski 1976; Putnam 1976) was largely focused on the broader issue of elite recruitment in industrialized democracies. These studies were interested in analyzing the different roles played by politicians, their political socialization as well as differences in access to political power across different categories of individuals, such as sex, income, race, education, and other personal attributes. However, for this sociological approach, political parties and the formal candidate selection procedures were not a focus of interest. It is only more recently that parties gained a central role in studies of candidate selection, where electoral rules and partisan regulations came to the fore as determining factors in the way in which

candidates are selected and the strategies followed by politicians to remain in office or move on to a different post (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Norris 1997).

This positive shift towards political parties and the different types of rules governing the candidate selection process has been largely positive. But this perspective still has a serious drawback by only focusing on parties as the unit of analysis, neglecting those cases where different sub-units within parties are in charge for the candidate selection process. In other words, parties have been largely observed as complex organizations using different procedures (more or less centralized and more or less democratic) to nominate their candidates in a relatively unified fashion. Some political parties, however, are organically structured around factions and this organizational model has different implications for the internal dynamics of parties and their behavior in legislatures.

The focus on parties as the unit of analysis in candidate selection can be found in most recent case studies for industrialized democracies (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Norris 1997). For instance, in analyzing the Australian case, McCallister (McCallister 1997) argues that parties determine recruitment and “[...] in common with other advanced industrial democracies with strong party systems, legislative recruitment depends on a party label” (p. 17). The same is true for Canadian parties, where Erickson (Erickson 1997) argues that despite its candidate-oriented electoral system, “parties monopolize” and “determine who will run under the party label” (p.34). Furthermore, in those cases like Finland or Germany, where nomination procedures are highly decentralized at the district level, local party elites have to negotiate with national party leaders the specific location of their candidates on the national list (Wessels 1997; p.79; Helander 1997; p.97). Even in the United States, where party leaders do not have control over the nomination process, party primaries have been the most important device for the supply of candidates in a unified or partisan fashion.

The fact that parties have been the predominant unit of analysis in most case studies does not imply that they are monolithic organizations. Indeed, different authors have pointed out the presence of “factions” or “tendencies” such as Panebianco’s (Panebianco 1988)

governing coalitions or the different competing groups stressed by Kitschelt (Kitschelt 1989). However, these “factions” or “tendencies” in the literature have been very diffuse agents in determining not only the nomination of candidates but also their behavior in the legislature. As some authors show for the Japanese case (McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995; Cox and Rosenbluth 1996), factions clearly dominate the Liberal Democratic Party. But it is not clear how those factions control the nomination process because factions have no legal status within and outside the LDP. In the next section, I show how the uniqueness of the Uruguayan electoral system and partisan regulations deliberately create those factions as selectorates within parties. Unlike other countries where factions may exist, Uruguayan factions are institutionalized or stable agents within parties, with their own legal status and mechanisms to nominate candidates for parliament. In turn, this faction-centered selectorate has relevant consequences for the internal behavior of parties and particularly for the way those factions compete with each other and their behavior in parliament.

II. Legislative Recruitment.

II.1. Two basic electoral rules

The Uruguayan electoral system has been traditionally observed as a very complex legal engineering. Indeed, it is so complex that a prominent politician (Juan Vicente Chiarino) ironized long ago that voting was “so secret that even Uruguayans didn’t know for whom they were voting for” (Solari 1991). In this section, I review both the legal and partisan rules (as independent variables) governing the candidate selection process (as a dependent variable) for the Chamber of Deputies. In particular, I show how factions are the units of selection within parties and how faction leaders control the whole nomination process.

The Uruguayan electoral system is structured around two main features. The first is the Double Simultaneous Vote (DSV), which was originally introduced in 1910 with the clear intention to prevent major splits within the traditional parties (Blancos and

Colorados) from forming a multiparty system. In essence, the DSV restrains defections that could hurt the electoral performance of parties by allowing intra-party competition. Basically, it allows national elections to operate as party primaries where different factions within parties compete for the executive and legislative seats in parliament. Thus, the DSV can be considered as a variant of the intra-party preferential vote (see Katz, 1986), where citizens are allowed to select among parties (*lemas*) and then among factions (*sublemas*) within parties (Botinelli 1991; González 1991; Buquet et al. 1998; Morgenstern 2001).¹


Notice that the DSV forces voters to choose parties before factions. However, parties as such have no candidates for electing members of parliament.² The ballot structure is designed in such a way that votes are primarily cast for a party, followed by a presidential candidate and a list of candidates for the national Senate and the lower chamber.³ In this way, factions are hierarchies with national leaders at the top (presidential candidates and senators elected on a national basis), followed by deputies elected on a mix of national and local basis (see Diagram 1). Arguably, the most visible dimension of a Uruguayan faction (or *Sublema*) is a list for the national Senate, which is usually below presidential candidates in the ballot structure (Botinelli 1991; Buquet et al. 1998; Morgenstern 2001; Piñeiro 2002).

¹ Regarding legislative elections, it is arguable that the system works with a Triple Simultaneous Vote (TSV), given that voters vote for parties, a particular presidential candidate and a list of candidates for the Senate and the lower chamber. For simplicity I will use the DSV as a synonym of the TSV.

² This is true before and after the constitutional reform of 1996, which eliminated the DSV for the presidential election by introducing party primaries for nominating single presidential candidates per party (see Buquet 2004).

³ See Buquet and Chasquetti in this volume. The authors present a very useful appendix illustrating the ballot structure and the way in which votes are allocated within parties.

Diagram 1
Party Organization and the Structure of Factions in Uruguay



* Note that pre-presidential candidates have to compete in open primaries. Before the 1996 constitutional reform, parties were allowed to present multiple presidential candidates running under plurality rule.

Additionally, Uruguayan factions are institutionalized agents within parties. This basically implies that factions (and not only Uruguayan parties) are stable groups within parties across time or elections. Indeed, if a Senate lists is the most accurate unit representing a faction, an *Effective Number of Factions* (ENF) can be easily calculated to show that these agents are stable across time.⁴ Table 1 shows the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) and the ENF since 1942 until the most recent 2004 national elections. As can be observed, the number of factions remains stable across elections along with the number of parties. Furthermore, it can be argued that two different factions since the mid twenties (*Herreristas* and *Batillistas*) within the traditional *Blanco* and *Colorado* party

⁴ The *Effective Number of Factions* (Buquet et al. 1998) is calculated using Laakso and Taagepera's (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) formula to calculate the *Effective Number of Parties*. In this case, parties are substituted by factions as national senate lists (or *Sublemas*). That is; $N = \sum (f_i^2)^{-1}$

have largely dominated the internal competition against minor factions. Although these minor agents also reveal stability, they have been more prone to coalesce against *Herreristas* and *Batllistas* within their respective parties.

Table 1. Effective Number of Parties (ENP) and Factions (ENF): Uruguay 1942-2004

	1942	1946	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966	1971	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	Mean
ENP	2.3	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.4	2.7
ENF-Colorado	2.2	3.0	3.0	2.1	2.3	2.5	3.9	2.7	2.3	2.5	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.5
EFF-Nacional	1.6	1.4	1.4	2.7	2.0	2.5	4.6	3.8	1.8	2.9	4.2	1.5	1.6	2.5
ENF-Frente Amplio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.6	2.6	2.3	3.5	3.8	4.2	3.3

Source: Buquet et al. 1998 and Piñeiro 2002

A second central feature of the Uruguayan electoral rules is a PR-closed list system for electing ninety-nine deputies and thirty senators (D’Hondt formula). These features ensure that the distribution of seats is extremely proportional in comparative terms among parties, because votes are primarily assigned on a single national district for both chambers. However, once the distribution of seats among parties has been determined, the second key step is the distribution of seats among factions within each party across the nineteen districts in which the country is administratively divided (also using PR-closed lists).⁵ Thus, it is at this level where competition among factions takes place, because those groups have to compete within districts (ranging in magnitude from 2 to 44) for the seats that the party received.⁶ I will develop this important point later in the paper. For now, what is important here is that the distribution of votes within parties takes place among factions and across districts.

Hitherto, it is unclear what makes a faction the effective unit of selection within parties, because the concept of faction can be elusive. For instance, a critical view of the role played by factions in Uruguayan politics defines factions as “lists”, and focuses on the party supply of lists for deputies to show an important proliferation during the last decades (Vernazza 1989; González 1991; Monestier 1999). The core of this position

⁵ The Senate remains as a single national district (M=30)

⁶ More specifically; M= 2(11); M=3(4); M=4 (2); M=13 (1); M=44 (1).

implicitly assumes that deputies are self-selected and that party leaders have no control over the nomination process. Thus, since parties are observed “from below”, this perspective undermines the ability of faction leaders to select who can be nominated for the lower chamber. In other words, the problem with this literature is that the electoral system does not provide incentives for self-selection, as clearly occurs in the case of Colombia (Pizarro Leongómez 2002; Escobar-Lemmon 2004).

This view has been fairly criticized for ignoring the fact that representatives are vertically integrated below presidential candidates and national senators, all of them elected in simultaneous elections (Botinelli 1991; Buquet et al. 1998; Piñeiro 2002). From this perspective, factions are national groups that coordinate the supply of candidates for the lower chamber because aspirants have to be linked to national senators and presidential candidates on the same ticket.⁷ Thus, faction leaders have control over ballot access, deciding who can be nominated under the faction label, which is the only level that really matters if we consider that parties (as such) have no provision of candidates for elective offices. In sum, this view “from above” largely agrees with Panebianco’s (Panebianco 1988) argument that factions are groups with a clear vertical cut within parties.⁸ The electoral system does not provide incentives for self-selection at the deputy level, but rather it promotes a highly hierarchical structure of factions with a national cut and powerful leadership.

II.2. Party statutes and Primaries

The basic organizational features of Uruguayan parties have remained stable for more than one hundred and fifty years. Indeed, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that Uruguayan parties had factions before the DSV was adopted, or what is the same, the DSV became the legal expression and solution for an organizational model of parties

⁷ Faction leaders also largely centralize campaign financing, since the Banco de la República distributes funds based on the number of votes won by each sublema or faction in the previous election. However, deputies or individual candidates also contribute to their own campaigns.

⁸ Uruguayan factions have been relatively stable over time as can be observed by looking at the main leaders within the two traditional parties (Blancos and Colorados). For instance, current president Jorge Batlle has been presidential candidate since 1966, leading a faction (Lista 15) originally formed by his own father, the former president Luis Batlle. Former president Sanguinetti (1985-1989 & 1995-1999) has been leading a faction for over twenty years.

already in place. Thus, it is hard to dispute the fact that political elites shape the rules with which they play, and that this maxim applies not only the electoral rules governing elections but also to the partisan statutes that may affect their organization, the distribution of power within parties, and the internal party competition among groups or factions.

As we have seen before, Uruguayan electoral rules promote an organizational structure where factional leaders concentrate a tremendous power in controlling the access for elective (and some non-elective) posts in government. In this context, most Uruguayan parties have weak mechanisms to counterbalance the power of faction-leaders in their control over the nomination process. Those limitations can take the form of party statutes or regulations that may cut across parties, such as the party primaries implemented in the US. However, both types of rules exist in Uruguay but both exert a very weak influence in the nomination of candidates for deputies. Faction leaders are powerful agents within parties because of the electoral rules or the particular combination of the DSV with PR-closed lists system. In this context, the party statutes and primaries are unable counterbalance or weaken the nomination control in the hands of faction leaders.

First, party statutes vary across the three largest Uruguayan parties. Both the National and Colorado parties stipulate in their statutes (approved in 1983 and 1999 respectively) that the National and Local (departmental) conventions will nominate the party lists for the national Senate and the Chamber of Deputies respectively. These conventions reflect the distribution of power within the party emerging from the previous general election. However, the party statutes allows for the nomination of different lists of candidates for both chambers, which implies explicitly that factions will provide those lists. In turn, the National and Local party conventions always endorse those lists of candidates that factions provide, because the general elections will determine who wins more votes or seats in parliament. However, the key point to understand who is on the lists is that Colorado and Nationalist factions have no statutes and therefore leadership discretion prevails within these organizations.

The Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista (FA) presents a somewhat different and more mixed picture. This party can be considered as a coalition of leftist parties formed by different types of political organizations. In some cases, like socialists (PSU) and communists (PCU), the organization delegates power into Local and National congresses authorized to select candidates for both chambers of parliament. Both parties have a “long tradition” of party leader manipulation in the nomination process, since those who control the Executive Committees are generally senators, representatives or local legislators (Ediles). In other cases, like Asamblea Uruguay and the Movimiento de Participación Popular (former Tupamaros), the statutes also stipulate democratic procedures for the nomination of candidates. But these factions also present a strong presence of national leaders like Senators Danilo Astori and José Mujica, respectively. For instance, Asamblea Uruguay was formed by Senator Astori in 1994 and still maintains a strongly personalistic style despite the fact that his faction has national and departmental authorities. According to interviews I conducted with party members and militants, if the leader does not impose his or her preferences over the nomination process, he can nonetheless veto alternative candidates. Since party lists are closed and blocked, the challenge for candidates is not merely gaining access to the list but also gaining a spot with chances to be elected, and here the leader exercises a tremendous power to impose his or her order.

Arguably, what distinguishes the FA is not the fact that militants have more participation or influence in the nomination process, compared to Blancos and Colorados. The key difference here is the presence of a unique party or coalitional leader (Liber Seregni for 1971-1989 and Tabaré Vázquez since 1989). All factions or parties within the Frente Amplio have national and local leaders, but the coalition has a single presidential candidate since the Frente’s inception in 1971. The leader has a relevant role in the programmatic or ideological positioning as well as the strategies followed by the entire coalition, but has no influence over the nomination process within each faction, party or coalition member.

Second, in 1996 the governmental coalition of Blancos and Colorados approved a constitutional reform stipulating that there should be open party primaries before national elections. However, while this reform has had a tremendous impact in Uruguayan politics (Buquet 2000), it has not diminished at all the importance of factions within parties. The reform has two broad points of contact with the process of candidate selection. On the one hand, it is mainly oriented to selecting single presidential candidates without explicitly considering the use of primaries for nominating deputies. Therefore, it seriously affects presidential rather than legislative recruitment (Buquet 2004).

On the other hand and more importantly, the reform prohibited the supply of multiple lists for deputy, restraining factions to present a single list in each district in which they are competing. Thus, the fact that a faction is no longer allowed to present several lists under the same umbrella centralizes even more power in the hands of national leaders to coordinate the supply of candidates. In all districts, faction leaders are forced to solve coordination problems in order to maximize their electoral chances. Certainly, if there is a local leader there will be less need for electoral coordination, because faction leaders will support those candidates more easily (generally incumbent deputies). As it was stated by a former candidate within a Colorado faction in a small district:

“Senator Hierro came here and said directly that we had to support deputy Pérez, by unifying lists [...]. In this way, [national leaders] have a person here with economic power, a political career, a well structured organization, and they play simply with that. The key point is that they put in the balance potential votes and the cost of those votes” (Luna 2004; pp.-180).

Faction leaders can decide if party primaries will elucidate the order in which different candidates will be located on the list. In some cases, like the Foro Batllista, the presidential primary was simultaneously used to decide the order of the list for deputies. But, this is an exceptional case across factions. That is, faction leaders may or may not use the presidential primary for nominating candidates. If leaders know *ex ante* that their candidates will be defeated in an open primary, they will simply opt for the most straightforward mechanism: discretion. As our local candidate clearly implies; the party primary is not an open primary with free competition for a spot on the list. Rather, the

primary is an endorsement of the preferences or coordination game made by faction leaders.

Table 2. Influences in Candidate Selection. Means comparison

<i>Party</i>	<i>Faction Leader</i>	<i>Personal Reputation</i>	<i>Business sector</i>	<i>Labor movement</i>
FA	3.73	2.88	1.36	2.20
PC	4.00	3.12	1.88	1.35
PN	4.09	3.36	1.60	1.40
Total	3.89	3.06	1.58	1.77

Note: See appendix 1 **Scale:** 1= very little; 2= some; 3= average; 4= a lot; 5= enormous.

As can be observed in Table 2, Uruguayan deputies perceive that the support of faction leaders is very important to achieve their spots. A simple means comparison shows that the influence of faction leaders is perceived to be more powerful than the “personal reputation” of individual legislators or the influence exerted by “interests groups”. Indeed, the personal reputation could have been relevant had the party statutes and primaries the function they had to have. However, since faction leaders tailor who is on the list and where, they are perceived as more powerful agents in determining the selection and election of candidates.

Overall, party statutes and primaries are relatively weak formal procedures in the nomination process because parties are structured around factions that dominate parties and the candidate selection process in particular. As we have seen before, those factions are the consequence of an electoral system characterized by the DSV and PR-closed list, where faction leaders exert an enormous control over the nomination process for deputies and also for other non-elective offices. Thus, in the absence of statutes banning the power of faction leaders, the electoral system overdetermines the procedures for the selection of candidates. In this context, Uruguayan legislators (or deputies in particular) can be clearly typified as faction loyalist according to Siavelis and Morgenstern (this volume).

II.3. Behavioral incentives

Given the features of the candidate selection process, what kind of political incentives do characterize individual legislators? The primary consequence of Uruguayan electoral rules is that party organizations are structured around factions with leaders exerting a

great deal of control over the entire nomination process. Internally, these factions are very hierarchical, since voters cast their ballots simultaneously for: a) a party; b) a presidential candidate; c) a list of candidates for the Senate, and d) a list of candidates for the chamber of deputies. In this chain of authority, deputies are always subordinated to presidential candidates and Senate leaders, who have the control over nominations.

In this context, this section presents two arguments. On the one hand, I argue that the intra-party competition among factions create incentives to cultivate a “factional vote”. This collective incentive forces individual legislators to differentiate their faction from other factions within the party. Most of the neo-institutionalist literature shows a tension between partisan (as a unified actor) and individual incentives (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Carey 1996; Crisp et al. 2004). However, there are few references to categories like factions and their collective incentives within parties (Morgenstern 2001). On the other hand, I argue that despite the fact that faction leaders centralize the nomination process, the career ambitions of individual legislators create incentives to cultivate personal reputations. In this case, while most of the literature focuses on reelection goals and past career paths (Ingall and Crisp 2001; Crisp and Ingall 2002; Crisp et al. 2004), I focus my analysis on the future career perspectives of legislators.

First, the existence of preferential vote (DSV) within parties promotes internal competition among factions, which are involved in a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, parties have the incentive to gain electoral support and there is a clear collective interest for all factions to win the election (as a party). But at the same time, factions have to differentiate among each other to obtain the highest number of seats in both chambers and win the presidency (Morgenstern 2001). Thus, electoral rules simultaneously create the collective incentive to win the election as a party, with a clear collective dilemma centered on the competition for votes among factions. Since the intra-party competition takes place among factions rather than individuals, I argue that legislators have incentives to cultivate a “factional vote”. This point implicitly assumes that legislators are agents of factions (as principals) in a prototypical principal-agent model.

Additionally, in electoral systems with intra-party preferential vote (like the DSV), the incentives to compete within parties (arguably among factions) increase as the district size increases (Carey and Shugart 1995). This is clearly the case of Brazil and Colombia. (Pizarro Leongómez 2002; Samuels 2003; Escobar-Lemmon 2004) But Uruguay has 19 districts with two large districts (Montevideo and Canelones) electing 44 and 13 out of 99 members of the lower chamber, where one could expect a strong internal party competition among factions. Furthermore, 14 out of 19 districts elect their deputies in two-member and three-member districts, where electoral competition takes place within parties competing for only one of those seats. In other words, with three large parties competing for two or three open seats, each party competes in $M=1$ because the probability to win more than one seat is very low. In these cases factions also have incentives to compete with each other in order to gain the only available seat for the party.

Second, legislator's career ambitions matter (Mayhew 1974 Samuels 2003; Morgenstern 2004). This type of incentive can be determinant for the strategies and behavior of individual legislators, even under rules of no-reelection as is the case in Costa Rica (Taylor 1992; Carey 1996; Taylor 2001). Different career paths (beyond reelection) have important consequences for the strategies pursued by legislators, beyond the mechanisms of candidate selection stressed before. For instance, career incentives seriously affect the extent to which legislators cultivate a personal vote. According to my own interviews, Uruguayan legislators provide a rich example of politicians seeking different career paths beyond reelection (52%), such as running for a local *Intendencia* (18%), ascending to the national Senate (9%), seeking an executive post in the administration (12%) or look for retirement (5%).

An observation of these alternative career paths shows that there is an order in terms of the level of leadership control over nominations and the incentives to cultivate personal reputations. Reelection-seekers are more reliant on faction-leaders at the time of tailoring the lists than those who seek the local *Intendencias* or the national Senate. In the case of *intendentes*, some important legal factors intervene in the nomination process since a

constitutional reform was passed in 1996 staggering national and local elections. One of the main byproducts of this reform has been that *intendentes* have gained some power within parties and their links with factional leaders have progressively diluted. Indeed, *intendentes* have become such an important group of political figures within parties that some of them have stand an excellent chance of making the step towards the presidency and there is some evidence indicating that they are also starting to influence the nomination process in some small districts.⁹ This type of (locally-oriented) career implies that legislators will be more interested in ensuring votes at the district level with the direct consequence of being more prone to cultivate a personal reputation.

Access to the Senate is more restrictive than the local *Intendencias*, because deputies have to have a national recognition or reputation within and outside the faction to be nominated by current senators and/or presidential candidates. Indeed, this is one of the most important reasons why there are more deputies running for the local *Intendencias* than the Senate (18 and 9 percent respectively). The cost of creating a new faction (or Senate list) is extremely large and most of the times results in electoral inefficiencies.

In sum, legislators face different and many times contradictory incentives to behave in parliament. *Prima facie*, the system promotes strong leadership control over nominations for deputies and other career ambitions. As we have seen before, the combination of DSV and PR-closed lists structures parties around factions with leaders controlling the nomination process. In this context, factions have incentives to compete with each other and by extension its members are induced to cultivate a “factional vote”.¹⁰ Beyond this, individual legislators have incentives to cultivate their own personal vote depending on their career ambitions. The next section uses the provision of constituency service to test the extent to which legislators cultivate a factional and personal reputation in a context where the whole candidate selection process is centralized in the hands of faction leaders.

⁹ Currently, this is the case of two out of three presidential candidates in the 2004 electoral race, headed by Tabaré Vázquez and Jorge Larrañaga, former *intendentes* of Montevideo and Paysandú respectively.

¹⁰ The differences among factions (within parties) are so relevant to some Uruguayan voters that if the electoral chances of their candidate are low, they prefer to switch parties and vote for the most ideologically proximate option or faction of “the other party” instead of any other candidate within their own party.

III. *Constituency Service*

Constituency service has been traditionally observed as a type of legislative behavior oriented to provide particularistic attention to voters or targeted groups within the electorate (Cain et al. 1987). Basically, it has been linked to electoral systems where legislators have incentives to cultivate a personal reputation or systems where the nomination control is highly decentralized, or out of the hands of party leaders (Norris 1997, 2004). In other words, constituency service has been an indicator to show how legislators compete for votes when the electoral system clearly provides incentives to cultivate a personal reputation (Ingall and Crisp 2001; Crisp and Ingall 2002). Given the features of the candidate selection process, Uruguayan legislators have no primary incentives to provide service to constituents. However, as we argued before, there are collective and individual incentives to do so.

Based on data gathered from a survey questionnaire I conducted in 2003 to a representative sample of 58 Uruguayan deputies (out of 99), this section tests the incentives shaped by the level of intra-party competition and the career preferences of individual legislators on the level of constituency service. More concretely: *Hypothesis 1* states that the higher the level of intra-party competition, the larger the effect on the provision of service to constituents. Since it is expected that the level of intra-party competition varies with the district size, *Hypothesis 2* states that: the larger the district magnitude (M) the greater the provision service to constituents.¹¹ *Hypothesis 3* is structured around a set of sub-hypothesis testing the impact of different career ambitions: 2a) reelection; 2b) sub-national executive governments or Intendencias; 2c) Senate and; 2d) executive posts in cabinets and the state apparatus. In this case, although all the career preferences are positively associated with the provision of service to constituents, reelection seekers have fewer incentives than those who seek the remaining career ambitions, because their political fate is more dependent on the faction leader.

¹¹ Notice that the correlation between the district size and the number of list per party and the total number of lists is of about .4 and .9 respectively. However, the correlation between the ENF and the district size is only .2.

The dependent variable to be tested is the number of hours per week that representatives and their staffs spend with individual persons (see Appendix). Representatives were asked to respond on the basis of an open-ended question, assuring an important level of variation in the number of hours reported. One of the implicit risks of this type of question and particularly the type of information that is being requested is that legislators can be simply inflating the real number of hours. However, informal conversations with members of the administrative staff of legislators and permanent staff of the Uruguayan Congress argued that on average the reported values are reliable. On average, legislators allocate 27 hours in constituency service activities, which is surprisingly high. Brazil has an average of 30 hours a week per legislator (Hagopian 2002)¹², but under notorious incentives to provide particularistic benefits to voters (Mainwaring 1991; Ames 2001; Samuels 2003).

The independent variables to be considered are included in the following negative binomial regression model (NBR).¹³ This type of model is more suitable than a linear regression for two basic reasons dealing with the dependent variable (hours). First, OLS leads to erroneous estimations when the values of the dependent variable are only positive integers (count data). Second, given that a precondition for using a Poisson model is that the mean must be equal to the variance, and this is a difficult condition to fulfill, NBR is the only alternative. Thus, the model can be expressed in the following simple equation:

¹² According to Hagopian, Brazilian legislators allocate (on average) 30 hours a week in constituency service (personal communication).

¹³ Here I use a very similar methodological procedure used by Ingall and Crisp (Ingall and Crisp 2001).

$$CS = \alpha + \beta_1 ENF + \beta_2 M + \beta_3 Resk + \beta_4 Amb1 + \beta_5 Amb2 + \beta_6 Amb3 + \beta_7 Rel_{t-1} + \beta_8 NL + \beta_9 FA + \beta_{10} PN + \beta_{11} PC + \varepsilon.$$

Where: ENF= Effective Number of Factions
M = District size
Resk = Reelection seeker
Amb1 = Seek Intendencia
Amb2 = Seek Senate
Amb3 = Seek Executive appointment
Rel_{t-1} = Reelected in previous period
Nulist = Number/Place on the List
FA= Frente Amplio
PN= Blanco Party
PC= Colorado Party

First, the effect of the level of intra-party competition is measured with the Effective Number of Factions per party, at the district level (Piñeiro 2002). Second, the effect of the district magnitude is captured by the district size (*M*) in which the legislator was elected. Basically, this variable simply takes the number of deputies elected in each district. Third, the career preferences of legislators are captured by a set of dummy variables (see Appendix). These career patterns include: a) reelection; b) *Intendencias* or local government executives; b) Senate; c) executive appointments, and: d) retirement. Given its marginality, this last variable was omitted in the estimation order to compare all other career patterns.

Finally, the model takes into account three control variables. First, since seniority has been systematically found to be a meaningful factor in the U.S literature on congressional behavior, I included a dummy variable to capture the effect of this factor. In this case, it is expected that senior members work less than new members of parliament because those seats are perceived as safe by those who join them (Cain et al. 1987). Second, it also has been argued that the incentives to provide service in PR-closed list systems vary depending on the place on the list. The farther a deputy is on the list, the greater the incentives to provide service. The intuition is that the effort required to gain better positions on the list (or gaining access to other posts) are costly for those with less reputation within the list. Third, the regression also controls for partisanship with dummy variables for each of the three main parties, excluding the Nuevo Espacio. In this case, it is expected that the Frente Amplio (as the opposition party) and a clearly programmatic

coalition since its inception in 1971 will present (on average) a smaller provision of constituency service compared to traditional parties.

Results

Uruguayan legislators allocate an important amount of their time in constituency service (27 hours on average). According to Table 2, time allocation is clearly affected by the Effective Number of Factions (*Hypothesis 1*) as an indicator of intra-party competition, the future Career Ambitions of legislators (*Hypothesis 3*) and their partisanship or ideological orientation (lef-right). Neither District Size (M), nor Seniority and Place on the List achieve statistical significance. Interestingly enough, Table 2 reports that the sign of the coefficient for the district size shows that Carey and Shugart (Carey and Shugart 1995) are primarily correct in their prediction that large districts with intra-party competition create the stronger incentives to cultivate a personal (or alternatively factional) vote by providing service to constituents.¹⁴ However, the evidence is relatively weak in this case.

*Table 3. Negative Binomial Regression
(Dep. Variable = hours devoted to individual citizens)*

	Coefficient	P> z
Effective Number of Factions	0.116	0.000
District Size	0.000	0.900
Seek Reelection	0.662	0.000
Seek Intendencia	0.813	0.000
Seek Senate	0.712	0.002
SEC Ex. Appointment	0.652	0.001
Reelected _{t-1}	-0.114	0.123
Nulista	-0.017	0.483
Frente Amplio	-1.111	0.002
Blanco Party	-0.213	0.329
Colorado Party	0.017	0.931
Constant	2.308	0.000
N	58	
Prob > chi2	0.0000	
Pseudo R2	0.0974	


Likelihood-ratio test of alpha= 0:chibar2(01)= 6.09 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.007

¹⁴ In this explanation, the geographical location of the Uruguayan congress in the capital is not a competing argument, since representatives elected in small districts allocate on average only 2 days a week in Montevideo.

These regression results might not be clear in terms of providing concrete measures or expected values, revealing how well (or not) the model fits the data. Thus, I provide additional results using *Clarify* from Gary King and his collaborators (King et al. 2000), which works on the basis of Montecarlo simulation to multiply the number of cases without changing the original results. The advantage of this program is that it allows us to have concrete expected values measured in the units of our dependent variable (hours).


As can be observed in Figure 1, while an average legislator allocates 27 hours a week in service to constituents, those elected in districts with the higher ENF spend 29 hours (or 106%) more in service than the average legislator. Inversely, a legislator elected in a district with the minimum ENF invests 6 hours (or 23%) less in constituency service than the average legislator. This results are statistically significant and are in the right direction, in the sense that higher levels of intra party competition forces legislators (as agents of factions) to provide higher levels of constituency service.

Figure 1



The set of hypotheses testing career ambitions show that all of them are statistically significant, with the expected sign. As it was stated in *Hypothesis 3*, reelection seekers are well below the remaining career paths in terms of the provision of service to constituents. As can be observed in Figure 2, reelection-seekers allocate 9 hours (or 32%) more in service than the average legislator. Inversely, those who do not seek reelection

will invest 9 hours (33%) less than the average legislator. However, all of these values are much lower than the expected time allocations made by deputies with different career ambitions, such as those who seek the Senate or the local *Intendencias*.




First, a deputy planning to run for the Senate will allocate 24 hours (or 87%) more in constituency service than the average legislator or 25 hours more than those who do not seek the Senate. Second, deputies planning to run for the local *Intendencias* or sub-national executives (competing with other factions and parties in M=1) allocate also 24 hours (or 89%) more than the average legislator or 28 hours more than those who do not seek this post. Third, in addition to those who seek the Senate and the local *Intendencias*, legislators seeking executive appointments also allocate an enormous amount of their time in constituency service, with 21 hours (or 75%) more than the average legislator or 23 hours more than those who do not pursue this career.¹⁵ It is important to note that this non-elective career cannot be pursued regardless of the electoral performance of the faction to which the legislator is associated with. Indeed, his or her chances to succeed depend on the whole electoral performance of the party, because all votes contributing to the electoral success of the whole party is compensated with important post in the

¹⁵ According to my interviews, this type of legislator is ambioning a post in the executive cabinet or a public firm.

administration. Like most European parliamentary systems, where those who occupy posts in the cabinet or many other non-elective posts (embassies, public firms, etc.) are first elected to the assembly, those who pretend this career path have to compete in elections by being part of the faction slate.

Figure 3



*Note: Blanco & Colorado =0 (min); Frente Amplio =1 (max).

Finally, partisanship (as a subsidiary set of control variables) deserves a separate comment. In this case, Table 2 shows that only the Frente Amplio has a statistically significant p-value and the sign of the coefficient goes in the right negative direction. However, this variable has a not a marginal effect on the expected number of hours, compared to our previous hypothesis and According to Figure 3, legislators from the *Blanco* and *Colorado* party allocate 63% more than an average legislator in constituency service. Inversely, legislators from the Frente Amplio allocate (on average) 15 hours or (44%) less in service compared to whole sample of legislators. As it was argued before, there are two intertwined factors explaining the traditional versus left-wing divide in terms of propensity to provide constituency service.

The first argument has to do with the fact that the Frente Amplio has been a programmatic coalition oriented to promote public policies and reforms since it was formed in 1971 (Garce 2004). This has been largely observed during the last three administrations of the capital (Montevideo), where the left-wing coalition has become a

predominant party. In general terms, the Frente Amplio born and remains as a programmatic party with a very critical discourse against the historical clientelistic practices performed by *Blancos* and *Colorados*. The second argument is more controversial but plausible. Since traditional parties have been historically attached to the state (and actually precede the state), it is reasonable to expect that access public resources may constitute an important strategic device for political competition. The systematic condition of the Frente Amplio as an opposition party or without access to resources and power within the bureaucratic structure limited the propensity of legislators to provide service to constituents.

In sum, although Uruguayan legislators largely depend on their faction leaders to gain the nomination for a seat in the chamber of deputies, there are notorious incentives to cultivate a factional and personal vote depending on the level of intraparty competition among factions and the type of career ambitioned by individual legislators. In other words, Uruguayan legislators have important incentives to provide service to constituents, although nomination procedures are centralized.

IV. Concluding remarks

The Uruguayan case shows how factions rather than parties taken as unitary actors can be the key units in candidate selection processes. The main explanatory factor facilitating this internal structure of parties rests upon the combination of the DSV with PR-closed list system. As we saw, a direct consequence of these rules is that faction leaders have a tremendous leeway to control the nominations for the lower chamber and other career paths. In this context, party statutes and primaries are mostly formal procedures that systematically endorse the preferences of faction-leaders. In other words, party politics in Uruguay is factional and so is the candidate selection process.

One of the main political consequences of a factionalized party system is that factions have to compete for votes within (and outside) parties. The byproduct of this intra-party

competition is that legislators (as agents of those factions) have incentives to cultivate a factional reputation. Beyond this, the career ambitions of individual legislators also affect the extent to which legislators may cultivate a personal reputation, even in a context where the whole candidate selection process is centralized in the hands of faction leaders. This paper shows that the cultivation of factional and personal reputations can be observed through the provision of constituency service.

Why individual legislators provide constituency service if faction leaders centralize the nominations? The answer to this question is that there is no contradiction. Most studies use constituency service to illustrate the scope of political competition for votes within and outside parties. But this behavior is generally understood as a set of actions that take politicians away from their interests in public policies and particularly their loyalty to party (or faction) leaders. This view compels us to conceive legislators as univocal providers of either public policies or particularistic services but not both in a simultaneous fashion. For instance, it is assumed that politicians who protect their individual political fortunes will provide more constituency service than those who are loyal to their leaders and value the party label. Thus, the consensus in the literature is that the provision of services can entail a collective action problem, given that those services can hurt the party (or faction) label.

Uruguayan legislators are comparatively high providers of constituency service and yet remain tremendously loyal to their faction leaders. The fact that they strongly depend on faction leaders to gain nomination or advance in their career ambitions guarantees that leaders overcome the collective action problem. Indeed, the evidence shows that Uruguayan factions are extremely disciplined when voting in parliament (Morgenstern 2001, 2004), and also parties taken as units have been very disciplined at least since the democratic restoration in 1985 (Buquet et al. 1998).

The available data do not allow us to answer under what conditions faction leaders promote or inhibit the provision of constituency service. We know that they are powerful agents because they control the nominations for the election and reelection of legislators.

In this context, leaders do not face important challenges in passing legislation or relevant public policies because they are able to discipline their members in parliament (Buquet et al. 1998). Thus, it is possible that faction leaders do not care about the activities of individual legislators who provide constituency service, given that they get what they want from their legislators in parliament (loyalty). Furthermore, it is also possible that faction leaders actually promote constituency service among legislators, given that the effect will be positive or neutral in the worst case scenario. In this context, representatives not only gain or retain votes by providing constituency service but also remain as disciplined agents in fulfilling the strategies pursued by their leaders.

Appendix

The questionnaire was design by Prof. Frances Hagopian for a comparative study on political representation in Latin America. In particular, for this research I used two questions from that questionnaire.

1. In thinking about your professional career; what position would you like to exercise in your next appointment?

1. President of the Republic
2. Intendente
3. Senator
4. An appointment at the Executive Power
6. Private sector
7. Reelection
8. Retirement
9. Other (specify) _____
10. NA

2. Considering your public activities: How many hours per week you and your staff employ in attending complies and requests from individual citizens? _____Hs.

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