

Chapter 2

The Recruitment and Selection of Legislative Candidates in Argentina

Mark P. Jones

Scholarly understanding of how electoral laws influence elite and mass political behavior has improved dramatically over the past decade. The advances in this area, particularly in Latin America, have magnified however the discipline's comparatively weak grasp on the internal functioning of political parties. The lack of information on the candidate recruitment and selection process is especially glaring, and of profound import, since the rules and processes governing candidate selection often are more relevant than the actual electoral laws governing the general elections for understanding legislator behavior.

One of the principal reasons for the lack of scholarly understanding of the vital topic of candidate selection, and especially for the lack of cross-national work, is that the topic is inherently difficult to study. A credible study of candidate recruitment and selection requires both a high level of knowledge of the country and party system under study as well a considerable amount of data and information that are often difficult to obtain. Given the above requisites, the ideal vehicle by which to conduct a comparative study of candidate selection in Latin America is an edited volume, such as this one, where distinct individuals describe and analyze the candidate recruitment and selection process for different countries and political offices. In this chapter I contribute to this overall endeavor by describing and analyzing the key issues surrounding the recruitment and selection of candidates for national legislative office in Argentina.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of Argentine political institutions and the relevant political parties. I then discuss the basic functioning of intra-party politics, highlighting the important role of financial and material resources in enabling a political leader (or leaders) to maintain control over/influence in a political party. I continue with an analysis of the candidate selection process, followed by an examination of the political career pathways of national legislators, both prior to and following their term(s) in the national legislature. I then examine the consequences of the nature of candidate recruitment and selection in Argentina for the functioning of the legislative process. I conclude with a discussion of where Argentina is located in terms of the four ideal type legislators identified by Morgenstern and Siavelis in the introductory chapter of this volume.

In terms of the ideal types of legislators presented by Siavelis and Morgenstern (this volume), Argentine legislators are located most proximate the category of Party Loyalist. In contrast to their Chilean counterparts however (Navia, this volume), this loyalty is to the provincial-level party, not to the national party. The chapter highlights the highly provincial-based nature of politics in Argentina. In particular it provides the most comprehensive evidence to date of the provincial-based nature of Argentine political career paths. An overwhelming majority of national legislators begin their careers at the provincial level and return to careers in the province following their brief tenure in the national congress. The chapter also refines and extends analysis of the candidate selection process in Argentina, highlighting the different methods of candidate selection employed in the country as well as how the decision of which selection method to use depends heavily on provincial-level factors.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM: 1983-2005

Argentina has a bicameral national legislature (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) as well as a federal system of government in which provincial governors (24 total, from 23 provinces and an autonomous federal capital) exercise substantial autonomy (Eaton 2002; Sawers 1996; Tommasi 2002). The Argentine Congress, while certainly more of a reactive blunt veto player than a proactive agenda setter, is nevertheless an important actor in the policy process (Corrales 2002; Jones et al. 2002; Llanos 2002).

Argentine Chamber deputies are elected from closed party lists (using proportional representation) in multi-member districts (with a median district magnitude of 3 and a mean of 5). Deputies are allocated to the provinces based on their population (according to the 1980 Census), with every province receiving a minimum of five deputies and no province receiving fewer deputies than it held during the 1973-76 democratic period. One-half (127 and 130) of the Argentine Chamber is renewed every two years, with each of the 24 electoral districts (provinces) renewing one-half (or the closest approximation) of its delegation.

Prior to 2001, Argentine senators were elected by the provincial legislatures. Between 1983 and 1995 senators (two per province) were elected for nine year staggered terms (with one-third of the Senate renewing every three years) by plurality rule. In 1995 the number of senators per province increased to three. Between 1995 and 2001 senators were elected by plurality rule as before, with the caveat that one party could not occupy all of the province's senate seats, and that the "third" seat be allocated to whichever party (other than the party that held two seats) had the most seats in the provincial legislature (Jones 2002). Since 2001 senators (three per province) have been directly elected for six year staggered terms (with one-third of the Senate renewing

every two years; the Senate renewed completely in 2001) using closed party lists and a limited vote/incomplete list allocation formula (two seats are allocated to the plurality party and one seat is allocated to the first runner-up).

Only political parties may present candidates in elections for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The rules governing the formation of new parties are sufficiently flexible though, that it is very easy for any credible political candidate (e.g., an "independent") to form a political party on their own (e.g., the new party must obtain a number of adherents equal to 0.0004% of the number of registered voters in the province). Candidates for public office must either be a resident (for a minimum of two years) of the province in which they are presenting, or else have been born in the province.

During the 1983-2005 period Argentine politics was dominated by two political parties, the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, Radicals). At several times a "third party" achieved a modest degree of national prominence.¹ However, to date every single one of these parties has seen its electoral support evaporate after only a few elections. In contrast to the PJ and UCR, these national third parties never established an effective party organization and overly depended on the popularity of a single leader (or small group of leaders). Furthermore, these national third parties have consistently failed to significantly branch beyond their initial core geographic area of support, the Capital Federal and the portion of the Province of Buenos Aires adjacent to the Capital Federal (Greater Buenos Aires) (De Luca et al. 2002).

This PJ-UCR dominance can be seen in the substantial control exercised by these two parties (especially the PJ) over the most important political posts in the country: the presidency, the Congress (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), and the governorships. The period 1983-2005 encompasses the presidencies of President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) of the UCR, President Carlos Menem (1989-95, 1995-99) of the PJ, the abbreviated tenure of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) of the UCR, the term of interim President Eduardo Duhalde (2002-03) of the PJ, and the current term of President Néstor Kirchner (2003-) of the PJ.

During this period the PJ held a median of 55.7% (ranging from 45.7% to 62.5%) of the seats in the Senate and 47.1% (ranging from 37.8% to 54.9%) of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the UCR accounted for a median of 39.9% (ranging from 22.9% to 39.1%) and

¹ Third parties that achieved this ephemeral national prominence include the Partido Intransigente (PI), Unión del Centro Democrático (UCEDE), Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (MODIN), Frente País Solidario (FREPASO), Acción por la República (AR), and Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (ARI).

32.7% (ranging from 17.3% to 50.8%) of the Senate and Chamber seats respectively (see Tables 1 and 2). The most successful third party in the Senate during this period was the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN) which held a median of 3.6% of the seats (no party other than the PJ or UCR ever held more than two senate seats during any legislative period).² In the Chamber, the most successful third party (FREPASO) reached a zenith of 14.8% of the seats, with the median percentage of seats occupied by the largest third party in the eleven two-year legislative periods (a status held by five different parties) only 4.3%. Reflective of the fate that appears to befall all national third parties in Argentina, by the 2003-05 period FREPASO's Chamber contingent had been reduced to a mere 1.2% of the seats, and the party had ceased to exist as viable political organization.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

This PJ and UCR dominance extends to the governorships. As Table 3 details, the PJ controlled a median of 62.5% (ranging from 54.6% to 77.3%) of the governorships between 1989 and 2003, with the UCR placing second with a median of 25.0% (ranging from 9.1% to 31.8%). In contrast, no other party ever possessed more than one governorship at any one time during this period, with the highest average for a third party (the MPN) only 4.3%.

Table 3 about here

INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

The locus of partisan politics in Argentina is the province (Benton 2002; De Luca et al. 2002; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones and Hwang 2005; Jones 1997a; Levitsky 2003). In virtually all Argentine political parties (including all of those discussed in this chapter), political careers are generally provincial-based (with even positions in the national government often a consequence of provincial factors), and the base of political support for politicians and parties is concentrated at the provincial level.

A single person or small group of politicians generally dominates political parties at the provincial-level (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones et al. 2002). In provinces where the party controls

² Argentina has a large number of parties that successfully compete either solely (or effectively) in only one province (De Luca et al. 2002; Sin and Palanza 1997). This diverse group of parties is collectively referred to as "provincial parties". With two exceptions (the Frente Grande held the governorship in Capital Federal during the 1999-2003 and 2003-07 periods), all of the governorships held by parties other than the PJ or UCR have been held by provincial parties. During the past twenty years, the MPN has been the country's most successful provincial party.

the governorship, with rare exceptions the governor is the undisputed (or at least dominant) boss of the provincial-level party. In many other provinces where the governorship is not held by the party, the party is nonetheless dominated in a comparable manner (with a greater amount of space for intra-party opponents) by a single individual. Finally, in the remaining provinces where the party does not control the governorship and there is not a single dominant leader, there is generally a small group of influential party leaders who predominate in party life.³

The above-mentioned dominance by party leaders is based principally on patronage, pork barrel politics, and clientelism (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Jones and Hwang 2005; Levitsky 2003). Campaigns, both primary and general election, are funded primarily via the use of resources gained from patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic activities. Government financing of campaigns and party building also exists (see De Luca this volume), although it represents only a very modest fraction of the resources used for campaign activity by the relevant parties.

Patronage positions are particularly important for maintaining the support of second and third tier party leaders, who in turn possess the ability to mobilize voters, especially for party primaries. The ability to engage in pork barrel politics improves the party's reputation with key constituents and aids clientelistic practices through the provision of jobs to party supporters and the infusion of money into the party coffers (e.g., kickbacks from contractors and suppliers, skimming off a percentage of the project budget, profits obtained from the granting of government contracts to friends and relatives, campaign donations by businesses and individuals who wish to curry favor to receive benefits from the government following the election) which in turn is employed to maintain clientelistic networks. Clientelism assists party leaders at all levels in maintaining a solid base of supporters.

The provincial-level party has a large number of positions at its disposal, with the exact portfolio depending on the party's control of national, provincial, and municipal governments (De Luca et al. 2002). All parties control positions (of varying number) in the national, provincial, and municipal legislatures. If the party controls the provincial government, it has further access to positions in the provincial executive branch, and likewise, where it controls municipal governments (the degree of this control varies depending on the province's province-municipality

³ In provinces where the party leadership is fragmented, the role of the national party (especially if it is the party of the President) in provincial-level politics is often more pronounced than is the case where the provincial-level party is united under a single leader (Jones 1997b).

revenue-sharing system), it also has access to positions in the municipal executive branch.⁴ Finally, if their party controls the national government, provincial party leaders have access to a host of positions in the national government, both in the federal capital as well as in the provincial offices of the national executive branch.

The provincial party also controls the distribution of national, provincial, and municipal level expenditures, with this control varying depending on the party's control over the national, provincial, and municipal governments.⁵ These expenditures provide a prime source of the resources needed by party leaders to engage in clientelistic activities. Argentina's federal revenue sharing system automatically transfers funds to the provinces, which are then mostly utilized at the province's discretion. During the past dozen years the distribution of expenditures in Argentina has been roughly equal between the national government and the provinces (Saiegh and Tommasi 1998; Tommasi 2002) with, for instance, in 2000 52% of expenditures being carried out by the national government, 40% by the provincial governments, and 8% by the municipal governments (Tommasi 2002).

Governors (and to a lesser extent mayors) exercise considerable influence over the execution of public policy (either through their direct control of the provincial budget or their discretionary control over the execution of national government funded programs) (De Luca et al. 2002). This influence allows them to obtain/maintain the loyalty of their supporters through the granting of privileges in the distribution of material/economic subsidies, low interest loans, scholarships, etc. It also allows them to construct a relationship with a wide variety of other organized groups. The above-mentioned benefits also accrue in a more limited manner to legislators (at the national, provincial, and municipal levels) who are able to allocate funds/resources given to them by the legislature or are able to directly allocate national,

⁴ The size of the provincial public sector is quite large in most provinces. For example, in 2000 the ratio of private to provincial employees was above 10 in only three provinces (Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Córdoba), and as low as 3 in four provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, La Rioja, Santa Cruz), with a median value of 6 (Guido and Lazzari 2001). If one includes all public employees (national, provincial, municipal), public employees account for over 25% of the work force in six provinces, with a median percentage among the 24 provinces of 19% (Guido 2002). Finally, all but one province spends over 50% of its total revenue on provincial public employee salaries, and over half spend more than 67%.

⁵ The control of the government also opens up other potential sources of funding for some, unscrupulous, politicians, such as payments received to pass certain legislation or to turn a blind eye to, or protect, illicit activity.

provincial, or municipal level funds/resources working in concert with the respective executive branch.

The fruit of these patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic activities is the dominance of the provincial-level political party. First and foremost, dominance of the provincial-level party requires that a party leader be able to defeat any rival in an intra-party primary (either to choose candidates for elective office or to elect the provincial-level party leadership).⁶ Patronage, pork barrel activities, and clientelism are important for success in general elections, but they are indispensable for success in party primary elections. In a related manner, patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic based support often has the same anticipated reaction effect on potential intra-party challengers that a large campaign war chest has in U.S. politics; it causes potential challengers to desist from any attempt to defeat the party leader.⁷

CANDIDATE SELECTION

Legislative candidates are selected via either party primaries or elite arrangement (or in a handful of cases via competitive party convention votes). Political parties, not the government, run party primaries (for both party leadership positions and candidacies for national, provincial, and municipal public office) (De Luca et al. 2002). Primaries involve a considerable amount of mobilization efforts by the competing intra-party lists. The electorate for these contests is either party members (elections for party leadership positions are restricted to party members) alone or party members and those not affiliated with any party (i.e., independents).⁸

⁶ The party leader, through his/her control of the provincial-level party organization, has a great deal of latitude regarding when and under what conditions the primaries are held; thereby providing incumbent party leaders with an additional advantage vis-à-vis challengers.

⁷ Challenging the party boss is always an option for intra-party opponents. It is however a decision that is taken with great care, since a failed challenge often entails serious negative consequences for the challenger. In recent years (2001 and 2003), some potential challengers who realize they have no chance of victory in a primary election have opted to run directly in the general election as a candidate of their own party.

⁸ During the 1989-2001 period, in PJ provincial-level national deputy primaries restricted to party members and open to independents respectively, the median percentage of registered voters who participated was 7% and 13%. The comparable figures for the UCR were 3% and 5% respectively. These estimates are based on partial data, and thus should be treated with some caution. All the same, what is clear is that a relatively small percentage of the overall electorate participates in most primaries.

Vital to these mobilization efforts is the support of three groups (De Luca et al. 2002). One, every list needs the support of its own machine composed of regional and neighborhood-level leaders (*punteros*) who have established ties (normally fostered and maintained via patronage) with the leader or leaders supporting the list. Two, lists seek the support of *punteros* not initially aligned with any of the competing lists. Three, lists seek the support of other organized groups with a strong ability to mobilize large numbers of people (e.g., *piqueteros* [organizations that block traffic/roads/access to businesses in order to extort funds/consumer goods from the government and private companies], community improvement committees, *barras bravas* [soccer team fan clubs], etc.). In addition to obtaining the support of these groups, to be competitive a list must be able to carry out the following tasks (De Luca et al. 2002): engage in campaign advertising, hire a large number of taxis and buses to transport voters to the polls [as well as mobilize those voters], and deploy several election monitors to every precinct (*mesa*) to prevent the list from being the victim of electoral fraud.

To be successful in an election (i.e., to insure that its list is victorious) a party machine must engage in some campaign advertising. This generally includes the painting of walls, the hanging of banners and signs, and the distribution of campaign literature. The party machine must also be able to mobilize a sufficient number of voters. Some of this mobilization is already guaranteed by the pre-existing relationship that exists with individual *punteros* and other groups. However, as the election approaches the machine will generally need to provide financial incentives to these *punteros*, who in turn will insure the turnout of the people under their influence (via the distribution of consumer goods, cash, and/or persuasion). The machine also will need to provide transportation, which is generally done through the contracting of taxis (in urban areas) and buses/vans (in rural areas where the polling place is some distance away, or also in urban areas where a large number of individuals from a single location, such as a slum [*villa miseria*] are mobilized at the same time). Finally, since the elections are run by the parties, it is imperative that the party machine have a sufficient number of election monitors to insure that the election is not "stolen" from it by a competing party machine via electoral fraud (e.g., removal of ballot papers from the polling booth, switching of ballot boxes, theft and destruction of ballot boxes, bribing or intimidation of "lone" election monitors, chain voting [*voto cadena*], etc.).

When a primary is held, success thus depends almost entirely on financial/material resources. Whether or not a politician will faithfully represent (or has faithfully represented) the interests of his/her constituents normally has no significant impact on success in the primary contest. As former (1999-2003) Chubut governor José Luis Lizurume recently stated, "la interna es aparato puro" [the primary is pure machine] (*Diario El Chubut*, 07/18/03). As a consequence,

the use of primaries to select candidates in Argentina does not have the same type of particularistic or ideological effect that primaries in some other countries often have. In Argentina the principal competition is between competing party machines far more than between individuals, and victory is determined far less by personal characteristics and policy positions than by the amount of material resources that the machine has at its disposal for the primary election contest. Primary election results then indicate which party machine has the most resources (and makes the most efficient use of its resources), not which candidate (or list of candidates) is most popular among the primary electorate.

In the remainder of this section I extend an analysis of the determinants of the use of provincial primary elections to select Chamber of Deputies candidates in Argentina carried out by De Luca et al. (2002). The analysis population consists of the nomination method employed to select the candidates on the lists presented by the PJ, UCR, the most prominent minor national parties (during the specified periods) in their bailiwicks (see De Luca et al. 2002), and provincial parties (see De Luca, this volume) for the biennial Chamber of Deputies elections held between 1983 and 2001 (672 cases total). A *case* is the method by which a party in a province selected its candidates for the Chamber election. Thus the method the PJ in the province of Neuquén used to choose its candidates for the 2003 Chamber election is considered a case.

Dependent and Independent Variables

PRIMARY ELECTION. I employ two dependent variables. PRIMARY ELECTION-ALL PRIMARIES codes as 1 all Chamber of Deputies nomination processes carried out using a direct primary and as 0 all nomination processes that were the product of elite arrangement or a party assembly.⁹ PRIMARY ELECTION-COMPETITIVE PRIMARIES codes as 1 all Chamber of Deputies nomination processes carried using a direct primary where the winning list won by a margin of less than 75% of the valid vote, and codes as 0 all other nomination processes.

Figure 1 details the evolution of the use of primaries (PRIMARY ELECTION-ALL PRIMARIES) between 1983 and 2003 by the provincial branches of the PJ, UCR, and all parties combined to choose their candidates for Chamber of Deputies elections. While during the 1980s the use of primaries was significantly more common in the UCR than in the PJ, since 1993 both

⁹ The use of party assemblies is so infrequent (2% of the cases) that they are not treated as a separate category, and instead are merged with elite arrangement. Excluding the party assembly cases has no substantive effect on the findings.

parties have employed primaries to choose their candidates for national deputy at relatively comparable rates.

Figure 1 about here

De Luca et al. (2002) hypothesize that there are seven principal factors (outlined below) that explain a party's decision to use a primary or an elite arrangement to choose its candidates for Chamber elections. For information on the theoretical logic behind these factors' hypothesized influence, see De Luca et al. (2002).

PROV. OPPOSITION PARTY is coded 0 if the party controls the governorship and 1 if it does not. I expect a positive relationship to exist between this variable and the probability of a primary election being held.

INCUMBENT GOV./REELECTION is coded 1 if the party controls the governorship and the governor is eligible to seek immediate reelection, and 0 otherwise. I expect a party that controls the governorship and whose governor is eligible to seek immediate reelection to have a lower probability of holding a primary to select its Chamber candidates than all other parties (coded 0).

NATL. GOVERNING PARTY. Instances in which a district-level party was also the party of the president of the Republic (UCR for 1985-1989 and 2001, PJ for 1991-1999 and 2003) are coded 1, while all other instances are coded 0. I expect a positive relationship between this variable and the probability that a party uses a primary to select its Chamber candidates.

CONTAGION. Cases where another relevant party in the province used a primary to select its Chamber candidates for that year are coded 1, while all other cases are coded 0. I expect a positive relationship between this variable and the probability that a party holds a primary.

1983 ELECTION YEAR. I include a variable (1983 ELECTION YEAR) for which all nomination processes for the 1983 election are coded 1, and all other processes 0. I expect an inverse relationship between this variable and the probability of holding a primary.

UCR IN ALIANZA. I code all cases of UCR candidate nomination in 1999 and 2001 1, and all other cases 0. I expect an inverse relationship between this variable (UCR IN ALIANZA) and the likelihood of holding a primary to choose candidates (for information on the UCR-FREPASO alliance, see De Luca, this volume).

PJ, UCR, MINOR NATL. PARTY, PROVINCIAL PARTY, MPN-MPF. I utilize five binary variables to control for party fixed effects: PJ, UCR, MINOR NATL. PARTY (minor national parties), PROVINCIAL PARTY (provincial parties), and MPN-MPF (Movimiento Popular Neuquino-Movimiento Popular Fuego). All cases of PJ party nomination processes are coded 1, and all other cases 0. I employ a similar coding scheme for the UCR, MINOR

NATL. PARTY (AR, ARI, FG, MODIN, PI, UCEDE), PROVINCIAL PARTY (see De Luca, this volume), and MPN-MPF variables. The hypotheses for these party variables are as follows. First, I expect PROVINCIAL PARTY, to have an inverse effect on the probability of holding a primary. Second, I expect the UCR to be more likely to hold a primary than the historically "verticalist" and uninstitutionalized PJ.

Analysis and Results

Table 4 provides the results of a binary probit analysis of the probability that a district-level party employed a primary (as opposed to an elite arrangement/party assembly) to select its Chamber of Deputies candidates in a given election year between 1983 and 2003.¹⁰

Table 4 about here

Whether or not a party is in the opposition at the provincial level clearly influences whether it selects its candidates using a primary or an elite arrangement. PROV. OPPOSITION PARTY has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of a primary. Holding other values at their mean or zero (if the mean is a logically impossible value), where a party is in the opposition at the provincial level, it is 15% (all primaries) and 18% (competitive primaries only) more likely to hold a primary than is a party that is in government at the provincial level.

INCUMBENT GOV./REELECTION has a significant inverse effect on the probability of holding a primary election. Where the incumbent governor is eligible to present for reelection, the likelihood of the incumbent governor's party holding a primary is 21% (all primaries) and 19% (competitive primaries) less than when a party is not that of an incumbent governor eligible to run for reelection.

NATL. GOVERNING PARTY does not have a significant effect on candidate selection at the provincial level when the dependent variable is PRIMARY ELECTION-ALL PRIMARIES. It does however exercise a significant effect when the dependent variable is PRIMARY ELECTION-COMPETITIVE PRIMARIES (i.e., when only competitive primaries are coded 1), with the probability of a primary being held for the latter 9% greater if the party's national leader is the president.

¹⁰ The time-series cross-sectional nature of our data is a potential cause of concern. Methodologies for dealing with this type of data when using maximum likelihood estimation, particularly in unbalanced settings, are relatively undeveloped. However, several diagnostic exercises, such as including temporal fixed effects variables and running population average and random effects models, suggest the results presented here are robust. Given the small number of cases (approximately eighty) that exist for direct senatorial elections, a comparable analysis is not possible for the Senate.

CONTAGION does not have a significant effect on the probability of holding a primary. 1983 ELECTION YEAR has a significant inverse effect on the probability of holding a primary, with parties in 1983 42% (all primaries) and 37% (competitive primaries only) less likely to choose their candidates using primaries than in other years.¹¹ In 1999 and 2001 the UCR (UCR IN ALIANZA) was significantly less likely to hold a primary than in other years. Due in large part to its role in the Alianza, the UCR district-level parties were 25% (all primaries) and 20% (competitive primaries only) less likely to choose their candidates via a primary in 1999 and 2001 than they were between 1983 and 1997 and in 2003.

Provincial parties (PROVINCIAL PARTY) were less likely to hold primaries than other parties, with the provincial parties 39% (all primaries) and 35% (competitive primaries only) less likely to hold a primary than the other parties. Additional analysis (based on the data used in Table 2) indicates the provincial parties are significantly less likely to hold a primary than all of the other parties/groups of parties. As for the relationships between the four other party variables (PJ, UCR, MINOR NATL. PARTY, MPN-MPF), the only significant differences detected (in additional analysis similar to that above) are that the MPN-MPF are more likely to hold a primary than the PJ, UCR, and minor national parties, and that the PJ and UCR are more likely to hold a primary than the minor national parties. In spite of the differences in the popular characterization of the UCR (liberal-democratic, institutionalized) and PJ (verticalist, uninstitutionalized), the UCR is not significantly more likely to hold a primary than the PJ.

To better understand the substantive significance of the results in Table 4, I calculated the probability of a primary being held under six scenarios (see Table 5).¹²

Table 5 about here

(1) Where a PJ district-level party is in the opposition at the provincial level and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 60% (all primaries) and 52% (competitive primaries only).

¹¹ Log likelihood ratio tests indicate including temporal variables to control for the other election years does not significantly improve the fit of the model. In all instances analysis conducted excluding all data from 1983 provided results not substantively different from those presented here.

¹² All party variables not explicitly mentioned are set to zero while the mean values for CONTAGION and NATL. GOVERNING PARTY are utilized (for scenarios 1-3 UCR IN ALIANZA is set to zero, while for scenarios 4-6 its mean value for the UCR is used). The probability is the expected value obtained from the analysis in Table 4 using Clarify (King et al. 2000).

(2) Where a PJ district-level party is in government at the provincial level, the incumbent governor is not eligible to present for reelection, and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 43% and 37%.

(3) Where a PJ district-level party is in government at the provincial level, the incumbent governor is eligible to present for reelection, and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 21% and 16%.

(4) Where a UCR district-level party is in the opposition at the provincial level and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 59% and 48%

(5) Where a UCR district-level party is in government at the provincial level, the incumbent governor is not eligible to present for reelection, and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 46% and 33%.

(6) Where a UCR district-level party is in government at the provincial level, the incumbent governor is eligible to present for reelection that year, and it is not 1983, the probability of it holding a primary is 22% and 14%.

The particular configuration of these partisan and institutional variables has a powerful effect on the probability of holding a primary. These are important substantive differences, and indicate provincial-level factors such as whether or not a party is in the opposition at the provincial level or an incumbent governor is eligible to run for reelection have a salient effect on the likelihood of a district-level party employing a primary election to choose its Chamber candidates. This analysis underscores the decentralized nature of the Argentine party system as well as highlights the prominent influence exercised by provincial-level factors over the nature of the candidate selection process in particular, and over Argentine political career pathways in general.

PROFILING THE SUCCESSFUL CHAMBER AND SENATE CANDIDATES

As the above-discussion would suggest, in most instances the reelection decision for members of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and Senate (as well as the decision regarding their political future) lies primarily with the provincial-level party boss(es), and not with the individual deputy. Furthermore, these party bosses practice rotation (Jones et al. 2002), with the consequence being very low reelection rates for Chamber deputies and Senators. Table 6 provides information on the median percentage (and range) of deputies who presented for reelection (i.e., obtained a position on the party list), were re-elected, and, among those who obtained a position on the party list, were reelected between 1987 (the first full period reelection date) and 2003. During this time period a median of 24% (range of 20-33%) of Chamber

deputies achieved immediate reelection (the lowest reelection rate I am aware of in democracies that do not prohibit immediate reelection).¹³ Among the two dominant parties, the median percentage of deputies that achieved immediate reelection during this period was 18% for the PJ and 17% for the UCR. However, once a deputy obtained a position on the party list, his/her probability of reelection soared to a median of 74% for the Chamber deputies overall, and 90% and 78% for the PJ and UCR respectively. These high rates underscore the importance of the control exercised by the provincial party bosses over the list creation process.

Table 6 about here

Argentine members of congress are amateur legislators, but professional politicians (Jones et al. 2002). The position of national legislator is merely one station on a lengthy political career path that normally begins as well as ends in the legislator's home province. As a consequence, the behavior of deputies and senators is best explained by a modified version of progressive ambition theory (where progressive is interpreted in a more flexible manner), with static ambition (i.e., where a deputy or senator pursues a career in the Chamber or Senate respectively) and, especially, discrete ambition (where the deputy withdraws from politics after serving their term in office) being uncommon (Jones 2002; Morgenstern 2002; Samuels 2003). Virtually all deputies and senators occupy some type of governmental or party position prior to being elected to Congress. As mentioned above, most of these deputies and senators serve only one term in the Congress. Nonetheless, following their tenure in the Congress, most deputies and senators do not withdraw from politics, but rather occupy a political position at the national, provincial, or municipal level.

In this section I first analyze the position held by deputies (elected between 1991 and 1999) and senators (elected between 1986 and 2001) immediately prior to being elected (for that term) to Congress. Second, I review the positions most commonly held (at any point during a period of full democracy) by deputies and senators prior to their assumption of office. Third, I examine structural (provincial government status), partisan, and individual differences in the types of positions occupied by deputies immediately prior to assuming office during the 1991 and 1999 period. Finally, I provide an overview of the career pathways of deputies and senators following the end of their term in congress.

¹³ In 2003, only 4 (17%) of the 24 senators leaving office were reelected. Calculating reelection rates for the pre-2001 period is complicated by the nine year terms and the ability of the majority party (at the provincial level) to replace senators at will, though overall the reelection rates between 1986 and 2003 (measured in various manners) were approximately twenty percent.

The Springboard to the Chamber and Senate

Table 7 provides information on the positions held by deputies (those elected between 1991 and 1999) and senators (those elected between 1986 and 2001). Three prominent conclusions can be drawn from the table. First, virtually all deputies (97%) and all senators occupied either a governmental (82% of deputies and 93% of senators) or party (15% of deputies and 7% of senators) position immediately prior to their election. This fact underscores the presence of relatively stable career pathways in Argentine political parties. While these pathways are more complex than those found in many countries (e.g., Chile, see Navia, this volume), as the remaining analysis demonstrates they do exist. It is not an accident that a dozen years ago, the country's most prominent politicians today occupied positions such as mayor, national deputy, and provincial legislator; just as it will be no surprise when in a dozen years today's mayors, national deputies, and provincial legislators will occupy the most prominent political positions in the country.

Table 7 about here

Second, prior to assuming office, an overwhelming majority of national deputies (62%) and senators (54%) held governmental or party positions in their home province, with an additional 24% (deputies) and 35% (senators) representing their province in the Congress. In contrast, only 7% of deputies and 11% of senators held a position in the national executive branch immediately prior to assuming office. In sum, virtually all relevant candidates for the office of national deputy and national senator are chosen from a pool of governmental and partisan officeholders in the province.

Table 7 provides a comprehensive review of the distribution of deputies and senators among the different position categories. Therefore, for reasons of space, I will highlight only a few of the most important points that should be drawn from a review of the table. One is that the position most commonly held by deputies immediately prior to their being elected as a national deputy was the position of national deputy (23%). It was followed closely by the post of provincial legislator (20%) (with 24% of the former "re-elected" deputies occupying the post of provincial legislator immediately prior to their initial election as deputy), and then by the post of provincial executive branch member (16%). Among senators, the most popular post held prior to election was national deputy (19%), followed by national senator (16%), and provincial legislator (14%).

Prior Political Experience of Deputies and Senators

Table 8 provides information on the percentage of different elective and appointive positions occupied by national deputies and senators at any time (during a democratic period) prior to their election as national deputy and national senator. Among national deputies, the most common shared position is that of provincial legislator (35% of the deputies had occupied that post prior to being elected as deputy), followed by national deputy (i.e., 28% had been national deputies prior to their election as deputy between 1991 and 1999), municipal councilor (23%), and a member of the provincial executive branch (21%). Similar to above, only 12% had held a position in the national executive branch. Among national senators, the most common shared position is that of national deputy (33%), followed by a member of the provincial executive branch (31%), and national senator (21%). A total of 17% of the national senators had previously held a position in the national executive branch.

Table 8 about here

Covariates of Deputy's Springboard Position

Table 9 displays a summary of a series (nine total) of binary logit analyses (using clustered standard errors) of factors related to the positions held immediately prior (i.e., the last post occupied) by those national deputy candidates elected between 1991 and 1999. In the Table 9 analysis, the dependent variables are coded based on whether the deputy occupied that type of position immediately prior to being elected. With one exception, the dependent variables conform exactly to the position categories in Table 9.¹⁴ The independent variables are primarily structural (i.e., higher level). These included PARTY CONTROLS GOVERNORSHIP (coded 1 if the party held the governorship at the time of the election and 0 otherwise) and partisan dummy variables: UCR, FREPASO, CENTER-RIGHT/PROV. PARTY (coded 1 if the deputy was elected as a member of that party and 0 otherwise).¹⁵ The partisan dummy variables are measured as differences from the PJ, which is the excluded partisan category.

Table 9 about here

Two individual-level variables also are included. The first (SEX) is the sex of the deputy elected (1 for women, 0 for men) while the other (HEAD OF LIST) is whether the deputy

¹⁴ Column D (PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH I) is restricted to governors, vice-governors, and provincial cabinet ministers. Column E (PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH II) includes all of the above-mentioned positions as well lower tier provincial executive branch officials.

¹⁵ The variable CENTER-RIGHT/PROV. PARTY combines the national-level center right parties (APR, MODIN, UCEDE) and the provincial parties. FREPASO includes all center-left deputies that belonged to minor left and center-left parties prior to the creation of FREPASO.

occupied the first position on the party list (coded 1) or not (coded 0). In Argentine campaigns the head of the list (*cabeza de lista*) is often the most visible "face" of the party list for that election, and the position frequently is used by an ambitious politician as a launching pad to run for a higher political office in the future.

A variety of other variables were examined (e.g., previous control of the governorship, midterm elections vs. non-midterm elections, list position), but the results either yielded uninteresting results or created serious multicollinearity problems. Hence, these variables are excluded from this exploratory stage of the analysis.

The cell entries indicate the ratio of the predicted value for the variable when it is set at its maximum value (1) to the ratio when it is set at its minimum value (0), with all other values set at their mean (except for the partisan predicted values when calculating the maximum value) (King et al., 2000). Predicted values are included only where the estimated coefficients in the binary logit analysis were significant at the .05 level or greater.

Unsurprisingly, when a party held the governorship in its province, a significantly greater percentage of its candidates occupied posts in the provincial executive branch prior to becoming a national deputy (Column B). Of greater interest is the finding that when a party controlled the governorship at the provincial level, its successful candidates were significantly less likely to have occupied positions in the national executive branch (Column B). Or, conversely, when a party did not control the governorship in the province, its candidates were more likely to be drawn from the national executive branch. Given that the PJ held the national executive branch throughout this period, this analysis is more clearly interpreted when the analysis is restricted to PJ deputies (the column [C] titled National Executive Branch-PJ), where a similar significant inverse relationship is detected.

The partisan variables (as well as additional analysis where the four different party groups were rotated as the excluded partisan category) indicate that there exist relatively few inter-party differences in regard to the previous position occupied by their successful national deputy candidates. With the exception of the unsurprising significant lower probability that non-PJ deputies previously occupied a post in the National Executive Branch, there are relatively few significant partisan differences. FREPASO deputies were significantly more likely than their PJ (as well as UCR and center-right) colleagues to have occupied the post of national legislator (Column A) immediately prior to assuming office. UCR deputies were significantly more likely than their PJ (as well as FREPASO and center-right) colleagues to have occupied the post of provincial legislator (Column F) immediately prior to assuming office. Finally, the center-right national party and provincial party deputies (CENTER-RIGHT/PROV. PARTY) were

significantly more likely than their PJ (and FREPASO and UCR) counterparts to have previously occupied a post in the provincial executive branch (Columns D and E). This latter finding is accounted for almost exclusively by the propensity of the provincial party deputies to come from these provincial executive branch posts.

The results indicate that few positions are significantly more likely to be previously occupied by the head of the party list (*cabeza de lista*) than by those lower down on the list. The only position that was more likely to be occupied by the head of the list was that of a high level provincial executive branch member (Governor, Vice Governor, or Provincial Cabinet Minister: Column D). The head of list was significantly less likely to be either a non-mayoral municipal official (municipal cabinet minister or municipal councilor: Column H) or someone who only occupied a party post (Column I).

Successful female candidates were significantly less likely than their male counterparts to have been drawn from the position of national legislator (Column A) (in large part due to the fact that one-half of the population was elected before the first round of beneficiaries of Argentina's pathbreaking gender quota legislation (in force for all Chamber elections held since 1993) had the chance to present for reelection, a post in the national executive branch (Columns B), a post in the provincial executive branch (all positions, Column E), and as mayor (Column G). In contrast, successful female candidates were significantly more likely than successful male candidates to have only held a party post (Column I) immediately prior to election or to have held a lower-level municipal level post (municipal cabinet minister and municipal councilor, Column H).

Post-Term Position of Deputies

An adequate understanding of the nature of legislator political career pathways requires the above information on the positions occupied prior to assuming office along with information on the positions occupied following the conclusion of a deputy's and senator's tenure in office. In order to better understand the career paths of national legislators I carried out a study of the position occupied by national deputies in the three years following the end of their term in the Chamber of Deputies. All deputies elected between 1991 and 1999 were included in this analysis.¹⁶

To determine the position occupied by the deputies upon the completion of their term in office, I examined rosters for the national executive branch, national congress, provincial

¹⁶ The combination of the limited number of senators with post-Senate careers during this period, along with space limitations, led me to restrict this analysis to national deputies.

executive branches, provincial legislative branches, municipal mayors, municipal executive branches (only the largest city/cities in the province), municipal councils (only the largest city/cities in the province), labor union national executive branches, the national judicial branch, and the provincial judicial branch (supreme court only). Due to time limitations, these rosters were examined as of September of the year following the end of the legislative term. The legislative terms end on December 10 of odd years, and I examined the rosters as of September of the following even year. Hence the rosters were examined for five separate years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004).

This methodology is not without problems. First, the rosters (particularly for the national and provincial executive branches) generally omit lower level positions, informal contractual positions, positions that are "off the books", provincial and municipal level party leadership positions, and a host of other positions that we know scores of former legislators occupy upon the end of their tenure in Congress. Second, the rosters often are dated or obtain inaccurate information. Third, last names are occasionally misspelled in the roster, or different names are employed (the latter is more common for women). Finally, the focus on September of the even numbered years will lead to the omission of individuals who held positions for a relatively short period of time (something that is especially common for appointed positions in the national and provincial executive branches). For instance, even though Domingo Cavallo was the national Minister of Economy for two-thirds of 2001, his entry indicates he held no identifiable position during the three years following the end of his tenure in office, since in September of 2000 he was still a national deputy and by September of 2002 he was no longer a Minister.

In spite of the above limitations, the data presented below represent the most comprehensive review of post-congressional careers of Argentine legislators to date. They provide convincing additional evidence of the strong provincial based nature of Argentine career pathways.

Table 10 provides the distribution of the position occupied by national deputies in the three years following the end of their term (the one for which they were first elected in elections held between 1991 and 1999) in office (if more than one position was occupied, the one occupied first is employed here).¹⁷ Columns are provided for all parties, the PJ, the UCR, the combined

¹⁷ For deputies elected in 1999, only the position occupied in the first year following the official end of their term is examined (i.e., 2004). If deputies left office prior to the official end of their term, the three year clock starts from the date of their departure (not the official end of their four year term). The same categories used in the previous portion of this section are employed here. A partial exception is

center-right national parties and provincial parties, and for FREPASO.¹⁸ One point that is immediately apparent is that on average we lack information on the position held by half (51%) of the deputies. This large percentage is due in large part to the methodological limitations discussed above. In particular individuals that occupy informal or lower level positions (along with prominent positions in the provincial or municipal/county level party organization) are not included here, and previous more detailed work (Jones et al. 2002; Jones 2002) that focused on deputies elected in 1991 found that nearly a quarter of deputies (23%) occupied these types of positions three years after the end of their term in office.

Table 10 about here

Of those individuals for whom post-congressional career information was available, an absolute majority (51%) continued to represent their province in the national legislature (44% as national deputies and 7% as senators). FREPASO deputies were especially likely to continue in the Chamber (albeit not always as FREPASO deputies, especially in 2001 and 2003), which is not particularly surprising given the limited set of career options open to FREPASO legislators at the provincial level.

Over a third of deputies returned to their province to occupy positions in the provincial executive branch (13%), provincial legislative branch (17%), and at the municipal level (5%). The percentage of legislators who returned to their province ranged from a high of 51% (Center-Right National and Provincial Parties) to a low of 9% (FREPASO).

In sum, of those legislators for whom information is available, an average of 86% continued in a career that was directly linked to the province (i.e., either they continued to represent the province in the national congress or they returned to occupy an elective or appointive position in the province). In contrast, only an average of 10% of the deputies went on to hold a position in the national executive branch following their tenure in Congress, positions that in some instances were obtained in "representation" of their province (i.e., their provincial party boss obtained the position for them). There was a PJ President in office in all but one (2000) of the five roster years examined in this study, and hence it is unsurprising that a higher percentage of PJ members occupied posts in the National Executive Branch during this period.

represented by the Muni. Cabinet Minister and Municipal Councilor categories which only include ministers and councilors from the largest (or in some cases two largest) municipalities in each province. A new "Judge" category was also created.

¹⁸ For additional information on the coding of center national parties and provincial parties and of FREPASO, see note 15.

All the same, even for the PJ the number of former deputies holding national executive branch posts (15%) pales in comparison to the number holding posts directly linked to their province.

The data presented above coincide with a more detailed prior analysis of the position held by major party (PJ and UCR) deputies of the 1991-95 class as of mid-1998 (i.e., two and a half years following the end of their term in office) (Jones 2002; Jones et al. 2002). This analysis highlighted the high percentage (85%) of deputies continued to occupy a partisan of governmental post following their tenure office (2% were deceased and 2% were in prison or fugitives from justice), with a large majority (69%) holding a post at the provincial level (44%) or representing the province in the national congress (25%).

This section has provided evidence of the provincial-based nature of Argentine political careers. Focusing on national legislators (with special attention placed on national deputies), it demonstrated that a lion's share of political careers begin at the provincial level. Furthermore, most politicians continue these political careers at the provincial level, either by continuing to represent their province in congress or by returning home to occupy a position at the provincial or municipal level.

CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, AND CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS¹⁹

In the United States (as well as in Brazil and Colombia; see the respective chapters in this volume by Samuels and Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno), legislators are considered to be independent entrepreneurs, exercising a great deal of control over their political careers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). Cox and McCubbins (1993) highlight the manner in which individual representatives delegate power to the party leadership (especially in the U.S. House) to further their own reelection efforts both generally (party reputation) and specifically (perks of office, pork) as well as to influence public policy. This delegation to the party leadership helps the representatives achieve their collective goals.

As was amply detailed above, Argentine legislators do not possess a level of autonomy comparable to that of U.S. legislators, but most Argentine provincial party bosses do. Hence, in both legislatures delegation occurs. But whereas delegation is by the representatives to the party leadership (House and Senate) in the U.S., delegation is by the provincial party bosses to the party leadership (Chamber and Senate, but also to the President) in Argentina. These bosses delegate in order to further their collective goal of maintaining control of the provincial party

¹⁹ This section draws from Jones and Hwang (2005).

machine and maintaining (governors) or obtaining (bosses in the opposition at the provincial level) control of the governorship. As mentioned previously, within the framework outlined in the introductory chapter by Siavelis and Morgenstern, Argentine deputies are party loyalists, but given the decentralized recruitment, nomination, and election process in Argentina, they are loyal to the provincial-level party, not to the national-level party.

In Argentina, majority control of the legislature is based on a distributive, ideological, and reputational logic, but with the distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation. The goals of the provincial party bosses are best served by distributive policy, since their hold on power is based primarily on patronage, pork, and clientelism.

There is considerable variance in the level of control exercised by Argentine provincial party bosses over the political careers of deputies and other politicians. At one extreme are situations where there is a single boss who is governor, is unencumbered by any constraints on his/her immediate reelection, and faces no significant intra-party opposition. At the other extreme are situations where the party does not control the governorship and no one person exercises dominance over the provincial party. For instance, most PJ deputies come from provinces with a PJ governor, who in all but a few instances was the undisputed party boss. Between 1989 and 2003 a median of 73% of the PJ delegation came from provinces with a PJ governor (range of 69-80%). In contrast, only a median of 24% of the UCR delegation came from provinces where the UCR held the governorship (range of 11-38%; 34% for 1999-2001). In the PJ an overwhelming majority of delegation was by provincial bosses to the party leadership, with the individual legislators most commonly following orders from the provinces. In the UCR, there was a broader mix in the distribution of legislators for whom provincial bosses were delegating power on their behalf and who themselves were the bosses delegating power, although the former easily represented the majority of the UCR delegation.

In countries like the United States, the representatives are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leadership, while in Argentina provincial party bosses are the key players who engage in this delegation (on behalf of their deputies), but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar. Just as U.S. representatives delegate power to the legislative party leadership to achieve collective goals, so to do the Argentine provincial bosses delegate power to the legislative party leadership (and indirectly to the President in the case of the majority party). The majority party leadership uses its majority status (especially negative and positive agenda control) to dominate the legislative process, excluding legislation it believes may pass despite its objection, as well as implementing legislation it desires.

The normal operating procedure in Argentina is for the majority party leadership (generally following presidential directives) to manage the functioning of the Chamber and Senate. In equilibrium, the majority party leadership, not the provincial bosses, exercises the principal influence over legislator voting behavior. The decisions made by the majority party leadership are though constantly influenced by the preferences of the provincial bosses (generally on topics that directly affect the provinces), both in terms of what they place on the legislative agenda and in terms of the drafting of the legislation they want to pass.

Of course, provincial bosses reserve the right to dissent (via their legislators) and at times they must be called on by the party leadership to control their legislators. Serious dissent by the provincial bosses is however relatively uncommon due to the skill of the majority party leadership (and the President) in internalizing their preferences (i.e., the leadership is a good agent of the provincial bosses).

In regard to the legislators themselves, as Jones et al. (2002) underscore, Argentine legislators devote relatively little energy towards the production of public policy, the development of policy expertise, and the provision of constituency services. The main principal they need to satisfy is the provincial party boss, a boss who realizes that the principal value of the member of congress is their "vote" on the floor (and to a lesser extent in committee). Therefore while these deputies do engage in a modest level of constituency service and personal vote seeking behavior (e.g., particularistic bill introduction), it is marginal in scope and impact compared to the amount of resources the provincial bosses obtain in exchange for the on-going support of "their" legislators.

In sum, the provincial-centric nature of candidate recruitment and selection in Argentina has profound consequences for the functioning of legislative politics in the country. The substantial influence exercised by provincial party bosses over the candidate recruitment and selection process in Argentina endows these bosses with considerable influence over national politics via the votes/participation of "their" national legislators in the Congress. This in turn signifies that in order to implement their policy agenda, Argentine presidents must concentrate their energies on obtaining the support of the provincial party bosses to a much greater extent than is the case in the other countries examined in this volume where presidents tend to focus their energies on obtaining the support of the individual legislators (Brazil, Colombia), national party leaders (Chile), or national-faction leaders (Uruguay).²⁰

²⁰ As Langston (this volume) persuasively demonstrates, Mexico is presently in a state of flux regarding the key principals with whom the president needs to negotiate, and appears to be slowly evolving from a

CONCLUSION

Political careers begin and end at the provincial level in Argentina. Furthermore, politics at the provincial level tends to be dominated by political machines, with the careers of individual legislators generally dependent on provincial level party bosses.

Of the four ideal types of legislative candidates (Party Loyalists, Constituent Servants, Group Delegates, Entrepreneurs) detailed in the introductory chapter of this volume (Siavelis and Morgenstern), Argentine legislators most closely resemble the ideal type of "Party Loyalists" (keeping in mind that the loyalty is to the provincial-level party, not the national-level party). Siavelis and Morgenstern present six party variables and four legal variables that together determine the extent to which any one country's legislators fall into one of the four legislative candidate ideal types. Argentina falls most closely into the Party Loyalists category on three of the six party variables (Candidate Choice, Campaign Finance, Gender Quotas) and into the Constituent Services on two (Coalitions, Party Rules). Since the unit of the party being considered here is the provincial party, none of the final party variable (Re-election Norm) options fit the Argentine case very well.

For the four legal variables, Argentina most closely fits the Party Loyalists ideal type on two (District Magnitude/List Type, Barriers to Independents) and the Constituent Servants type on one (Residency Requirements). Argentina fits into three possible Ideal Types in regard to the Re-election Norms category (Party Loyalists, Constituent Servants, Group Delegates).

In sum, Argentine legislators are party loyalists, but they are provincial-party loyalists, not national party loyalists. Their careers are determined in large part by decisions made by provincial party bosses. They are recruited from positions within the province (e.g., provincial cabinet minister, provincial legislator, municipal mayor), and following their tenure in congress most commonly return to an elected or appointive position in their province. Whether or not they are selected to occupy a viable position on the congressional lists is determined in large part by the provincial party boss(es). Similarly, whether or not they are able to extend their tenure in congress (either via re-election or election to the other branch) is also a decision that lies more in the hands of the provincial party bosses than in those of the individual legislators. Finally, once their tenure (one term in over three quarters of the cases) in congress is over, it is the provincial

situation most similar (of the countries in this volume) to that found in Chile towards a situation comparable to that found in Argentina (i.e., the state governors are increasingly important actors in the country's legislative process).

party boss (or bosses) who primarily determine what position (if any) they will occupy upon their return to the province.

In the Argentine Congress, this party loyalty (to the provincial-level party) results in legislators who behave primarily in accordance with the interests of their principals (i.e., the provincial party bosses). While some modest level of constituency based work is expected, the principal role of these legislators is to provide the votes on the floor (or perhaps in committee) that the provincial party bosses employ as a form of currency in their constant negotiation with the national executive branch designed to obtain the maximum amount of resource transfers to their province. These resources are in turn to achieve the party bosses' paramount goal of maintaining control of the provincial party machine and maintaining (governors) or obtaining (opposition provincial bosses) control of the provincial administration.

REFERENCES

- Benton, Allyson Lucinda. 2002. "Presidentes Fuertes, Provincias Poderosas: La Economía Política de la Construcción de Partidos en el Sistema Federal Argentino," *Política y Gobierno* 10(1):103-37.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," *American Journal of Political Science* 48:742-57.
- Corrales, Javier. 2002. *Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones, and María Inés Tula. 2002. "Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes?: Candidate Nomination in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 35:413-36.
- Eaton, Kent. 2002. *Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in the 1990s*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Finocchiaro, Charles J., and David W. Rohde. 2002. "War for the Floor: Agenda Control and the Relationship Between Conditional Party Government and Cartel Theory." PIPC Working Paper 02-02, Michigan State University.
- Gibson, Edward L., and Ernesto Calvo. 2000. "Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: The Territorial Dimension of Economic Reform in Argentina," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35(5):32-55.
- Guido, Pablo. 2002. "En el 2014 Todos Seremos Empleados Públicos," Unpublished Manuscript, Fundación Atlas.
- Guido, Pablo, and Gustavo Lazzari. 2001. "Tasa de Desempleo Encubierto en las Provincias," Unpublished Manuscript, Fundación Atlas.
- Jones, Mark P. 2002. "Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones, Mark P. 1997a. "Federalism and the Number of Parties in Argentine Congressional Elections," *Journal of Politics* 59:538-49.
- Jones, Mark P. 1997b. "Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983-1995," in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Mark P., and Wonjae Hwang. 2005. "Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 49:267-82.

Jones, Mark P., Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. "Amateur-Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System," *American Journal of Political Science* 46:656-69.

King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Political Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation," *American Journal of Political Science* 44:341-55.

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Llanos, Mariana. 2002. *Privatization and Democracy in Latin America: An Analysis of President-Congress Relations*. New York: Palgrave.

Morgenstern, Scott. 2002. "Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Saiegh, Sebastian, and Mariano Tommasi. 1998. "Argentina's Fiscal Federal Institutions: A Case-Study in the Transaction-Cost Theory of Politics" prepared for the Conference "Modernization and Institutional Development in Argentina," United Nations Development Programme, Buenos Aires, May.

Samuels, David. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sawers, Larry. 1996. *The Other Argentina: The Interior and National Development*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Sin, Gisela, and M. Valeria Palanza. 1997. "Partidos Provinciales y Gobierno Nacional en el Congreso," *Boletín SAAP* 3(5):46-94.

Tommasi, Mariano. 2002. "Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s" prepared for the Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform project on "Federalism in a Global Environment," Stanford University.