

Chapter 16

Conclusions: Political Recruitment, Candidate Selection and Democracy in Latin America

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In this book we have addressed several theoretical issues. At its base, this book evaluates institutions in explaining political processes. The substantive chapters support our general conclusion that institutions matter, but the chapters equally demonstrate that they are not determinant; institutions create the environment which molds outcomes and behavior. At a second level, we have explored the role of specific institutions, including party and electoral systems in explaining a specific type of outcome, namely the procedures for choosing executive and legislative candidates. Again, we have emphasized the importance of these institutions, but also found that party level factors, such as organization and control of financing, plus non-institutional contextual factors, such as the degree of partisanship in the electorate, are necessary for understanding the origin of different types of candidates. Third, we have asked how these institutions and non-institutional factors affect executive-legislative relations, campaigns, and intra- and inter-party relations through their effects on the types of politicians that different recruitment and selection (R&S) systems produce.

In this concluding chapter we apply the lessons of the preceding chapters to develop these themes. We begin with a general discussion of why an analysis of R&S is crucial for understanding problems of governability in Latin America. We do so by providing an overview of how our argument fits in with recent debates on presidentialism, arguing that the central challenge of presidential systems is to balance representation and efficiency. We continue with a synthetic theoretical discussion of how our types of legislators and executives are likely to interact, and the consequences of this interaction for the quality of democracy. We thus examine how our countries combine the types of legislators (*constituent servant, party loyalist, group agent, entrepreneur*) and executives (*party insider, party adherent, group agent, free-wheeling independent*) that

are discussed throughout this volume, asking how these pairings affect the functioning of democracy. We examine this issue from a theoretical view of efficiency and representation and then examine the empirical results of our country chapters. While we find advantages in certain combinations (e.g. *party loyalist* legislators with *party insider* presidents) we do not argue in favor of a “one-size-fits-all” system, as every system involves multiple and complex tradeoffs between efficiency and representation. Thus, while no system is optimal, there are multiple routes to effective—if sometimes problematic—democracy.

Executive and Legislative Types and the Quality of Presidential Democracy

The failures of presidentialism, including the removal of fourteen Caribbean and Latin American presidents by angry populations or military pressure in just the last 20 years, has been a central concern of pundits and academics alike (Oppenheimer 2005, Linz 1990; Mainwaring 1993, 1999). In spite of its problems, presidentialism persists and even prospers in some Latin American countries as indicated by vigorous political debate, but the absence of severe executive-legislative stalemate. Analysts have thus turned their attention to the factors that affect the quality and stability of presidential democracy. Shugart and Carey (1992) initiated this line of argument by focusing on constitutional provisions and partisan issues. Others, including Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), M. Jones (1995) and many others point to the influences of the party system and other aspects of institutional design.

All of these studies, however, have a few common features. They primarily focus on institutional dimensions of democracy, and they are elite-centered. Few studies have analyzed informal internal party processes, and none has analyzed the issue of the impact of political recruitment and candidate selection on the workability of presidentialism. While Linz does talk about “outsiders” and the problem of self-selection in presidential nominations, a comprehensive analysis of the effect of recruitment on the performance of presidential systems should go further. Our cases have shown, in particular, that R&S is crucial in determining how presidentialism functions and whether it succeeds. The cases have shown further that R&S variables are critical for both the legislative and executive

branches. This is an important finding, since those few studies that tie recruitment variables to the functioning of presidential systems usually do so only for the executive branch. Recruitment and selection for legislators, however, is at least as critical to the functioning of presidentialism, given the critical role that these processes play in determining party discipline in the legislature and other aspects of inter-branch relations. In sum, while we concur with many of the findings of previous studies, in this volume we have focused on the overlooked internal party processes that are also at play in determining the workability of presidentialism.

Legislators and executives, of course, interact with one another in determining governability or democratic success. To understand the impact of R&S processes on democracy, then, requires consideration of R&S processes for both branches plus an analysis of how the resulting legislator and executive types work independently and together. For example, R&S processes can feed the creation of legislators who are more likely to form cohesive or disciplined “workable” majorities and presidents with a disposition to work with them. They can also yield independent-minded presidents with a proclivity to end-run more obstructionist legislatures. A principle goal of this volume was to develop and apply a typology of legislators and presidents, and our goal in this concluding chapter is to explore the interaction of the different types.

In evaluating the pairings of the legislative and executive types, we avoid recommending a one-size-fits-all prescription for the optimal mix of candidate types, because our cases suggest that no system is optimal but many have virtues. For example, though Chile would suggest that the workability of presidential systems is enhanced by the combination of legislators that are *party loyalists* and presidents who are *party insiders*, Coppedege’s (1994) study and the recent collapse of the party system in Venezuela suggest severe problems with this pairing. Indeed, even in Chile where the *party loyalist/party insider* model has functioned well, there is talk of growing elitism and the development of parties that have lost touch with constituents. This is primarily the case because, as noted by Navia, the exigencies of coalition formation and maintenance put the candidate selection process very much into elite hands. Still, while these problem cases and the U.S. example might suggest a desirable move toward *constituent servant* legislators and *party adherent* presidents, much theory (Schattschneider 1942; APSA

1960; Ames 2002; Mainwaring 1993; Linz 1990) and many examples suggest wariness of systems with less disciplined parties or presidents unconstrained by party structure or ideology. Indeed, while we would consider the *entrepreneurs-free wheeling independent* pairing the most problematic, some of the cases that move furthest in this direction (Peru under Fujimori and Venezuela under Chavez) have also generated at least short term benefits.

Therefore, though a once-size fits all R&S recipe is impossible, we can assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of various combinations of executive-legislative pairings by showing the tendencies produced by each. The four basic types of executives and legislators yield sixteen possible pairings, and our cases shed light on a number of these possibilities. In order to make the comparison meaningful we begin with a discussion of the significance of these types for the performance of democracy in terms of the goals of representation and efficiency.

Representation and Efficiency as Goals of Democracy

As polities strive for peace and prosperity, theorists struggle with the value of autocratic executive decision making versus providing as many citizens and groups as possible voice and veto over decisions. On this scale, Latin America's democratic polities fall into a wide range, with some leaning towards powerful presidents who provide "efficient" policy making and others giving more power to legislative groups to generate systems with more "representation." The inherent conflict between the two goals of efficiency and representation, however, does not imply a zero sum game where at least a modicum of both cannot be satisfied simultaneously; particular types of presidents can both provide some efficiency while facilitating representation and legislators can work with presidents without neglecting representation. The key is to identify the pairings that best allow for the maximization of representation *and* efficiency in distinct national contexts.

Before categorizing our pairings a number of caveats are in order. First, authoritarian and democratic polities have exhibited two types of efficient governance. As Cox and Morgenstern (2001) explain, the first is a dominant "imperial" executive

facing a “subservient” legislature. Such “delegative democracies” may be stable, but they operate without the “horizontal accountability” which is the backbone of a clean and representative system (O’Donnell 1994). Further, while Chavez or Fujimori might be credited with producing short term policy changes, they are also criticized for destroying political institutions and societal coalitions. The alternative is a “coalitional” executive supported by “workable” legislature or one in which the president works with the legislature to produce consensual policy. Thus, we operationalize efficiency with a clear normative bias for the types of efficient outcomes that emerge through the combination of a “coalitional” executive and “workable” legislature. We do so both because it is the most likely combination to contribute to the long-term maintenance of institutions, and because a well-designed democracy provides legitimate veto points for agents with a stake in policy outcomes. Therefore, our notion of efficiency goes beyond simply getting things done; it includes a bias in favor of getting things done consensually and working through democratic institutions.

Second, some of our pairings are much more likely than others. Throughout this volume we have not suggested that any of our executive or legislative types “go together” despite clear parallels between them. However it is clear that certain combinations of pairings are more likely to appear than others. For example, the *party insider* president will more likely emerge in country with long-standing and highly disciplined parties, as will *loyalist* legislators. Similarly, if politics are organized along the lines of functional groups, the probability that *group agent* executives will be paired with *group delegate* legislators is enhanced. Likewise, it is unlikely that a *party insider* president will face off against a majority of *entrepreneurs* in the legislature, because recruitment procedures that allow *entrepreneurial* and hence un-disciplined legislators are unlikely to also produce presidents who are loyal to a party hierarchy.

Third, our arguments are built on the case material presented in this volume’s chapters which was oriented around the theoretical framework set out in our introduction. We recognize that this limited number of cases influences our conclusions, but we hope this study will provide a baseline from which to evaluate other cases.

Fourth, while we focus here on the effects of R&S variables on efficiency and representation, other variables clearly impact these goals. Some of these variables, such

as the size and number of parties, enter into our discussion, but others, including the constitutional balance of power, are not considered in any depth. We view R&S processes, then, as contributing to, but not fully accounting for the degree to which a country has an efficient or representative system.

Finally, when we conclude our theoretical analysis we use a numerical scoring system to rank each of our combinations based on their tendency to enhance representation and promote efficiency. We want to emphasize that we are not suggesting that one unit of stability is worth one unit of representation or that a pairing with a cumulative score of 8 is twice as representative and efficient as one with a cumulative score of 16. Rather we attempt to show the tendency each type of executive and legislator (and, in turn each pairing) exerts with respect to representation and stability relative to the other types. In sum, our scale is only ordinal.

Efficiency

As noted, we recognize two types of efficient systems, and seek to rank our pairings using a consensus model of efficiency rather than an authoritarian one. This means that presidents will need to build legislative contingents to support their policies. M. Jones (1995) and Cox and Morgenstern (2001) argue that the size of the president's legislative contingent, and that contingent's discipline and willingness to support the president are the key variables in determining whether the legislature is obstructionist or workable. The president's type also matters, as we would expect a *party insider* to be more prone to seek legislative coalitions than a *free-wheeling independent*.

In order to consider the impact of the possible pairings, we have scored each executive and legislative type according to its expected impact on efficiency, with lower scores indicating a better rank (Table 1). We first presume that efficiency is eased when there is a disciplined legislative majority and a president predisposed to working with it. As a result, we give *loyalist* legislators the best ranking, as they are most likely to facilitate discipline. It is also likely that *loyalist* legislators will be associated with systems where there are fewer parties, but efficiency is not guaranteed unless there is a majority party. An important issue, therefore, is whether parties of *loyalists* will be more

likely to form coalitions or whether it is easier to buy support from more loosely organized parties. For particular issues it may be easier for a president to seek support of independent (*entrepreneurial* or *constituent servant*) legislators, but these deals will not bring wide or deep support. Thus while negotiating with *loyalists* of other parties will require important concessions, such negotiations can yield longer-lasting coalitions that can facilitate governance on a wide range of issues. Thus we rank *party loyalists* as most likely to facilitate efficiency, even in the face of multipartism.

Next, *constituent servants* are defined by their weaker ties to parties, but in order to serve constituents they may find that parties afford them the clout to extract the resources and gain influence (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich, 1995). The U.S. case suggests that these motivations support some degree of party discipline, and studies of divided government (Mayhew 2002; C. Jones 1994) suggest that U.S. presidents have often been able to find the support they need for important legislation. Again, the number of parties is key, as the lack of a majority or near-majority party would severely hamper the president's ability to find consistent support.

We rank *group delegates* next, but the difference is probably less significant than between our first two rankings. Group agents should be disciplined, but they are likely to represent small minorities and given their stronger ideological bent, they may be particularly recalcitrant in coalitional bargaining.

Finally, *entrepreneurs* receive our lowest ranking because, by definition, they eschew organized majorities. Not only would too many entrepreneurs harm short-term efficiency, without long-term legislative goals, they would be unlikely to build the infrastructure that facilitates oversight capabilities and general legislative capacity (Polsby 1968).

-- Table 1 about here --

On the executive side of the equation, we rank our presidents with respect to their proclivity to work constructively with legislative coalitions. We expect *party insider* presidents to have the easiest (though not necessarily easy) time with the legislature, because they are likely to emerge from systems that also produce *loyalist* legislators, at

least from the presidents' party. As the *loyalists'* leader, discipline will be assured, though as we noted above, this is insufficient for efficiency if the president's party lacks a majority. *Party adherent* presidents may also be able to gain the loyalty of their party's legislators, but their leadership may be in question and *loyalist* legislators less common. On the other hand, their more dubious partisanship could facilitate inter-partisan bargaining. *Group agents* are similar to *party adherents* in their ability to build legislative contingents, and their relative influence will depend a great deal on the types of legislators they face and the numerical composition of congress. We rank them third, because their loyalty to a functional group may constrain their ability to work with the legislature. Finally, we rank *free-wheeling independents* last, because they will be unlikely to be able to rely on a contingent of their own party in congress, and should have more trouble building legislative coalitions.

To reiterate, this scale presupposes a goal of efficiency based on executive-legislative bargaining. The scale could be reversed when considering authoritarian-style efficiency. Due to minimal legislative support and limited proclivity for building it, *free-wheeling independents*, should be the most likely candidates to pursue domination strategies. Collor in Brazil or Fujimori in Peru would serve as examples. Some *party adherents* (Menem) have also followed this strategy, using decrees and other techniques to avoid the legislature. By contrast, *party insiders* (including Alfonsín, Cardoso, and Lagos) have worked with the legislature.

Representation

A second basic goal of democracy is representation. Legislators' ability and willingness to engage in the process of interest representation and aggregation determines the representative capacity of a democratic system. Which of our typologies of legislators is more likely to effectively represent constituents through interest representation, aggregation, and the extraction of resources? The political science literature offers several distinct notions of representation and differing perceptions on the role and importance of parties. Schattschneider (1942) underscored the crucial and positive roles played by US parties in representation, and though there are numerous

classic criticisms of political parties (Ostragorski, 1902; Michels, 1911), contemporary political science continuously regards parties as necessary and desirable components of representative democracy. Nonetheless, there remain differing notions about how particular aspects of parties, namely the number of parties and party discipline, affect representation.

With respect to the number of parties, the question is whether two centrist “catch-all” parties is preferable to a system in which multiple parties can carve out ideological niches. Of course this debate is also tied to questions of efficiency, as Sartori (1976) famously tied multipartism to democratic stability.

The debate is also unsettled with respect to discipline. The undisciplined parties of Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru have been frequently blamed for governance deficits and are seldom seen as improving representation (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1992; Ames 2002). At the other extreme, excessive party discipline helped lead to the crisis of democracy in Venezuela (Coppedge 1994) and the “perfect dictatorship” in Mexico was made possible by the hegemony of the PRI.

Taken together, then, we conclude that representation is enhanced by a system with relatively large parties and moderately high party discipline. Table 2 presents our rankings of how legislator types are related to these two variables.

-- Table 2 about here --

Party loyalists and *constituent servants* contend for the top spot, as the former will increase discipline and the latter are defined by their representative function, service to constituents. If the constituent servants are tied together in a large party, however, then as the U.S. case shows, they will find that they can better serve their voters by binding together on many important issues. Their independence, however, will foreclose moves towards unrepresentative “partyocracy” that Coppedge described in Venezuela.

While we rank *constituent servants* first, *party loyalists* also have a claim to top honors, especially if we take into consideration debates about nationalized parties (APSA 1960; Caramani 2002, Chibber and Kohlman, Morgenstern and Swindle 2005, Cain et al 1987). This debate revolves around the idea that parties can serve either national or

parochial interests and party discipline facilitates the former. Moderation, again, seems to be the preferred alternative. In sum, then, the ideal representative system would have *constituent servants* who also have an important degree of party loyalty.

Next on our list are the *group agents*, who also could contend for a higher ranking. By definition this type of legislator is representative, and we only rank them lower due to their likely representation of smaller segments of society. In a sense, then, representation is inhibited by lower levels of efficiency.

Entrepreneurs receive the lowest ranking since they have fewer ties to constituents or parties. If legislators are more interested in their next job rather than winning reelection, for example, representation will suffer.

The presidents' type is also tied to representation through the link of accountability. Citizens expect presidents to represent their will and faithfully implement campaign promises. Thus presidents who reverse course after campaigns challenge ideals of representation. Our rankings in Table 2 for executive candidates are thus based on the likelihood that presidents will carry out campaign promises rather than engage in major policy reversals. Again, they are ranked 1 to 4 from most to least representative.

First, the *party insider* presidents will be more likely to be accountable to voters, because they will be more constrained by party ideology and platforms. They are also more likely to have a party contingent in congress that can act as an additional check on their policies. The *party adherent* is less constrained by party platforms and ideology, and less likely than the *party insider* to have a strongly disciplined party in congress. Once again, the *group agent* could also be considered for a high ranking on the accountability or representation scale, as ideology should constrain their rhetoric and actions. But because group agents will likely focus on a single issue (eg workers, environment, or indigenous groups) they will be less constrained with respect to the broad spectrum of politics. We are confident that the *free-wheeling independent* should receive our lowest ranking, as they are unconstrained by partisanship or ideology.

In Table 3 we provide a synthesis of the arguments, showing the cumulative ranking of how each of our sixteen possible pairings matches up. Bearing in mind the caveats presented early in the chapter concerning scoring and the exclusion of other influential factors, the table is meant to give the impression that combinations in the

upper left region better balance representation and efficiency, and the pairings are less favorable towards the lower right. In addition, the table provides the added benefit of allowing the reader to consider both the overall ranking of particular pairings relative to others, and to see how each pairing scores individually in each of the areas we measure. We resist the obvious temptation to provide composite scores for each of the pairings given the ordinal nature of our rankings and other difficulties with comparability we have already noted. Nonetheless, the chart does imply the trade off, though it is not zero-sum and absolute, between the goals of representation and efficiency.

-- Table 3 about here --

The six countries which are the focus of this volume fill many of the possible combinations explored in Table 3. The discussion that follows explores the empirical interaction of different types and pairings in our country cases.

V). Explaining R&S: Institutions, Party Rules, and Informal Processes

Legislators

In the introductory chapter we generated a framework from which we hypothesized that electoral laws and other institutions would create a context within which party rules and informal processes, including primaries, deference to leaders, party control over career paths, and other factors that could be considered part of a party's norms or culture would determine candidate types. We now turn to an empirical analysis of those types. We begin with legislators. Table 4 shows a summary of the legislative candidate types in our cases. Of course, in coding candidates or countries we face numerous difficulties, not least of which are the multiple types of legislative candidates within most countries, and potentially within each party. Nonetheless, we identify the modal type of candidate for each country and party according to the evaluation the substantive country chapter author.

-- Table 4 about here --

The interaction of institutions and non-institutional factors on politicians' types is clear throughout the volume. Four countries generate *party loyalists*, but two of these are described as subtypes. Chile and Mexico provide our clearest examples of *party loyalists*. For Chile, several factors contribute to the production of *loyalists*, and Navia focuses on the crucial role of informal variables. In spite of some primaries, the party elites have maintained control over nominations in Chile, even vetoing some primary results. Navia also cites the elites' control over legislative perquisites and committee membership which incites loyalty. Navia, however, does not ignore the role of institutions, showing that Chile's unique two-member district electoral system motivates parties to remain in coalitions, thus discouraging outsiders.

A different set of variables generates Mexico's *party loyalists*. Institutions including the prohibition on immediate reelection, federalism, and the electoral system under which some legislators are elected by proportional representation and some by plurality in single-member districts, are central to Langston's discussion, but she cites the differences among parties (including the labeling of PRD legislators as *constituent servants*) as a reason to focus on non-institutional factors. That is, given that the election system is common to all the parties, it cannot explain differences across parties in their R&S procedures. Among the non-institutional variables, she focuses on the parties' pre-democratization organizational form and their response to increased competition.

Next, Argentina provides the first sub-type of *party loyalist*: the *provincial-party loyalist* (though Jones also argues that some variables push the legislators toward the *constituent servant* category). From the institutionalist perspective, Jones describes an institutional context based on a closed list electoral system operating within a federalist system with two primary parties that sometimes must share the political playing field with provincial parties and occasional important third parties at the national level. While in some countries (eg pre-Chavez Venezuela) these rules could yield national party elite control, in Argentina informal processes instill candidate loyalty to provincial rather than national leaders. These informal processes include the provincial-party elites' power to nominate candidates, control campaign financing, and influence ex-legislators' careers, as

well as other aspects of patronage politics. Formal and informal variables have other influences as well. The lack of (formal) barriers to form new parties and limited residency requirements for candidates, and (on the informal side) voters who are willing to vote against the traditional parties, allow disgruntled politicians to leave the party fold, thereby limiting the degree of discipline leaders can apply. An important aspect of Jones's study is the decision by parties to implement primaries. Though these are party-level rules rather than national structures, Jones's discussion shows how the primaries create a context to which the parties and candidates react; winners are those that better control the party machinery and financial resources are key.

Uruguay yields another loyalist sub-type, the *faction loyalist*. Again the electoral system plays a central role, as the double-simultaneous vote allows factions to compete in the general election. On the informal level, Moraes takes note of an important issue not highlighted in other parts of the volume, the source of the institutions. Uruguayan electoral rules have been in place and influencing factionalism for over 150 years, where the result of elite negotiations intended to accommodate the prevailing factionalism of the time. Moraes also highlights how parties have created different statutes to deal with the electoral system, thus furthering our contention that informal mechanisms interact with formal institutions.

Next, both Brazil and Colombia generate *entrepreneurial* legislators. For both Samuels and Escobar-Lemon and Moreno, this legislator type is strongly tied to the electoral system. The electoral systems in both of these countries allow virtual self-nomination of candidates, thus limiting leaders' abilities to gain loyalty. Leaders of Brazil's PT, however, have gained such control, thus yielding legislators that are much closer to *party loyalists* (or perhaps *group delegates*, given the party's ties to the labor unions) than other parties. By the PT employing this different strategy, Samuels again helps to illustrate our point about the lack of determinacy of institutions.

Finally, Langston labels PRD legislators and some PANistas as typifying *constituent servants*. Concerned with choosing "good" candidates, these two parties have experimented with primaries to select legislative candidates with better ties to the electorate. The party level decision as to what type of selection system is thus a key

variable, but as noted above, the electoral system and the no-reelection clause are also central concerns.

In sum, the authors place legislators from these six countries mostly in the *party loyalist* and *entrepreneurial* columns, though there are also a few examples of legislators of the other types as well. This distribution, however, is the result of our case selection. If we had chosen Ecuador or maybe Bolivia we would have had more *group agents*, and since the peasant, workers, and “popular” sectors of Mexico’s PRI were always given an important number of legislative seats, that party could also land in the *group agent* category as well. Further, we have already mentioned the U.S. legislators as fitting into the *constituent servant* category, but Chile’s legislators prior to the dictatorship might also fit that description.

To conclude, a conjunction of institutional and non-institutional features combine to explain the type of legislators a system produces. Given that the institutions only create a context, different parties create different strategies to face their electoral challenges and to promote policies, thus generating different types of candidacies. This also allows significant fluctuation within a system, as the rules and processes are easier to change than institutions. Even in the United States this is evident, as parties’ greater use of campaign support to individual legislators has perhaps helped move the *constituent servants* somewhat towards the *party loyalist* category.

Executives

On the presidential side, our cases generated examples of all four types, though no country exclusively produced presidents (or candidates) of just one type. Table 5 summarizes this result. Authors identified *party insiders* in all six of our countries. In three countries (Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) *party insiders* currently hold the presidential office, while *insiders* have not held the presidency since the 1980s in two (Colombia and Argentina). Camp describes the first post-PRI president in Mexico as a *FWI*, though his PRI (and probably the PRD) competitors in 2000, as well as previous PRI presidents, were *insiders*.

-- Table 5 about here --

What factors generate these presidential types? The analysis of R&S for presidents highlighted a mix of institutional variables, including primaries, two-round electoral systems, party systems and non-institutional variables, such as candidate leadership, career experience, and social connections. Though the institutions were evident in the analyses, the striking fluidity of the R&S systems for the executives suggests that informality plays a central role. For every country in our sample the recruitment pattern changed dramatically or the formal process used for the candidate selection exhibited a profound change for at least one major party or coalition in the country's most recent election (Table 6). This result suggests that, at least at the executive level, a) R&S procedures are not unchangeable structures or b) that parties and candidates can choose substantially different strategies within one set of rules.

-- Table 6 about here --

These changes had profound effects on politics in each country, shaping the types of candidates produced by the systems and ultimately determining who would (or would not) govern the country. The ability of the parties to make decisions about how they would choose their candidates, for example deciding whether or not to hold a primary, could support a non-institutional argument. Our view, however, is that these party decisions are made within an institutional context, in these cases the party and/or electoral systems. For example, the PJ could not have run multiple candidates if there had not been a two round electoral system or a fragmented opposition. Similarly, the Concertación primary in Chile was the result of the unique coalition dynamics in that country, and the legally-mandated primaries in Uruguay have been clearly influenced by its factional system and the electoral system that governs the legislative elections. Perhaps the 2000 Mexican election was the most dramatic within our sample, with the change away from the “*dedazo*” to a primary for the PRI. These examples again show that the institutions are influential, but by themselves they are poor predictors of how a party will operate.

The chapters also point to a number of specific variables that influence types of presidential candidates. First, when parties are institutionalized, candidates rise through their ranks, thus producing *party adherents* or *insiders*. This does not guarantee against possible outsiders, as the success of Uribe in Colombia or Chavez in Venezuela attest. Further, in spite of Argentina's long-standing party tradition, *party adherent* Menem acted more like a *FWI* after the election. Still, our cases point to factors that give more nuance to this broad theory. For Argentina, Deluca argues that governors and presidential candidates are the result of an institutionalized party system, provincial control over candidacies and mixed and decentralized campaign finance. He then explains that candidacies are won after long provincial careers, generally within the party's organization. He also discusses the importance of the legal context, including the recent changes that a) created a two round system for presidents b) permitted multiple candidates for an individual party and c) allowed reelection. Reelection was also important to gubernatorial elections, and the electoral timetable (whether or not the gubernatorial and presidential elections were concurrent) was also a variable in his analysis.

In Altman's discussion, Chile's *party insiders* fit our theory well, resulting from the solid party structure. The *party insider* presidents Aylwin and Lagos had long extended careers in their respective parties, while Frei, who was more of an *adherent* came into politics much later in his career from the business world.

Colombia is a particularly interesting case, in part because the loose party system generates entrepreneurial legislators but at least some *party insider* presidents, a combination we labeled unlikely in Table 3. Taylor, Botero, and Crisp argue that the malleability of the institutional rules allows different types candidates to emerge, and elites alter the rules to accommodate different candidates. Thus when a potential candidate emerges who has worked with the party and perhaps has family ties to the incumbent or previous presidents, the leaders centralize the decision to facilitate the selection of this *party insider*. Alternatively, the *party adherents* that have emerged have been successful in seeking more decentralized nomination procedures that suit their needs. But in making the argument that the rules do not matter, the authors also acknowledge the importance of institutions; in this case it is the weakness of the

institutions (including majority run off elections, privately printed ballots and non-concurrent executive and legislative elections) that permits such easy rule adjustment. The changing party system is also a key variable in their analysis, as they suggest that the increasing urbanization of the electorate helps *party adherents* over *insiders*. This increasing urbanization has contributed to waning patron-client ties and party allegiances, and was thus important to the success of current *FWI* president Uribe.

Power and Mochel note that Brazil has produced a number of *party insiders* in spite of the country's loose party structure. The authors point to the importance of foundational elections as attracting *insiders*, but it is notable that of the elected presidents, only the current and previous presidents fit that category. Perhaps this suggests an improving structuration of the parties (see Lyne n.d.). Power and Mochel also identify Brazilian candidates fitting into each of the other boxes. The *party adherents* and *FWIs* are the result of the country's weak party system and the ease with which a candidate can form new parties, and they attribute the nomination of several *group agents* to the country's corporatist tradition. The authors also point to other institutional factors, including the timing of elections and laws on coalition formation (including Supreme Court interpretations) that shape the R&S systems for presidents, ministers, and governors. In the non-institutional area, the authors discuss regionalism and the difference between catch-all and ideological parties.

Next, Camp shows that each Mexican party uses a unique system to select its executive candidates, thus resulting in different types of presidential candidates. In 2000 the PAN chose Vicente Fox, who Camp labels a *FWI* due to his outsider image, though his stint as a governor under the PAN label and his success in the PAN primary could land him in the *party adherent* category. For that election the PRD and PRI chose *party insiders*, but did so using very different processes. The PRI used a primary to resolve an important division in the party (and to move away from the traditional *dedazo*) while the PRD chose its standard-bearer by acclamation. Institutions and structures provide background for Camp's analysis, which focuses largely on the parties scrambling to create processes to deal with a new competitive environment. Still, the importance of the three-party structure and plurality rules (Mexico being one of the few remaining countries in Latin American that has not adopted a two-round system) are clearly influential.

In contrast to the suggestion that *free-wheeling independents* are likely to be the norm in Colombia in the future, Camp argues against the development of a tendency toward *FWIs* in Mexico. Such a development is unlikely because parties are well institutionalized across the spectrum and Fox's emergence was somewhat of an anomaly that was partly based on timing and Fox's individual characteristics. Camp shows that presidential hopefuls within even Fox's own PAN party are much more likely to follow the path of *party insiders* as they arrive at the highest reaches of party leadership.

Finally, similar to Moraes's discussion of the legislators, Buquet and Chasquetti focus on the electoral system in explaining why most Uruguayan presidential candidates rise as faction leaders. Until the recent reform which mandated primaries, faction leaders (who gain that role by acclamation) for the two "traditional" parties competed against one another and against other parties in general elections simultaneously. Under the new law, the parties hold primaries, but the factions still structure the vote. Key, then, is how the factions choose their candidates. The authors define two basic processes: the anointment of natural leaders or the designation of compromise candidates. Factional politics, an informal process, thus interacts with the electoral institutions in defining executive candidacies.

In sum, the chapters substantiate our claim that a mix of institutions and informal processes define R&S processes which, in turn, explain the emergence of different types of candidates. In returning to our hypotheses from Chapter 1, we see substantiation of several influential variables. First, many formal (eg the number and size of parties) and informal aspects of the party system (such as the ideological dispersion of parties, the strength of party identification in the electorate, and factionalism) enter into every chapter. For example, the importance of the party label determines whether a candidate can consider breaking from one party to run under a different, or even newly created, label. In Mexico, Camp notes that losers in the PRI primaries have been converted into successful PRD gubernatorial candidates. At the legislative level, Jones explains how disgruntled Argentina politicians who fail to win the nomination from one of the large parties can often win election as a member of a provincial party, and from Samuels' chapter on the Brazilian legislature we can conclude that the weak partisanship in the country contributes to the development of *entrepreneurial* legislators.

A second set of variables common to most of the chapters fits under the rubric of regionalism and federalism. For example, what Power and Mochel call “environmental characteristics of subnational political systems” are central to discussion of Brazil. The analysis revolves around two parts: the privileged power of governors and differences across states that yield parties that are in some cases mere “instruments of oligarchical power” while in others the parties effectively organize and mobilize the electorate. The chapter on R&S for executives in Colombia relates a similar story, but tells it at the factional level. Taylor, Botero and Crisp note that candidates with more clientelist ties run best in the rural areas, while reformist candidates win more votes in cities. Escobar-Lemon and Moreno add that there is a parallel system of R&S at the national and state levels; governors have only been elected since 1991 and already there is evidence of a proliferation of candidates. Further, Camp argues that democratization has vastly increased the importance of the state offices in the recruitment of federal officials, with President Fox as a prime example. Similarly, Langston shows how the parties have created different structures to deal with Mexican federalism, ranging from the PRI’s centralized system to the PAN’s state-based organizations. Even in Chile, a non-federal country, the politics of regionalism enter into the discussions. Navia explains that the parties have regional strategies and consider which candidates compete best in different districts.

A third variable that is common to many of the chapters is the primary election. Primaries are new to Latin America, but they are now common at both the executive and legislative levels. In most cases primaries are not nationally prescribed, and thus while they have been used at the executive level in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, in three of the four cases (Uruguay being the exception) only one major party or coalition used them. Primaries also gained a foothold in the legislative arena in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Primaries entered into the discussions in a number of ways. Navia contends that the decision to use primaries in Chile has been consequential, in that it sometimes allows a small group of local militants to impose candidates (due to low levels of turnout) who lack the “skills and appeal” necessary to win the general election. The potential of choosing poor general election candidates through primaries is also discussed in Buquet’s and Chasquetti’s chapter on the Uruguayan presidency. Using a spatial modeling

analogy, they argue that the primaries have led the parties to choose candidates who may be close to the median of their membership but far from the median of the country's electorate. The parties will all have to take full consideration of these issues now that the country has mandated primaries for all parties at the executive level. Finally, the lack of primaries has played a clear role in the two cases where they have not been used at the executive level. First, Deluca explains how several Peronist candidates took advantage of a rule loophole that failed to specify that a party could only present one candidate. As a result, multiple Justicialista candidates competed against one another in the first round of the 2002 election, in effect running a primary and a general election simultaneously. This resulted in two Peronists reaching the second round with just over 20 percent of the vote. The effect in Colombia, alternatively, was to produce its first president independent of the longstanding parties. Alvaro Uribe emerged to challenge the traditional parties due to voters' long frustration with continuing violence that the traditional parties' had failed to resolve. Uribe could have competed for the Liberal party's nomination, but apparently decided that the party label had become more of a liability than an asset. Still, it is possible to sustain an argument that Uribe ran as an independent precisely because the party did not have a primary system.

Finally, perhaps no variable embodies the interaction of informalism and institutions more than gender. The issue is highlighted in the two chapters focusing on the issue as well as the chapters on the Chilean and Argentine legislatures. For Argentina, Jones shows the law has had its desired effect, substantially increasing the number of female legislators. Overall, however, Baldez shows that the quotas have not always been so successful in combating tradition. Loopholes in the law have allowed some parties to "obey without complying." As a result, while quota laws have raised the percentage of female legislators to 33% in Argentina and 24% in Mexico, the Brazilian legislature languishes with only about 10%.

Though informal traditions have continued to limit women's participation in many legislatures, they are having more success in executive positions. Altman discusses President Ricardo Lagos' efforts to engage in an affirmative action program for female ministers, and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor's contention that ministries can be important proving grounds for female presidential candidates seems to be playing out since the

leading presidential candidate of the governing coalition is a woman and former minister, as was her closest competitor who recently dropped out of the race. While Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor focus on the informal factors that bring women to the cabinet, other factors such as legislative service and turnover in the legislature—both of which are clearly related to institutions—are also important parts of their analysis.

VI). **Recruitment and Selection as an Independent Variable**

Our organizing principle in this volume is that R&S processes are not simply arcane details of a political system: they affect the substance of politics. The 14 substantive chapters provide ample evidence of this conclusion, identifying both direct and indirect ties between R&S and the capacity of each political system to balance representation and efficiency. In this section we analyze the more specific effect of R&S variables on particular aspects of the representation and efficiency equation. The authors show that the presidents' and legislators' types affect inter-party relations (coalitions), executive/legislative relations, legislator behavior, cabinet composition, and intra-party arrangements. The relative importance of each varies across our countries, and thus while the maintenance of the durable coalitions has been a central concern for Chile, the chapters on Argentina and Brazil focus more directly on federalism and the control by sub-national leaders over resources. Therefore, our analysis in this section considers these varying patterns, but we tie them together by concluding with a discussion of where on the map of executive/legislative pairings presented in Table 3 each of our cases tends to fall.

Argentina

For Argentina, De Luca explains that the R&S process and candidate type have affected the presidents' cabinet decisions and executive-legislative relations. He categorizes Argentine presidents as fitting into the *party insider* and *party adherent* categories and finds stark differences in their behaviors. *Party insider* Alfonsín distributed cabinet posts to his co-partisans and obtained the support of potential internal rivals through his distribution of different party and government posts. Menem, who

DeLuca categorizes as a *party adherent* named cabinet members of personal confidence, rather than those that had been long-standing activists in the PJ party. DeLuca also characterizes Kirchner as an *adherent*, but one who has been more constrained in his ability to appoint a cabinet by pre-electoral deals.

With respect to executive-legislative relations, Alfonsín's *party insider* status gave him firm control of the party and facilitated dealings with Congress, where he could count on his own party's support and was able to deal effectively with the opposition for much legislation. DeLuca argues, on the other hand, that Kirchner and Menem have had more of a tendency to govern unilaterally, partly because of their status as *party adherents* rather than *party insiders*. Still, it is important to consider the legislative side of the equation, where, as Jones convincingly shows, Argentine legislators have loyalties to provincial party bosses. The ability of presidents to build majorities, then, depends on the relationship of the president to these provincial bosses. Jones underscores the significance of provincial party loyalty among legislators, underscoring its positive outcomes in representational terms, but also some of its drawbacks in terms of the ability of Argentine presidents to be able to rely on disciplined legislative contingents.

In sum, while Argentina might be placed in the *party adherent/party loyalist box*, it is not an entirely comfortable location. Two issues complicate the placement: first, legislators' loyalty to provincial leaders undermines, to some extent, the legislative side of efficiency and, second, Menem and other leaders' proclivities to evade the legislature and use decrees suggest the country has sometimes operated with a more authoritarian style of efficiency and a more limited degree of representation.

Brazil

As noted, Power and Mochel find that all of the types of presidential candidates we identify have emerged in Brazil, and all but the *group agent* type have arrived to the presidency, though current president Lula da Silva could potentially fit that description. The authors provide evidence that presidents' post-electoral behavior tends to serve the groups which brought them to power, confirming the hypotheses we set out in the introductory chapter. With respect to presidential campaigns Power and Mochel confirm that *FWIs* usually campaign by attacking established parties, and are "erratic and

unpredictable after election[s].” Quadros and Collor ran, they point out, attacking the corruption of the sitting governments. However, tellingly, neither one finished his term, leaving Brazil with two unelected presidents, Goulart and Itamar Franco. They go on to show that *group agent* candidacies have not been viable, and that *party adherents* campaign in line with what is suggested in the introduction, stressing broad themes and downplaying ideology. Power and Mochel add a note of caution regarding *party insiders*. Because they must often forge pre-electoral governing alliances in a political system where this is at times quite difficult, their behavior on the campaign trail and in government, has the potential to vary according to coalition exigencies.

With respect to executive/legislative relations Samuels argues that because party leaders do not control access to the pathways to power, and control few resources once politicians are treading that path, party leaders are particularly weak. While, like Argentina, nominations are centered at the state level, the Brazilian case differs because local state party officials lack the carrots and sticks that Argentine provincial party bosses wield. Therefore, in terms of legislative behavior, discipline is low, and individual incentives for pork-barrelling are high. Brazilian legislators engage in largely individualistic or state-based pork-barreling efforts. However, unlike *constituent servants*, Samuels notes that deputies engage in this behavior to build careers back in state government. There is no organized “partisan” dynamic to pork-barreling, and national political parties do not control resource distribution to the extent that they do in other countries. Consequently, Samuels argues, Brazilian presidents face a tough time in cultivating working legislative majorities. This is particularly the case when these *entrepreneurial* legislators are paired with *free-wheeling independent* presidents, who tend to lack a core party contingent around which they can build a majority.

Therefore, in line with the analysis presented here, Brazil tends to oscillate between the lower left and lower right quadrants of Table 3, with different types of presidents and consistently *entrepreneurial* legislative candidates. Tellingly, empirical evidence from the Brazilian chapters suggest declining levels of representation and efficiency when candidate pairings move toward the lower right quadrant, as evidenced by the disastrous governments of Quadros and Collor.

Chile

Tables 4 and 5 indicate that Chile fits into the top-left box, with *insider* presidents and *party loyalist* legislators. The authors focus on two behavioral implications. First, Altman shows how the equitable distribution of cabinet posts among different parties of the coalition has contributed to the maintenance of the Concertación coalition. He shows, in particular, that *party insider* presidents (Aylwin and Lagos) were much more likely to abide by party and coalition agreements than *party adherent* Frei, who tended to appoint candidates more from his inner circle, in a sense, violating coalition norms. From the legislative perspective, Navia underscores that *party loyalists* provide a high level of discipline. This discipline also reinforces the coalitions because leaders, including the president, have been able to compel legislators to toe the party line. Further, *loyalist* parties have also made it easier for the executive to broker agreements with the opposition, because leaders have been able to credibly negotiate as representatives of the full party. Thus *insider* presidents and *loyalist* legislators have helped to generate solid coalitions which, in turn, have facilitated governance in Chile.

While this pairing supports our contention about the benefits of the upper left corner of Table 3, Navia does suggest that because *party loyalist* legislators owe their selection and election to party elites, they have lower incentives to serve constituents. What is more, he shows that because the executive now often negotiates with party leaders, the role of the legislature as a law-making and representative body is undermined. Thus, our contention that efficiency at times (but not always) undermines representation is confirmed by the Chilean case.

Colombia

Taylor et al. find that three types of presidents have existed since the end of Colombia's National Front period: *party insiders*, *party adherents*, and *free-wheeling independents*. Evidence from their case suggests that candidate type matters in several ways. First, their findings regarding the cabinet behavior of Colombian presidents present an interesting and counterintuitive complement to the Chilean case. Altman showed that the one president in Chile that tended toward the *party adherent* type tended to rely more on an inner circle of his own party for appointments and Taylor et al. find

that *insider* presidents have been more confident in reaching out to the opposition in cabinet formation, while *adherents* have focused on shoring up their support within the party. Current *free-wheeling independent* president Uribe has worked differently, naming ministers outside of the traditional party structures.

Second, presidential candidate type also matters for the type of voter each attracts. They argue that *party adherents* and *independents* rely more on support in urban areas where they are less bound by patron-client ties. The result is important differences in the campaign organizations and system of representation. These candidates, moreover, are chosen through more participatory procedures, thus somewhat belying our view that representation is furthered by *party insiders*.

These differences carry over to executive-legislative relations. In spite of the *entrepreneurial* legislators discussed by Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno, Taylor et al. argue that the presidents have been able to generate support among their co-partisans. This seems similar to the U.S. pattern, and is likely facilitated by the existence of two large parties. Still, the authors show that patterns of bill initiation are dependent on the president's relation with the legislature, which is based on the partisan composition of the legislature and the type of executive. *FWI* Uribe has had great success, but the authors caution that if his personal popularity were to decline, relations with the congress would quickly sour. We can thus conclude that long term efficiency is threatened by *FWIs*. This has serious ramifications, since Taylor et al. conclude by noting that the norm for executive types is moving toward the *free-wheeling independent* and Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno show that *entrepreneurial* legislators are increasingly the norm. Overall, then, the Colombian case has been in the unlikely lower left quadrant of Table 3, but may be moving towards the unfortunate lower right quadrant.

Mexico

Throughout the PRI hegemony which only recently ended, executive-legislative relations and coalition building were not a concern for presidents. *Insider presidents* were guaranteed a majority and efficiency was assured, though the powerless legislature surely hampered representation. With the transition, there have been dramatic changes to the party system, R&S processes, and, as a result, patterns of executive-legislative relations.

Though the system is evolving quickly, the Fox administration does offer some intriguing clues as to the relationship between R&S variables and politics in Mexico. Fox's status as a non-professional politician with few ties to his own National Action Party lead Camp to conclude that Fox is a *free-wheeling independent*. Fox has been hampered by the lack of a partisan majority in Congress, but his outsider status has also been a hindrance. Camp argues that this status led Fox to surround himself with business people and party outsiders, which, in turn, has strained relations with his own party and stymied his legislative success.

Since Camp argues that future presidents are likely to be *insiders*, a key question is whether that type will have more success in building coalitions. The Chilean, Colombian, and Uruguayan examples suggest that this might be so, though to this point the Mexican example suggests that *party loyalist* legislators will be wary of joining presidential coalitions.

Uruguay

As Chasquetti and Buquet and Moraes stress, the combination of *faction loyalists* and *party insiders* or *party adherents* structures Uruguayan politics. In terms of the effect of presidential candidate types on cabinets, Buquet and Chasquetti find the evidence inconclusive, though they do find that the types of cabinets appointed and cabinet durability do depend on how presidents were chosen. "Natural" faction leaders have had somewhat more diverse, representative, and stable cabinets than the "designated" faction leaders. With regard to executive-legislative relations, though they are necessarily tentative about the strength of their conclusions, Buquet and Chasquetti find some confirming evidence that *party (faction) insiders* are better able to rely on consistent legislative contingents. Moraes adds to this contention from the legislative side, showing that that *party (faction) loyalist* legislators have high levels of commitment to their factions in the legislature, even with respect to constituency service.

In sum, while the factionalism and multipartism could challenge legislative efficiency, the authors' indicators (including cabinet formation, constituency service, and coalition building) suggest that the country scores highly in terms of both representation

and efficiency. It remains to be seen, however, what changes the watershed election and recent institutional reforms will bring.

Conclusions

Recruitment and selection processes are central components of a party's organization, indicating how a party works and influencing how members of that party behave. Given the centrality of political parties to democratic governance, R&S processes can be seen as both indicators and determinants of the quality of democratic government.

While central to the life of a political party, R&S processes are difficult to define and explain—and their influence on political behavior and democratic governance is even more difficult to discern. Two factors complicate analysis of R&S systems. First, R&S takes place over a long period, without a clear beginning. Even its end is foggy, as appointment to one position may be just a step on a long ladder. As we explain in our introductory chapter, it is not even possible to separate those variables that are more pertinent to recruitment from those that pertain to selection. Second, R&S processes involve many behind-the-scenes operations which are difficult to study. We accept that these back-room decisions are taken in response to an institutional context full of incentives that motivate political behavior, but the variance in how politicians and parties react implies a need to go far beyond institutional analysis in any explanation.

In spite of these difficulties, our authors have substantiated many of the hypotheses set up in Chapter 1 by identifying a number of R&S factors that contribute to the definition of a politician's type and consequent post-electoral behavior. On the institutional side, the party and electoral systems play key roles, as does federalism. Primaries, be they national legal mandates or party rules, entered into many discussions and the importance of campaign funds can motivate behavior in different ways. Gender quotas, finally, were shown to have profound effects in some cases. On the non-institutional side, gender quotas were sometimes ineffective as elites found ways to evade the spirit of the law. Factionalism, regionalism and the parties' ideological bent, all of which have some relation to institutions, were also consequential variables. Other examples are the informal processes through which leaders emerge and the development

and application of their skills. Finally, the coalitional arrangements which are so crucial to the functioning of democracy require informal agreements, though again these have ties to party and electoral system variables.

Nonetheless, this volume shows that R&S processes have clear effects on political behavior and, as a result, democratic governance. The contributors have focused on how R&S processes yield different types of presidents and legislators, and they have found many behavioral attributes associated with these types. In this chapter we have combined these findings to offer a synthetic view about efficiency and representation. We also recognize, however, that these outcomes, or democratic governance overall, are underdetermined in our analysis. We do not disagree with the findings of other studies that point to the crucial importance of, among other factors, the number of parties and their ideological spread, social organization, the constitutional distribution of power between the branches, and social capital. This study has shown, however, that the heretofore overlooked or understudied processes of candidate recruitment and selection also have a tremendous influence on campaign behavior, the makeup of cabinets, and inter-branch relations—outcomes that are directly tied to the viability and quality of democracy.

Table 1: Efficiency Rankings

Legislators	Executive
<i>1-party loyalist</i>	<i>1- party insider</i>
<i>2-constituent servant</i>	<i>2- party adherent</i>
<i>3-group delegate</i>	<i>3- group agent</i>
<i>4-entrepreneur</i>	<i>4- free-wheeling independent</i>

Table 2: Rankings for Representation

Legislators	Executives
<i>1-constituent servant</i>	<i>1-party insider</i>
<i>2-party loyalist</i>	<i>2-party adherent</i>
<i>3-group agent</i>	<i>3-group agent</i>
<i>4-entrepreneur</i>	<i>4-free-wheeling independent</i>

Table 3: Politician Types, Efficiency and Representation

		President Types			
		Party Insider	Party Adherent	Group Agent	Free-Wheeling Independent
Legislator Types	Loyalist	LE=1 EE=1 LR=2 ER=1 Representative and Coalition-style-efficiency	LE=1 EE=2 LR=2 ER=2	LE=1 EE=3 LR=2 ER=3	LE =1 EE=4 LR=2 ER=4 Inefficient and problematic representation
	Constituent Servant	LE=2 EE=1 LR=1 ER=1	LE=2 EE=2 LR=1 ER=2	LE=2 EE=3 LR=1 ER=3	LE=2 EE=4 LR=1 ER=4
	Group Delegate	LE=3 EE=1 LR=3 ER=1	LE=3 EE=2 LR=3 ER=2	LE=3 EE=3 LR=3 ER=3	LE=3 EE=4 LR=3 ER=4
	Entrepreneur	LE=4 EE=1 LR=4 ER=1 Unlikely combination	LE=4 EE=2 LR=4 ER=2	LE=4 EE=3 LR=4 ER=3	LE=4 EE=4 LR=4 ER=4 Perhaps authoritarian-style efficiency but not representative

Efficiency Ratings

LE= Legislator Efficiency

EE= Executive Efficiency

Representation Ratings

LR= Legislator Representation Rank

ER= Executive Representation Rank

Table 4: Legislator Types

	Party Loyalist	Constituent Servant	Group Delegate	Entrepreneur
Argentina	<i>Provincial Party Loyalists</i>			
Brazil	PJ, PR PT*		PT*	PP, PTB PMDB, PFL PSDB
Chile	PS, PPD, PDC, UDI, RN			
Colombia				PL, PC
Mexico	PRI, PAN*	PRD, PAN*		
Uruguay	<i>Faction Loyalists</i> PC, PA, FA			

* Indicates that the authors place this party in more than one category.

Table 5: Presidential Types

	Party Insider	Party Adherent	Group Agent	FWI
Argentina	Alfonsín	Menem* Kirchner*		Menem* Kirchner*
Brazil	Kubitschek, Goulart, Lula, Cardoso	Gomes, Garotinho	Caiado, Gabeira	Quadros, Collor
Chile	Aylwin, Lagos	Frei, Buche, Lavín		Errázuriz
Colombia	Lopez, Turbay, Betancur, Barco Gaviria	Samper, Serpa, Pastrana		Uribe
Mexico	Labastida and pre-democratic PRI candidates	Fox*		Fox*
Uruguay	Vazquez	Sanguinetti, Lacalle <i>Or faction insiders</i>		

* Indicates that the authors place this party in more than one category.

Table 6: Recent Changes in Executive R&S Systems

	Old System	Recent Election
Argentina	One candidate/party	PJ multiple candidates
Brazil	All parties had natural leader	PT ran primary
Chile	Elite agreement within coalitions	Concertación ran primary
Colombia	2 major parties dominated system	Uribe broke from traditional parties and ran successful independent campaign
Mexico	Hand picked (<i>dedazo</i>) of PRI candidate	PRI ran primaries
Uruguay	Double-simultaneous vote	Legally mandated primaries for all parties

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