

Chapter 13

Presidential Candidate Selection In Uruguay (1942-1999)

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I. Introduction

This chapter deals with the presidential candidate selection process in Uruguay, both before and after the constitutional reform of 1997. Given the peculiar features of Uruguayan system—internally factionalized parties and a double simultaneous vote electoral system—presidential candidate selection processes are analyzed from the perspective of factions and parties. We focus here on impact of institutional variables on the candidate selection process and then discuss the political consequences of the types of presidential candidate and the ensuing behavior of the person elected.

The way that faction candidates compete is directly shaped by the national electoral system. Uruguayan electoral rules allow party factions to present their own candidates who compete among themselves while at the same time recognizing that their votes will be summed to determine the inter-party contest. As a result, Uruguay is unique with respect to the visibility of internal party competition in the electoral arena. This allows us to study factional systems with a similar lens used to study the relationship between electoral systems and party systems in other countries.

In this chapter we argue that Uruguayan presidents are *party insiders* and *party adherents* in the terms used in this volume. However, given that they usually represent factions, we contend that most really should *faction insiders* or *faction adherents* (though they exhibit the predicted behavior of each type, this behavior is tied and directed to the party faction rather than the party as a whole—quite similar to Moraes’ findings for legislators in this volume). Further, we find that the electoral path to power helps to determine whether *factional insiders* or *factional adherents* emerge. The Double Simultaneous Vote (DSV) promotes the natural leaders of main national factions to be themselves presidential candidates, while plurality rule for presidential elections creates incentives for minor factions to build agreements among themselves to designate common candidates. The former we call “natural” candidates and the latter we call “designated”

candidates. Natural candidates tend to *faction insiders* and the “designated” candidates are more likely to be and act like *faction adherents*.

The next two sections of this chapter briefly describe the most significant institutional features of the Uruguayan political system, especially of the party system and the electoral system. The fourth section explains how the electoral and party systems influence the type and number of presidential candidates. Section five, then, analyzes the influence of candidate type on the political process, focusing on the size of presidents’ legislative contingent, legislative discipline, and type of cabinet. We show that the type of candidate has a weak influence over the size of legislative contingents does not seem to have a substantive effect on legislative discipline. Candidate type, however, does tend to affect the characteristics of the cabinet. While the presidents who were natural candidates had more stable and lasting cabinets than the presidents who were designated candidates, the latter showed more care in building cabinets congruent with their legislative support.

II. The Uruguayan Party System

The Uruguayan party system is one of the most stable and persistent in Latin America. In their foundational work, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) recognize Uruguay, along with Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, and Colombia as having a particularly institutionalized and competitive party system.

The Uruguayan party system is characterized by three relevant parties. On the center-right are the two “traditional parties,” the Colorado (Red) Party (PC) and the National or Blanco (White) Party (PN), and on the left is the Frente Amplio (Broad Front). The traditional parties are as old as the country itself, and have always held governing positions. During most of the 20th century, however, they have coexisted with a group of minor parties, called “parties of ideas.” In 1971 these parties joined to form a third relevant party, the Frente Amplio (FA), nowadays called the Encuentro Progresista (Progressive Encounter)–Frente Amplio–Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) (EP-FA-NM). This party has governed the capital city of the country for three consecutive periods and in 2004 captured the presidency.

The most outstanding feature the major parties is the existence of strongly organized autonomous factions. Though it is common for political parties to be internally divided, the peculiarity of the Uruguayan case is that these factions show great political visibility, to the extent that they have been considered as parties inside parties (Lindahl, 1977). Nevertheless, national parties still matter, and thus, as many scholars have argued (González, 1993; Mieres, 1992) Uruguayan parties are best described as “factionalized parties” (Buquet et. al., 1998).

Although a large and diverse number of factions have existed in throughout history in both parties, they tended to group around two main competitive blocs. The Colorado Party is divided between the “batllistas,”¹ who in general have constituted the progressive wing of the party, and the non-batllista sectors,² who are generally more conservative. At present, the non-batllistas sectors have practically disappeared in the Colorado Party and all its factions are thus considered batllistas. In the National party the “herreristas,”³ are more conservative sector with solid roots in the rural areas, while non-herreristas have a more urban base an a more centrist ideology.

Batllismo and herrerismo have been the dominant factions of traditional Uruguayan parties to such an extent that throughout the whole 20th century there was never an elected government that excluded both of these factions. Further, when defeated in internal competition, the victors always required support from dissident batllistas or herreristas.

At the party level, the first three decades of the century were dominated by the Colorado Party and the charismatic José Batlle y Ordóñez, the leader who gave his name to the long-lived faction. The batllista faction obtained an average of 70% of the party votes during the 1920s. After the death of Batlle, Gabriel Terra, a Batlle follower, was elected president in 1931. Two years later he carried out a coup d’etat in agreement with Luis Alberto de Herrera, the leader of the main faction of the National Party. This inter-party coalition ruled the country until 1942. With the return of competition, the batllista faction of the Colorado

¹ Followers of José Batlle y Ordóñez, who was President twice (1903-1907 y 1911-1915) initially adopted this name, which was reinforced with the presidency of Batlle’s nephew Luis Batlle Berres (1947-1951).

² They have gone by different names like the “Riveristas,” “Blancoacedistas,” “catorcistas,” “pachequistas” or just “colorados.”

³ Named after Luis Alberto de Herrera, the main “blanco” leader of the 20th century.

Party again claimed the presidential mansion between 1942 and 1958, led during much of this time by a nephew of Batlle (Luis Batlle Berres).

After a long absence from power, the Blancos won the elections in 1958 and 1962. The herrerista faction was the majority during the first government, but the non-herrerista wing (Unión Blanca Democrática) dominated the second government. The Colorados returned to office following the 1966 election, and remained there until the military coup of 1973. Significant social unrest combined with an awkward election in 1971 brought to power a president with dubious party ties to the Colorados (Juan María Bordaberry⁴) leading to a military coup and military government that lasted for 12 years.

The dictatorship did little to change the country's electoral map at the party level. Colorado, Julio María Sanguinetti won the foundational elections in 1985, and after sitting out the required term, was re-elected in 1994 and continues to lead his own faction, the Foro Batllista. The Colorados also won in 1999, when Jorge Batlle Ibáñez (son of Luis Batlle) was elected under a new rule that forced the country's only runoff. The Blancos have only won once election since the return to democratic rule, in 1989 under herrerista Luis Alberto Lacalle (a Luis Alberto de Herrera grandson).

At the faction level, there have also been only limited changes. The main Colorado intra-party conflict has been between the Sanguinetti's Foro Batllista and Jorge Batlle's Lista 15. Among the Blancos, the conflict has been between herrerismo led by Lacalle and a variety of non-herrerista groups that converged on Jorge Larrañaga as their leader.

Though the first post-dictatorship election yielded a similar result for the FA as prior to the dictatorship (with the party winning about 20 percent), the party grew rapidly and won its first presidency in 2004 under Tabare Vazquez. Unlike the other parties, however, there is not a clear bipolar division, though there are "moderate" and "radicals." Currently the FA has five main factions. Three groups prior to the founding of the FA: *Democracia Avanzada* (Communist), *Espacio 90* (Cocialist) and *Movimiento de Participación Popular* ("tupamaros"⁵). The other two large factions developed from within the *Frente Amplio* itself, and include the *Vertiente Artiguista*, which is headed by the former mayor of Montevideo,

⁴ Juan María Bordaberry came from a traditional non-batllista Colorado family but he was elected as senator for the PN in 1962 as a consequence of the agreement between the ruralist movement and the PN.

⁵ The "tupamaros" are a former guerrilla movement that was active during the 1960s.

Mariano Arana, and the *Asamblea Uruguay*, which is headed by the current Economics Minister, Danilo Astori. A sixth sector is not a formal member of the Frente Amplio but allies with it: the *Alianza Progresista*, which is constituted of former “blancos,” Christian Democrats and former communists, among others. Finally *Nuevo Espacio*, another electoral ally of the FA is a last crucial piece of the puzzle. Its membership has origins in the Colorado party, and though it joined the Frente Amplio in 1971, it operated independently between 1989 and 2004. In the 2004 election, *Nuevo Espacio* along with the other six FA affiliates, rode Vazquez’s coattails to obtain legislative representation.

III. The Uruguayan Electoral System

Between 1967 and 1994 Uruguayan elections were held concurrently every five-years to choose the following offices are chosen concurrently: i) The President and Vice-president,⁶ ii) all 30 members of the Senate, iii) all 99 members of the House of Representatives. The following municipal authorities were also elected simultaneously in the 19 departments of the Republic:⁷ i) Intendente Municipal (Mayor), and ii) members of the Departmental Assembly (city council).

Here we only consider elections to national office, though most of the rules for the election of departmental authorities were similar. The President and Vice-president were elected on a list that contained both candidates (called “presidential formulas”) through a plurality system using “double simultaneous vote” (DSV). The double simultaneous vote is simply a mechanism which allows an intra-partisan contest at the time of the national election,⁸ in essence, a primary and general election at the same time. The president was the candidate that received the most votes on the party list which received the most votes. In response, traditional parties presented many candidates (hoping that the sum of their votes would bring victory), whereas the minor parties and the EPFA generally unified under a

⁶ Between 1954 y 1962 a collegial National Council of Government of nine members was elected instead of a President and Vice-president.

⁷ Following the 1997 Constitutional reforms, municipal authorities are now elected on a different date.

⁸ Uruguay is not the only place that uses this type of mechanism. In Japan, Italy, Belgium and Colombia, for instance, employ methods for intraparty competition during elections.

single list, hoping to be able to pool enough votes to win. After the 1997 constitutional reform, the DSV was eliminated for the presidential election and the majority run-off method (*ballotage*) was introduced.

The legislative seats are assigned by an "integral" proportional representation system (PR), again with multiple simultaneous vote.⁹ At the "lema" (or party) level senators' and representatives' seats are assigned by D'hondt, taking the whole country as a single constituency. At the "sublema" (faction level) the national constituency remains for the Senate, but for the House, the allocation is done in 19 electoral districts that correspond to country's 19 departments. Before each election, the 99 deputies are distributed among the 19 departments in proportion to the number of qualified people to vote in each one, with the only restriction of a minimum of two seats per department. Consequently, the senate lists are national, while the house lists are departmental, even though both lists are included on the same ballot (see Moraes, this volume for a fuller description and analysis).

The elections for the three national offices of government were connected by means of a "block vote." Voters select one among a large assortment of "voting sheets" or ballots which identify the lists of candidates for all offices. These voting "sheets" are printed by each political group in every department and registered to the Electoral Court— which contain the candidates supported by each political group for every position in dispute. All candidates appearing on a voting sheet must belong to the same party, so voters cannot choose different parties for different offices. The voter, thus, had to choose from one of different "combinations" for the different offices. For instance, until the 1996 reform (see below), one or more president-vice president "formulas" could be "accompanied" by different senate lists and the voter, after choosing her favorite candidate for president, could opt for any of the senate lists that support him (see Morgenstern, 2001 or Moraes in this volume for a diagram of this system). However, as the voting sheets' are created by the political groups and are non-separable, voters cannot create their own combinations.

It is important to note that these "sheets" pertained to both offices operating in a single national constituency (the Senate plus, until the reform, the Presidency and Vice-presidency) and those operating with department boundaries (House of Representatives). As a result, the

⁹ In addition to the double simultaneous vote a "triple simultaneous vote" had also been used., where several lists formed alliances "sublemas" whose votes were pooled against other "sublemas."

voting sheets have purely departmental validity (Candidates for the Executive and for the Senates) and there must be 19 sheets, once for each department.

Since each presidential candidate offered voters multiple options of lists of senators and the senatorial lists, in turn, were accompanied by several (or more) lists of lower house candidates, the system produced a great number of sheets. The 1996 reform reduced this number, however, by changing two practices. First, after the reform parties had to choose a single presidential candidate and second they were prohibited from having the same house list appear in different voting sheets. As a result, the number of lists dropped sharply. For instance, the number of lists in Montevideo dropped from 101 in 1994 to 33 in 1999.

In sum, though the reform reduced their options somewhat, the Uruguayan electoral system still offers the voter a great variety of options; they chose among several parties, among several presidential formulas within each party; among several “sublemas” for the Senate, among several Senate lists within the “sublema,” among different “sublemas” to the House of Representatives, and, finally, among diverse house lists within the “sublema.” There were no formal or real restrictions obstructing the proliferation of voting sheets, and for just the cost of printing the sheets any leader or political group, even just symbolic ones, could offer its own option within the party.¹⁰ To register a new political party not much more was required; it was only necessary to present a set of documents (a declaration of principles or a foundational act) to the Electoral Court.¹¹ Actually, creating a political group and presenting candidates to elections in Uruguay was easier and cheaper than establishing any other single-person enterprise. The Uruguayan electoral regime was also extraordinarily loose, with regard to the registration requirements, allowing almost any citizen to “own” a list.¹² The number of “combinations” which were presented to the citizenry, yielding a variegated and motley panorama that, without further analysis, produced the “optical illusion” of an explosive political fragmentation. This panoply of options, however, is just an illusion, since there is

¹⁰ While each lema’s authorities could in theory impede the use the party’s label most do not.

¹¹ From the 1997’s Constitutional reform, the requirements to register a party have come to be far more onerous, because parties are obliged to participate in internal elections and to choose numerous partisan conventions.

¹² Recent Uruguayan electoral history is full of picturesque political groups which have obtained fewer votes than the number of candidates included in their lists.

only a small number of *relevant* political groups with real opportunities to obtain electoral positions.

IV. The National Factions' Candidate Selection

The Uruguayan electoral system establishes a set of rules for candidate selection that allows self-selection as a general criterion. As previously explained, the requirements to present candidacies to elections are scarce, and political parties are very permissive about the use of their labels. Therefore, anybody who seriously wants to postulate as a candidate for any elective post is able to do so. Despite this process, the main national factions continue to virtually monopolize the elective positions. The previous section described the great diversity in sheet options available to voters, especially until 1994. In spite of the great number of options, almost no minor electoral entrepreneur has succeeded in winning an elective position, because in spite of non-restrictive formal and informal norms that rule the presentation of candidacies, there are quite restrictive norms and rules that govern the allocation of seats.

The main national factions, which are the ones that have won practically all elective offices, control their own candidates' selection (Morgenstern, 2001). Most Uruguayan factions have a strongly individualist slant, with a leader who concentrates most decision-making power. Faction leaders normally control the design of the closed and blocked lists that allows them to control the selection and the order of the candidates to the elective positions, as well as the economic resources of the faction.¹³ Therefore, elected legislators owe loyalty to the faction leader more than to the party or to the electorate. This is especially true for senate lists and house lists of Montevideo (which elects almost one-half of the lower house members), but in other departments candidates may develop their own bases of political and economic support, thus alleviating their need for loyalty to national faction leaders (see Moraes chapter in this volume).

¹³ The public contribution to any political group is determined by the total vote received by each voting sheet and is distributed in the following way: 20% for the presidential candidate, 40% for the senate list and 40% for the house list. As the presidential formula and the senate list are presented in every constituency, the factional leadership controls most of the public economic resources for campaigning.

One way the factions maintain control is by designating “official lists” which are promoted by the faction and the presidential candidate (Morgenstern 2001). Some national factions also build alliances at the national or local level which are crucial to electoral outcomes, thus again, limiting the chances of outsider candidates. These two systems combine to provide faction leaders power because they are able to count on the vast majority of citizens voting for these official lists, which generally have the better-known personalities, the support of strong political organizations and major economic resources. As a result, candidate self-selection and the wide diversity of the electoral options belie what is really a party centered process of candidate selection in Uruguay. As in many other countries, the key difference is between “real” and “formal” candidates, with only the former having serious potential.

The following section describes the presidential selection methods used by the national factions of the three main Uruguayan parties. In keeping with the framework we have followed, we first present the pre-1994 process, separating the traditional parties and the EPFA. In those two sections we also consider how the system has affected the number of presidential candidates. We then consider the changes introduced by the 1997 constitutional reform and their impacts.

The Presidential Candidate Selection in the Traditional Parties

Between 1942 – 1994 no traditional party presented a single presidential candidate, as the factions each chose their own. The DSV provided incentives for the creation and maintenance of a faction based nomination pattern, because any person who wants to be a candidate can present a list. As long as parties were not forced to present single presidential candidates, and multiple candidacies enhanced potential success, it was less costly to have more than one candidate than to reach an agreement on a single one. By the same token, presidential candidacies emerged in pre-existing parties because running under a party banner was less costly than creating a new party. In this way the DSV generated a double impact; on the one hand stimulated factionalized parties and, on the other, made for the continuity of already established parties (González, 1993; Buquet et. al., 1998, Morgenstern, 2001).

In the case of the traditional parties, the selection of presidential candidates is decided at the faction level, following patterns of behavior and specific rules of decision. *A priori*, all faction leaders are potentially natural presidential candidates. Their main ambition is to reach the presidency and their decisions and strategies are oriented toward that goal, but they must compete with co-partisans. The designation of the presidential candidates of the main factions is dominated by elites.¹⁴ Even though the predominant method is elite selection, some distinctions ought to be made. First, most presidential candidates have been the undisputed leaders of their own factions, so there is not a “selection process,” and nomination is taken as a given by party elites and the public. These candidates are, by definition, “*party insiders*” using Siavelis and Morgenstern’s terminology, but could be better termed “*faction insiders*.” Most of these leaders have either run previously for the presidency or carried out privileged governmental or legislative positions that placed them in a leading political role. The DSV promotes “natural candidates” who are able to build new movements to challenge old leaders.

The alternative to natural selection is a collective elite designation procedure where some factions perceive they have scarce chance of individual success and therefore seek agreement over a common presidential candidate. In this case the possible candidates do not need to be a natural faction leader and they are more likely to be a *faction adherent* than a *faction insider*, because a competition for the leadership must be taking place during the nomination process. In some cases leaders may find it more attractive to accept a “neutral” personality rather than running themselves and losing. In these cases the minor factions may be forced to go along, thereby losing their bargaining power as well as the exposure that a general election would give them.

There are three cases where the faction’s presidential candidate is not its natural leader. The first is where a faction lacks an undisputed leader and the collective leadership must decide. Such a situation is more likely to be exceptional, given that the partisan factions, unlike the parties themselves, are strongly personalistic. It can occur, however, when a faction leader dies without leaving a clear heir. The second occurs where different factions build an alliance to present a common candidate. Finally, this can occur where the

¹⁴ The only exceptions were in 1966 and in 1989 when the Colorados used primary elections to designate their presidential candidate.

Presidents is a leader of a faction and is constitutionally banned from re-election. In this case, Presidents tend to designate a trustful heir with a low profile, thus allowing the president to maintain his leadership.

When the presidential race begins, faction leaders that have little chance of winning seek to build coalitions to challenge the frontrunner. These negotiations almost always culminate with the designation of a single presidential candidate. The designation, however, does not generally satisfy all groups, and those disenchanted often create new factions with their own presidential candidates. Similar breakaway factions also form when the heir designated by the incumbent president lacks prestige or does seem to have a serious chance at victory.

The predominant type of presidential candidate in Uruguay has been the *faction insider*. Though Uruguayan parties are far from having “a clearly defined ideological base,” as Siavelis and Morgenstern put it, *party insider* “candidate[s] emerg[e] from a long-standing and institutionalised party” and “where party identification is important to voters.” Analyzing 78 presidential candidates¹⁵ who in the 13 elections during the period 1942-2004 obtained more than 5% of the votes, we can observe that 73 of them (94%) have been “*party or faction insiders*” and only 5 (6%) “*party or faction adherents*” (see Appendix Tables 1 and 2). The country has produced neither *free-wheeling independents* nor *group agents*. Given this finding, we now focus on the distinction between “natural” and “designated” presidential candidates, and Table 1 shows the distribution of these different types of presidential candidacies for the traditional parties.

¹⁵ For the period of the collegial executive (1954, 1958 and 1962 elections), we took the head of the Council list as the “presidential candidate.”

Table 1
Types of presidential candidates in the traditional parties.

	Natural		Designated		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Partido Colorado	22	63%	13	37%	35	100%
Batllista Factions	8	62%	5	38%	13	100%
Non-Batllista Factions	14	64%	8	36%	22	100%
Partido Nacional	17	57%	13	43%	30	100%
Herrerista Factions	9	69%	4	31%	13	100%
Non-Herrerista Factions	8	47%	9	53%	17	100%
Others parties	6	46%	7	54%	13	100%
Total Candidates	45	58%	33	42%	78	100%
1942-71	20	44%	25	56%	45	100%
1984-04	25	76%	8	24%	33	100%
Winning Candidates	6	46%	7	54%	13	100%

The table suggests that natural candidates are the dominant type, but designated leaders are also common. In part there is a bias in the results, however, in that designated candidates do not tend to endure more than one election, because they either lose and fade away or parlay their exposure to convert themselves into natural candidates.¹⁶ Still, it is notable that the candidate's type does not seem to act as a predictor of electoral success, as seven of the thirteen winners were natural candidates and the remaining six designated.

If we divide the studied period into two parts, we can observe an important change in that natural candidates predominated in the post-dictatorship period, while in the pre-coup years (1942-71), a bit less than one-half of candidates could be considered natural. The other interesting pattern here is the separation of the herrerista and non-herrerista factions, with the former having a greater preference for the natural candidates than the latter. This phenomenon reflects the *quasi*-hegemonic condition of Herrerismo within the party, which has obliged the other factions to make alliances and, as a result, look for presidential candidates by negotiating. Apart from this, the independent nationalist sectors have always questioned Herrera's "personalismo," perhaps therefore inciting them to avoid creating and choosing their own "natural candidates."

¹⁶ Echegoyen (1958-1966), Gestido (1962-1966), Zumarán (1984-1989), and Volonté (1994-1999) were faction insiders who became faction leaders.

Effect of the Electoral System on the number of Candidates

Though voters still have access to numerous electoral sheets, there are several aspects of the electoral system that reduce the number of sheets open to voters and keep the number of presidential candidates at around two per party. First, while every faction could present its own presidential candidate, in many cases minor factions in the traditional parties abstained from doing so either because they sought a common candidate with other factions or directly supported the presidential candidate of a larger faction. This happens because of the strategic constraints that the electoral system imposes over minor factions. This is not simply because the system's plurality nature discriminates against minor factions, but fundamentally due to the fused vote for the houses and, until 1996, the presidency. Given this system, minor factions that failed to join a serious list had little chance of winning a senate seat. Not only has the linkage of competition for presidency and senate reduced the number of sheets, it has also kept a lid on the number of aspirants to the presidency. The following table shows the "effective number"¹⁷ of presidential candidates for both traditional parties in the period of 1942-2004. In it, we can appreciate the persistence of a "two-factional" competitive scheme at the presidential level as can be derived from "Duverger's law."¹⁸

Table 2.
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates in the traditional parties.

	1942	1946	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966	1971	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	AVG.
Colorado Party	1.78	2.23	2.96	2.03	2.04	2.46	2.99	2.26	1.57	2.11	1.63	2.01	1.20	2.10
National Party	1.03	1.02	1.01	2.41	2.22	1.96	2.72	1.82	1.39	2.29	2.43	2.81	1.82	1.92

Within the party, the presidential contest is decided by plurality of votes, thus the optimal number of candidates will tend towards two. Before the constitutional reform of 1996, the DSV resolved the competition between parties and the competition between candidates of a same party at the same time. As Morgenstern (2001) claims, the system creates a prisoners' dilemma for the factions, because they have to cooperate with each other in order to win the election, but at the same time they are forced to compete among themselves. Within the parties, however, the factions seem to have resolved the conflict,

¹⁷ The effective number of presidential candidates is calculated in a similar way to the effective number of parties proposed by Laasko and Taagepera (1979): $1/\sum p_i^2$, where "p" represents the share of votes obtained by each presidential candidate over the total party vote.

¹⁸ Duverger (1951) sustains that the plurality electoral system favors the formation of a two-party system.

generally putting into play cooperative campaign strategies, perhaps because the factions frequently fit Panebianco's (1990) description of opponents rather than competitors (owing to their diverse ideological tendencies).

Presidential Candidate Selection in the Frente Amplio.

The most evident difference between the traditional parties and the FA is that the latter has always presented a single presidential candidate. Since its foundation in 1971, it has presented three presidential candidates. Líber Seregni, known for his independence and consensus personality, was nominated as the group's first candidate. After his nomination and especially due to the outstanding role he played in the last stretch of democratic transition, Seregni became a natural leader of the whole FA. He therefore would have been the party's standard bearer in the first post-authoritarian election but the military prohibited his candidacy. The party thus chose Juan J. Crottogini, who had been Seregni's vice-presidential candidate in 1971 and Seregni was the candidate in 1989. In that year, however, the FA suffered a political crisis and two founding groups seceded, beginning a notorious deterioration of Seregni's leadership. Tabaré Vázquez, a charismatic member of the Socialist Party who was elected in 1989 as Montevideo's Mayor, emerged as the party's new leader. He then became the party's presidential candidate for the 1994 election, and with the banner of natural leader, ran again in 1999 and won the presidency in 2004.

Being the natural leader, however, did not guarantee Vázquez's claim to the party's candidacy after the electoral reform. Under the new rules, even though the Frente Amplio chose its candidates in a convention, the party had to run a primary for the 1999 election. Danilo Astori, leader of a moderate faction of the FA, took advantage of this situation in order to present himself as a candidate, formally competing against Vázquez. Astori did not have much hope of actually winning in 1999, but it raised his profile and popularity, particularly among the left wing of the party's supporters. Still, much of the party's base saw this challenge as unfortunate and divisive for the party.

The process used by the FA clearly shows the importance of informality within the context of formal laws and rules. A convention of delegates elected by FA adherents formally designates the candidate and FA statutes suggest that the selection of the

presidential candidate does not emerge from the elite but from the membership of the party. However, convention members are almost all tied to one of the factions and vote in a disciplined manner in the convention, thus simply ratifying the elite's resolutions. The FA, then, is not an exception of the predominant model of selection by elite which tends to benefit the natural candidates. The most important difference is the fact that the FA has had natural candidates for the party, whereas the traditional parties have only had natural candidates of their factions.

The New Internal-Elections of the Parties

The constitutional reform of 1997 removed the double simultaneous vote for presidential elections, forcing parties to present single presidential candidates by establishing mandatory open primary elections. Since the new rules are in force, all parties that want to participate in the electoral process must have "internal" elections on the same date.¹⁹ Internal elections serve two purposes: i) to select the presidential candidate in each party and ii) to elect delegates to the national and 19 local party conventions. The national party conventions comprise 500 members (elected by proportional representation) and have two purposes: a) to select the presidential candidate if none receives more than 50% of the vote, or more than 40% with at least a 10 point margin over the second front runner; and b) to select the vice-presidential candidate.

At first sight, the electoral reform would seem not to have changed much, because as before, factions can designate pre-candidates. There are numerous forces at work, however, that will likely change competition within and among the parties. First, the rules to select the party presidential candidates have changed; under the new rules, candidates must win a primary by gaining either 50% of the vote or at least 40% with an advantage of 10 points over all rivals. If no candidate meets these requirements, a party convention chooses the candidate. This high threshold for winning the primary provides an impetus towards a two-person race in the primary, but the possibility of having the candidate chosen

¹⁹ Citizens may vote in any party primary, but may only participate in one. Part of the reasoning behind holding the primaries on the same day for all parties was to prevent voters from intervening in the affairs of more than one party.

through the convention could yield a more fragmented scheme as happens in two-round electoral systems (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).

Second, holding primaries independently of the general election it lengthens the political campaigns and increases the costs of the campaigns and the electoral process, negative consequences in a country where political and government spending is of high concern. The high costs of the electoral organization and prolonged campaigns can cause loathing and political distrust in the citizenry and undermine legitimacy. At least one important advantage of the DSV system was its shorter campaign season owing to its holding the primary and the general election simultaneously. The legislature did try to deal with the long campaign period by moving the primaries back from April to June, which has also forced the parties to define their pre-candidates earlier and has resulted in a shortening of the calendar by considerably more than just two months.

Separate primary elections have another impact which could carry even greater weight. Primary elections force candidates belonging to the same party to compete among themselves, highlighting their differences and potentially generating internal confrontations. Here the prisoner's dilemma structure of incentives is clear, as cooperative solutions are difficult to find, and it is normally accepted that parties that contain the internal conflict are better off in the general elections. This is not different from the U.S. system where: "all studies point toward divisive nomination campaigns contributing a negative effect in general election outcomes" (Atkeson, 1998:257). Kenney and Rice (1984:31) concur, finding that "when one party has a divisive primary season while the other party's nominee is essentially uncontested, the divided party will be adversely affected in November." Uruguayan evidence does conclusively confirm these findings, but rather seems to suggest that something of an optimal level of competitiveness exists, where either too high or too low competition damages the party.

The three main parties have chosen different strategies to deal with the new primary system, and each party has dealt with the situation differently in 2004 than they had in 1999, with a general decrease in competitiveness. The EP-FA-NM had some symbolic internal competition in 1999, but put forth a single candidate in 2004. The PC had had a well balanced competition between two candidates in 1999, but also put forth a hegemonic candidate in 2004. The PN, which in 1999 had been excessively fragmented, ran just two main candidates

in the last election who competed without high levels of vitriol. If we link the degree of competitiveness of each primary contest to the electoral performance of each traditional party at the general election, we can see that when the effective number of candidates was close to two the party did well and when this number moved away from two, either up or down, the performance in the general election worsened (Table 3). This does not seem to be true for the EP-FA-NM, which had a very low level of competitiveness in both elections while their electoral growth continued an upward trend that started in 1971.

Table 3.
Effective number of presidential candidates in the traditional- parties primaries.

Election Year	Partido Colorado		Partido Nacional	
	Ef. N° Candidates*	Electoral Growth**	Ef. N° Candidates*	Electoral Growth**
1999	2.0	0.4%	2.8	-8.9%
2004	1.2	-22.2%	1.8	12.8%

* Effective number of presidential candidates at the primary contest

**Percentage of electoral growth related to the previous election

In sum, the notion of a well-balanced primary contest implies that in addition to running an effective number of candidates close to two parties should work to minimize confrontation between the two front runners. This is because, along with an attractive primary contest, the party must offer a united image to the electorate to avoid losing voters as the result of a conflict-filled primary.

While too much confrontation can lead to an internal deterioration of the parties, manipulating of struggle to avoid confrontation has also been harmful for the traditional parties. In 2004 the major factions of the PC unified behind a single candidate, thus distorting the primary process. The result, however, proved disastrous as the party lost badly in the general election. Again, since the DSV forces intra-party rivals to focus their campaigns more on inter-partisan rivalries, it allows internal party choice without yielding strenuous and divisive internal fights. The DSV, then, favors parties whereas primaries may damage them.

Finally the DSV presents one last virtue over primaries, both for the parties as for the voters. In a recent article, Josep Colomer has tried to show how “the candidates selected on a primary elections’ basis tend to be not very popular or losers in the corresponding presidential elections” (2002:119). This occurs due to the differences in who participates in the two rounds. In Colomer’s words,

“The bigger the mass participation in the primary elections, within certain

limits, the less the influence of the party's leaders directed to winning elections, the more the influence of the activists and voters with extreme or minority political-ideological preferences, and the longer the distance between the winner in the primary election and the median voter's preference on the whole electorate." (2002:119, 120)

Colomer's reasoning can be clearly illustrated in spatial terms. A primary winner should be the one who is closest to the median voter within a party. However, a centrist within a party may be an extremist for the whole electorate. A leftist party, therefore, would do better in the general election by choosing a candidate who is to the right of their median member and a rightist party should do the opposite. The DSV resolves this problem for the parties by allowing them to present a wide array of options to the whole electorate, therefore benefiting both the citizenry, which enjoys a wider menu, and the party, which does not limit its capacity of electoral appeal.

Although there are only two elections to consider their results only partially support these hypotheses. In 1999 the PN's winning pre-candidate—Lacalle—was without doubt closer to the median Blanco voter, but his defeated contender —Ramírez— was much closer to the whole electorate's center. Something similar could be said of the EPFA, where the winner, Vázquez, clearly showed a more radical profile than Astori. The winner in the Colorado internal election, Batlle, however, was ideologically farther to the right than the defeated candidate, Hierro, but Batlle was still in a much better position with the entire electorate due to Hierro's relation with the outgoing government. In 1999, then, the Colorados chose the best candidate for the general election and were successful. In 2004, the only party with a true primary was the PN, choosing Larrañaga over Lacalle. In this case Larrañaga was closer to the electorate's median than Lacalle, and thus does not conform to Colomer's (2002) hypothesis that the party militants will choose the more extreme candidate. Even though the Blancos chose a centrist, the Frente Amplio won the general election in a landslide, despite that Vasquez, was positioned on the left of the ideological scale. In sum, the primaries have not always yielded winners who are more representative of their parties than the full electorate, and it is also unclear that these relatively extreme candidates are poor general election competitors, perhaps in part because the other parties also choose poorly.

V. The Type of Candidate as an Independent Variable

In this section we analyze the influence of the type of candidate elected as president. According to Siavelis and Morgenstern,

recruitment patterns also affect the prospects for presidents to be able to build and rely upon majorities (...) party insiders presidents will be more likely to have support of their own parties, particularly where they face legislators of their own party who are legislative loyalists. Party adherents will be less likely to control majorities in the congress, because the likelihood of intra-party factional conflict will be higher.

We analyzed these relationships for Uruguay between 1942 and 2004 tying presidential type to presidents' legislative support, the legislative discipline of the presidents' parties, and the types of cabinets.

Legislative support. Following Siavelis and Morgenstern's introductory chapter, we will consider the president's legislative contingent as a dependent variable. In the period considered, 13 chiefs of government were elected, 10 as presidents and three as head of the National Council of Government (NCG, "colegiado"). With the two exceptions of Juan María Bordaberry, who was classified as a Faction Adherent, and Tabaré Vázquez (2005), who is a *party insider*, all other winning candidates were *faction insiders*. The main difference among the *faction insiders* is how they have been selected, being whether they are "Natural" or "Designated" candidates.

Of the 13 presidents, six were Natural Faction Insiders—Luis Batlle Berres (1955), Julio María Sanguinetti (1985 and 1995), Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990) and Jorge Batlle Ibáñez (2000)—whereas Juan José de Amézaga (1943), Tomás Berreta (1947), Martín Etchegoyen (1959), Daniel Fernández Crespo (1963) and Oscar Gestido (1967) were *designated faction insiders*. Table 4 illustrates the average of the presidents' legislative support, and the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) according to the type of candidates. It shows that the designated candidates have had considerably more support than the natural candidates, 51.5% in comparison with 39.6%.

Table 4
Types of Candidates and Presidents Parties Support (average)

TYPE OF CANDIDATES	Number of candidates	Wining candidates	Presidents' Party Support	Effective Number of Parties*
Designated Faction Insider	24	6	51.5%	2.50
Natural Faction Insider	39	5	39.6%	3.07
Natural Party Insider	6	1	52.5%	2.39
Designated Faction Adherent	3	1	41.4%	2.72

* Effective Number of Parties at the Chamber of Representatives

Source: Data Bank ICP - UDELAR

This association, however, is less clear than it appears, however, since the effective number of parties also comes into play. Jones (1995) has shown that there is a strong association between the effective number of parties and the legislative contingent of the president. In addition, almost all the designated candidates are concentrated in the period 1943-1973, when Uruguay had a two party-system. With the exception of Batlle Berres, the natural candidates, by contrast, emerged in the post-authoritarian period when the party system fragmented. As a result, the average ENP for the designated candidates is 2.5, whereas for the natural candidates is 3.1, and there was a strong correlation between the effective number of parties and the presidents support (-0.83), which confirms Jones's hypothesis.

The move to a multi-party system has also had other effects. During the long two-party era, there was strong intra-party competition among many factions, though as we have explained, that competition was generally structured between two main political blocks inside each party as minor factions built agreements to maintain their viability. As a result of these negotiations, designated candidates were common. This changed after the dictatorship, and the proportion of designated candidates dropped from 56% to 24% (see Table 1). Further, six designated candidates were successful in their electoral bids in the earlier period, while none have won election since the return to democracy. In sum, changes in the party system dramatically affected the nature of intra-party competition, and in the current period factions with a natural candidate had more electoral success than those without such candidates.

To sum up, the legislative contingent of the president was higher when Uruguay had a two-party system. Given those conditions, there were more designated candidates than there are currently, in part because larger parties had more space for strong intra-party

competition. Thus while the level of the party system fragmentation (ENP) is still the best independent variable in explaining the size of the legislative contingent of the president, there is a clear link between the type of candidate, the effective number of parties, and the legislative support of the president's party.

Legislative discipline. According to Morgestern and Siavelis, we should expect the *insiders* to enjoy greater legislative supports than *adherents* or *independents*. Unfortunately, there are no data to measure party discipline for the pre-dictatorship period, but we can consider the post-1985 period when a succession of *natural faction insiders* won election. Table 5 shows the average Rice Index for the party president for the most important laws of each legislative term (Buquet et.al 1998).²⁰

Table 5
Legislative discipline of the presidential party (average)

Period	President	President's Party Rice Index	Number of laws
1985-90	Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	94	40
1990-95	Luis A. Lacalle	90	33
1995-00	Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	99	34
2000-05	Batlle Ibáñez	100	18

Source: Buquet et.al. 1998; Lanzaro et.al. 2000; Koolhas 2003.

The parties have maintained extremely high discipline for each president, indicating a possible relationship between *faction insider* presidents and the level of discipline of his partisan supporters. Nevertheless, these four cases do not allow categorical conclusions, given that we do not have information for the other cases. Further, we have not taken into account the closed and blocked legislative electoral lists which others find crucial do discipline. (Morgenstern 2001, Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Moraes this volume).

Cabinets. Finally, we examine the implication of candidate type on cabinet structure. Specialized literature on parliamentary cabinets affirms that the fragmentation of the party system and the degree of ideological polarization are related to cabinet duration (Laver & Schofield, 1990; Strom, 1990). These features should come into play in Uruguay, as presidents have the power to appoint and dismiss their ministers, but the legislature has

²⁰The Rice Index is the difference in the percentage of yes and no votes divided by the total number of votes.

the power of censure. Weak legislative support, therefore, risks cabinet instability. Here, our concern is to follow Siavelis and Morgenstern in their suggestion that *insider* presidents should have more stable and lasting cabinets than *adherents*.

For this study we analyzed presidential cabinets for the period 1943-2000, taking into account the type of candidate, the effective number of parties, the size of the president's faction in the legislature and the degree of congruence between cabinet shares and legislative weight of the cabinet parties. We could not include an analysis of ideological polarization due to the lack of information for the period 1943-1973. We define a "new" presidential cabinets using three criteria: a) the inauguration of a new president; b) a change in the party membership of the cabinet; and c) a change of more than 50% in the identity of individual ministers (Amorim, 1998).

Table 6: Type of Candidate and Cabinet Stability

Cabinet	Date	Type of Candidate	Average	Number of Cabinets	Coalescence	ENP ²
			Duration in months		Index ¹ (Average)	
Amézaga	1943	DFI	16	3	0.80	2.43
Berreta*	1947	DFI	10	1	0.92	2.97
Martínez Trueba	1951	DFI	19	2	0.76	2.55
Batlismo (Batlle Berres)	1955	NFI	24	2	0.96	2.53
Herrerismo (Echegoyen)	1959	DFI	48	1	0.69	2.41
UBD (F.Crespo)	1963	DFI	24	2	0.76	2.35
Gestido*	1967	DFI	5	2	0.83	2.33
Bordaberry	1971	DFA	5	3	0.84	2.72
Sanguinetti	1985	NFI	60	1	0.85	2.93
Lacalle	1990	NFI	20	3	0.83	3.33
Sanguinetti	1995	NFI	60	1	0.74	3.30
Batlle Ibañez	2000	NFI	30	2	0.86	3.07

* Berreta passed away in October 1947 and Gestido in December 1967

1 Cabinet Coalescence Rate is a mathematical indicator proposed by Amorim Neto (1998) of the congruence between cabinet shares and legislative support of the parties in cabinet.

2 Effective Number of Parties.

Source:

Table 7: Types of Candidates and Average of the Independent Variables

	N	Duration in month	Number of Cabinets	Coalescence Index	ENP
Designated Faction Adherent	1	5	3.0	0.86	2.72
Designated Faction Insider	6	20	1.8	0.81	2.52
Natural Faction Insider	5	28	1.8	0.83	3.03

Tables 6 and 7 present data about the duration and stability of cabinets, the degree of cabinet coalescence, and the effective number of parties. They show that the *natural*

A score of 100, then, implies perfect discipline and a score of 0 implies the party was divided equally.

faction insiders have almost two cabinets per government lasting an average of 28 months, while the *designated faction insiders* also have an average of about two cabinets each, though with an average of only 20 months of duration. In particular, Sanguinetti, a *natural faction insider*, maintained a single cabinet for each of his two terms in office, while Batlle Ibañez, Batlle Berres and Fernández Crespo were forced to make multiple changes. The only *designated faction adherent*—Juan Ma. Bordaberry—had an even more unstable cabinet (3 changes that lasted an average of just 5 months each), though this was a period of high turmoil that eventually ended in a coup.

There is also some difference in terms of the care that the two types put into building their cabinets. At 0.86, the average coalescence index for *designated faction insider* presidents is a bit higher than that of the *natural faction insider* presidents (0.81). Even though the difference is slight, these figures suggest that designated candidates put more care into intra-cabinet equilibrium than natural candidates by appointing faction ministers in proportion to the legislative size of each partner.

In sum, the analysis shows that *natural faction insiders* have somewhat more stable cabinets than the *designated insiders*, though the latter type appoints slightly more representative cabinets. Still, we cannot validate Siavelis and Morgenstern prediction, given that there no data on other presidential types and there is significant variance in the stability levels for the two sub-types with which Uruguay has had significant experience.

VI. Conclusions

Candidate selection in Uruguay is and has been deeply influenced by its electoral system. The age and institutionalization of the party system has assured that almost all presidential candidates have been leaders with long political careers within their parties and factions, yielding candidates who are situated between the *party insider* and *party adherent* categories, though they are usually (and almost exclusively in the traditional parties) *faction insiders* or *faction adherents*. While DSV allows self-nomination, in practice a few internal factions of the main parties to monopolize the elective positions, making them the true agents of candidate nomination.

The candidates of large national factions either emerge naturally or result from a negotiated settlement among different factions. Even when the designation is formalized by means of a convention or primary, participants tend to ratify a previous elite decision. The most salient exception to this rule has been the designation of the Frente Amplio's presidential candidate, where the party has played a greater role. All parties must now hold primary elections, but the previous forms of designation continue beneath the surface.

While the effects of the electoral system on candidate selection are clear, we have had less success in delineating the effects of executive type on political outcomes or behavior. We found that there were more designated candidates, but this was related to changes in the number of parties. We also showed that natural faction leaders had won the last five elections, and that internal competition did affect electoral outcomes. The clarity of the result, however, is clouded by other factors, including the number of parties and the type of candidates chosen by each party. Finally, we found that natural candidates produced somewhat more stable cabinets, though upon becoming president, designated candidates were a bit more careful in appointing cabinets congruent with legislative support.

The 1997 constitutional reform introduced significant changes in the electoral system—eliminating the DSV for the presidential election and mandating primaries—which were intended to produce important changes in the parties. With these parties embarked on a learning process, as they have used very different selection systems in the two elections since these changes went into effect. It is already clear, however, that the party and faction leaders are finding ways to accommodate the changes while retaining the most crucial aspects of Uruguay's presidential candidate selection: factional politics and elite decision-making.

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Appendix Table 1

Election	Candidate	Party	Faction	Type of Candidate	Previous Political Career
1942	Juan J de Amézaga	PC	Batllismo-PSP	Designated Faction Insider	1908-14 Representative / 1914-18 Minister / 1921-31 Public Enterprise Director BPS
1942	Eduardo Blanco Acevedo	PC	LS	Natural Faction Insider	1934-38 Senator
1942	Eugenio Lagarmilla	PC	Riverismo	Designated Faction Insider	1908-14; 1920-23 Representative / Minister
1942	Luis A. de Herrera	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1905-08; 1914-17 Representative / 1925-30 CNA / 1934-42 Senator / 1919, 1925, 1930 Presidential Candidate
1942	Martín C. Martínez	PNI		Designated Party Insider	1899-1902; 1905-08; 1914-16 Representative / 1917-25 Senator
1946	Tomás Berreta	PC	Batllismo	Designated Faction Insider	1923-30 Representative / 1931-33 CNA / 1943-46 Minister Obras Públicas
1946	Rafael Schiaffino	PC	LS	Designated Faction Insider	1945-46 Minister
1946	Alfredo Baldomir	PC	PSP	Natural Faction Insider	1938-43 President
1946	Luis A. de Herrera	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1942 Presidential candidate
1946	Alfredo García Morales	PNI		Designated Party Insider	1920-23; 1926-29; 1943-45 Representative / 1929-31 Senator / 1931-33 ANC
1950	César Mayo Gutiérrez	PC	Batllismo 14	Designated Faction Insider	1920-25; 1927-31 Representative / 1943-50 Senator
1950	Andrés Martínez Trueba	PC	Batllismo 15	Designated Faction Insider	1920-29 Representative / 1943 Senator / 1947-1951 Mayor of Montevideo
1950	Eduardo Blanco Acevedo	PC	LS	Natural Faction Insider	1942 Presidential candidate / 1947-51 Senator
1950	Luis A. de Herrera	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1946 Presidential candidate
1950	Asdrúbal Delgado	PNI		Designated Party Adherent	none
1954	Orestes Lanza	PC	Batllismo 14	Designated Faction Insider	1932-33 Representative / 1951-54 Senator
1954	Luis Batlle Berres	PC	Batllismo 15	Natural Faction Insider	1926-33; 1943-47 Representative / 1947 Vicepresident / 1947-51 President
1954	César Charlone	PC	LS	Natural Faction Insider	1932-33 Representative / 1934-38; 1940-54 Senator / 1938-1943 Vicepresident
1954	Luis A. de Herrera	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1950 Presidential candidate
1954	Daniel Fernández Crespo	PN	MPN	Designated Faction Insider	1932-51 Representative / 1951-54 Senator
1954	Pantaleón Astiazarán	PN	Reconstrucción	Designated Faction Insider	1932-33; 1943-54 Representative
1954	Arturo Lussich	PNI		Designated Faction Insider	1905-08; 1917-27; 1943-47 Representative
1958	César Batlle Pacheco	PC	14-LS	Designated Faction Insider	1951-58 Representative
1958	Manuel Rodríguez Correa	PC	Batllismo 15	Designated Faction Insider	1947-52 Representative
1958	Martín Echegoyen	PN	Herrero-Ruralismo	Designated Faction Insider	1943-58 Senator
1958	Angel María Cusano	PN	Intransigentes	Designated Faction Insider	1934-42 Representative / 1943-58 Senator
1958	Salvador Ferrer Serra	PN	UBD	Designated Faction Insider	1947-55 Representative / 1955-58 Senator
1962	Luis Batlle Berres	PC	Batllismo 14	Natural Faction Insider	1947-51 President / 1955-59 NCG
1962	Zelmar Michelini	PC	PGP 99	Natural Faction Insider	Representative 1955-62
1962	Oscar Gestido	PC	UCB	Designated Faction Insider	Military / 1955-1962 Public Enterprise Director PLUNA and AFE
1962	Alberto Arocena	PN	Herrero-Ruralismo	Designated Faction Insider	none
1962	Daniel Fernández Crespo	PN	UBD-Herrer. Ortodoxo	Designated Faction Insider	1954 NCG candidate / 1955-59 NCG / 1959-63 CD Montevideo
1966	Jorge Batlle Ibañez	PC	Batllismo 15	Natural Faction Insider	1959-66 Representative
1966	Amílcar Vasconcellos	PC	Defensa Batllismo	Natural Faction Insider	1951-59 Representative / 1962-66 NCG
1966	Zelmar Michelini	PC	PGP 99	Natural Faction Insider	1962 NCG candidate / 1963-66 Representative
1966	Oscar Gestido	PC	UCB	Natural Faction Insider	1963-67 NCG
1966	Martín Echegoyen	PN	Alianza Nacionalista	Natural Faction Insider	1959-62 NCG / 1963-66 Senator
1966	Alberto Heber	PN	Herrerismo Ortodoxo	Natural Faction Insider	1959-63 Representative / 1963-66 NCG
1966	Alberto Gallinal Heber	PN	Reforma y Desarrollo	Designated Faction Insider	1958 NCG Candidate
1971	Liber Seregni	FA	Independent	Designated Party Adherent	Military
1971	Jorge Batlle Ibañez	PC	Batllismo 15	Natural Faction Insider	1966 Presidential candidate

1971	Juan Ma. Bordaberry	PC	UCB	Designated Faction Adherent	1963-67 Senator PN; 1970 Minister
1971	Amilcar Vasconcellos	PC	Unión del Partido	Natural Faction Insider	1966 Presidential candidate
1971	Mario Aguerondo	PN	Herrerismo	Designated Faction Adherent	Military
1971	Wilson Ferreira Aldunate	PN	PLP-MNR	Natural Faction Insider	1954-62 Representative / 1963-67 Minister
1984	Juan José Crottogini	FA	Independent	Designated Party Insider	1971 Vicepresident candidate
1984	Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	PC	Batllismo	Natural Faction Insider	1963-73 Representative / 1970 and 1972 Minister
1984	Jorge Pacheco Areco	PC	UCB	Natural Faction Insider	1967-72 President
1984	Dardo Ortiz	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1955-1972 Representative / 1972-73 Senator / 1966 Vicepresident candidate / 1966 Minister
1984	Alberto Zumarán	PN	PLP-MNR	Designated Faction Adherent	none
1989	Liber Seregni	FA	Independent	Natural Party Insider	1971 Presidential candidate / since 1971 FA's president
1989	Hugo Batalla	NE	PGP 99	Natural Party Insider	1960-71 Representative / 1985-89 Senator
1989	Jorge Battle Ibañez	PC	Batllismo	Natural Faction Insider	1971 President candidate / 1985-89 Senator
1989	Jorge Pacheco Areco	PC	UCB	Natural Faction Insider	1967-72 President / 1984 Presidential candidate
1989	Luis A. Lacalle	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1972-73 Representative / 1985-90 Senator
1989	Carlos J. Pereyra	PN	MNR	Natural Faction Insider	1971 Vicepresident candidate 1963-67 Representative / 1967-73; 1985-89 Senator
1989	Alberto Zumarán	PN	PLP	Natural Faction Insider	1984 Presidential candidate / 1985-89 Senator
1994	Tabaré Vázquez	FA	PS*	Designated Party Insider	1990-95 Mayor of Montevideo
1994	Rafael Michellini	NE		Natural Party Insider	1990-94 Representative
1994	Jorge Battle Ibañez	PC	Batllismo 15	Natural Faction Insider	1989 Presidential candidate
1994	Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	PC	Foro Batllista	Natural Faction Insider	1985-90 President
1994	Jorge Pacheco Areco	PC	UCB	Natural Faction Insider	1989 Presidential candidate
1994	Juan Andrés Ramírez	PN	Herrerismo	Designated Faction Insider	1990-92 Minister of Interior / 1992-94 Senator
1994	Alberto Volonté	PN	Manos a la Obra	Designated Faction Insider	1988-1993 Public Enterprise Director UTE
1994	Carlos J. Pereyra	PN	MNR	Natural Faction Insider	1989 Presidential candidate / 1990-94 Senator
1999	Tabaré Vázquez	FA	PS*	Natural Party Insider	1994 Presidential candidate / since 1996 FA's president
1999	Rafael Michellini	NE		Natural Party Insider	1994 Presidential candidate / 1995-99 Senator
1999	Jorge Battle Ibañez	PC	Batllismo 15	Natural Faction Insider	1959-67 Representative / 1985-00 and 1995-00 Senator / 1966-71-89-94 Presidential Candidate
1999	Luis Hierro López	PC	Foro Batllista	Designated Faction Insider	1985-89 Representative / 1990-98 Senator / 1998 Minister of Interior
1999	Juan Andrés Ramírez	PN	Desafío Nacional	Designated Faction Insider	1994 Presidential candidate
1999	Luis A. Lacalle	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1990-95 President
1999	Alberto Volonté	PN	Manos a la Obra	Natural Faction Insider	1994 Presidential candidate / since 1995 PN's president
1999	Álvaro Ramos	PN	Propuesta Nacional	Natural Faction Insider	1994 Vicepresident candidate / 1995-97 Minister of Foreign Affairs
2004	Tabaré Vázquez	FA	PS*	Natural Party Insider	1999 Presidential candidate / since 1996 FA's president
2004	Guillermo Stirling	PC	Batllismo	Designated Faction Insider	1985-98 Representative / 1998-2003 Minister of Interior
2004	Alberto Iglesias	PC	UCB	Natural Faction Insider	2000-04 Public Enterprise Director BSE
2004	Jorge Larrañaga	PN	Alianza Nacional	Natural Faction Insider	1990-99 Mayor of Paysandú / 2000-04 Senator
2004	Luis A. Lacalle	PN	Herrerismo	Natural Faction Insider	1990-95 President / 1999 Presidential candidate

* Tabaré Vázquez is a member of the Socialist Party but he is not the faction leader

ANC: Administrative National Council (1919-1933) / NCG: National Council of Government (1952-1966)

Appendix Table 2

Presidents	Years	Type of candidate	Party	Birth	Age	Years in public functions	First Degree
Juan J de Amézaga	1943-47	Faction insider - Designated	PC	1881	62	18	Lawyer
Tomás Berreta	1947 *	Faction insider - Designated	PC	1875	77	14	Farmer
Andrés Martínez Trueba	1951-55	Faction insider - Designated	PC	1884	67	25	Lawyer
Luis Batlle Berres	1955-59	Natural Faction Insider	PC	1897	58	15	none
Martín Echegoyen	1959-63	Faction insider - Designated	PN	1891	68	18	Lawyer
Daniel Fernández Crespo	1963-67	Faction insider - Designated	PN	1901	62	31	none
Oscar Gestido	1967 **	Faction insider - Designated	PC	1901	66	12	Military
Juan Ma. Bordaberry	1972-73	Faction adherent - Designated	PC	1928	44	5	Farmer
Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	1985-90	Natural Faction Insider	PC	1936	49	10	Lawyer
Luis A. Lacalle	1990-95	Natural Faction Insider	PN	1941	49	7	Lawyer
Julio Ma. Sanguinetti	1995-00	Natural Faction Insider	PC	1936	59	15	Lawyer
Jorge Batlle Ibañez	2000-05	Natural Faction Insider	PC	1927	73	18	Lawyer
Tabaré Vázquez	2005-	Party Insider - Natural	FA	1940	65	5	Medical Doctor