

Chapter 12

“Political Recruitment, Governance, and Leadership, Has Democracy Made a Difference?”

Roderic Ai Camp

Mexico underwent a remarkable transformation in its political model in 2000, with the electoral victory of the National Action Party, the inauguration of President Vicente Fox, and the removal of a political party and leadership which had governed Mexico for some seven decades. To what extent has the democratic transformation in the 1990s, and the introduction of electoral democracy, affected the processes and outcome of political recruitment and selection among state and national executive leaders? Intuitively one might expect equally remarkable transformations in leadership characteristics as both the political process and origins of that leadership were altered. On the other hand, an equally compelling case might be made that the degree to which those processes had become ingrained since the 1920s would make it difficult, in spite of electoral democracy, to modify recruitment and selection patterns in a relatively short period of time.

Regardless of the failures of the Fox administration to address numerous policy issues as of 2005, his administration already has produced influential consequences on numerous aspects of political recruitment and selection, many of which are less obvious than policy achievements and failures. Within months of his inauguration, indeed, his election alone, alterations in political structures and behavior began to occur in response to different leadership emerging from the larger context of competitive elections. Thus, as will be clearly demonstrated, democracy functioned as an independent variable in producing new types of leaders who achieved electoral success. At the same time, the background characteristics of these new leaders also produced policy consequences, highlighting the importance, as Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern argue, of recruitment processes functioning as independent variables.

The impact of electoral democracy and specifically Fox's administration on political recruitment and selection can only be understood in broad terms if we understand why Mexicans actually voted for Mr. Fox, and what they appeared to expect from his leadership. We cannot

divine his own leadership selections if indeed we assume a connection between those selections and Fox's perceptions of citizen policy concerns, as well as similar linkages which have occurred at the state level among gubernatorial candidates.

A comprehensive panel survey, repeated among the same random group of voters, sponsored by a National Science Foundation grant led by Chappell Lawson from MIT, captures citizen views in 2000.¹ This study is valuable because it provides insights as to how Mexicans viewed the leading presidential candidates over time, particularly the two leading contenders, Francisco Labastida from the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party, and the National Action Party's Vicente Fox, in terms of specific leadership qualities.

Why did Mexicans vote for Mr. Fox, who were those Mexicans, and what were they seeking in a leader? The fundamental issues which were of greatest concern to the Mexican voter in July, 2000, were: personal security, the economy, and poverty. It is ironic therefore, that among those voters who cast ballots for their presidential candidate on the basis of his proposals to cope with these issues, only 22 percent of the voters based their actual choices on the candidate's policy proposals. So, voters did not prefer Fox because he offered specific policy solutions. Of all the reasons given for voting for a particular candidate, by far the leading reason was change.² Forty-three percent of Mexican voters listed change as their number one reason, twice that of any other reason.

Among those voters who considered change most important, two-thirds voted for Fox, but only 15 percent for PRI's candidate. By contrast, of those Mexicans who voted for the candidate, only 9 percent of all voters, half voted for Labastida compared to 28 percent for Fox. These figures clearly suggest that voters were not choosing specific leadership qualities such as experience, skill, integrity, but were choosing someone who represented characteristics

¹ For a detailed discussion and the published results, see Chappell Lawson, "Introduction," in Chappell Lawson and Jorge Domínguez, eds. *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Elections, Campaign Effects and the Presidential Race of 2000* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 1-21.

² I explore this issue in considerable detail in my "Mexican Attitudes toward Democracy and Vicente Fox's Victory in 2000," in Chappell Lawson and Jorge Dominguez, eds. *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Elections, Campaign Effects and the Presidential Race of 2000* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 25-41

consistent with changing the political model of 2000, which they defined in terms of change. Fox was perceived as someone outside of the traditional political system, and to some extent, not even a politician. He clearly fits Siavelis and Morgenstern's label of a **Free-Wheeling Independent** (although he did compete successfully in the party's primary process for the nomination open to active members and adherent members)³ in sharp contrast to Labastida, who is the perfect embodiment of a **Party Insider**.⁴ Fox himself, as will be detailed shortly, brought different personal qualities to the forefront as president, qualities which were atypical of his executive branch predecessors in the presidency, the cabinet, and state governorships.

Mexico's presents a fascinating example of a political transformation, in this case from a semi-authoritarian to a democratic model, in which democracy is wrapped up perceptually as change in the minds of the voters. Thus a democratic political model, defined as political change, produces the presidential victory of Vicente Fox, who qualitatively also represents leadership characteristics which were atypical of all three major parties. Numerous voters equated change and democracy as one and the same, and they contributed significantly to Fox's recruitment, his selection as his party's presidential candidate, and his election to the presidency.

Fox and his cabinet choices represent a significant change in certain respects from past Mexican politicians, but this change by no means was intentional. In other words, voters did not identify any personal or professional qualities specifically as important to their decision. Most of

³ Analysts have long pointed to PAN's restricted membership, and the obstacles it has placed in the way of expanding the membership. The original leadership hoped to keep the party ideology consistent by relying on a small, homogeneous membership. This attitude contradicts a political party's mission in a highly competitive process. In 2001, the party returned to a more restrictive candidate selection process, limiting voting in primary elections to active members only. This is exacerbating differences between PAN rank and file, and the leadership, because new members more sympathetic to the neo-Panistas, such as Vicente Fox, are slow to be accepted into the active party ranks. For a detailed discussion, see Yemile Mizrahi, *From Martyrdom to Power, the Partido Acción Nacional in Mexico* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2003), 56-57.

⁴ Labastida actually won the nomination in an open primary. But the party was in the throes of internal divisions and transformation and his candidacy was viewed by many as having the support of President Zedillo, who nevertheless did not participate in the process nor publicly advocate any of the candidates. All of the potential leading PRI presidential candidates, however, were examples of **party insiders**.

those characteristics, which in turn affected executive branch recruitment, were a reflection of Fox's career and personal experiences. The argument can be made, however, that Fox's outsider status as a non-professional politician with no ties to the incumbent party or federal government, and few ties to his own National Action Party, guaranteed that he would bring associated leadership qualities not found among the pre-2000 Priistas and to a lesser extent Panistas. Yet, Fox would have never been recruited and selected as the PAN candidate, and even less likely would not have achieved the presidency, unless the presidential campaign focused on changing the political model, which he personified in the minds of a significant percentage of voters. Furthermore, the case can be made that Fox's popularity with the voters, and the fact that independent voters determined his presidential victory, encouraged him when proposing major policy reforms to reinforce his personal connection to voters after taking office instead of focusing on the necessary details of executive-legislative relations, resulting in significant administration failures, a variable raised by Siavelis's and Morgenstern's analysis of U.S. executive-legislative relations.

Political recruitment changes in the recent past, of which the most notable was a shift from the generalist to the technocrat in the 1980s and 1990s, were definitive, intentional changes made by Mexico's leading executive branch politicians, changes reflected in significant leadership qualities and ideological and policy preferences. The introduction and dominance of a technocratic elite, specifically an economically trained elite, which in turn contributed to and indeed accentuated the internal political transformation toward a democratic model, clearly illustrated this shift.⁵ But in Mexico, democratization did not produce technocratic leadership or democracy, nor were most technocrats actively promoting democracy. Their opening of the economy to outside influences, however, generated other pressures favoring a democratic transformation. These earlier recruitment patterns were not, of course, a reflection of citizen preferences expressed in the electoral process, but were largely predetermined by an elite-controlled candidate selection process, which mentored individuals with appropriate credentials.

⁵ See my "Technocracy a la Mexicana, Antecedent to Democracy," in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva, *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 196-213.

A second variable which played an important role in the 2000 election was the predominance of the urban voter, who provided 70 percent of the electorate, nearly half of whom supported Fox. The other distinguishing quality about the Fox voter was the young, often first-time voter, among whom he earned half of their votes. Sixty percent of the voters were under 39, and Fox received nearly half of their votes. Urban and younger voters were among the best educated in Mexico. This group too supported Fox. Of the high-school or better educated voters, who represented 58 percent of the electorate, more than half also voted for him.

The age of the voter is significant because it can be linked to the age of Mexican leadership in 2000. The most astounding figures illustrating this point can be found in the makeup of the 2000-2003 congress, where a comparison of PAN with PRI deputies reveals that 70 percent of the Priistas were over 49 and 70 percent of the Panistas were under 49. This suggests an extraordinary generational difference which I would argue was translated into policy preferences and explains, in part, the stalemate in congress. The congressional delegations from these two parties represent entirely different generational experiences. Further exploration of the composition of these legislators in greater detail is likely to reveal substantial differences, many of which can be explained by the collective age of those politicians.

The age of the voter may also determine the age of future politicians, thus introducing a structural component in the selection and recruitment process. In other words, parties, as PRI did in 2003, purposely selected younger candidates so as to appeal to younger voters. In doing so, they automatically altered some of their legislative representatives' characteristics, which not only differ from their older counterparts within the party, especially plurinominal deputies, but who may actually share more in common with similar age cohorts from the National Action Party.⁶

Having offered these brief observations about why Mexican citizens were voting for Fox,

⁶ Mexico is represented by two types of deputies in the federal congress, 300 elected from single-member districts, and 200 from party lists. The latter, who are designated by party leadership, are often older, well-established political figures, with strong ties to the party organization, and therefore do not share the characteristics of deputies who have fought heated electoral contests, regardless of the party. This is a structural characteristic which produces a significant divide in legislative recruitment and

and who were most supportive of his election, let us explore what he has accomplished in relation to the overriding reason for his election and for, change, and if possible links to executive branch recruitment and selection exist. His accomplishments thus far can be measured in three steps, the immediate impact of his election as a preeminent test of democracy, his taking office and the selection of his collaborators, and his first four years as president.

A Democratic Election and Expectations from an Altered Leadership

Of the three, his election has, perhaps, achieved the most significant long-term consequences so far. Why is this so? First, the removal of the incumbent party from control over the federal executive branch automatically set in motion a plethora of consequences for leadership recruitment and selection given President Fox's own career background in the private sector, his status as an outsider in his own party, and the specific leadership qualities characterizing prominent Panistas. Second, prior to the election, most Mexicans continued to believe that their country was not a democracy, only 40-48 percent believing that was the case. In the National Science Foundation panel survey, we interviewed the same voters 3 times prior to the election; in each case, the 40-48 percent figure remained essentially unchanged, but immediately after the election, we went back to the same voters and repeated the question: 63 percent reported Mexico was a democracy, a huge 50+ percent increase in favorable opinions.

What are the implications of voter perceptions of electoral democracy? The recent congressional elections in 2003 provide an answer to this question. There are fewer voters today who believe that Mexico is a democracy than in September, 2000. Even more significant, 54 percent of the voters who voted for Fox in 2000, are now dissatisfied with democracy. Fewer voters today believe in radical change, and that change is the answer to Mexico's problems. Whether or not those perceptions will be translated into a specific type of leadership in 2006, remains to be seen. It is possible that Fox's policy failures will eliminate future "outsiders" from winning major political office if voters link his failures to his political experiences and career origins.

candidate selection.

Presidential Selection and Political Recruitment

The second way we can measure Fox's impact on Mexico, and on the democratic transformation, is through his taking office, and in his choice of collaborators. These choices presage a much broader impact on political selection and recruitment in the executive branch because they go beyond the voters' choice of one individual, even though the president is responsible for the cabinet makeup, and therefore indirectly the top leaders of executive branch agencies. In Fox's case, his personal influence on his initial cabinet selections may well have been moderated by his reliance, in some cases, on using headhunters, rather than determining the pool himself or through his close political advisers.⁷

Throughout this section we will argue that Mexico's democratic transformation led to numerous changes in the recruitment and selection processes, thus democracy became the independent variable effecting these processes. It did so because competitive pluralism emphasizes skills different from those found in a modified one-party system. The victory of President Fox was a product of those very changes, yet Fox himself complemented the alterations wrought by electoral democracy, by emphasizing different facets of political recruitment, and in selecting national executives representing different credentials, often similar to his own background qualities. Thus, it can be argued that democracy as a casual variable produced changes in recruitment which in turn, also as a casual variable, produced changes in leaders. The foremost example of the latter is Fox, who in turn instituted or emphasized changes introduced by democracy. It is the democratic setting and a new president, as well as their interactions, which re-characterize the recruitment and selection processes. The altered recruitment process led to changes in leadership selection criteria too.

Political recruitment patterns can be explored in two broad categories, formal and informal. The formal credentialing process is much easier to identify and measure, but is critical to informal characteristics which mold the process. A detailed survey of top leaders in the executive branch are revealing of the trends set in motion by Fox's victory, by his appointments,

⁷For the best description of this to date, see George Grayson, *Beyond the Mid-term Elections, Mexico's Political Outlook 2003-2006*, Western Hemisphere Election Studies Series (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2003), 13.

and by the democratic setting which made that possible. It is also important to note that Fox's outsider status, atypical of the pattern followed by Panistas through national party leadership, responded to a set of specific political circumstances in Mexico and to the fact, which will be discussed later, that the PAN restricts party membership to an unusually narrow partisan base. Therefore his outsider status, while definitely affecting some of his choices, is not likely to replicate itself in the presidency in 2006, either through a PAN, PRI or PRD presidential contender.

PRI's candidate, Francisco Labastida, emerged as the winner of an open primary in 1999. PRI is the first and only party as of 2005 to have held a presidential primary. PRI also used state-wide primaries to select their gubernatorial candidates until 2003, when they replaced this procedure at the state level with a convention of party delegates. They replaced the open primary because it was costly, it allowed losing primary candidates to obtain recognition, declare the elections to be fraudulent, and to leave the party and become a candidate from one of the other parties. Such splits occurred in Baja California del Sur, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. If the PRI decides to use this method for selecting its presidential candidate in 2006, it will return control at the national level to party insiders, enhancing the candidacy of the current party president and former governor, Roberto Madrazo.⁸

In contrast, Fox was selected through a closed, democratic ballot among PAN delegates, a long established party tradition. At the state level, PAN has actually moved away from electing its candidates among party delegates, instead allowing a larger pool of party activists to participate in the selection process. As individuals struggle to achieve prominence as potential presidential candidates, PAN's leading contenders include a Fox cabinet member, Santiago Creel, and a former PAN party president and national party figure, Felipe Calderón, an active member since 1978. PAN's current process favors **party insiders or adherents**.

PRD's 2000 candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, was self-imposed, as had been the case in 1994. PRD's likely nominee in 2006 is the elected head of the Federal District, Manuel Andrés López Obrador, also a former party president, who ran unsuccessfully for governor of his home

⁸ Carlo Varela, "The Electoral Processes Have Begun," *Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico* (June 2004), 221.

state. But PRD has developed no clear process for selecting its candidates at the state level, typically relying on a decision by delegate conventions combined with national or state leadership. In fact, it often takes advantage of splits in the PRI, and nominates the losing contender as their own candidate. They won six gubernatorial races in 2003 and 2004 relying on this unorthodox technique. It can be argued that these victories help to reinforce recruitment patterns that are more typical of PRI politicians, since these individuals are selected by the PRD typically after long public careers as *Priistas*.

Fox himself, given his unusual background, and the PRI's defeat, automatically altered the political recruitment process in Mexico, a process which had evolved continuously since the 1920s. By the mid-1990s, most national politicians in Mexico came from upper-middle class backgrounds, from urban settings, specifically Mexico City, from public careers, especially in the national bureaucracy. They were highly educated, they increasingly were products of Mexico's leading, secular private institutions, they often boasted graduate degrees, including a high percentage of Ph.D.s, they had studied abroad, typically in the United States, and increasingly they were from technical fields, with economics dominating their academic preparation.⁹ Furthermore, they were disciples of similar individuals, career politicians, who recruited them into national bureaucratic politics. This recruitment occurred through various channels, including kinship ties and shared career experiences, but education proved to be a major locus of recruitment, accounting for more than six out of ten linkages.¹⁰ Thus, it was no accident that most top members of Mexico's executive branch were college professors, as well as politicians. Many of these characteristics played a crucial role in the selection process as well. Typically, their contacts at the highest levels of the national bureaucracy, and in many cases, their educational experiences together in college, led to their being selected for the cabinet, and

⁹ See my *Political Recruitment across Two Centuries, Mexico, 1884-1991* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 99.

¹⁰ According to my study of Mexico's most influential political figures from 1970 to 2000, the exact figures are educational institutions, 61 percent, career positions, 28 percent, family, 7 percent, social engagements, 2 percent and civic organizations, 2 percent. These data are based on 510 known networking contacts. See my *Mexico's Mandarins, Crafting a Power Elite for the 21st Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Table 6, 43.

therefore, making them visible to the incumbent president as presidential material.

Electoral democracy, in allowing a candidate from another party to win the presidential race in 2000, instantly altered the recruitment and selection processes. Fox shared few of the typical characteristics among his presidential predecessors or cabinet members. A significant linkage is worth noting because for decades, Mexican presidential leadership was drawn from the incumbent president's cabinet, thus the potential pool of successful contenders was rather small. It also established national bureaucratic politics as the place to be and the skill to learn. Democracy, through the 2000 election changed that condition dramatically, opening up the pool, given the fact that the three leading candidates were state governors, and only Labastida, PRI's candidate, had served in the cabinet. Thus, by changing the presidential candidate pool, and opening it up to possibilities outside of the cabinet, Fox and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, products of electoral pluralism, altered a long-established structural boundary which gave the federal bureaucracy and specific cabinet agencies, a commanding role in the recruitment and selection of future presidents and cabinet members. In effect, democracy reduced the impact of traditionally important political institutions on recruitment and selection processes, and reinforced the influence of other, existing institutions.

Will democratic pluralism continue to alter those processes? Even though we cannot predict the outcome of the 2006 election, what is clear is that regardless of which party's candidate wins, the pool from which executive leadership is drawn will be larger and different than previously. The reason for this is that neither a PRI nor PRD victor can go back to a group of cabinet members since neither likely candidate can claim such an experience. Both PAN candidates do have cabinet experiences, but the makeup of Fox's cabinet, as we shall see shortly, is quite different from the traditional PRI cabinet. Furthermore, governors have become the most important pool for future national leadership selections, and democratic elections since 1997 have significantly altered their qualities too.

Fox's credentials can be distinguished from his predecessors in numerous respects. First, he came from a provincial background, never having lived or worked in Mexico City except for those years during his college education. American analysts would describe him as an individual from outside the Washington, D.C. "beltway," both symbolically and realistically. The fact that

nearly all of Fox's adult life was spent outside Mexico City, not only distanced him from the halls of political power, but eliminated possible links with governmental institutions and traditional paths through which he might have been recruited to politics, even opposition party politics. The fact that Fox lived and worked for much of his career in Guanajuato, or elsewhere in Mexico emphasizes his provincial residential credentials, and more importantly, establishes regionalism, for the first time in decades, as a revived variable in explaining national political leadership.

Democratic processes, in contrast to a modified one-party system, have begun to decentralize political recruitment, altering the pool from which politicians would be selected for prominent executive offices. To what extent has regionalism crept back into national political leadership generally? According to the data in Table 1, a fifth of Fox's cabinet came from small towns or villages, and an equal number were born in state capitals. However, the remaining 60 percent were born in the Federal District, thus

Table 1: Background Characteristics of Fox's Cabinet, 2000-2004

Characteristic	Percentage Having
Middle-class origins	64
Graduate degrees	64
Non-traditional college degrees	50
Attended private university	44
Graduate work abroad	44
Business career	40
No governmental experience	33
Held Any Elective Office	32
Law degree	29
Elective Federal Office	29
Attended provincial university	25
Professional politician	21
Born in state capitals	21
Born in small towns	19
Led business organization	16
State Party Leaders	14
Mayors	11
Developmental Post State Bureaucracy	4

No college degrees	4
Working-class origin	0

Note: Based on a complete sample of 28 cabinet members and chief of staff from 2000 to April, 2004.

continuing the national capital's dominance in the backgrounds of leading national political figures. Under Fox this figure declined (Table 2), but not enough to eliminate the huge distortion between the capital's actual population and the political elite's unrepresentative geographic origins.

Table 2: General Trends in the Fox and Zedillo Cabinets

General Characteristic	Zedillo Cabinet	Fox Cabinet
-		
Place of Origin		
Federal District	68	60
University Attended		
Private	18	44
Undergraduate Work		
Economics	36	32
Law	32	29
Other	32	39
Graduate Work		
United States	50	48
England/Europe	32	19
Mexico	18	33
Career		
Private Sector	0	68
Public Sector	100	32
Electoral Experience		
Elective Office	23	32

Note: Economics includes CPAs and Business Administration degrees.

Source: Roderic Ai Camp, *Politics in Mexico, the Democratic Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 112.

Throughout the twentieth century, since the establishment of the National Revolutionary

Party (PRI's antecedent) in 1929, Mexican political leadership has sought to centralize decision-making and leadership in the hands of a national party, and more significantly, the federal bureaucracy. As the post-revolutionary elites exclusive control grew, the importance of the national bureaucracy became paramount. Proximity to the physical location of the governmental apparatus in Mexico City facilitated access to that bureaucracy in several ways. First, kinship or social connections to established political elites were much more likely to occur in Mexico City, where retired and active elites themselves lived. Second, since many of these active elites taught in local public institutions, notably the National Autonomous University and National Preparatory Schools, and in later years the private Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, attendance at these institutions in numerous cases was tantamount to establishing a mentor-disciple relationship.¹¹ Third, individuals professing an interest in politics who resided in areas outside the capital were much more likely to enter politics through other institutional doorways, specifically elective positions on the state and local level, eventually allowing them entrance to national politics through Congress.

What democratic elections have accomplished in Mexico is to place a greater emphasis on the third of these patterns, and its characteristics are likely to continue. Fox illustrates this pattern personally as does his cabinet. He first ventured into politics when Manuel Clouthier ran for the presidency in 1988. In fact, he was not a member of PAN until that date, just twelve years before becoming president. That same year he became a victorious PAN candidate for congress from his home state, representing the 3rd District of Guanajuato from 1988-1991. Encouraged by the relative opening of electoral politics, Fox obtained his party's nomination as a gubernatorial candidate in 1991. He lost in a decidedly fraudulent election, after which he ran a second time, six years later, and won overwhelmingly. He used his political base in Guanajuato to achieve national prominence, and to make his race for the PAN presidential nomination in 2000. What is important is that both of his prior positions originated in Guanajuato, not the capital.

¹¹Ninety-six percent of Mexico's leading politicians in the last three decades were mentored by members of Mexico's political power elite. In turn, those mentors were disciples of figures in Mexico's power elite. Forty-five percent of mentors' contacts occurred in an educational setting, followed by 42 percent through a career post. See *Mexico's Mandarins*, 23-24, 29.

Equally important, the only way to achieve a national office from a provincial background is to obtain a nomination for elective office, representing your home state in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Successful governors have also found themselves recruited to cabinet posts by various presidents. Regardless, to achieve adequate recognition without the Mexico City connection, one typically has served in elective office, either in the national legislative branch or as governor. Thus, because democratization has decreased geographic centralization, it has increased the number of prominent national executives with backgrounds incorporating elective careers.

This pattern can be seen in the fact that a third of Fox's cabinet members held elective office, many of them as governors and mayors, and several of them, like Fox, as members of congress. Of his four new appointees in 2004, two were governors and the other two ran unsuccessfully for the statehouse. Several cabinet figures, such as Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, a **party insider**, can be viewed as influential members of congress. Calderón, who twice served in the chamber, coordinated the PAN delegation in the 2000-2003 congress. The numbers in the Fox cabinet represent a significant increase over the de la Madrid and Salinas cabinets, where only 5 and 20 percent respectively had been members of congress.¹² More telling is the fact that among all executive branch leaders under De la Madrid and Salinas, only 5 and 2 percent respectively held local political office. Zedillo maintained the presence of executive branch leaders with elective political experience at the level of his predecessor (Table 2), but Fox increased that by 39 percent, to 32 percent. Elective offices are becoming more common among national executives, and competitive elections are likely to increase their presence in the next administration regardless of which party is victorious.

This geographic anomaly in presidential leadership, after seven decades of moving in the opposing direction, reflects an historic pattern common to the PRI and the governing elite in the 1940s through the 1960s, during which time large numbers of leading national politicians pursued careers more similar to that of Mr. Fox, establishing their reputations at the local level. All of Mexico's presidents through 1970 shared state and/or local political experiences. Fox's election, and the competitive electoral setting which made it possible, has encouraged a return to

political credentials characteristic of this earlier era, thus altering the recruitment pool.

Fox, however, introduces a different version from the traditional PRI regional politician, and this difference is crucial. Not only is he an outsider by virtue of his “geographic credentials,” but he is truly an outsider for not having been a professional politician. Most successful national politicians prior to 2000 spent 15 to 20 years or more working in the government, typically in the federal bureaucracy in Mexico City. Fox was a Johnny Come Lately to politics, having spent his entire career in the private sector before becoming a congressman. His personal experiences, his social world, his institutional culture, and his political attitudes and values would likely be different from those of a professional politician, regardless of party label.

One of the truly dramatic differences between Fox’s and Zedillo’s collaborators, having the potential for altering the institutional culture of politics, is that only one-third of Fox’s cabinet pursued careers in government service compared to every member of the preceding cabinet. (Table 2) Three of four new appointees in 2004 also pursued careers outside the public sector. The lack of public sector experience in the Fox cabinet is notable, and in the opinion of many analysts helps to explain his disappointing failures in the policy-making process, and in his relations with congress, a result which Siavelis and Morgenstern suggest would be linked to **free-wheeling independents** like Fox.

Another distinctive quality Fox brought to Mexican national leadership associated with his not having been a professional politician is that he is a product of the private sector. Fox joined Coca Cola of Mexico immediately following his graduation in 1965, and left the company as the CEO in 1979, to manage his own frozen foods export firm, Grupo Fox. For twenty-three years, Fox operated in a business environment. He became the first president of Mexico since the political model emerged in 1929 to have emerged from the private sector. Indeed, only one other cabinet member could claim his level of managerial experience in the private sector before 2000, and that person served in Miguel Alemán’s cabinet (1946-1952). Among Fox’s own cabinet, however, two-thirds pursued careers in the private sector, either as businessmen or professionals. (Table 2)

These altered patterns reflected in the president’s own career and preparation signify a

¹² Roderic Ai Camp, *Political Recruitment across Two Centuries*, 140.

dramatic change in regional focus and career orientation and an end to the technocrats' dominance at the cabinet level. In fact, only two of Fox's original cabinet level ministers could be described as orthodox technocrats, including his treasury secretary; and only four had pursued national bureaucratic careers typical of the technocrats represented in the Zedillo and Salinas administrations.

Consequences of Political Recruitment in a Democratic Transformation

Political recruitment may operate as an independent variable in explaining other influential patterns. Fox's appointments have introduced several significant features which I believe have long-term implications on governance and on political leadership in Mexico. Those qualities are a reflection of Fox's own leadership preferences in the narrow sense, but equally important they reflect the pluralistic, democratic setting which made possible his victory. What are those patterns and what consequences might they have for the political model generally and political recruitment and selection specifically?

One of the notable differences between the Fox government and its predecessors is the overt and increased collaboration with the private sector, represented by prominent career managers taking over major portfolios in his administration. As Yemille Mizrahi has shown at the state level: "Where entrepreneurs have run as party candidates and won elections, they have had a decisive influence in the integration of their cabinets. Usually first-level positions in PANista administrations (secretaries and deputy secretaries) have been held either by businessmen who worked closely with the candidate during the campaign or by professionals who do not necessarily belong to the PAN."¹³

The same pattern can be found at the national level. This is the first time since 1946 that individuals from Mexico's capitalist elite have influenced an administration directly, and that a CEO from a top company (Ernesto Martens Rebolledo) has been in the cabinet.¹⁴ Forty percent

¹³ Yemille Mizrahi, *From Martyrdom to Power*, 94.

¹⁴ Martens Rebolledo served as the Director General of Vitro, a company he joined in 1977, and was CEO of Aerovias de México, in the 1990s. Earlier in his career he worked for Union Carbide, rising to the position of Director General. *Expansión*, June 10, 1992, 60; www.macroasesoria.com.mx. Fernando Elizondo Barragán, Fox's third secretary of

of the cabinet members in Fox's administration owned their own firms or held high-level management posts prior to their appointments. (Table 1) Fox relied equally heavily on prominent entrepreneurial figures in his campaign, some of whom he knew from his career with Coca Cola or his studies at Ibero-American University.¹⁵ Fox stated publicly that he would apply what he learned at Coca Cola of Mexico to administering public institutions. If his collaborators from the private sector also attempt to introduce their entrepreneurial "institutional culture" to a public sector setting, they may have long term consequences, which are not yet visible, on the way in which government agencies make decisions. Fox's choices increase the importance of two new institutions in the selection process of prominent executive branch leadership, the campaign itself, and private sector careers associated with the president's own career background.

From a political perspective, Fox's initial cabinet appointments also legitimized the private sector's open role in politics. In effect, it made it acceptable for individuals with prominent business backgrounds to accept cabinet level appointments or to run for elective office as governors or presidents. This pattern, while common to American politics, was rare in Mexican politics, stemming from Mexico's pre-2000 leadership's desire to keep the business community

energy, has strong ties to a prominent Monterrey capitalist family through his mother, the daughter of Manuel L. Barragán. Elizondo served as Executive President of the Salinas y Rocha Group, one of Mexico's leading holding groups. Elizondo served under Fernando Canales Clariond, his economic development secretary, when he was governor of Nuevo León, as his Finance Secretary, and replaced him as interim governor when Canales Clariond was brought into the cabinet in 2003. It is reasonable to conclude that Canales Clariond recommended Elizondo for the position.

¹⁵For example, he resided at the Five Star Fiesta Americana in Mexico City from 1999-2000 courtesy of Gastón Azcárraga Andrade, leader of the Grupo Posadas, and one of Mexico's leading capitalist families. Fox's connection to Azcárraga occurred through Santiago Creel, who became his secretary of government, and is a stockholder in Grupo Posadas. His first campaign coordinator, José Luis González, owner of Helados Holanda, allowed him to use some of his retail locations, and Roberto Hernández, also provided him with office space. Other leading capitalists, such as Carlos Slim Helú, Lorenzo Zambrano, Alfonso Romo Garza, and Lorenzo Servitje, loaned him planes during the campaign. Pedro Cerisola, his first secretary of trade, became his second campaign manager. See Rubén Martín Martín, "Fox, los empresarios y el nuevo bloque de poder in México," in Joaquín Osorio Goicoechea, *Fox a uno año de la alternancia* (Mexico: ITESO, 2001), 46-47. Also see the essay by Flavio Irene Rodríguez, "Detrás de un gran presidente, hay un gran empresario," *Milenio* August 14, 2000.

out of electoral politics, and from supporting partisan groups, especially those in opposition to the government party. This pattern began to break down in the 1990s, well documented by Yemille Mizrahi, as individual businessmen began to, in some cases, risk their own entrepreneurial activities to support PAN or to run for office.¹⁶

The most influential institution promoting the larger issue of legitimizing active business political interests is unquestionably the national Mexican Association of Employers (Coparmex). Coparmex, unlike most business groups in Mexico, long encouraged its members to be interested and informed of political and social issues, and to take an active role in their communities in promoting policies reflecting their knowledge.¹⁷ A recent history of the PAN confirms that one of the “key social institutions contributing to the rise of the neopanistas” was Coparmex.¹⁸ This linkage can be detected in our own data at the state level, where opposition groups, and the National Action Party, achieved their first major victories, beginning in 1989. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the 30 governors elected between 1997-2004, about whom we have information, nine of whom were members of PAN, of the Panistas, over half were local or national leaders of Coparmex and/or other business organizations. In the cabinet, the figures are not nearly as dramatic; nevertheless, 16 percent led business organizations. For example, Eduardo Romero Ramos, the newly appointed controller general in 2003, served as vice-president of Coparmex in Ciudad Juárez.¹⁹ Most significant is the fact that Emilio Goicochea

¹⁶ Yemille Mizrahi, “A New Conservative Opposition in Mexico: The Politics of Entrepreneurs in Chihuahua (1983-1992),” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1994, and her “Rebels Without a Cause? The Politics of Entrepreneurs in Chihuahua,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26 (1994), 137-158.

¹⁷ Roderic Ai Camp, *Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164.

¹⁸ Michael J. Ard, *An Eternal Struggle, How the National Action Party Transformed Mexican Politics* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 99.

¹⁹ These differences appear sharply in the career professions of PAN versus PRI members of congress, illustrating the degree to which their recruitment processes focus on different types of professionals. According to official data in the 2000-2003 legislature, large numbers of PAN members were managers, accountants, industrial engineers, physicians and lawyers, with lawyers accounting for the single largest category. Among PRI congresspersons, an equally large percentage were lawyers, but they were much more strongly represented in teaching and the economics professions.

Luna, who as President of Concanaco in 1983-1984 advocated business involvement in politics, took over as Fox's chief of staff mid-term in 2004.²⁰ Fox himself also affirms that he first met his political mentor, Manuel Clouthier, the PAN presidential candidate in 1988, when the latter was president of Coparmex.²¹

Fox not only has altered the pool of future political elites by integrating people from the private sector, and from extensive state and local political experience, but has brought in representatives of the international, institutional community, notably appointing Luis Ernesto Derbez as his first economic development secretary, a two-decade veteran of the World Bank, who then became secretary of foreign relations in 2003. Julio Frenk Mora, his health minister, shares in this unusual international, cosmopolitan background. Fox in a sense has carried globalization to a new level. Instead of only appointing prominent figures who were educated in the United States or Europe, he has incorporated individuals with extensive career credentials in international bureaucracies. One could make the argument that democratization, as part of a global trend in the 1990s, introduces and emphasizes the importance of international institutions, language and culture, especially in economic policy arenas, thereby certifying a new type of career credential as ideal for national executive leadership. Again, democratization has opened up the pool of potential political recruits to a new and broader career base.

These fresh experiences, along with Fox's own career in a multi-national corporate setting, raise an interesting issue. To what extent are these three individuals products of international cultures, sharing institutional values and international vocabularies different from those Mexicans who have spent most of their careers in domestic organizations, public and private? The global character of their experiences may well be more important than whether or not they originate from private vs. public sector careers, a traditional focus in the literature on political leadership.²²

Secretaria General, Secretaria de Servicios Parlamentarios, December 12, 2001.

²⁰ Personal interview, Mexico City, August 24, 1983.

²¹ Edgar González Ruiz, *La última cruzada, de los Cristeros a Fox* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2001), 175.

²²In fact, there is no question that it has affected the behavior of Mexican capitalists, including changing the actual corporate structure of their firms. See Strom C. Thacker,

Fox represents a third pattern distinct from his immediate predecessors in the presidency and in the executive branch. At the time of his presidential bid, Fox did not have a college degree. He completed his business administration studies in 1964, but never wrote a thesis, which he allegedly completed during the presidential campaign. Thus, while Fox technically could claim a degree when he became president, in no way does he represent personally the highly educated pattern characterizing recent executive branch figures. Both Salinas and Zedillo, and the majority of their cabinet appointees, could claim Ph.D.s, and Miguel de la Madrid, who took office nearly two decades before Fox, graduated from Harvard with an MA in public administration.

The level of education per se is not the interesting or influential component of this credentialing process. Rather, academia carved a sizeable role in the careers of former presidents and cabinet figures. In fact Ernesto Zedillo accurately could be described as a budding academic before he entered the Mexican economic bureaucracy. Many prominent figures from the 1990s, including Pedro Aspe, the architect of Salinas's neo-liberal economic program and treasury secretary, were college administrators and professors.²³ Fox, on the other hand, pursued little contact with academia, and therefore the intellectual community affiliated with academia. Academia exerted an important influence over recruitment and later in their careers, selection processes, and of course was crucial to elite socialization.

Because higher education did not play a central role in Fox's background, Fox cannot be identified with a political mentor found in a university setting. Fox, unlike most national politicians of his generation, remained in his home town of León, Guanajuato for his elementary, secondary, and preparatory education. He attended local parochial schools operated by the Jesuit and La Salle orders. Thus, unlike many figures before him, Fox never had the opportunity in his youth to come together with other ambitious Mexicans attending popular elitist private and parochial preparatory schools in Mexico City. When he left home to attend college in Mexico City in 1960, he chose the leading Jesuit institution, the Ibero-American University. Ibero-American University, until the 1990s, could not even be found in the backgrounds of any

Big Business, the State, and Free Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 99-100.

²³ Aspe served as dean of the economics curriculum at ITAM while serving as the

prominent figures in the executive branch. In recent years, however, as Mexican politicians have witnessed a shift from public to private schools, Ibero-American University has increased its prominence.

The Ibero-American University, however, is to PAN what the National University for many years was to PRI, a primary source of political mentorship among its future leaders, given the fact that several prominent figures in the party's history were educators and intellectuals who taught there.²⁴ However, Ibero-American is not a politicized academic environment, nor does it specifically attract students and faculty with political ambitions. Therefore, while Fox may have networked with future prominent figures in the private sector, the likelihood of his coming into contact with future political leaders of any stripe given his undergraduate business major would be limited.²⁵

The central locus of educational political recruitment in the recent past was the National University, but in the current administration, UNAM accounts for only 25 percent of the undergraduate degrees among Fox's cabinet members. This small percentage is even more significant when you consider how many Mexicans graduate from UNAM compared to the leading private schools.

director of Mexico's council of economic advisers. *Proceso*, August 31, 1992, 15.

²⁴ For example, Juan Manuel Gómez Morín Torres, secretary general of PAN in the 1970s, and son of the co-founder, taught mercantile law there. Efraín González Morfín, also son of the co-founder, who became president of the party in the 1970s, graduated from the Ibero-American University, and was a member of the PAN youth group as a student. Manuel González Hinojosa, who taught agrarian law at Ibero, became president and appointed his fellow professor Gómez Morín Torres as his second-in-command.

²⁵ He did meet Roberto Hernández Ramírez, one of Mexico's leading capitalists, while both were students in the business administration program. Hernández Ramírez's net worth in the mid 1990s was estimated at 1.2 billion dollars. *Forbes*, July 18, 1994, 195; *Proceso*, March 8, 1993, 18; and *Diario de Yucatán*, July 25, 2000. Ironically, Hernández Ramírez is extremely well connected politically, since his father was the former mayor of Tuxpan, Veracruz, his grandfather was a general in the federal army during the Mexican revolution, his great uncle, Tirso Hernández García, was a division general and department head in the secretariat of national defense in the 1940s and 1950s, and his uncle is Miguel Mancera, the former head of Mexico's Banco de Mexico, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.

The importance of educational recruitment can be viewed through a different perspective. Among every college-educated president who graduated from a Mexican university since 1946, with the exception of Fox (1960-1965), his student generation is best represented in his administration. Most of Fox's collaborators are younger, having been born in the 1950s. This can be explained, I would argue, by the fact that Fox attended the Ibero-American University, that he did not harbor political ambitions as a student, that he did not network with fellow students with political ambitions, and that he pursued for most of his life a successful career in the private sector.

In the last several decades, as economics replaced law as a significant discipline among national politicians, ITAM replaced UNAM as a source of economics-educated politicians. This change produced a significant increase in private university degrees among top government officials. Under Zedillo, nearly a fifth of his collaborators graduated from private colleges, the largest number of them from ITAM. Under Fox, private school graduates account for 46 percent of his collaborators, that is, more than twice the numbers found in the preceding administration.

The democratic setting, as we have argued repeatedly above, introduce a number of changes in the overall recruitment process because by opening up political competition from the grassroots upward, it stressed different skills from the incumbent semi-authoritarian system. The politicians boasting those skills, in turn emphasized career backgrounds different from their pre-democratic peers. Electoral democracy, in allowing Fox to win the presidency fairly, also influenced the recruitment and selection processes through the new presidents. Presidents, in playing an overwhelming role in the designation of their cabinets, often choose individuals in their own image, valuing their own credentials highly. In this regard, Fox is no different from his predecessors.

The case can be made that the private school graduate introduces more diversity in the recruitment process during the transition from public to private schools, but in the long run it will only add to the socio-economic homogeneity of Mexican politicians. Private schools narrow the socio-economic backgrounds to upper-middle class, eliminating an important source of working class Mexicans among political leaders. Indeed, not a single member of Fox's cabinet is known to have come from the working class, and over a third come from wealthy families. This

is an unexpected recruitment consequence of democracy. That is, one would not intuitively believe pluralism would produce socio-economic elitism. Since the next president is not likely to come from the business community, a different kind of private school graduate is more likely to prevail.

It is also important to remember that the move from public to private institutions, while reducing the centralization of recruitment performed by the National University, has not altered the dominance of geographic centralization in Mexico City, even under Fox. As noted above, 60 percent of Fox's cabinet were born in the capital, representing only a small decline compared to the geographic source of Zedillo's collaborators.

Fox's educational patterns differ in two significant respects from those of his two immediate predecessors. In the first place, Fox introduces the dominance of one of Mexico's most prestigious schools, an institution with long ties to PAN and to the judiciary branch, the Escuela Libre de Derecho. Three cabinet members are graduates of this small institution. In the second place, while national public institutions continue to be important, a significant group of politicians are currently represented by provincial public institutions, including the universities of Chihuahua, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, and the Escuela Técnica de Jalisco.

Another element of diversity introduced in recent years is the changing professional emphasis-- as disciplinary interests change they have the potential for changing both the level and location of education. Law, of course, always dominated college-educated politicians in Mexico, as in the US, from a high of 75 percent in 1910, to only 23 percent among Salinas's collaborators. Three out of ten of Fox's cabinet members boast law degrees, continuing a de-emphasis on legal backgrounds. For the first time among Mexican politicians, economics graduates equaled those in law under Salinas, and graduates from disciplines other than law and economics formed the highest single group, accounting for half of all graduates.

Another change in the educational backgrounds of Mexican politicians can be found in the advance levels of education achieved, a quality not shared by Fox himself. Typically, however, graduate education among Mexican cabinet members exceeds that of US cabinet officers. The emphasis on graduate education began with Luis Echeverría, increased to nearly half under de la Madrid, and rose dramatically under Zedillo, where 7 out of 10 obtained such education. Under

Fox, just slightly fewer collaborators, 64 percent, also completed graduate work. These figures are more important because of where the education is obtained, not necessarily their level.

The most dramatic educational change in the recruitment process is the globalization of leader's education, not only among politicians, but among all leadership groups in Mexico. Of the five most important groups, politicians, Catholic bishops, intellectuals, capitalists, and the officer corps, of those born since 1945, 50 percent have studied in the United States and 20 percent in Europe. Indeed, only 28 percent of Mexico's influential leaders have studied only in Mexico. Even among older figures prominent since 1970, 53 percent studied abroad.

These remarkable statistics clearly establish beyond any doubt that the majority of Mexico's most recent leadership has been exposed to cultural influences from abroad. Among Fox's cabinet members, half studied abroad, 85 percent in the United States. Of those cabinet members who studied in the US, half did so in economics.

The central issue of this leadership pattern, which has been unstudied among all levels of students, is to what extent are foreign students socialized by their experiences in US classrooms?²⁶ On the basis of letters and interviews with numerous students and their former professors, I have concluded that the impact is substantial, although it varies considerably by elite profession and discipline studied. For example, among economists who became Mexico's leading decision-makers in the 1980s and 1990s, American graduate school views of macro-economic policy making moved Mexicans to pursue those policy strategies in their own country beginning with President Salinas in 1989. Individuals well-versed in the language of international, western economics controlled the three leading financial institutions in Mexico: the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Budget and Planning.

Today, treasury and the Banco de Mexico continued to be controlled by the same group who emerged under the prominent economist Leopoldo Solís in the 1970s, providing continuity in economic policy for nearly 20 years under Guillermo Ortiz Martínez and Francisco Gil Díaz, both of whom are disciples of Miguel Mancera and Pedro Aspe, although Gil Díaz taught Aspe.

²⁶One of the few exceptions to this is the work of Verónica Montesinos and John Markoff in Latin America. For example, see their "From the Power of Economic Ideas to the Power of Economists," in Miguel A. Centeno, ed., *The Other Mirror: Essays on Latin*

In short, numerous leadership groups, for different but complementary reasons, came away from their educational experiences abroad with a new approach to intellectual discussion and debate, and with fresh ideas about political and economic development, all of which contributed to elite-led change producing the Fox presidential victory in July, 2000. These attitudes and interpretations, learned in educational environments, are the cause of as well as a direct result of, changing recruitment processes brought on by the democratic transformation and the victory of an opposition party candidate. The recruitment process has reinforced the importance of these international educational experiences. Under the past three presidents, international educational experiences also contributed to the selection process by bringing together individuals in US graduate schools who would later appoint each other to influential political positions. Under Fox, this has not occurred, largely because such educational experiences are more dispersed than previously.

Finally, as I have argued in my earlier work, the importance of teaching, and the location of one's teaching career in the backgrounds of Mexican politicians has been crucial to initial political recruitment for more than a century, and continues to be ignored in elite literature for Mexico and elsewhere. Theoretically, this may be the most important point. Most prominent figures in politics, and in all other leadership groups in Mexico, are the disciples of mentors, who themselves were equally prominent in a previous generation. These linkages are important to recruitment patterns themselves, including the changing pattern of education.

The first generation of politicians who studied in the United States was more likely to have been disciples of mentors who also studied there. That can be seen most clearly among Mexico's technocrats. This issue needs to be addressed because most leaders in Mexico are mentored by other prominent elites, and those same elites often established their connection to their disciples through education. Equally important, they were responsible for shifting educational patterns to private institutions and to graduate study abroad at elite American colleges.

College professors play a critical role for three reasons: as a stimulus for a career in public life, as a source of recruitment, often the most important source of **initial** political recruitment in Mexico, and as a means of forming or enhancing the teacher's own political group in politics and

sometimes in cultural life. Under Fox, what is remarkable is that two individuals, Jorge Castañeda and Santiago Levy Algazi, both taught full-time at NYU and Boston University respectively, and both received their undergraduate degrees from American universities.

Fox may also have altered the professorial pattern somewhat since the professional background of some of his cabinet collaborators, which includes numerous individuals from the private sector, typically does not include part-time professors. Fox is also the first recent president who has not taught. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of his collaborators have taught, and a fifth of them could be described as important educators, including even the secretary of national defense, who directed the armed forces elite Colgeio de Defensa Nacional and directed the entire Army/Air Force University system.

Because mentors are crucial to the Mexican recruitment and selection process, and because many of them have come in contact with future leaders in their classrooms, any alteration in the educational system, or in the level of mentors who are university professors, alters the political mentoring process. In other words, it redirects political mentoring away from educational institutions and away from part-time educators, and places that role in the hands of other types of individuals, in different institutional settings, such as managers in large corporations.

What sets Mexico apart from many other countries is that education not only has been used to train future leaders in the skills necessary to fulfill their responsibilities, but to recruit the best and brightest into public office. Some countries also have witnessed education performing this function, such as Japan, France or England, but Mexico differs in that politicians themselves played a role in skill development, in recruitment, and in a third function, socialization.

The educational institutions which have appeared strongly in the cabinet-level backgrounds of Fox's collaborators, and could indeed provide opportunities for mentoring and recruitment, in addition to UNAM, are Ibero-American University, which as noted previously is Fox's alma mater, and therefore played a role in his ties to future prominent capitalists; ITAM, where Ortiz Martínez, Levy Algazi, Gil Díaz, and Creel taught and/or held administrative posts; the Universidad de las Americas, where Derbez and Alejandro Gertz Manero held important positions, and the aforementioned Escuela Libre de Derecho, where Fernando Canales Clariond and Carlos Abascal overlapped. Another institution is Opus Dei's IPADE, whose management

course is increasingly found in the backgrounds of top Mexican officials (Josefina Vázquez, Romero Ramos, Pedro Cerisola, and Abascal are graduates).

Despite its decentralization, and the consequences that it introduces on political recruitment, among the formal institutions or organizations in Mexico, few political institutions, whether they are parties or government agencies, can compete with the influence exerted by educational institutions, Mexican and foreign.

The consequences which political recruitment have produced on Mexican leadership has been explored only at the national executive level. Because democratic changes first occurred at the state level, and because governors have increasingly become major political actors on the national scene, we can obtain a deeper and broader sense of changing recruitment patterns by examining recent governors, especially because they represent all three political parties, suggesting influential trends which may well extend beyond 2006.

Given the importance of state and local politics in Mexico's democratic transformation, where pluralism and competition first found a foothold, increasing its control and influence to half the population in less than ten years in the 1990s, it makes sense to analyze governors elected during the period of electoral transparency as a reflection of top executive leadership. (Table 3) Furthermore, as suggested above, the three leading presidential candidates in 2000 were governors, and there is no question that governors will again provide competitors for their party's presidential nomination in 2006, confirming Siavelis' and Morgenstern's strong argument for their inclusion. As was the case of the presidency in 2000, the democratic setting, beginning in the mid-1990s, influenced the recruitment and selection process of state governors, both foreshadowing and replicating many of the characteristics Vicente Fox represents.

Table 3 Background Characteristics of Recent Mexican Governors

Characteristic	Percentage	PAN Governors Only
Pre-college studies locally	90	89
Held elective office	77	56
Graduated from provincial university	64	33
Elective Federal Office	63	33
Middle-class origins	63	50
Professional politician	55	0
Born in small towns	43	33
Developmental Post State Bureaucracy	40	22
Born in state capitals	37	63
State Party Leaders	33	33
Mayors	33	44
Non-traditional college degrees	33	44
Law degree	32	11
Business career	29	56
Attended private university	21	30
Led business organization	20	44
Graduate degrees	20	22
No college degrees	20	33
Working-class origins	25	25
Graduate work abroad	17	22
No governmental experience	10	33

Note: Based on a sample of 34 governors who took office between 1997 and 2004. Only one governor is excluded from the sample, that of Tabasco (PRI), for insufficient information.

The backgrounds of recent governors suggest some interesting and changing patterns in executive branch leadership at the state level. First and foremost, the majority of new governors,

regardless of party, began their careers locally, whether they entered politics as student activists in high school, as college students, or during their professional careers. The fact that nine out of ten governors remain in their home towns or in a local community for the pre-college education is significant for two reasons. First, they do not come in contact with future national elites educated at leading public, and more recently private preparatory schools in the nation's capital. There are only four exceptions to this pattern, Miguel Alemán Velasco and José A. González Curi, who attended the influential Centro Universitario de México, a Brothers of Mary institution which produced at least twenty-one leading Mexicans from all sectors from the 1910s to 1973, when it closed its doors,²⁷ Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, the governor of Oaxaca, 2004-2010, who attend the Colegio La Salle, another Catholic school in Mexico City, and Sergio Estrada Cajigal, the governor of Morelos (1997-2003), who attended the Colegio Madrid in nearby Mexico City. Second, recent governors are not given the opportunity to form mentor-disciple relationships at such institutions with peers or teachers.

Additionally, two thirds of governors remain in their home states or nearby states for the college education. This pattern prevents even more significant networking ties with influential future national politicians at Mexico City institutions, public and private. It also contributes to the decentralization of education, and a move away from the more homogeneous socializing experiences shared by the majority of national politicians who were previously educated in a small number of institutions. Of the college-educated governors in the provinces, twelve different schools in eleven states were represented. The National Autonomous University is still responsible for the largest pool of alums among governors since 30 percent were graduates, followed by 13 percent from the Monterrey Institute of Higher Studies (ITESM), one of Mexico's most prestigious and increasingly influential universities among national political figures. It is the only regional university which produces a significant number of prominent politicians in the executive branch.

Democratic conditions, and the highly competitive elections they foster, with parties losing and regaining control over local and state executive positions, have emphasized, even to a stronger degree than is the case in national leadership, the importance of local roots, and

²⁷ Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins*, 133.

recognition among local citizens and politically active groups. The dramatic change in municipal incumbency rates is illustrated by the fact that in 1991, only 11 percent of the incumbent mayoralty parties (mostly PRI) lost, compared to 52 percent in 2003.²⁸ Candidates who have been imposed by the national authorities, regardless of party, have not had a successful track record in recent years.

It is worth noting that a significant group of governors, one-fifth, have not graduated from any college. Not having such a credential would basically preclude such an individual from holding a cabinet level post. Finally, although governors have begun to reflect the national level increase in post-graduate education, only 20 percent have obtained such training, most of them abroad. From a recruitment angle, that 20 percent is insignificant because governors are not attending the elite Ivy League institutions preferred by prominent national figures, having graduated from such institutions as the University of Florida or Southern Oregon State University.

A second important trend in governors' backgrounds, with influential consequences for political recruitment patterns generally, is that several career experiences stand out in their backgrounds. First, as I argued above, elective office is becoming a valued and common quality among chief executives before they reach their top posts. Two-thirds of governors have previously been elected as congressmen or senators, and a third served as mayors, often of capital cities. Indeed, nearly eighty percent have held elective office. In contrast, only 8 percent of executive branch administrators from director general through the cabinet in the 1990s shared similar electoral experiences. As increasing numbers of governors use their posts to achieve national prominence, including candidacies for president, elective career experiences will dominate presidential backgrounds, and increasingly, among cabinet figures too.

The other quality which stands out about governors is that over half were professional politicians, having made their livelihood from holding governmental positions, often in the state bureaucracy. Many of these politicians held two types of positions. Interestingly, with state administrative agencies, an increasing number of governors enhanced their careers and obtained

²⁸ Carlo Varela, "The Electoral Processes Have Begun," *Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico*, June, 1974, 224.

experience in departments and institutions devoted to state economic development or finance. Two-fifths of all governors counted that experience in their public service careers. This pattern suggests that financial skills in the public sector are as important, or even more important, than prior experience in sensitive political posts such as secretary general of government or director of governmental affairs. Governors do have direct political administrative experiences, but the most common such position in their backgrounds is as a leader of their political party. Ties to the party, as local party leadership increasingly determines the gubernatorial candidates, are essential for political success.

Finally, several demographic variables combine to alter the backgrounds of younger governors, variables that may be translated into national level executives in the next decade. What do the towns of Santiago Ixcuintla, Calxico, Soyaló, Delicias, Tepetitán, Acotapan, Jamay, Atlacomulco, Jiquilpan, El Rosario, Santa Catarina los Reyes, Apizaco, Fresnillo and Cananea have in common? They are birthplaces of recent governors, and they represent small, provincial cities either at the time these governors were born, or in many cases up to the present. This is an important finding because national politicians in the executive branch have not emerged from small towns and villages for many decades. Only the Catholic Church, and to a lesser extent the armed forces, has produced prominent leaders with such geographic credentials, thus providing them with closer ties to the rural population and to grass roots issues.

The growth of grass roots citizen groups, partisan and non-partisan, since the flowering of democracy after 1988, has been nothing short of phenomenal. Organizations such as Alianza Cívica, an independent umbrella organization, actually made possible the transparency of elections, thus setting the groundwork for intensive electoral competition and ultimately the PAN victory. As a recent analysis concluded, “the contributions of Alianza Cívica to a tolerant and plural political culture were very important in ultimately guaranteeing alternation in power.”²⁹ One of its major figures, human rights activist Sergio Aguayo, ran for congress in 2003. Partisan groups also played crucial roles. The most notable organization in Fox's campaign was not the PAN, but the Amigos de Fox, a grass-roots partisan organization that did not even

²⁹ Alberto J. Olvera, *Movimientos sociales prodemocráticos, democratización y esfera pública en México: el caso de Alianza Cívica* (Jalapa: Universidad Veracruzana, 2001), 58.

exist before 1998. That organization helped to persuade the majority of people who voted for Fox to get behind his candidacy.³⁰ Its dramatic success demonstrates a changed setting in Mexican politics favorable to the creation and growth of citizen groups, a pattern which has been occurring since the Mexico City earthquake in 1985.

Traditional institutions have played a dominant role in Mexican political recruitment, including academia, the federal bureaucracy, the congress, the state executive, and local elective offices. But additional sources of Fox's recruitment and selection suggest the changing nature of the Mexican political process, and the role new institutions are playing in Mexico, and can be directly attributable to the democratic transformation and to Fox's electoral campaign.³¹ Among the most important are civic organizations or NGO's, which have never produced top leadership in prior administrations, with the possible exception of Zedillo's environmental secretary.³² The clearest example of this in the Fox administration is the influential San Angel Group, where Fox met many of his future top advisers and cabinet appointees. For example, Jorge Castañeda, his first foreign relations secretary, came from this group, as did his national security adviser and ambassador to the United Nations, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, and his secretary of Government, Santiago Creel.³³

Provincial grass roots organizations are likely to produce more significant consequences for political recruitment. A casual connection exists between rural backgrounds and parents' socio-

³⁰Patricio Patrón Laviada, current governor of Yucatán, elected in 2001, coordinated the Amigos de Fox in Yucatán.

³¹ For an excellent case study of the impact of two NGO's on democracy at the local level, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, the state capital, see René de la Torre Castellanos and Juan Manuel Ramírez Sáiz, *Conservadurismo, sociedad civil y Gobernabilidad, nueva grupalidades in Guadalajara* (Jalapa: Universidad Veracruzana, 2001).

³² A recent Ph.D. thesis by Jordi Diez-Mendez demonstrates definitively that environmental NGO's, even in the Zedillo administration, were involved in the policy making process in Congress. But as the author suggests, the most influential NGOs did not appear to represent constituency interests, but rather functioned as advisers to larger movements and as brokers between those movements and the state. See his excellent "Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico," University of Toronto, January, 2004.

³³ "Tensiones, diferencias y recelos entre Fox y el PAN," *Proceso*, July 16, 2000, www.proceso.com.mx.

economic status among Mexican politicians. Governors come from working class origins in numbers higher than their national colleagues, representing a shift away from the complete dominance of middle class backgrounds. Among executive branch administrators from the department level on up in the mid-1990s, only 2 percent came from working class origins.

I have argued above, and will continue to make the case that the democratic setting generally, beginning in the late 1990s, has contributed to altered Mexican recruitment and selection patterns. Thus, all parties and their representatives have been affected by these environmental changes. However, the National Action Party's increased presence in gubernatorial posts allows us to make the case that this newly incumbent party, just as is true at the cabinet level, has accounted for some significant changes, or contributed disproportionately to altered recruitment characteristics which would not be apparent without identifying PAN's specific impact.

The most remarkable distinctive quality which PAN governors bring to Mexican leadership is their lack of life-time governmental experiences. PAN governors are not professional politicians. (See Table 3) Not one has made governmental service a career. Of course the reason for this is structural, and it's a pre-democratic condition. Prior to 1989, active Panistas would not have been able to hold state offices, since all of those positions were controlled by PRI governors. The fact that these individuals have made a living through some other activity also explains why they have held few posts in the state bureaucracies, and even more dramatically, have not been well represented in federal, elective offices. On the other hand, unlike their PRI and PRD peers, they are much more likely to have served in local elective offices as mayors.

What really distinguishes PAN state executives, and a quality they share with Mr. Fox, is their business backgrounds. Over half have worked in the private sector, and many have owned their own businesses. They have pursued political interests through business organizations, many of them having served as president of local and state business interest groups, most commonly Coparmex. They are also the most likely to have only a secondary level education, having gone into family business after preparatory school. This pattern can be found among Mexico's leading capitalists, who are the least-well educated elite among politicians, the officer corps, intellectuals, Catholic bishops, and capitalists.

Public Policy and Political Recruitment

Can Fox's policy failures be attributed to his leadership choices, and therefore, to these new political recruitment and selection trends, which unquestionably are linked to the democratic transformation? Not entirely, but there is a connection. He fired his energy and environmental secretaries in 2003. What did these two secretaries, Martens and Lichtinger, represent? Martens, as I suggested, represented the re-introduction of prominent business leadership. Obviously, in terms of policy impact, he represents a dramatic failure, thus reducing the likelihood of more top businessmen taking over cabinet portfolios. Nevertheless, one of his cabinet appointments in 2004 represents a figure with strong ties to leading capitalists as a top manager of a major corporation. The failure of a business leader turned politician was reinforced dramatically in a recent gubernatorial race, where PAN "lost overwhelming in Nuevo León because the people are disillusioned with business-style governments," according to a leading entrepreneur.³⁴ Lichtinger, on the other hand, represents the failure of the international NGO leader, also new to the Mexican political process.

Their replacements also represent a new emphasis, political party skills, and the importance of negotiating with congress. Felipe Calderón, whose experience come from the chamber of deputies and PAN leadership, replaced Martens, and Alberto Cárdenas, the former governor of Jalisco, replaced Lichtinger. Fox's press secretary openly admitted that these two individuals were meant to have political skills useful in the executive-legislative branch battles over policy issues.

Trends in political recruitment within the PAN, at both the national and state executive branches, have produced a bifurcated leadership. This leadership is made up of neo-Panistas, many of whom come from the business community, who began exerting considerable influence in 1982,³⁵ and established PAN figures, who spent years in the party bureaucracy, and have made their political careers in the national legislative branch, who represent party insiders. This

³⁴ George Grayson, *Beyond the Mid-term Elections*, 25.

³⁵ Griselda Martínez Vázquez, "La conformación de la elite panista, relaciones diferenciales de poder entre los géneros," in Dalia Barrera Bassols, ed., *Participación*

shared leadership, common to state leadership, has produced numerous tensions which are translated into significant policy failures.³⁶ Fox has replicated this same pattern at the national level, with a divided cabinet, and poor relations between his cabinet and his own party in congress, especially from 2000 to 2003, which Siavelis and Morgenstern predicted would be the case of a party outsider.

What policy successes, if any, can we identify which are affected by or even determined to a large extent by his choice of leadership? One of the most significant actual accomplishments of his administration to date because of its long-term structural implications is his willingness to weather criticism while pushing significant political disputes into legal channels for a permanent resolution. The most important political consequences Fox's presidency originally set into motion were widespread conflicts on the state and local level among the various political parties. One of the most notable occurred in Yucatán, involving the decision of the Federal Electoral Institute to seat its choice of commissioners on the state board. Instead of intervening to prevent locally-controlled intransigence, Fox publicly advocated legal channels for a solution. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Federal Electoral Institute.

Fox's posture toward the legal system is the product of two influences. First, he campaigned in support of accountability and the culture of law, a position strongly supported by the business community he represented in Mexico. Second, in order to guarantee a fair electoral outcome, he and other opposition leaders strongly supported the Federal Electoral Institute, the newly independent, quasi judicial/executive body tasked with the job of holding and certifying the electoral results.³⁷ Because many of Fox's collaborators were from opposition party or from business backgrounds, and both sets of institutions repeatedly expressed the desire to establish a credible legal system, both to improve the business environment and to provide accountability politically, their dominance in the new administration helped Fox push this issue in his policy agenda.³⁸

política de las mujeres y gobiernos locales en México (Mexico: GIMTRAP, 2002), 124.

³⁶Yemile Mizrahi, *From Martyrdom to Power*, 94.

³⁷ This is the only political institution in Mexico which generates high levels of public confidence.

³⁸ Interestingly, Fox submitted a major judicial reform bill in March, 2004. See Richard

Fox's decision in Yucatán, and others like it, established three important precedents: first, the independent role of the judiciary in solving highly charged, legal disputes; second, the real and symbolic importance of the rule of law, or more broadly, the culture of law; and third, the willingness of the executive branch to reduce its decision-making authority. As the president of the Supreme Court noted, it is the institution of last resort in defending Mexicans against the abuse of public power.

A second accomplishment of his administration, which also can be linked to the type of leadership he recruited, and to a democratic mandate for change, is the passage and recent implementation of the transparency law in June 2003. This policy change is tied to a much larger and fundamental issue of democratic transformation, accountability. The sharing of governmental information, while still imperfect, is nothing short of astounding compared to pre-2000. This law, which has widespread implications, requires a fundamental change in attitude among political leaders, that is, being responsive to their constituents, and knowing how to respond to those constituents.

The third consequence of his administration, with serious implications for the democratic process, the product of the distribution of leadership elected by the citizenry, is that policies before congress require the support of two of the three major parties to obtain a simple majority of votes. This, of course, continues to be the case since 2003. Despite Fox's lack of legislative success, this means that democratic compromise will dominate presidential and legislative behavior if the government hopes to function successfully. From a recruitment perspective, this suggests that individuals with skills in negotiating will become highly valued in this process. Nine cabinet members have held elective office, an all-time high in the last twenty years.

Fourth and finally, and perhaps the most interesting consequence of all, in terms of its links to political leadership, is the emphasis on the importance of local politics, both city and state. The divided support for the various parties has produced a situation which rewards political leaders for their performance, not for their party affiliation. Partisanship will be less valued, and pragmatism becomes more important. This is demonstrated conclusively through statistics on

repeated victories in municipal elections. In 2001, PAN only won 35 percent of the elections where it was the incumbent party.³⁹ Politicians with strong grass roots support, and ties to their communities, will increasingly dominate state and local positions, the very same positions which will become increasingly important for national political office. Again, nearly a third of his cabinet held local or state elective offices, a revival of earlier patterns from the 1940s and 1950s.

In conclusion then, most of Fox's accomplishments, or the consequences of his administration so far, while not visible in the policy process itself, have significant implications for Mexican political behavior, institutions, and structures, implications which will mold the Mexican model for years to come, and will impact importantly on political recruitment and selection patterns. Thus the consequences of Fox's administration at this point are largely political in terms of their impact on democratic behavior and decision-making.

Whether the political process can implement substantive policies which address citizen concerns, still remains to be seen. Those policy issues which dominated the 2000 presidential race remain the same according to citizen attitudes in a recent Reforma poll. Fox will need to implement influential economic and social programs, not only to satisfy citizen demands, but equally important, to legitimize and sustain this new democratic process and these recruitment and selection patterns. The failure of the executive and legislative branch leadership to reach compromises on major legislation in the next two years will adversely affect all the parties, but more importantly, will have a negative impact on democracy's health, and on some of the recruitment and selection trends introduced in 2000.

³⁹ Yemile Mizrahi, *From Martyrdom to Power*, 29.