

Chapter 10
Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile (1990-2003):
The Executive Branch

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I) Introduction *

This research examines patterns of executive branch candidate recruitment in Chile and their significance for politics and policy since democratic reinstatement in 1990. Generally speaking, within the ruling coalition – the *Concertación* – candidate selection or recruitment has evolved from being extremely informal (albeit constrained), to a more formalized process. While the first post-authoritarian president, Patricio Aylwin (1989), was chosen by a pact within the political elite his successors, Eduardo Frei (1993) and Ricardo Lagos (2000), were elected in primaries. Nonetheless, Frei was chosen in a closed-primary and Lagos was elected, for the first time in Chilean history, in an open primary. This has important practical and theoretical consequences that will be explored in further depth in the following pages.

The central challenge in post authoritarian Chile has been reconciling the goals of many parties in one coalition over thirteen years and one of its most critical aspects has been the nomination process. While primaries are obviously important and "natural" leaders have emerged, there has also been a feeling of "whose turn it was" at the time. Some scholars, such as Siavelis, would even argue that the primaries that have been held so far were forgone conclusions – everyone knew who would win before the actual election. During the 1999 elections, committed *Concertacionistas* "knew" it was a socialist's turn, and accordingly supported Lagos (Siavelis 2004: personal communication). In the opposition camp it is hard to see a pattern or evolution towards the democratization of the nomination process of presidential candidates. On the contrary, the right has relied on elite centered mechanisms, which might be one of the reasons it consistently loses elections.

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The overall argument of this chapter is centered on three major points. First, presidential candidate selection in the *Concertación* is moving towards formality, and remains informal on the right. Second, the type of candidate chosen has a bearing on campaigns, coalition relations, and cabinet structure. Finally, it argues that cabinet distribution depends on proportionality in elections, levels of horizontal integration, and on the general type of presidential candidate.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Following Morgenstern and Siavelis introductory chapter, the first part of the chapter tackles candidate selection as a dependent variable and the second part approaches it as an independent variable. The first section begins with a basic description of how candidate selection for the presidency has evolved since the democratic reinstallation (both in the governing *Concertación* coalition, and within the opposition parties and coalitions, the *Alianza*). It goes on to analyze the different types of candidates and campaigns. Section two analyzes recruitment and selection (R&S) as an independent variable. It begins by tying the types of candidates to cabinet structure and behavior, and goes on to quantitatively analyze how the distribution of executive offices is related to patterns of proportionality, the electoral calendar, and levels of horizontal integration.

II) PART I: Candidate Selection as a Dependent Variable

As Siavelis & Morgenstern argue in the introductory chapter, context matters, and at times, overrides institutional variables. The processes of selection and nomination for the executive branch must be understood in the context of the restraints imposed by Chile's transition to democracy and the "reserved-domains" inherited from the military regime, circumstances unique to Chile in the region. The end of the authoritarian period and the delicacy of the transition warranted a consensus/centrist candidate and the need to use an elite centered method of selection. Democratization, then, pushed the *Concertación*, the governing coalition since 1990, to use more open systems in the next three elections (1993, 1999, and 2005). However, as noted the right, which operated under a different logic, continued to rely on elite centered mechanisms.

a. Election of Presidents and Selection of Presidential Candidates (Since 1990)

Before the military regime there was only one round of elections for the presidency, and the candidate who obtained the majority of votes was usually elected president. However, this was not a

constitutional requirement. If no candidate obtained an absolute majority of votes, congress in joint session chose between the two top candidates. Congress never chose the second place finisher as has occurred in Bolivia several times.¹ Currently, presidents are elected for a single six-year term using a majority run-off method (ballotage) when no candidate obtains more than 50% of the valid vote (Dow 1998: 63). The president cannot be reelected for the following term and elections are not concurrent.

Law 18.700 (Articles 13 and 14) spells out the process for nominating presidential candidates. Independent candidates can be nominated if they have the support of at least the 0.5% of voters who cast ballots in the previous election for deputies, through the collection of signatures. Parties who wish to nominate candidates can do so if the party is legally registered in all regions of the country. If it is not, the party it must fulfill the same requirements (in the regions where it does not legally exist) as independent candidates.

In Chile there are no legally mandated internal party or coalition rules for choosing the presidential candidates. Also, the organization and financing of the presidential selection process is the sole responsibility of each party and coalition, leaving an open door for potential corruption.² When elections for the legislature and the executive are concurrent—as it happened in 1989 and 1993—the presidential nomination and the distribution for legislative positions are all part of the same negotiating equation.

Beyond these general similarities, the government and opposition blocs differ in their handling of presidential nominations. In the governing coalition there is a clear and explicit intention to democratize the process. It moved from a *conclave* style of nomination in 1989, which placed power exclusively in the hands of party elites, to indirect or closed primaries in 1993, also known as a “*convención de origen mixto*” (a mixed origin convention) where only militants and adherents in one of the parties of the coalition had a say in the election process. Finally, for the 1999 elections the governing coalition opted for open primaries (Table 1 summarizes the selection method for each presidential candidate in Chile since 1989).

In the opposition camp partisan elites nominate candidates, emphasizing personal charisma, popularity in public-opinion surveys, and previous electoral accomplishments. During the last fourteen

¹ This democratic tradition was threatened in 1970 with pressures for the Christian Democrats to opt for rightist candidate Jorge Alessandri. Eventually, the PDC opted to uphold tradition and supported Salvador Allende.

² Chile has a mixed campaign financing system. There are no limits on private donations to political campaigns but there is also indirect public financing, including free TV ads before elections, and tax exemptions. See Valdés Prieto (2000; 2003).

years of democracy, the Right has shown a clear tendency toward “*independentismo*” (with candidates asserting their independence from party-machines or even claiming they are not politicians).³

Candidates Hernán Büchi and Joaquín Lavín were nominated in this way, though the nomination of Arturo Alessandri Besa by a party convention in 1993 is a partial exception.

Table 1: Candidates, Parties and Selection Methods for Chilean Presidential Elections

Elections	Candidate	Party/Coalition	Selection Method
1989	Patricio Aylwin Azócar	Concertación (PDC)	Elite centered
1989	Hernán Büchi Buc	Independent – (Right)	Elite centered
1989	Francisco Javier Errázuriz	Unión de Centro Centro	Self-Nomination
1993	Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	Concertación (PDC)	Closed Primaries (Only for affiliated citizens)
1993	Arturo Alessandri Besa	Independent – (right)	Elite centered
1993	José Piñera Echeñique	Independent	Self-Nomination
1993	Manfred Max Neef	Independent	Elite centered
1993	Eugenio Pizarro Poblete	Communist	Elite centered
1993	Cristián Reitze Campos	Humanist & Green	Elite centered
1999	Ricardo Lagos Escobar	Concertación (PS)	Open Primaries (All citizens permitted to vote with the exception of those affiliated with parties other than Concertación)
1999	Joaquín Lavín Infante	Alianza por Chile (UDI)	Elite centered
1999	Gladys Marín Millie	Communist	Elite centered
1999	Tomás Hirsch Goldschmidt	Humanist	Elite centered
1999	Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle	Independent	Self-Nomination
1999	Arturo Frei Bolívar	Independent	Self-Nomination

1. Birth of the Concertación and the 1989 Presidential Election

After the formation of the first organized resistance to the military regime in August 1983 (the *Alianza Democrática*), two types of leaders emerged in the opposition that would down the road shape presidential candidate selection processes: *disruptive* and *adaptive*, exemplified by PDC leaders Gabriel Valdés and Patricio Aylwin, respectively. While Valdés advocated constant social mobilization and a radical democratic transition, Aylwin had a strong commitment to negotiate with the

³ This is not a rare phenomenon on the continent.

military regime. The *Valdesista* position did not succeed for four main reasons: 1) the substantial support the regime managed to maintain; 2) the demobilization of society and isolation of subversive sectors; 3) the self-confinement of the opposition within the rules imposed by military regime; and 4) a political class that valued negotiations and compromises (Cañas 1994: 51).

Aylwin, sustained that Valdés' *rupturista* would damage the chances for a democratic transition and strengthen the support for the military regime. On August 2, 1987, Aylwin assumed the leadership of the PDC while simultaneously another adaptive and non-disruptive leader emerged from the left, Ricardo Lagos. In response to Pinochet's planned plebiscite, Aylwin and Lagos agreed on an important project that came to life in February of 1988: *La Concertación de Partidos por el No*. As Cavallo (1992: 48-9) sustains, from the moment Aylwin was appointed official spokesman of the Concertación, he was validated as the leader of the coalition. Nonetheless, his tenure as the leader of the alliance and his party was far from tranquil. Few expected the internal fissures that emerged (Otano 1995: 70-71).

New PDC leaders challenged Aylwin's position, and most importantly, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle entered the political scene, and has stayed ever since. While most of the party supported Aylwin, Valdés was the candidate of the minority, and pressured Aylwin to represent the party as a whole. Frei, at the same time, appeared as the most popular candidate in surveys, no small issue to an alliance preparing for elections. Internal elections were promoted by Valdés' faction, who, following the internal statutes approved in 1987, forced the party to form a National Council (*Junta Nacional*) to decide on a mechanism for selecting a candidate. By October 20, 1988 a battle was raging in the PDC over who had the right to vote and the electoral mechanism to be used. These struggles concluded with Aylwin gaining support for an adaptive transition and increased internal party support for his candidacy.

Finally, Aylwin was chosen by the majority of the delegates (156 to 129 votes) and recognized unanimously as the presidential candidate.⁴ The Concertación appears to have been waiting for the PDC to sort out its messy internal politics before further negotiations on presidential candidacies. The period from October 5, 1988 to July 6, 1989 was marked by two events of great significance for the democratic transition and the Concertación: 1). An agreement to support a single candidate from the Concertación. 2). An agreement to compensate participation of all the parties of the alliance through

⁴ This national council was integrated by delegates and provincial presidents elected in the past internal election.

eventual cabinet posts and shared lists for congressional elections.⁵ Intra-elite pacts continued to characterize the process, and on January 6, 1989 the PDC and PS leadership reached a solid agreement that Aylwin would be the candidate. He was elected president with a clear majority and his government was "fairly successful in facing the myriad complex and controversial topics that invariably follow an authoritarian regime" (Siavelis 2001). Table 2 summarizes the outcome of the first post-authoritarian presidential election in Chile.

Table 2: Presidential Elections of 1989

Presidential Candidate	Votes	Percentage
Patricio Aylwin Azócar	3.850.571	55,17%
Hernán Büchi Buc	2.052.116	29,40%
Francisco Javier Errázuriz Talavera	1.077.172	15,43%
Total Votes	6.979.859	

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/indexf.html>

The presidential nomination process on the right was more inchoate. The Partido Nacional, the pre-authoritarian expression of the political right, dissolved itself immediately after the coup d'etat—conforming to the anti-political discourse it shared with Pinochet. Nonetheless, as Agüero et al (1998) note, the 1980 constitution brought a new sort of political life as the authoritarian regime drew to a close. New constitutional provisions would govern all democratic institutions and there new would be new laws regulating parties and elections. This new scenario, coupled with growing divisions within the regime and among its adherents, provided the political impetus for re-organization of the political right. Finally, two parties emerged: Renovación Nacional (RN) and the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI). The UDI positioned itself as the most loyal to the military regime and its legacy. Renovación Nacional had a more liberal tradition with roots in the former Partido Nacional. After the defeat suffered in the plebiscite of 1988, the political right attempted to fill the leadership void left by Pinochet looking for a presidential candidate for elections of 1989. However, finding a common candidate of the right was no easy task. Renovación Nacional tried to distance itself from Pinochet, while simultaneously defending the substance of the military regime's program, and especially its economic policies.

For the most important leaders of RN, the potential candidate had to respond to the "new times" and lighten the burden of the Pinochet legacy. Renovación Nacional wanted a candidate from the one

⁵ See Navia (this volume).

of the party machines, and proposed the nomination of party activists that had been former ministers of the Pinochet regime: Arturo Fontaine Talavera, Sebastián Piñera, Enrique Barros and Andrés Allamand. However, the UDI was convinced that these candidates would not attract sufficient support from the more anti-party business sector, which was fundamental for success. The UDI, therefore, decided on a candidate that seemed to satisfy both those who wanted a less partisan “new face” and those who wanted continuity with the military regime: Hernan Büchi. Büchi’s approach was fine-tuned by the UDI and its style of making politics without being political (a trend that has continued on the right in every election). However, this style of politics also tended to increase the gap between the parties of the right because RN advocated a more traditionally partisan approach. Though all counterfactuals involve a high level of speculation, it is plausible to argue that the division of the right negatively influenced its electoral performance in the 1989 elections. However, even if the sector had supported a common candidate right from the beginning, it is unlikely that the right would have beat Aylwin.

2. The 1993 Presidential Election

The 1993 presidential race within the PDC demonstrated that it had not overcome its divisions even after four years of government. Within the PDC, three candidates explicitly threw their hats into the ring: Andrés Zaldívar, Alejandro Foxley, and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. Andrés Zaldívar asserted that he represented a larger share of the party than the others, and at the same time, was more loyal to traditional party institutions. Eduardo Frei was less tied to traditional party institutions, and had the advantage of name recognition as a member of one of Chile’s most important political families. He was, once again, one of the favorites in opinion polls. The best bet for Alejandro Foxley, Aylwin’s Minister of Finance, was to cast himself as the guarantor of stability. Among all of Aylwin’s ministers Foxley received the highest approval ratings and was one of the best known political leaders at the time.⁶ Though Zaldívar ultimately turned out to be a weak candidate, he forced Frei to “enter the debate and show his political abilities” (*Hoy* n° 775, May 25, 1992). Although for a while, Zaldívar was able to cultivate an important anti-*freista* faction, he ultimately lost to Frei. Ultimately, Frei had three strengths going into the process of candidate selection that the other candidates lacked: his name, his low profile political career that allowed him to attract votes from the political right, and a close relationship with the business world (Godoy 1994).

⁶ See CEP. http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_1/cat_443_inicio.html

In terms of choosing the Concertación's standard bearer, this election was more complex than the founding election. The results of the 1992 municipal elections were used by the PDC as a bargaining chip. The PDC argued that it was positioned as the strongest party within the Concertación with more than 30% of the votes while the combined parties of the left (PS-PPD) had garnered less than 18% of the votes. The left, on the other hand, contended that in the interests of coalition maintenance that all parties should be represented and that it "was their turn to have the presidential candidate." However, the parties of the left had few electoral arguments with which to defend their position.

The PDC continued to advocate an inter-elite settlement to choose a candidate, because primary elections would introduce a significant element of chance (Genaro Arriagada in *La Época*, January 20, 1993). The PDC proposed an inter-party convention similar to the one used for the 1989 elections. The other significant partners of the PDC in the Concertación, specifically the PS-PPD, argued that a convention was not really participative and would only produce a predetermined result.

The strategy of presenting two candidates of the Concertación for the elections of 1993 and then allowing the presidential first round to decide between the two started to evolve. The PDC opposed this route claiming that it would be like presenting a Concertación divided in two. Consequently, the PPS-PPD proposed presenting two parliamentary lists, a proposition which the PDC rejected. The PDC also rejected the idea of using primary elections to choose a presidential candidate based on practicality: the high costs of the election and the extremely difficult task of defining who had the right to vote in such short time (*El Mercurio*, February 5, 1993). PS-PPD candidate, Ricardo Lagos, proposed an alternative plan for a "mixed convention." Such a convention would include delegates elected through some sort of primary election and another group reflecting each party's proportion of votes in the 1992 municipal elections. The PDC sustained that only the second part of Lagos plan should be adopted. With the opportunity for an agreement fading away, the PDC agreed to accept an open primary with the condition that parliamentary lists would proportionally reflect the relative power of parties based on the 1992 elections (Sergio Carrasco, *El Mercurio*, February 6, 1993).

Finally, the parties agreed on the participation of 400,000 party members and adherents who would elect 1,800 delegates to the convention. The previous criticism that the outcome of this system would be predictable and predetermined proved true. The results were close to those predicated and Lagos obtained 37% of the vote to Frei's 63% (see Table 3). More than 430,000 people participated.

Table 3. 1993 Presidential Primary Results, May 23, 1993

Type of voters	Eduardo Frei		Ricardo Lagos		Total	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Militants	68.100	60,7	44.054	38,3	112,154	100
Adherents	204.455	64,1	115.318	34,9	319.773	100
Total	275.555	63,4	159.372	36,6	434.927	100

Source: Navia (2005) based on El Mercurio, mayo 29, 1993

On the right, this election was marked from the beginning by “*Piñeragate*,” a case of telephone espionage that involved Sebastián Piñera. A recorded conversation was made public in which Piñera gave tips to a friend on how to discredit potential presidential pre-candidate Evelyn Matthei.⁷ What could have been a small internal affair escalated to career-damaging proportions by the harsh words used in the conversation revealing serious internal competition and avid strategizing. The consequence of this affair destroyed the presidential possibilities of both Piñera and Matthei.

As expected, some new names also appeared: on the UDI’s side Jovino Novoa, and Manuel Feliú from RN. Simultaneously, José Piñera, brother of Sebastián Piñera, would run in the election as an independent, trying to gain the support of the UDI from which he had resigned previously. Meanwhile, the UDI had also successfully managed to include a new ally: the UCC, a right-leaning populist party created by Francisco Javier Errázuriz that had garnered 8% of the votes in the 1992 municipal elections. The mechanism chosen for the presidential nomination was a convention fixed for August 8, 1993. Although José Piñera did not approve, representatives to the convention were assigned in proportion to the electoral force each party had received in the 1992 elections. With 1847 members participating, the votes were divided as follows: Renovación Nacional -- 547, the UDI-- 449, the UCC 391, Independents-- 370 (20% of the total), and the other 90 were shared between the Partido Nacional and the Partido del Sur.

Once convened, this convention was far from simple or straightforward. At the convention Jovino Novoa, the UDI’s candidate, withdrew his candidacy in favor of a man who had barely registered, Arturo Alessandri Besa. Alessandri was an independent who collected over 33,000 signatures in record time, was privileged with a historical Chilean last name, and counted with the support of the diminished Partido Nacional. The results of the convention were clear and produced

new loyalties: 56.48% voted for Alessandri and 38.74% for Feliú. In spite of not obtaining the required 2/3 support, Alessandri was proclaimed victor as soon as Feliú recognized his defeat. However, José Piñera refused to recognize the result and continued as an independent candidate into the general election. Therefore, the right's first convention provided new lessons and, once again, divided its ranks causing it to appear disorganized. It seemed that the right came up with a last minute candidate who, to add insult to injury, would have to compete for votes with an independent candidate on the right. Table 4 show results from the 1993 elections.

Table 4: Presidential Elections of 1993

Presidential Candidate		Votes	Percentage
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	Concertación	4.040.497	57,98%
Arturo Alessandri Besa		1.701.324	24,41%
José Piñera Echeñique		430.950	6,18%
Manfred Max Neef		387.102	5,55%
Eugenio Pizarro Poblete		327.402	4,70%
Cristián Reitze Campos		81.675	1,17%
Total Votes		6.968.950	

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/indexf.html>

3. The Presidential Elections of 1999

In the presidential elections of 1999 the figure of Ricardo Lagos emerged with force similar to that of Aylwin ten years before. Lagos had vast political experience. There was also a sense that it was definitely his turn, both with regard to his personal trajectory as a politician and a sense that it was time for some alternation of power within the alliance. Lagos represented both parties on the left (the PS and PPD) and though he is formally a Socialist (PS), his relation with the PPD goes beyond mere instrumentality. Both parties tended to act as a unit, at least for the purposes of the presidential election. During the primaries of 1993 Lagos had showed a strong commitment to the maintenance of the Concertación. However, during the primaries of 1999 something was changing: after two administrations headed by the PDC, there was a general consensus within the Concertación that the alliance needed some revitalization. All these factors paved the way for a candidate that exhibited more of his own personal seal. While Lagos had to prove his support in “indirect primaries” in 1993,

⁷ A transcription of the conversation between Pedro Pablo Diaz and Sebastián Piñera can be found at: <http://www.apocatastasis.com/sebastian-pinera-grabacion.htm>

in 1999 he faced "open primaries" against Zaldívar, the PDC candidate. The results of these primaries are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5. 1999 Presidential Primary Results

Candidate	Women Votes	Women %	Men Votes	Men %	Total Votes	Total %
Ricardo Lagos	479,342	69.7	511,708	73.1	991,050	71.4
Andrés Zaldívar	208,862	30.3	188,572	26.9	397,434	28.6
Total	688,204	100.0	700,280	100.0	1,388,484	100.0

Source: Navia (2005) based on Auth and García, 1999

On the right Joaquin Lavín emerged as the most popular candidate. Almost from the very beginning, Lavín showed a significant inclination towards local politics.⁸ Analysts note his tendency to "municipalize" problems, which are painted in terms of immediacy, and whose solutions are technocratic rather than political. Lavín was an *alcalde* (mayor) who during elections took on the problems of everyday people, instituting programs with marked populist shortcuts. The effects of this leadership style on his exercise of power will be seen later. Certainly the endless contradictions between his proposed policies and the ideological position of the political and business elites that supported him can only be understood within a populist frame of reference.

Lavín also intentionally detaches himself from the right's traditional way of doing politics, without abandoning the underlying ideology of his own party. He discredits "politics," which he sees as associated with conflict and a lack of resolution. As Morales notes, Lavín is a "Sunday politician" who uses a colloquial and simple language, with rolled up sleeves and an easy and comfortable manner. For Lavín the road to power is paved by achieving small, concrete goals, where the ends justify the means. He consistently advocates solving the problems of "real people." Constitutional reforms are not a priority for "Doña Juana," (the common people), and therefore they won't be for Lavín either (Morales 2004: personal Communication). Lavín's relative success in the 1999 elections, and particularly the inroads the right has made among the poor, are often traced to this political style. Thus other UDI leaders welcome Lavín's style, accepting even some of the extravagant measures he took as

⁸ Such an affinity may be due to his loss as a deputy candidate in 1989.

Alcalde of Las Condes and Santiago.⁹ For them, Lavín has discovered a successful formula for the right's quest for power.

Despite Lavín's leadership on the right, the sector is still marked by the ghost of *independentismo* (Allamand 1999). In its search for presidential candidates since the return of democracy, this *independentismo* has forced the right to look to family name, a technocratic profile, or associations with a successful personal ministerial performance. The nomination of Büchi and Alessandri certainly fit this pattern, while Lavín's ascendancy, after a very long trajectory within the UDI really represents an insider playing the "outsider's" game. Ultimately, he enhanced the performance and popularity of the right, as very narrow thin loss in the elections of 1999 suggest. Table 6 summarizes these results.

Table 6: Presidential Elections of 1999 (First and Second Round)

Presidential Candidate	Votes	Percentage	Votes (2 nd R)	Percentage (2 nd R)
Ricardo Lagos Escobar	3.383.339	47,96%	3.677.968	51,31%
Joaquín Lavín Infante	3.352.199	47,51%	3.490.561	48,69%
Gladys Marín Millie	225.224	3,19%		
Tomás Hirsch Goldschmidt	36.235	0,51%		
Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle	31.319	0,44%		
Arturo Frei Bolívar	26.812	0,38%		
Total Votes	7.055.128		7.168.529	

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/indexf.html>

b. Types of Candidates and Campaigns

1. Candidates

It is clear that the same elites that dominated the political scene during the pre-authoritarian period returned to positions of leadership during the transition to democracy (Aguero, et.al. 1998: 161).

Chile's three presidents since the democratic transition, Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, and Ricardo Lagos, had a strong relationship with the Chilean political establishment and they all fit the category of *party insiders* that Morgenstern and Siavelis define in the introductory chapter, albeit with Frei this category is more problematic as will be demonstrated. Nonetheless, all three have emerged from

⁹ Among these count his effort to make rain to clean polluted air, a beach on the banks of the contaminated Mapocho River, and a ski resort in downtown Santiago.

ideological parties with established roots in society. Moreover, their parties, the Socialist and the Christian Democratic, have consistently been central to the Chilean political process and were key protagonists of the period between 1958 and 1973, which has been characterized as the period of party politics of the “three-thirds”.¹⁰

As Siavelis and Morgenstern explain, *party insiders* “will have been party activists for a considerable period of time, and have held important leadership posts.” Two of the three presidents (Aylwin and Lagos) held important leadership positions, and Frei had been a senator. Nonetheless, the three of them were leaders from traditional parties who proudly wore the party label and their political visions were largely attuned to the parties they represented. In addition, all three share another fundamental characteristic: they were proponents of the *adaptive* transition, which also affected their leadership style as presidents. They all had a transactional leadership style, and moved away from the confrontational or disruptive model of the past. Their high regard for their political cadres, party militancy, and internal discipline is evidenced by their long history as leaders of institutionalized parties. They clearly accepted the mechanisms of candidate selection decided at the coalition level, even though they tried to change them for their own benefit on occasion.

Despite these realities, Frei falls in between the category party adherent and party insider. Party adherents are according to Siavelis and Morgenstern are “strong partisans, but differ from the loyalists in that they are not their party’s undisputed leader, perhaps jumping to the national (or statewide) campaign from a provincial (or municipal) position. These candidates, thus, are more likely to have to earn their candidacy from having competed in a primary than are insiders,” and this is partially the case with Eduardo Frei. Frei can be considered a party insider primarily because he built his career in business rather than within the party before entering politics.

It is hard to underline any *cursus honorum* for the presidency in Chile. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made. An account of the last 12 presidents Chile has had since 1932, tells us that all presidents were male, with an average age of 60.9 years, and 50% were lawyers. Most started as deputies and then moved to the senate or other cabinet positions before reaching the presidency. Table 7 shows the path to power taken by the last twelve presidents of Chile and does not suggest significant changes in the post-authoritarian setting.

¹⁰ For different interpretations of the Chilean “three-thirds” see Carey (2002); Flisfisch (1992); Mainwaring and Torcal (2003); Montes, et. al. (2000); Ortega (2003); and Scully (1992;1995).

Table 7: Presidents and their Backgrounds in Executive or Legislative Offices (*)

	Years	Party	Birth	First Degree	University	First
Arturo Alessandri Palma	1932-1938 (2nd.)	PL	1868	Lawyer	U. of Chile	1) 1897: Deputy 2) 1915: Senator
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	1938-1941	PR	1879	Lawyer and Spanish Professor	Pedagogical Institute	1) 1915: Deputy 2) 1918: Min. Education and Justice 3) 1920: Min. Interior 4) 1921 Senator
Juan Antonio Ríos	1942-1946	PR	1888	Lawyer		1) 1924: Deputy
Gabriel González Videla	1946-1952	PR	1898	Lawyer	U. of Chile	1) 1933: Deputy 2) 1939: Ambassador 3) 1945: Senator
Carlos Ibañez del Campo	1952-1958 (2nd.)	..	1877	Military	..	1) 1925: Min. Guerra y Marina
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez	1958-1964	PL	1896	Civil Engineer	U. of Chile	1) 1947: Min. Hacienda 2) 1957: Senator
Eduardo Frei Montalva	1964-1970	PDC	1911	Lawyer	Catholic U. of Chile	1) 1946: Min. of Public Works 2) 1949: Senator
Salvador Allende Gossens	1970-1973	PS	1908	Surgery	U. of Chile	1) 1937: Deputy 2) 1939: Min. of Health and Social Welfare 3) 1945: Senator
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte	1973-1990	..	1915	Military	..	
Patricio Aylwin Azócar	1990-1994	PDC	1918	Lawyer	U. of Chile	1) 1964: Senator 2) 1971: President of Senate
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1994-2000	PDC	1942	Civil Engineer	U. of Chile	1) 1989: Senator
Ricardo Lagos Escobar	2000-2006	PS-PPD	1938	Lawyer	U. of Chile	1) 1972: Ambassador in USSR(**) 2) 1990: Min. Education 3) 1994: Min. Public Works

* For the 2005 elections the opposition candidate is *Joaquín Lavín Infante* (1953) an engineer from the Catholic University (see table 5 for more information); the Concertación will hold primaries on July 31, 2005 in order to decide between (1) *Michelle Bachelet* (1951) Surgeon from the U. of Chile, socialist, who was Minister of Health (2000-2002) and Minister of Defense (2002-2004); and (2) *Soledad Alvear*, Lawyer from the U. of Chile, Christian-Democrat who was Minister of Women affairs (1991-4), Minister of Justice (1994-9) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2000-4). ** (Never ratified by Congress)

2. Campaigns

During the 1989 presidential campaign, Aylwin faced five significant challenges: (1) to cultivate support on the Left, (some of which opposed him because of his past position as leader of the opposition to the Unidad Popular and Salvador Allende's government) (2) to incorporate the interests of a heterogeneous coalition in his campaign, (3) to maintain support of conservative Christian Democrats who might be disaffected by the alliance with the left, (4) to avoid outright confrontations among parties, and (5) to face a candidate who challenged him at the center of the political spectrum, Francisco Javier Errázuriz.

His key strategy was to depersonalize the campaign. The Concertación's slogan for the campaign, "*gana la gente*" (the people win) focused on the idea that he was merely the leader of a coalition that had succeeded in transferring the power of decision to the citizenry. This image allowed him to downplay his personal past. He managed to capitalize on his political performance in his fight against the military regime and position himself as a democratic statesman. His participation as spokesman of the "No" in the plebiscite broadened his support, and his plan of government was the reflection of common understanding of the need for a peaceful transition. He successfully managed to maintain the rhetoric of the 1988 plebiscite, capturing anti-dictatorship votes while simultaneously incorporating new issues into the campaign.

The most delicate issue was human rights, not because Aylwin lacked support within the Concertación for a human rights agenda, but because each of the parties of the coalition had different proposals. Aylwin had to balance maximalist positions with others that were quite moderate. He struck this balance with a proposal for *justicia dentro de lo posible* (justice within the realm of the possible). Another difficulty for Aylwin was his age. In this sense, Büchi was clearly a candidate who empathized with the Chilean youth. However, this handicap was effectively managed, again, by the depersonalization of the campaign and, as had occurred during the "No" campaign, through the use of young politicians and popular TV faces to cultivate support of the young.

Aylwin oriented his campaign toward the twin goals of reconnecting citizens with democracy (and made particular efforts to reconnect forgotten sectors like trade unions), while simultaneously marketing the *concertacionista* coalition as a viable and capable governing force. In this sense, the electoral campaign helped form a collective identity, a visible conglomerate, and consequently, a real alternative of government. Aylwin's status as a *party-insider* added coherence to the campaign, with

the preservation of a continuous base of support that maintained the nexus between civil society and politicians and between politicians and the coalition's program. The depersonalization of the campaign was also much more easily accomplished for a *party-insider* because ideas mattered more than individuals. Finally, this nexus was constructed maintained while avoiding the maximalist tendencies of the pre-1973 era. Citizens understood the transitional logic and provided Aylwin with a significant electoral support for an agenda of gradual change and *democracia dentro lo posible* (democracy within the realm of the possible).

The right's campaign focused on an image of discontinuity with the military regime. Given his status as *party adherent* rather than a *party insider*, Büchi's campaign stressed three themes much more related to the candidate as a person: (1) how Büchi represented a sharp change of leadership from the Pinochet regime, (2) his outstanding performance as Finance Minister, and (3) his apolitical nature and how he differed from traditional politicians who were filled with "mucho ruido y pocas nueces" (a lot of noise and few results).

The Alianza also stressed non-political issues to focus on concrete problems of real people in order to differentiate it from the "idealistic" and "ideological" focus of the Concertación. While this may seem irrelevant, the right forgot one crucial issue. There is a difference between the "essential" and the "concrete" problems of citizens. The right called for the solution of the "concrete problems of the people," while timidly trying to erase its old loyalties to the military regime. This led to a campaign that looked ahead to the modernization of the country as its leitmotiv, ignoring items on the current political agenda and some pressing political problems. While it is possible to consider Büchi as a *party adherent* (in the light of the parties that supported him), given his apolitical orientation it is very likely he would have considered himself a *free-wheeling independent*. Ultimately, Büchi's campaign was a dissonant reaction to the political agenda raised by Aylwin. Also, unfortunately for Büchi, his service in the Pinochet government prevented him from effectively distancing himself from the military regime.

The third presidential candidate, Francisco Javier Errázuriz, representing the new and non-traditional UCC party, experimented with a populist campaign, moving away from the problems of the democratic transition; his idea was to radically suppress the past. This attitude brought Errázuriz immediate dividends from the right, directly harming the Büchi candidacy. Over time, Errázuriz advanced a political platform aimed at "solving the problems of the people." He managed to obtain

only about 15 percent of the vote, mainly from the depoliticized. Errázuriz clearly fit the category of *free-wheeling independent*, without any partisan constraints, a situation that Büchi likely envied.

For the elections of 1994, Frei could count on a more consolidated Concertación, more in sync with the business world, and with a proven track record in managing the economy. He also could rely on a more advanced democratic transition, with agreements on the basics of macroeconomic policies, prudent handling of the civil-military relations and a policy of reconciliation based on the principle of justice within the realm of the possible (Godoy 1994). The cornerstone of his campaign was the slogan “*para los nuevos tiempos* (for the new times)” that, without breaking the unity and continuity of the Concertación, would allow it to project the idea of a future government dedicated to helping the poor, the young, and women, in accordance with the values of democracy, justice, and fairness (Godoy 1994). Frei’s campaigned on support for the market economy but one that included a political technocracy whose expertise would bolster the effectiveness and the efficiency of public policies. The Right’s candidate Arturo Alessandri combined the right’s tendency toward *independentismo* with some of the characteristics of a traditional politician. He was neither young nor dynamic. A crucial strategic error he made was to separate his campaign from the legislative campaigns in order paint himself as an independent, even though elections were concurrent. This hurt both the presidential and legislative campaigns because it seemed the right was, again, tending toward incoherence. This perception was further confirmed by the existence of another independent candidate from the Right, Jose Piñera, who managed to snatch some votes from him.

By the 1999 elections the electoral clash between traditional politics and anti-politics came to a head. Concertación candidate Ricardo Lagos had to achieve the difficult task of appealing to both the still-politicized voter and the new depoliticized voter. The Concertación sought to attract both types of voters with a new focus on social policies. *Crecer con Igualdad* (Growth with Equality) was the motto of the first round, which suggested maintaining the basic rules of the market economy, while making adjustments to it to better deal with the inequality it created. Lavín, on the other hand, also focused on social issues but emphasized de-politicization and reinforcing the power of the individual. It is important to stress that in this campaign the candidate of the Right set the communicational standards. Lavín’s modern and effective campaign forced Lagos to a change his style during the campaign in response to Lavín’s success. For the second round, the Concertación refocused the campaign to widen its appeal to all Chileans, with the slogan: “*Chile mucho mejor*” (Chile, much better). Table 8 summarizes all of Chile’s presidential candidates, designating their type and listing electoral returns.

TABLE 8: Presidential Candidates

	% (votes)	Election Year	Type of Candidate	Party / Coalition	Previous Political Career	
Patricio Aylwin Azócar	55,2	1989	Party Insider	Concertación – PDC	Senator	1964-1973
Hernán Büchi Buc	29,4	1989	Party Adherent	"Independent" – (right)	Under Secretary Minister	1979-Economía; 1981-Salud 1985-9 - Hacienda
Francisco Javier Errázuriz Talavera	15,4	1989	Free–Wheeling Independent	Unión de Centro Centro	NO	
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	57,9	1993	Party Insider	Concertación – PDC	Senator	1990-1994
Arturo Alessandri Besa	24,4	1993	Party Adherent	"Independent"	Deputy Senator	1972-1973 1990-1994
José Piñera Echeñique	6,2	1993	Free–Wheeling Independent	"Independent" – (right)	Minister	1978-81 Work; 1981 Mining
Manfred Max Neef	5,5	1993	Group Agent		NO	
Eugenio Pizarro Poblete	4,7	1993			NO	
Cristián Reitze Campos	1,2	1993	Party Insider	Humanist	NO	
Ricardo Lagos Escobar	47,9	1999	Party Insider	Concertación – PS	Minister	1990-3: Education; 1994-1998: Public Works
Joaquín Lavín Infante	47,5	1999	Party Insider	"Independent" – (right)	Alcalde	1992-9: Las Condes; 2000- Santiago
Gladys Marín Millie	3,2	1999	Party Insider	Communist	Deputy	1965-73
Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt	0,5	1999	Party Insider	Humanist	NO	
Sara Ma. Larraín R-T	0,4	1999	Group Agent		NO	
Arturo Frei Bolívar	0,4	1999	Free–Wheeling Independent	Independent	Deputy	1969-73
					Senator	1990-98
<i>Michele Bachelet</i>		<i>2006(*)</i>	<i>Party Insider</i>	<i>Concertación - PS</i>	<i>Minister</i>	<i>2000-2: Min. Health 2002-4: Min. Defense</i>
<i>Soledad Alvear</i>		<i>2006(*)</i>	<i>Party Insider</i>	<i>Concertación – PDC</i>	<i>Minister</i>	<i>1991-4: Min. SERNAM 1994-9: Min. Justice 2000-4: Min. Foreign Affairs</i>
<i>Joaquín Lavín Infante</i>		<i>2006(*)</i>	<i>Party Insider</i>	<i>"Independent" – (right)</i>	<i>Alcalde</i>	<i>1992-9: Las Condes; 2000-4: Santiago</i>

* Pre-candidates for the 2005 election.

III) PART II: Candidate Selection as an Independent Variable¹¹

As demonstrated throughout this volume, the procedure used to choose candidates has a profound impact once politicians assume office. Consequently, given that all presidents in Chile since 1990 have been *party insiders* we should expect to see similar patterns of executive behavior. Nonetheless, this volume also recognizes that there are contextual nuances related to behavior of each of the types. For instance, this chapter categorizes Frei somewhere between a *party insider* and *party adherent*. Therefore, if the assertions of this volume hold we should note subtle differences between his behavior and that of Aylwin and Lagos. As a matter of fact, Frei's behavior with respect to coalition formation, cabinet formation, and policy orientation was different than the other two presidents. When Lagos won, he reintroduced a pattern in these areas that is much more similar to Aylwin, suggesting that their origins as *party insiders* might explain some of this similarity. Frei's status as less of a *party insider* in part explains how he molded his cabinet, how he campaigned, how he acted, and his more technocratic policy orientation.

a. Cabinet Structure and Behavior

In this section we spell out the cabinet strategies that the three presidents followed. The general rule for post-authoritarian presidents was to appoint cabinets proportional to the relative power of the coalition's constituent parties. The transitional situation that Aylwin's government faced forced him to be extremely careful to not make any movement that would alter the basics of the political consensus created between the military and civilian authorities and, perhaps more importantly, between the partners of the Concertación. Therefore, it is no surprise that his cabinet was one of the most stable in Chilean history, and that the distribution of offices reached almost perfect mathematical proportions. Aylwin used what Alfredo Rehren calls a mechanism of *horizontal integration* to distribute portfolios (Rehren 1992: 71), where a minister of party "A" is paired with an under-secretary not from party "A". In this manner, Aylwin avoided the creation of administrative and executive reserved-domains or *nichos de poder* (power niches).

The model facilitated cooperation among the parties of the Concertación in a way that resembles the power-sharing typical of a consociational democratic model (see Lijphart 1999; Lijphart

¹¹ For interesting analyses of the organization of the presidency before and during the military regime see (Rehren 1989; 1992; 1998).

and Waisman 1996). Nevertheless, the PDC had preferential treatment in the distribution of power and offices, receiving a larger share of the political ministries than other parties (the percentage of the votes received in the 1989 legislative elections was used to distribute offices).

The key institution that helped to smooth relations between parties, and especially between the executive branch and the legislature was the *Secretaría General de la Presidencia* (SEGPRES), which holds ministerial status. All proposals for legislation from each of the ministries pass through SEGPRES, which acted as both a clearinghouse and "filter" for legislation (Siavelis 2000:56). Moreover, in the words of Siavelis,

interbranch relations were conducted through a series of informal meetings between members of congressional committees and the representatives of the executive working in the same policy areas (...) This pattern of cooperation has not been limited to relations between parties of the governing coalition. The parties of the center-right also played a vital role as members of the loyal opposition willing to broker negotiations between the military and the Concertación (Siavelis 2000: 57).

Whatever the cause of Aylwin's success, Frei was its beneficiary, though there are some differences in the way he structured his cabinet. Frei respected less the notion of horizontal integration and was willing to rely more on a close inner circle of advisors and a more personalist cabinet. If Aylwin progressively looked to de-personalize his administration Frei surrounded himself with what became known as his personal "iron circle." As already noted Frei was not a strong party activist, and was more connected to the business world. After the tragic death of his father in 1982, who was presumably assassinated by the military regime, he became a member of the Directorate of Radio Cooperativa, along with Genaro Arriagada, Edmundo Pérez Yoma, and Carlos Figueroa (Cavallo 1998: 237). These three colleagues became Frei's "iron circle". Later, Gutenberg Martínez, Juan Villarzú and Francisco Frei would complete his circle of confidence. Half a year after assuming office, Frei reshuffled his political cabinet, placing his "iron circle" in its entirety in the cabinet. He decided to give preference to the majority party, his, placing the iron circle in the key political offices (Garretón 2001). Although the consensualism inherited from the Aylwin administration was under severe stress (Siavelis 2000: 54), Frei altered but did not destroy the horizontal integration he inherited. Frei also gave his administration a much more technocratic element than Aylwin. Frei's status as a *party adherent* in Siavelis and Morgenstern terms helps to explain his more personalistic orientation, greater technocratic tendencies, and willingness to bend party rules.

Lagos's as a *party insider* revived the horizontal integration that dominated the executive branch during the entirety of Aylwin's administration and the first months of Frei's. Lagos also introduced an informal affirmative action policy in his cabinet and for other executive offices. Five women were appointed ministers: Michelle Bachelet (Health), Soledad Alvear (Foreign Affairs), Mariana Aylwin (Education), Josefina Bilbao (Women's Affairs), and Alejandra Krauss (Planning). María Antonieta Morales, who was appointed to the Supreme Court, could also be included on that list. Interestingly, all of these appointees were from the PDC with the exception of Bachelet, who like Lagos, is a Socialist. The positive outcome of this experiment in affirmative action is evident today. Both presidential pre-candidates of the Concertación are women: Bachelet and Alvear.

b. Executive Offices: Proportionality, Electoral Calendar, and Horizontal Integration

This chapter now delves deeper into the effect of candidate types and other variables on executive appointments. With this focus in mind, three hypotheses are advanced. (1) The type and number of executive offices received by parties is determined by their electoral performance in legislative elections. (2) As elections approach the president's party benefits from more appointments, and consequently, the fewer offices the coalition allies have to share. Finally (3), based on Rehren's findings (1992; 1998), presidents in Chile have carefully divided the executive among parties in order to avoid a party monopoly in any given specific policy area. The chapter also analyzes how candidate type plays into these relationships.

This analysis relies on a database using two different snapshots of the Chilean executive per year. While the first snapshot corresponds to most of the executive offices (ministers, under-secretaries, intendancies, governors, and ambassadors), the second represents the party affiliation any individual had. Table 9 below shows the frequencies of each office in the database. Not all ministries are equal in public visibility and resources. Therefore, I divided all cabinet positions in the following way: (1) the "political ministries" (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Secretary of the Presidency, Secretary of Government); they are those that physically are located at the "*La Moneda*" (Presidential palace). (2) Economic ministries (Budget, Agriculture, Transport, Mining, Economy and Energy, Public Works, Planning and Cooperation); and (3) "social ministries" (Justice, Education, Health, National Patrimony, Women, Housing, Work and Social Welfare). As done with Ministries and Under-Secretaries, Ambassadors were also divided into three groups based on their perceived

importance: Ambassador 1: United States, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, China, Korea, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, México, Organization of American States, United Nations, United Kingdom, European Union. Ambassador 2: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Russian Federation, Finland, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, The Vatican, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela. Ambassador 3: the rest of Chilean representations worldwide.¹²

Table 9: Frequencies of Offices (1990-2003) and Gender

	Total	Women	%	Men	%
Governor	702	99	14,1	603	85,9
Mayor (intendente)	182	17	9,3	165	90,7
Ambassador III	453	41	9,1	412	90,9
Ambassador II	244	5	2,0	239	98,0
Ambassador I	203	0	0,0	203	100,0
Under-Secretary III	98	22	22,4	76	77,6
Under -Secretary II	126	9	7,1	117	92,9
Under -Secretary I	140	4	2,9	136	97,1
Minister III	94	30	31,9	64	68,1
Minister II	94	3	3,2	91	96,8
Minister I	70	6	8,6	64	91,4
Candidate Presidency	12	2	16,7	10	83,3
President	3	0	0,0	3	100,0
Total	2421	238	16,1	2183	83,9

This table says a lot. Perhaps most evident is the extremely chauvinistic orientation of Chilean politics in almost all levels and offices. Within the subset group of analysis, it is evident that women have a tougher time trying to enter the system through the municipal system than through a ministerial appointment.

1. Distribution of Executive Offices through a Principle of Proportional Representation

As noted, Aylwin and Lagos were extremely careful in sharing their executive offices among the Concertación parties in a fair way. Frei tried to adhere to the same strategy during the first months of his Administration, but changed less than a year after he assumed the presidency. As Altman (2001) shows, in multiparty presidential regimes, once a governing coalition is formed, the distribution of offices within the executive corresponds mainly to a principle of proportional representation between

¹² I thank Roberto Duran for his help in on the criteria in differentiating the importance of embassies.

the electoral results received by each member of the governing coalition and the type and amount of offices received by each.

Table 10 below shows the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the share of the vote each party that makes up the Concertación received in the last election and its respective share of executive offices (ministries, Under-Secretaries, and mayors). Although the number of cases is relatively small, the results are powerful. The three models have an enormous predictive power and in no model did any of the control dummies for administration come up as significant. In other words, there are no statistical differences among the three analyzed administrations (the Frei administration is tackled later in this section). Model 1 has an almost perfect r-square of .921, which tends to decrease as we go to lower levels of executive offices (undersecretaries and mayors). The information of the relation of the Concertación parties and their share of the cabinet (ministers and under-secretaries) and mayors is shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3.

Table 10: OLS (Unstandardized Coefficients and Std. Errors)

	Model 1: Share Cabinet	Model 2: Share Sub-Secretaries	Model 3: Share Intendencias			
N	56	56	56			
R Square	.927	.882	.840			
Adjusted R Square	.921	.873	.827			
F	162.306***	95.138***	66.767***			
Share of CPD Votes	1.127***	.044	.875***	.045	.936***	.057
D_AYLWIN	.000	2.37	.002	2.409	.000	3.073
D_FREI	.002	2.18	.002	2.209	.000	2.818
CALENDAR	.001	2.71	-.001	2.748	.000	3.506
(Constant)	-3.181	2.74	3.114	2.776	1.610	3.542

Figure 1





Figure 2






Figure 3

2. Electoral Calendar and Distribution of Executive Offices

From the section above we know that in Chile a principle of PR is applied to distribute executive offices. Nonetheless, this distribution can change, as Frei's cabinet reshuffle shows. In Latin America the balance of executive appointments among members of a governing coalition changes as each administration approaches new elections (see Altman 2000; Altman 2001). In other words, the closer the elections are, the more offices the party of the president concentrates in its favor, and consequently, the fewer offices the coalition allies have to share. If this proves correct in Chile it would represent a violation of the principle of horizontal integration examined in the previous section.

Figures 4 and 5 below show the percentage of portfolios and undersecretaries for parties in Chile since 1990. Two observations are extremely interesting: (a) the remarkable stability of the cabinet during the Aylwin administration (given the almost flat lines in both figures) and the fluctuation of the distribution of these offices during the Frei and Lagos administrations. (b) The "mirror" effects of these lines during the last two administrations. This is to say; in the last 10 years there is a clear zero-sum game in the distribution of cabinet post between the PDC and the PS-PPD sub-pact.




Figure 4




Figure 5

The figures above show the cabinet in an aggregated fashion— although it is commonly understood that portfolios are not “equal” in public visibility and the resources with which they deal, etc. Table 11 shows the distribution of portfolios based on the mentioned criteria and reflect a similar stability. As a matter of fact, there is no statistical evidence that the president’s party tends to concentrate more offices as time goes by as happens in most of Latin America (Altman 2001). In other words, the distribution of cabinet positions is not contingent on the electoral calendar. In Chile, this is probably because presidents know that the probability of the coalition’s survival is extremely high, though it is uncertain to which party the next president will belong.

Table 11: Distribution of Cabinet by Parties by type of Ministries

		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Cabinet Total	DC	61,5	61,5	61,5	61,5	57,7	61,5	61,5	53,8	53,8	57,7	54,2	54,2	37,5	33,3	33,3
	PS-PPD	26,9	26,9	26,9	26,9	34,6	34,6	34,6	42,3	42,3	38,5	37,5	37,5	54,2	58,3	58,3
	PR	7,7	7,7	7,7	7,7	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	8,3	8,3	8,3	4,2	4,2
	INDP	0	0	0	0	3,8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,2	4,2
	PAC	3,8	3,8	3,8	3,8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political	DC	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	77,8	22,2	22,2	22,2
	PS-PPD	11,1	11,1	11,1	11,1	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	22,2	77,8	77,8	77,8
	PR	11,1	11,1	11,1	11,1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic	DC	40	40	40	40	50	50	50	30	30	40	44,4	44,4	44,4	44,4	44,4
	PS-PPD	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	60	60	50	44,4	44,4	44,4	44,4	44,4
	PR	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	11,1	11,1	11,1	11,1	11,1
	PAC	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social	DC	71,4	71,4	71,4	71,4	42,9	57,1	57,1	57,1	57,1	57,1	33,3	33,3	50	33,3	33,3
	PS-PPD	28,6	28,6	28,6	28,6	42,9	42,9	42,9	42,9	42,9	42,9	50	50	33,3	50	50
	PR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,7	16,7	16,7	0	0
	INDP	0	0	0	0	14,3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,7	16,7

Nonetheless, when one considers party congruency between a minister and his or her under-secretaries, the analysis of executive positions are more telling. In Figure 6, I show the partisan congruency between ministers and under-secretaries by type of portfolio. For instance, if the minister of a social portfolio belongs to party A and the under-secretary of that portfolio belongs to party B, there is no partisan congruency. The figure below shows this partisan congruency at the aggregate level taking into consideration the three types of portfolios.

Figure 6 says something compelling about the organizational style of the presidency in the three past administrations. The first and perhaps most obvious phenomenon is the impressive degree of partisan congruency in the “political” ministries during the PDC administrations. Again, Aylwin’s presidency is the most stable of the three analyzed here. The second observation is the absolute lack of partisan congruency in the social portfolios during the last two administrations. In other words, the principle of “horizontal integration” reaches its maximum in this group of ministries. Lagos administration has the overall lowest degree of partisan congruency of the three. This might be because of the point analyzed above: the principle of proportional distribution of offices based on electoral results. Finally, Frei’s administration is characterized by a concentration of PDC members in the political portfolios at both levels: ministers and under-secretaries, thus violating the principle of horizontal integration in this cabinet subgroup.




Figure 6

I statistically tested whether congruency depends on the electoral calendar (if it changes with the proximity or distance to the next election), administration, or type of ministry. Table 12 reports the result of the logistic regression. Basically, the conclusions drawn intuitively by analyzing the figures above were correct. The type of ministry does have an effect on the degree of partisan congruency, as do the dummies controlling for administration. What is interesting is that electoral calendar has no effect whatsoever on the degree of partisan congruency. The lack of significance of this variable is consistent with Altman's (2001) study of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential regimes and could be explained by the extremely powerful influence the Chilean electoral system has on parties' behavior.

Table 12: Partisan Congruency in the Cabinet (1990-2003)

	B	S.E.
Electoral Calendar	-,026	,396
Dummy AYLWIN	1,435***	,389
Dummy FREI	,787*	,375
Type Ministry (1= political, 2= economical, 3= social)	-1,048***	,192
Constant	-,098	,500
N	356	
Nagelkerke R Square	,191	
Cox & Snell R Square	,128	

***<0,001; **<0,01; *<0,05; "<0,1

IV) Conclusions

This chapter analyzed how presidents become presidents in Chile, and the consequences of the process for parties, policies, legislation and representative government. As a dependent variable it explored how recruitment for the presidency has evolved since the democratic reinstallation, underscoring different types of candidates and campaigns. It is clear that the two majority blocs (government and opposition) differ greatly in their handling of presidential nominations. In the Concertación, candidate recruitment and selection have evolved from being extremely informal (albeit constrained), to a more formalized process with time. On the right, elite-centered mechanisms continue to be the norm on the Right.

In terms of the Siavelis and Morgenstern typology, the three presidents that Chile has had since the transition, Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, and Ricardo Lagos, all have strong relationships with the Chilean political establishment, and fit in the party *insider* category. Nonetheless, Frei's increased personalism, strong technocratic orientation, and less active and long-standing party membership gave him some of the characteristics of the *party-adherent* rather than the *party-insider*.

As an independent variable this chapter statistically analyzed whether the patterns of distribution of executive offices that arose from historical circumstances hold today (i.e. proportionality, electoral calendar, and horizontal integration). The bottom line conclusion is that presidents were quite careful in building and sustaining their coalitions by sharing and carefully distributing offices among coalition allies. At times, this distribution approached perfect mathematical proportions. Of course, this was not a law, but rather an informal institution all members were expected to respect and defend. Moreover, the institutions of horizontal integration were maintained

during the last 14 years of democratic rule. Nonetheless, if different categories of ministries (political, economic, and social) are considered, during the Frei Administration horizontal integration was undermined. This chapter suggests that this difference is in part explained by Frei's closer approximation to the *party adherent* type. In short, the type of candidate matters for how Chilean presidents act once they assume power.

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