

## Chapter 1

### **Introduction: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis**

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Students of political institutions have found Latin America's presidential democracies useful laboratories for the study of federalism, electoral systems, executive power, political parties, and party systems. One of the central assumptions of these studies is that institutions create a singular and uniform incentive system for political actors, which in turn, tends to produce similar outcomes. Often, however, institutional analysis has trouble explaining situations where the institutional context is identical, yet political outcomes and behavior vary significantly. For example, political parties in the same country exhibit important behavioral differences despite a uniform institutional structure. Thus, while political outcomes may be conditioned by the institutional context, they are not fully determined by it. A fuller explanation, we contend, requires an analysis of the interaction of the institutional environment with other factors. For understanding executive\legislative relations and party systems in Latin America, we contend that key among these factors is the process of political recruitment and candidate selection, i.e. politicians' pathways to power. This volume analyzes the importance of these pathways in helping to determine political outcomes in Latin America.

This introductory chapter provides an analytical framework for the volume's subsequent country chapters by developing six principal themes. First, we begin with a brief discussion of why political recruitment and candidate selection matter. We provide an overview of how the topic has been studied in recent years, underscoring some of the impediments to its analysis. We argue for the importance of analyzing the political recruitment and candidate selection process as an independent and dependent variable, something rarely done in the literature. Second, we go on to define political recruitment and candidate selection, exploring the intimate connection between the processes. Third, we explore how the combination of institutional and party system variables interacts to produce particular types of legislative candidates, presenting a typology and empirical examples of each type of candidate. Fourth, we continue with a discussion how political

party and legal variables related to recruitment and selection condition the behavior of executives (both presidents, and where relevant provincial/state governors)<sup>1</sup>, also providing a typology and empirical examples. Finally, we provide a brief introduction to the substantive chapters and conclude with a discussion of the significance of our findings for the study of comparative politics and for democratic governability in Latin America. We argue that recruitment and selection variables have a much more important impact on democratic governability in Latin America than is usually supposed, and that they should be taken into account by would-be institutional reformers.

#### **D). Why Pathways to Power Matter: The Study of Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection**

A key goal of institutionalists has been to establish the relationship between electoral systems and party outcomes, with a particular focus on party discipline in the legislature and the nature of the party system (Ames 2001; Morgenstern 2004; Samuels 1999; Siavelis 1997; Shugart 1995; Shugart and Carey 1995). However, in failing to consider the interaction of the electoral system with recruitment and selection (hereafter R&S) variables these studies cannot explain the types of candidates, parties, and resulting levels of discipline that emerge within different countries. For example, Brazil's open list system (where voters choose among multiple intra-party legislative candidates) is said to work against party discipline. However, one party, the PT, has traditionally maintained much more control over nominations than others, and has therefore sustained much higher levels of party loyalty. Similarly, analyses of countries employing rules that provide incentives towards party discipline (e.g. Argentina) fail to explain intra-partisan conflict that can arise from legislators beholden to regional powerbrokers that nominated them as candidates. Systemic institutional rules also fail to explain how such disparate presidential candidates can emerge in the same country. The differences (even beyond those related to personality) between Menem, Kirchner, and Alfonsín in Argentina, Labastida, Fox, Cardenas, Madrazo, and Lopez Obrador in Mexico, or Collor, Lula and Cardoso in Brazil underscore this point. In short, electoral laws do not generally determine the degree to which R&S procedures are centralized, and thus fail in explaining

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<sup>1</sup> Using the term president and governor along with congress and state or provincial assembly when we refer to recruitment generally is awkward. Therefore, throughout the text we use the terms "president" and "congress" when we are specifically referring to national level politics, the terms "governor" and "state/provincial assembly" when we refer to sub-national politics, and the terms "executive" and "legislature" when refer to recruitment generically on both levels.

candidate types and the resulting behavior of politicians. That explanation, in sum, requires analysis of the R&S processes.

Institutionalist scholars have been less disposed to studying recruitment and selection because the associated variables are notoriously difficult to measure. Further, the analysis must contend with the written rules of the game, which include party and legal statutes, as well as the informal procedures that often govern the results.<sup>2</sup> However, if we are interested in analyzing the effect of political institutions, we must understand the ambitions and real personal and party incentives operating on politicians, the roots of which can often be traced to R&S procedures. Many have argued that electoral system variables help determine loyalty, legislative discipline, and the nature of the party system in Latin American countries (Ames 2001; Shugart; 1995; Siavelis 1997). The often overlooked reality is that electoral system and candidate selection variables interact to determine to whom candidates (and in turn legislators and executives) are loyal, and loyalty shapes behavior. We contend that the relationships of loyalty produced by R&S process are central to understanding political outcomes and behavior.

Despite its centrality to understanding political outcomes, only a few theoretically isolated case studies squarely address questions of R&S in Latin America and none is broadly comparative (Friedenberg and Sánchez López 2001; Buquet 2001; Camp 1995; Langston 1997; Martz 1999; Siavelis 2002; Pennings and Hazan 2001). As such, we lack an overarching framework for understanding political recruitment, candidate selection, and their consequences. Nonetheless, the importance of R&S has not escaped scholars focusing on European parliamentary governments or the United States. Gallagher and Marsh (1988) build upon the early “classic” literature (Black 1972; Maryick 1968; Prewitt 1970; Seligman 1971; Czudnowski 1975; Eulau and Czudnowski 1976), and provide a comprehensive treatment of R&S issues, to which Norris (1997) and Davis (1988) have made important additional contributions. However, this literature is less relevant to Latin America's predominantly multiparty presidential systems.

Further, irrespective of the regional focus, in the limited cases where R&S is explored, most scholars interested in theory building tend to treat the R&S process primarily as either a dependent variable (analyzing how politicians are recruited and selected), or an independent

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<sup>2</sup> On informal institutions see Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2004)

variable (analyzing the effect of the recruitment processes on subsequent political behavior).<sup>3</sup> No study of which we are aware does both simultaneously, despite the significant insights that can be gleaned by doing so. Thus, our framework also departs from existing work by explicitly treating the factors that influence R&S processes as well as the influence of those processes on the behavior of politicians.

Institutional studies have also failed to address informal processes. Following Helmke and Levitsky (2004), we distinguish between formal party (and faction and coalition) rules or federal statutes and informal norms or procedures that guide the implementation of the “parchment” rules or laws. Whether formally inscribed or not, parties develop rules with respect to seniority, incumbency, and the rights of candidacies for militants or outsiders. In some cases party rules and processes yield centralized control over nomination decisions and tightly guarded campaign finance while others allow primaries and encourage candidates to raise and spend their own funds. Further, many parties have norms or quotas based on race, gender and socioeconomic status beyond those required by law. Most of these rules and processes are compatible with different types of electoral systems, and all can tighten or loosen the relation of candidates to party leadership. Thus, while electoral rules create the context for candidate selection, they interact with informal and formal party rules to determine the types of candidates chosen as well as their behavior during and after campaigns.

Argentina provides a good example of how the interaction of R&S processes with electoral rules affects behavior. Argentine parties fill closed lists of candidates giving party leaders (in this case the provincial party leaders) significant power to name and rank candidates on their lists. Thus, in line with predictions made by the institutional literature, we would expect legislators who are loyal to be regularly renominated and reelected. However, in Argentina the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) has maintained a rule discriminating against incumbents, with the result that only about one-fifth of the legislature is filled by incumbents. In addition, the party’s organization reflects the country’s federal structure, in that the national hierarchy must contend with significant influence of provincial leaders who wield tremendous power in the candidate selection process. Thus, Argentine deputies look to and serve the provinces, a behavior which in large part is determined by recruitment variables (Jones, this volume).

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<sup>3</sup> There is work on the connection between selection procedures and the character of legislators and the composition of legislatures, but less on how the processes affect behavior. See for example, Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) and Keynes, Tobin and Danziger (1979).

Similarly, Uruguay's electoral law is recognized for creating party fractionalization (Morgenstern 2001; Moraes, this volume). However, what is crucial and often overlooked is that while the Uruguayan system allows virtual-self-nomination of (closed) lists of legislative candidates—a potential harbinger of undisciplined parties—faction leaders can direct support to one of the lists by designating one as “official” to encourage voter support. The system thus generates more party or factional discipline than would be expected by a straightforward analysis of the electoral rules (Buquet and Chasquetti, this volume).

Perhaps one of the clearest demonstrations of the impact of candidate selection procedures in affecting outcomes comes from Chile. The institutional literature would predict that the two-member electoral system should have a reductive effect on the party system. However, as Navia (this volume) shows, candidate selection norms, embedded in broader coalition agreements, have allowed Chile's five major parties to strike coalitional agreements. They have also shaped the behavior of members of parliament in their legislative behavior and their strategies for election and re-election. By simply analyzing Chile's formal institutions we cannot explain why legislators behave in the way they do. We must also analyze formal and informal R& S variables within the context of Chile's coalitional dynamics.

Similar effects are evident in Mexico and Brazil. Within the context of their open list system, money and the governors are key are also key to understanding Brazilian legislative politics. Given the high campaign costs, only those candidates with ties to moneyed interests, including the governors can seriously compete. Samuels (this volume) and others have also pointed out other ways in which governors maintain influence over legislators. In her study of the Mexican Senate, Langston (this volume) argues that the increased competition of the 1990s, rather than formal rule changes, led to a growing role of governors in the choice of Senate candidates for the PRI. Further, a party rule change, rather than a legal change, led to delegate conventions and primaries and their concomitant effect on candidates and legislators. This example shows both the importance of formal party rules and informal procedures because party leaders can decide which candidate selection mechanism to use.

Party rules and informal processes are at least as important in explaining the choice of executive level candidates—choices that later affect the relation of the executive with the legislative contingents and the policy process generally. The rules for selecting candidates often provoke strong debates, suggesting, as Taylor et. al (this volume) note, their vital importance.

With the possible exception of the pre-2000 tradition in Mexico of outgoing presidents figuratively pointing their big finger at their own successor (the *dedazo*) and in effectively naming governors, the procedures for determining presidential and gubernatorial candidacies in other Latin American countries are understudied. Recent work, however, has begun to theorize on these issues, at least for presidents. For Uruguay, Buquet and Chasquetti (this volume) explain how the Frente Amplio uses a very different selection method—in this case a national unity convention—to choose its candidates while the other main parties allow their factions to compete in the newly mandated primary. They also explain how the parties operated differently across time in response to vagaries of alliance potential and electoral exigencies. Since the electoral system has a constant effect across the parties (or across time), the explanation for the differing behavioral outcomes must fall to party-level norms or procedures. The interaction of the electoral system with party rules and procedures is also clear. In Mexico the law banning reelection gave rise to the *dedazo* (Camp, this volume), while Taylor et al. argue that the relatively open system in Colombia allows parties wide latitude in determining their procedures.

In sum, formal institutions create a context, but their functioning is determined by formal and informal party, coalition, or faction-level norms and procedures. Our approach complements rather than challenges formal institutional analysis. Our goal is to stress the extent to which the interaction between R&S processes and the electoral rules elicit effects that neither alone would produce.<sup>4</sup> In so doing we do not purport to provide a general theory of R&S, but rather to provide scholars a framework, the tools, and the terminology to analyze the important role of R&S in understanding legislative and executive behavior in Latin America's presidential regimes.

## **II). Definitions and Range of Analysis: Recruitment versus Selection**

Political recruitment can be defined as how potential candidates are attracted to compete for political office while candidate selection concerns the processes by which candidates are chosen from among the pool of potential candidates. While Norris (1997), Hazan (2002), Camp (1995), and others, have tried to work within these analytical distinctions, the processes involved are so entangled that it is seldom possible to determine where recruitment ends and selection

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<sup>4</sup>Here we build on Taylor's (2000) suggestion.

begins. Norris, for example usefully divides the legal and party variables that affect how candidates become elected officials in to three levels: system variables (legal, electoral, and party variables) recruitment structures (party organization, rules, and ideology), and the recruitment process (how eligibles become elected, including candidate motivations, party gatekeepers, and electoral choice). These divisions, however, are blurry as several items could fit into different categories. Further, an explanation of the behavior of politicians before and after elections would be incomplete and perhaps misleading if the processes were separated. Moreover, different aspects of the R&S process take prominence in different countries or even within different parties in a single country.

In sum, we view recruitment and selection as overlapping processes; the variables that define these processes may be more pertinent to one or the other concept, but the variables are closely tied and do not clearly fit under one rubric or the other. We have depicted this relation in Figure 1. It shows three baskets of variables. On the far left are those that are most closely identified with political recruitment, such as education, political contacts, and career trajectories. On the right are those variables most associated with candidate selection, such as the rules that govern access to the ballot by setting up primaries, endowing governors with powers to choose candidates, or allowing candidates to self-nominate. In the middle, finally, are those variables that are pertinent to both processes, such as the party system and the parties' organizational structure. Here we are thinking of parties' decision-making structure (hierarchical or decentralized) their coalitional calculations, and their ideological bent. The vertical lines in the figure divide these three groups of variables, and the diagonal line differentiates recruitment from selection processes. Overall the figure is meant to imply that the variables cannot be bifurcated; some variables are central to recruitment and selection and even those that are most closely associated with one process also have relevance for the other. As our interest is in political institutions, in this paper we focus primarily on the middle and right boxes, though we also recognize the importance of variables fitting in the left box.

-- Figure 1 about here --

### III). Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection for Legislators

Norris's (1996) work sets out numerous variables defining the R&S process, and thus in presenting our analytical framework for analyzing legislative R&S, we begin with many of the variables she employs,<sup>5</sup> but take the extra step of analyzing how these variables affect political behavior once candidates take office. Figure 2 provides a schematic of our approach to understanding the outcome of legislative R&S. We first treat the emergent candidate's type as a **dependent variable** asking about the variables that determine the R&S process, which in turn determine the qualities of candidates. In the figure we recount some of the party and legal variables that affect candidate choice.

The link between R&S and political behavior and outcomes is our next concern, or the R&S process as an **independent variable**. We posit that the many determinants of how candidates become leaders shape the type of leadership and the constraints that motivate and shape behavior. However, before moving to this question we must be more specific in terms of the outcomes produced by our R&S variables. The multiplicity of independent variables set out in Figure 2 makes it unrealistic and not very interesting to test an endless series of hypotheses related to the effect of each and every one on political behavior. What is more, it is practically impossible to isolate the effects of electoral system variables from party system variables, or indeed to deal with serious problems of collinearity and the interactive effect of the many variables shaping the recruitment process.

To deal with this problem we make two assumptions as we carry forward our analysis. Returning to two center ovals in Figure 2, we acknowledge that process variables produce candidates with certain qualities, and contend that at this point they can simultaneously be considered dependent and independent variables. Each of the variables we analyze can help lead to the election of party insiders or outsiders, static or progressive ambition, or determine to whom candidates are beholden for their election. However, to better analyze the effect of R&S on behavior we have devised four ideal types of legislators tied to different sets of candidate qualities that tend to cluster together as a result of process variables to form certain types of candidates. This allows us to analyze effects and outcomes while avoiding the many problems

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<sup>5</sup> For a complete list of these variables see Norris (1996).

associated with testing each of the independent process variables. This approach also allows us to theorize about how different executives are likely to interact with different types of legislators. Finally, this makes our transition of candidate outcomes from a dependent variable to an independent variable far less complex.

Before elaborating the types, we offer some notes of caution. First, we stress that our candidate typologies (both for legislative and executive candidates) are stylized ideal types, and that no one candidate will absolutely fit the typology in terms of all of the determinative independent variables, nor in terms of behavior. Second, we are speaking of tendencies. That is to say the independent party and legal variables we set out will tend to interact in a way to produce the general types described. Further, we make no assumption that every independent process variable must be present in order to produce each type, though we contend that if every one were present in the combinations we set out that these are the types of candidates they would produce. Third, within one country we are likely to find several types of candidates. As noted previously, formal institutions provide the incentive structures within which all parties operate, but the parties still have a good deal of leeway in how they handle R&S. Since candidate types result from the interaction of institutions and R&S processes, different types of candidates may emerge from different parties.

In developing our typology for legislators our central concern is how different sets of process variables interact *to affect to whom candidates (and then legislators) are loyal*. We ask, are candidates loyal to party leaders, to constituents, particular social groups, or to themselves? We argue that loyalty is a central determinant of behavior, and a useful place to start to build theory on the relationship between R&S and political outcomes. Legislators want many things. The institutional literature clearly establishes the importance of political ambition, building on insights from the US Congress. However, this literature has been criticized for taking too narrow a view of the incentives operating on legislators. We accept ambition as important, but also acknowledge that legislators have loftier goals in terms of constituent service and seeing their ideas and the legislative initiatives of their party prosper. Where loyalties lie also affects campaign styles, the policy promises of candidates, and their ability to extract resources to make good on their promises. Finally, the ability to achieve goals both for executives and legislators is predicated on building working majorities in Congress. Legislators who are loyal to the party will respect party discipline, and when part of an executive's party or coalition, will be likelier to

toe the party line. We argue, then, that loyalty is a useful dependent variable because it is determinative for career paths, the loftier goals of public service, campaign styles and policy promises, and the ability of parties and executives to build both governing and opposition coalitions.

With these considerations in mind, we develop four ideal types of *legislators*: **party loyalists**, **constituent servants**, **group delegates**, and **entrepreneurs**. These types of legislators and the independent variables which tend to yield them are summarized in Table I.

**Party Loyalists**—*Party loyalists* are more faithful to their party than to constituents, and this loyalty is determined by the interaction of the party and legal variables set out in Figure 2. Centralized selection procedures and party control of financing make them beholden to the party to achieve their goals. Where coalitions are important for victory, parties have the negotiating clout to ensure nomination, reinforcing the power of party and loyalty to it. Party rules restrict the extent to which outsiders can achieve nomination, giving preference to long-time insiders. The existence of quotas where the party determines list order and automatic incumbent re-nomination will reinforce loyalty to the party because finding one's way onto a final list depends on the centralized decision of the party. Loyalty to the party is also reinforced because automatic re-nomination of incumbents will be the norm.

There are also particular institutions and political contexts that exert additional influence to produce *loyalists*. These include proportional representation electoral systems with moderate magnitudes and closed lists, barriers to independent candidacies, and few limits on re-election. Very low magnitude systems encourage the cultivation of a personal vote simply because the focus is on a single person who needs to win, while in large magnitude systems, candidates must differentiate themselves from their co-partisans and competitors in order to be elected. Moderate magnitude systems are intermediate in this regard, because magnitude is high enough that party ID remains important, but not so high that internecine list competition emerges.

Each of the features outlined here provides incentives for party loyalty. For example, where institutional and historical variables combine to make partisan identification more important to voters than individual candidate qualities, the system will tend to produce *loyalists*. Moderate magnitude closed lists make party identification important for winning and optimal party placement on the ballot crucial to victory, all of which is reinforced by the possibility of re-election. Whether a country is unitary or federal also has a profound effect on the party to which

a *party loyalist* is loyal. In federal systems *party loyalists* may have incentives for loyalty to the state level party, rather than the national level party. This loyalty will, of course, affect the potential to be nominated, and the later legislative behavior of a *party loyalist*. Finally, there are likely to be few residency requirements to provide incentives for legislators to cultivate personal votes, or these incentives may be trumped by high district magnitude, which dilutes the individual importance of legislators. In empirical terms, Chilean legislators fit the profile of the *party loyalist* most closely (Navia, this volume).

***Constituent Servants***—*Constituent servants* are relatively more loyal to constituents than to their parties, and can better achieve goals through cultivating constituent support. Such candidates should emerge where there are decentralized R&S procedures and sources of independent or state financing that dilute the ability of parties to use pecuniary means to induce loyalty. Where coalitions are less important to victory, and where decisions regarding candidate placement in quota system are decentralized, candidates will not need to depend on the party to negotiate them into candidacies or plum list positions. Party rules that give candidates significant deal of leeway in running their campaigns will also support the development of *servants*. Where re-nomination is subject to decentralized approval, cultivating relationships with national party elites will be less important.

The legal variables that contribute to R&S procedures that produce *servants* include low magnitude systems that magnify the importance of individual candidacies, limited barriers to independent candidacies, and permissive re-election rules. Residency requirements will reinforce incentives to cultivate the support of district constituents or local party activists. *Servants* will tend to emerge more where the importance of party identification to election is diluted by all of these legal variables.

Empirically, Lyne (n.d.) describes Brazil especially prior to 1964 and Venezuela prior to the Chavez period as producing *constituent servants*. Clientelism and patronage were the currency of politics in these two countries, in spite of electoral systems that suggested very different incentive systems for the legislators. These examples once again show the need to go beyond electoral systems to explain candidate or politician types.

**Group delegates**—*Group delegates* owe their primary loyalty to a particular non-party functional or social group. Such candidates may (or may not) need a party label to run, but owe their election to the support or sponsorship of a functional or corporate group. This group may be a trade union, a business association, or a peasant or religious group. While parties and party organizations are important, functional groups within the party exert some control over candidate selection either in the place of or in addition to the party (elite, base, or otherwise). *Delegates* are likely to emerge where a functional group has some responsibility for naming and financing candidates. Coalitions are unnecessary for victory, and party rules or informal norms include some decision-making role or quota for members of the functional group. These groups also may play a role in re-nomination.

The legal variables that will tend toward the selection of *delegates* are more variable than for our other types and depend on whether party organization encourages personalism or collectivism within the functional group. For example, if the parties of *delegates* simply recommend the election of a complete party slate, and little personal differentiation among candidates, *delegates* may perform quite well in large magnitude systems with closed lists. Alternatively, if party and functional group practice is to build personalistic followings, we may find that small magnitude open list systems are equally likely to encourage *delegate* candidacies. The other legal variables that can underwrite the candidacy of *delegates* include limited barriers to independent candidacies, and permissive re-election rules. There are no residency requirements (or residency is easy to establish). This limits incentives for the cultivation of constituent loyalty, as the best candidates will be placed where the functional group perceives it can win, and where candidates can cultivate the support of functional group loyalists rather than all constituents.

Group delegates were the norm in the Brazilian PT before Lula's election to the presidency, in the Mexican PRI during its period of predominance (indeed, deputies were elected to directly represent the party's various "pillars"), and can be found today in several Andean nations where parties represent indigenous groups, with the Ecuadorean *Pachakutik* party being a prime example. *Delegates* may also be found among those representatives who occupy constitutionally mandated legislative seats for particular ethnic groups (beginning in 1991 in Colombia and 1999 in Venezuela).

***Entrepreneurs***—*Entrepreneurs* have little loyalty to parties or constituents, or at best, have fleeting and instrumental loyalty to one or the other. These actors are more than simple “independent” candidacies in the traditional sense of the term. *Entrepreneurs* may or may not be elected with a formal party label. However, once chosen as a candidate, ambition tends to trump other policy or legislative goals. *Entrepreneurs* are most likely to emerge where there are open primaries or where candidates can self-nominate. Financing is underwritten by individuals or less formal special interests not tied to political parties. Quotas, party rules, and the necessity of coalitions do not stand in the way of candidacies, and re-election is either banned or subject to individual candidate choice. All of these variables diminish the influence of parties, or indeed, make them unnecessary for *entrepreneurs* to succeed in getting on the ballot and being elected.

The legal variables that tend toward recruitment patterns that produce *entrepreneurs* include high magnitude open lists (where incentives to cultivate personal vote is higher and lower thresholds for representation make party support less important), low barriers to independent candidacies, a ban on re-election or the greater attractiveness of positions beyond the legislature, and no (or easy to subvert) residency requirements.

Entrepreneurs are common in many Brazilian parties, and in Peruvian and Ecuadorian parties where there are fewer incentives for party loyalty and legislative discipline as a result of the interaction of institutional and R&S variables (Samuels, this volume)

### *Legislative Types as an Independent Variable*

Having now established these types, we return to Figure 2 to treat the R&S outcome as an **independent variable**, asking *how the qualities and types of candidates selected affect the political behavior of legislators*. Still the dividing line between candidate type as a dependent and independent variable is much less stark than the framework presented here suggests. While we treat candidate type as an independent variable, we stress the importance of continuing to consider how candidates have become candidates even as we turn explore electoral and political behavior and outcomes. That is to say, candidate preferences and characteristics have already been deeply shaped by candidate selection processes once they enter the electoral and political arena, with an important effect on campaign strategies, policy-making orientations, and legislative behavior. Also, once candidates are victorious, rules regarding re-election and whether candidates have static or progressive ambition continue to affect the extent to which

they have to think about re-election and again entering the recruitment arena, which in turn, will affect decisions about policy and behavior. This is the case to varying extents depending on whether legislators are *loyalists*, *servants*, *delegates*, or *entrepreneurs*.

We are interested, then, in how R&S procedures—acting through a candidate or legislator’s type—affect specific aspects of political behavior. These behavioral issues include: personal vote seeking and campaigns behavior, cooperation with presidents, relations with the party hierarchy and party discipline, and the propensity to engage in patronage politics and logrolling.

In terms of campaigns and campaign promises, the *loyalist* will campaign with a concern for presenting the major ideas, ideologies and programs of the party. The one caveat is, of course, that in a federal system the *loyalist* may also campaign on issues that are more of a concern to the state or provincial party (though of course the interests of the state level and national level party are not necessarily mutually exclusive). *Servant* legislators will be much more concerned with promoting policies and agendas with more particular significance for their district. The *delegate* will stress the interests of the functional group in the campaign and propose policies that serve that group’s interest nationally. Finally, the *entrepreneur* is likely to seek any way to cultivate the support of voters, and is likely to engage in more populist rhetoric, and discuss few particulars of ideology or policy.

The decisions of legislators with respect to each of these questions also have a good deal to do with the balance of partisan composition between the president and legislature. Loyalty also has to do with the contextual party variables or what we call, returning to Figure 2, *party system filter* variables. For example, we assume that *loyalists* have an incentive to maintain party discipline given the variables that brought them to power. We can then also assume that in these situations governing majorities would be more stable, and presidents better able to achieve their legislative agenda. Similarly, when a member of the opposition, we would assume that a *loyalist* is more likely to toe the party line. When a *servant* or *delegate* faces similar challenges, the constellation of incentives is different. A *servant* legislator must balance the incentives of serving constituents, while retaining some degree of loyalty to the party with respect to its core ideology, and the opinions and influences of the party militants in the legislator’s district. Similarly, a *delegate* will more jealously guard the preferences and interests of the associated functional group. The consequences for policy making are likely to be distinct, both where

*servants* and *delegates* represent a governing party and when they are in the opposition. Finally, for *entrepreneurs*, policy-making orientation is quite different, and it is likely for presidents, even those who are from the same party as *entrepreneur* legislators to be able to maintain governing and opposition coalitions. We leave complete analysis of the variation in behavior based on type for our concluding discussion on the relationship between different types of legislators, and different types of executives.

#### **IV). Executive Recruitment and Selection**

In our consideration of R&S for the executive branch we consider both presidents and provincial/state governors for the federal systems analyzed in this volume (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). We do so to increase our total number of observations, but also because the governorship is often a key step on the ladder to the presidency, and in some cases governors wield a good deal of control over recruitment in their states or provinces--this is especially the case in Argentina as DeLuca (this volume) shows. For our analysis of the executive branch we are interested in many of the same party and legal variables that we used to study legislative candidates, such as campaign finance, reelection, and primaries, but here our focus is more on how campaigns matter to the eventual winner. In other words, while the legislative studies are interested in the types of candidates get on the ballot and how they behave when in office, here we are interested in both who gets on the ballot and how the campaign influences the vote. We focus on candidate types and campaigns for a number of reasons. First, because of the small-N nature of executive R&S analysis, it is much more difficult to make convincing generalizations across cases. Second, because of the complexity of the executive R&S process and the variation across cases, the link between R&S patterns and eventual behavior once in office is much more tenuous than is the case for the legislative branch. Finally, campaigns influence the eventual behavior presidents and governors much more than that of legislators. Campaign platforms and promises constrain executive behavior more. Though several Latin American presidents have successfully engineered policy switches that contradicted their campaign promises, presidents who do so risk greater electoral penalties than their legislative counterparts.

In discussing the issue of campaigns, we expect that different types of candidates will run different types of campaigns, and the eventual winner will thus morph into a particular type of

president or governor. In order to explain the strategies of candidates and the actions of executives, it is first necessary to delineate a typology of candidates and a theory about the source of these types. The individualistic nature of the executive positions, however, makes theorizing about the executives rather hazardous. The hazards are evident from a review of the studies of U.S. presidential types, which find a range of types in spite of a (largely) unchanged political system (Barber 1972; Gergen 2000; Greenstein 2000).

The caution that we draw from the U.S. studies, does not, however, preclude building a theory of some aspects of executive types. While we agree that we could not hope to find a direct relation of institutional factors and executive types, we do expect that the way a candidate was chosen and the institutions that convert that candidate into an executive affect a) the campaign b) the executive's behavior towards different groups of supporters and c) the context of executive\legislative relations.

In exploring the source of these executive candidate types (with implications for campaign processes, and, in turn, executive\legislative relations), we use a group of variables that parallel those we described to explain R&S patterns of legislators (Figure 3). Paralleling our discussion of legislative R&S, we treat the types of candidates chosen as **dependent variable** asking, *what are the variables that determine the type of candidates selected?* As with the legislatures, we focus on both party and legal process variables, which help to encompass both informal and formal practices. Some of the variables, such as campaign finance do not clearly or fully fit into one or the other of these boxes, but most variables do fit these broad categories. Within the party box is the formal method by which parties choose their candidates (e.g. conventions or primaries), the nature and institutionalization of the party under which a given candidate runs (and perhaps other parties), re-nomination norms, financing, and the organizational basis and influence of social groups. Figure 3 also positions three variables in the legal box: the nature of the electoral system, election concurrence, and barriers to independents.

Different combinations of these variables will produce different sorts of candidates. In addition to sometimes mandating primaries (e.g. Uruguay) and creating a framework for campaign finance (both of which we discuss below), the legal system determines whether or a majority or plurality is needed to win the election and the timing of executive and legislative elections, all variables that help determine the kinds of candidates (and presidents/governors) that will emerge.

First, when as is now prescribed in most Latin American countries (Mexico is an exception) there is a runoff in case where no presidential candidate garners a majority, independents, leaders of small parties, or provincial leaders have a better chance of eventual success than where there is a single round of voting that is generally dominated by two traditional parties. The Argentine rule, in which the leading candidate must either win an outright majority or lead other candidates by at least 10 points is a useful example. That rule was designed to encourage two-party competition, but it failed to work when the party system broke down after the 2001 economic collapse (and the resignation of numerous presidents). As a result, the 2003 election saw 19 candidates, five of whom won between 14 and 25 percent of the vote. Further, since the law failed to force parties to select a single candidate, the runoff pitted two candidates from the PJ against each other (the runoff was cancelled after Menem pulled out). Similarly, several authors attribute Fujimori's success in 1990 to the two-round system in Peru. For that election, Fujimori created a new party banner and won 31% of the vote in the first round. Thus if the rules had made forming new parties more difficult or if there had not been a ballotage system, it is highly unlikely that he could have become president. We expect similar outcomes at the sub-national level where similar rules are employed.

Second, Shugart (1995) has shown that when legislative and executive elections are concurrent, the president has a better chance of winning strong legislative support. If concurrent elections tie executive and legislative candidates together, then we may expect more party loyalists and supporters under these rules than when elections are not concurrent. Finally, several countries (including Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) have relatively new provisions that allow presidents to serve more than one consecutive term and all the incumbents that have run have won. Reelection, therefore, has a clear role in explaining candidate choice, eventual winners, and the behavior of presidents and governors.

Within the party box, we focus on the candidate designation mechanism. In recent years at least some parties in many Latin American countries (including Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay) have adopted primaries—which are legally mandated in some countries but run and organized by parties in others and their effects have been varied.<sup>6</sup> While Polsby (1983) argues

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<sup>6</sup> See Freidenberg and Sanchez Lopez (2001) or Paynet et. al. (2002) for tables detailing where primaries are used and the legal or party framework governing them.

that primaries produce poor candidates in the United States, Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (n.d) unexpectedly report that primaries do not have a similar impact in Latin America.

Though also regulated by legislation, campaign finance also fits within the party box since parties raise and distribute funds. How this is handled certainly affects the types of candidates able to mount a serious campaign and the influence of party leaders with the candidates. Payne et. al. (2002) discuss campaign financing rules in Latin America. They note that the systems fit on a continuum from Venezuela and Chile where there is, respectively, no public financing or only limited amounts for presidential campaigns, to Mexico where, after their 1996 reforms, public funding predominates. Where public funds are limited, candidates must be successful fundraisers and may end up with strong ties to moneyed interests that the candidates competing in the new Mexican arena might avoid.

Finally, organized functional social groups, if integrated or influential in parties, can affect R&S outcomes. Labor unions, indigenous organizations, and business producer associations can back particular candidates, to which presidents will continue to owe loyalty.

We now provide four stylized executive types and the variables that we expect to contribute to their emergence: *party insiders*, *party adherents*, *group agents*, and *free-wheeling independents*. Loosely following the typology we developed with regard to legislatures, we ask to whom are executive candidates loyal, and how this loyalty affects their behavior. These types in many ways parallel the types set out for legislators in terms of their loyalty, but there are subtle differences related to their candidacies for distinct offices. Table 2 summarizes the types. As with legislators we presume that these types will run different sorts of campaigns, in turn affecting their actions once in office. As in the case of legislators, it is conceivable that different types of candidates will compete against one another, since different types of parties can co-exist within a country's borders. In these cases, the choice of candidates will be filtered differently, thus producing different sorts of candidates. In Brazil or Uruguay, for example, the candidates emerging from the looser party organizations look different than those from tightly organized leftist parties.

***Party Insiders--*** This type of candidate emerges from a long-standing and institutionalized party. That party, moreover, will have a clearly defined ideological base. Candidates will have been party activists for a considerable period of time, and have held important leadership posts. Given that they emerge from long-standing parties, it is possible that these leaders will be chosen from primaries, but they may also emerge as the natural and unchallenged leader of their party. In either case, party elites will play a greater role in designation or nomination. Automatic re-nomination will be the norm where re-election is allowed. Financing for loyalists is likely to be party centered, either through direct party financing or party control over campaign finance. Functional social groups associated with the party will be subordinate to it. Party loyalists are likely to emerge where party identification is important to voters.

Many of the legal variables that affect who among the candidates emerges as the eventual winner should, by backwards induction, affect the types of candidates that participate in an electoral contest. In legal terms we expect *insiders* to emerge where a majority or high plurality is necessary for victory, and to be more likely to emerge where the legislature chooses among high polling candidates, given the party basis of legislative organization. We do not suggest that a runoff system cannot produce an *insider*. Rather, an *insider* will be more likely where there is a role for the legislators in designating candidates. Similarly, concurrent elections are likely to help *insiders* as a result of the more centralized and institutionalized nature of party competition and the effect of reverse coattails. We are likelier to find *insiders* where re-election is permitted and where barriers to independents are high. In a general sense, Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos, Eduardo Frei and Patricio Aylwin fit this profile (Altman, this volume).

***Party Adherents--*** These candidates will be strong partisans, but differ from the loyalists in that they are not their party's undisputed leader, perhaps jumping to the national (or statewide) campaign from a provincial (or municipal) position. These candidates, thus, are more likely to have to earn their candidacy from having competed in a primary than are *insiders*. As a result, they are more likely to have trouble maintaining discipline in their ranks. In the campaign this may manifest itself with campaigns that attack *insiders* and a somewhat limited degree of support by the party (or wings of the party) for the candidate. More decentralized or fractionalized parties are likely to produce this type of candidate, and primaries will be more

permissive in allowing the victory of the party's dark-horse candidates. Financing is similarly less centralized, and functional groups have the potential to be more influential, but still are subordinate to, and may be reflective of, divisions within the party. Party identification among voters is less important than for *insiders*, but is still matters.

Legally, we should find *adherents* more likely to emerge where the legislature does not play a significant role in breaking pluralities, and concurrent elections allow candidates to take advantage of their party connections to ride to party victories (albeit a potentially weaker influence than is the case for *insiders*). Finally, *adherents* will be more likely to emerge where there are moderate barriers to independent candidacies. The potential to launch an independent candidacy if things go wrong will tempt *adherents* to defy party elites and facilitate the emergence of challenging adherents, but the continued importance of party identification should prevent the unbridled declaration of independent candidacies of the *free-wheeling independent* type. Former Argentine President Carlos Saúl Menem, most Argentine governors, and most U.S. presidents can be classified as party adherents (DeLuca, this volume).

**Group Agents--**These candidates are recognized leaders of defined societal groups, such as business organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups, or religious organizations. As such, they will have a defined ideology and platform, at least through their campaign. These candidates differ from the *party insiders* in that their supporters form a more cohesive group. This group, therefore, may work through a party, but these parties have more explicit links to external organizations than do candidates from the *party insider* model. At least early in their development, group-oriented parties should choose candidates through informal practices rather than primaries. If the party becomes a vehicle to promote presidential candidates, however, it seems feasible that the party's institutionalization could include public and competitive mechanism for choosing amongst potential leaders. In terms of the party system, we are likely to find influential functional groups within parties, and these groups will be likely to finance and support campaigns. *Agents* obviously have strong ties to influential groups, and voters may use party identification to make voting decisions, but at least part of that decision will be based on the candidate's perceived loyalty to the functional group.

Legally, *agents* are likeliest where plurality runoffs exist, given that the groups that *agents* represent may lack mass appeal, and plurality runoffs will permit the victory of

candidates with smaller pluralities. In turn, they are also more likely to benefit from low barriers to independents at least in their pre-institutionalization stage. *Agents* will not benefit from concurrent elections at least initially, unless an institutionalized and regular relationship develops between their functional group and party. Similarly, re-election is permitted, but influenced by the perceived loyalty of the candidate to the functional group. While not a perfect example, we can see undercurrents of the *group agent*-candidate in Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, and clearer indications of this type in former presidential candidate and indigenous leader Evo Morales of Bolivia. Many Brazilian governors fit this type, and are loyal to particular state level oligarchic groups (Power and Mochel, this volume).

***Free-Wheeling Independents (FWIs)***--These candidates stand in stark contrast to the *party insiders*. They have no long-term identification with a party, though they may use a small or new party as an official vehicle for their election. As such, there will not be primaries in this party, since the independent candidate essentially creates a personal vehicle for the contests. If the vehicle does compete in subsequent elections, there are likely to be fights about the nomination process, with potential challengers leaving the new party if rules are not formalized. Because re-election is banned, *FWIs* will have a strong incentive to act fast in policy-making, and have less incentive to cultivate longer lasting relationships with legislators of their own and other parties. *Free-wheeling independents* will rely on the financing of particularistic, non-group related supporters, and will have few ties to the type of functional group that underwrites support for *agents*. The importance of party identification will be low, and retrospective voting will be more important to victory.

*FWIs* are likely where plurality wins are possible, and where run-off systems provide ample opportunity for candidates to throw in their hat and to see what happens. This is particularly the case where many parties compete in executive elections. Concurrent elections will undermine *FWIs* where party identification is important to voters, because reverse coattail effects will not operate. Finally, low barriers to independent candidacies will facilitate the emergence of *Free-wheeling independents*. Former presidents of Brazil (Fernando Collor de Mello) and Peru (Alberto Fujimori) and current Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez fit the *free-wheeling independent* candidate profile quite well, as do many Brazilian governors (Power and Mochel, this volume).

### *Executive Types as an Independent Variable*

Now that we have elaborated particular stylized types of candidates we now treat R&S as an **independent variable** to ask, *how do R&S procedures mediated by the electoral process and the legal and institutional structure affect political behavior of executive candidates and eventual presidents and governors?* As noted, there are numerous problems with a direct tie between R&S processes and the behavior and executives. Executive behavior is mediated by the constraints of campaign promises, and more importantly, whether a president or governors are aided or constrained by the party constellation of congress. Therefore, in terms of outcome and behavior, we focus primarily on campaigns and the propensity of executives to stick to campaign promises, and go on to speculate only briefly on the impact of R&S on policies and executive\legislative relations.

How is each of our types likely to campaign? Equally important, once in office is one type of candidate more likely to avoid mandate reversals and keep promises, and how are executive\legislative relations likely to play out given these different types of executives?<sup>7</sup>

We expect *insiders* to wage campaigns on bigger issues related to ideology and differences between parties and party platforms. On the campaign trail the *insider* will proudly wear the party label. Once becoming an executive, we expect that *insiders* will be less likely to engineer dramatic policy switches than *party adherents* (or *free-wheeling independents*).

For *party adherents*, loyalty to the party is important, but in a certain sense instrumental. *Adherents* will accept the basic tenets of the party, but often play down the party's central ideas and ideology, and advocate the need for reform (both in general and within their parties). Once in office, the likelihood that these presidents will fail to stick to the party's campaign platform should be relatively high, and these presidents could be expected to try to move their parties in new directions. State or provincial governors will have less power to move their parties, though they may be influential in state party organizations.

The ideal-typical *group agent's* platform more will be more explicitly tailored towards a particular group than would an *insider*, and would be less inclined towards a pragmatic bending of ideology in order to win an election. This also implies that this type of candidate should be

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<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of other determinants of mandate reversals, see Stokes (2001).

more trustworthy in office, and more likely to implement the policies elaborated in campaigns than to switch.

Finally, *free-wheeling independents* eschew parties. The campaigns for these candidates should focus more on retrospective evaluations and vague promises for the future. At the national level constitutional revisions, for example, could be a theme, while tax or industrial policy would likely be left to the *party adherents* or perhaps the *party insiders*. As populists, these candidates should attempt to build multi-sector coalitions for their campaign, and perhaps in their cabinet. Since these are new faces, it is unlikely that these candidates will be able to build legislative campaigns, though particular electoral laws (concurrent elections, ballot ties between the executive and legislature) could aid legislative support. As a result of the weak support, cabinets may appear to be filled with cronies rather than leaders from different parties who could build legislative support.

We have already noted the difficulty in tying types of executive and legislative behavior to distinct R&S patterns, though we do suggest that different types of candidates, after conducting different types of campaigns will interact with legislatures differently once in office. As Cox and Morgenstern (2001) argued, the behavior of presidents is in part determined by the nature of the forces the executive faces in the legislature. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Morgenstern and Nacif (2001) have also shown that presidents with working majorities, or presidents with incentives to build majorities usually can expect happier relations with the legislature. Our study builds on these findings to analyze an additional determinant of how friendly and cooperative relations will be between these two government branches. We add that R&S patterns also affect the prospects for executives to be able to build and rely upon majorities. *Party insider* executives should be more likely to have support of their own parties, particularly where they face legislators of their own party who are legislative *loyalists*. *Party adherents* will be less likely to control majorities in the legislature, because the likelihood of intra-party factional conflict will be higher. Since *insiders* and *adherents* must (by definition) come to power as part of a significant party, they will, however, both enjoy significant, though not necessarily majority, support in the legislature. Key to their relations with the legislature, therefore, will be their ability to form party-level coalitions to generate supportive majorities. *Groups agents* may be able to build coalitions within the legislature depending on how widespread support is for the functional group they represent and how influential the party is in

addition to the functional group with which the candidate is tied. A key question for these types of executives is whether they will be able to negotiate with legislative parties (thus attracting *party loyalist* legislators) into their coalitions, or whether this presidential type will have to rely on ad-hoc support, consisting of *servants*, *delegates*, and *entrepreneurs*. Finally, we would expect *free-wheeling independents* to face a difficult time in building coalitions in the legislature, since they will start with a low base of legislative support. Their problems will be aggravated in systems where there are many *loyalist* legislators, since they will be difficult to lure into the *FWI* president's or governor's coalition.

## **VI) Conclusions: Pathways to Power and Democracy**

Our goal in this chapter has been to provide a set of schematic models and stylized typologies that together yield a theoretical framework for understanding and comparatively analyzing both the processes that bring politicians to power, but also and equally important, how those processes affect the political behavior of the powerful.

The chapters that follow apply the framework elucidated here to analysis of particular country cases. This volume focuses on political recruitment and candidate selection for the executive and legislative branches, recognizing that the processes are intimately related. We also recognize that gender equity is a pressing concern in the region. Thus, the volume is divided into three sections: one on the legislative branch, one on the executive branch, and a final section on political recruitment and gender. While the chapters in the gender section are cross-national, each of the chapters in the first two sections covers one of our six focus countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico (for a total of twelve country chapters). In addition to their regional significance, these cases provide enough variance in terms of size and institutional characteristics (e.g. federalism, party systems, and electoral systems) to test theoretical propositions. Our concluding chapter then returns to the theoretical issues, bringing together the insights from the substantive chapters in order to provide evidence for our basic theory.

The cases that follow all contain important lessons about the relation between R&S and institutions, with implications for democratic quality and governability. Though we leave the complete comparative analysis of the cases for the volume's conclusion, we offer a few words of introduction that presage our major findings. First, the authors provide ample evidence that

reformers should consider the effect of R&S procedures when contemplating reforms, as these party-level rules and norms interact with the electoral system and other institutions to determine the behavior of candidates and elected officials. Mandating primaries, for example, may—but will not necessarily—generate more internal party democracy, as some parties could contravene the law’s decentralizing intention with creative rules such as centralized control of campaign funds or ballot-access rules that are biased in favor of one or another candidate. Neither can we be certain of the effects of such rule changes. For example, Navia’s chapter on Chilean legislators shows that primaries actually seemed to undermine the electability of legislators.

Second, Latin America’s presidential systems have been criticized as unstable, uninstitutionalized, or with tendencies toward “delegative democracy” (O’Donnell 1994) due to their structural problems (including the difficulties associated with minority-supported presidents) (Linz and Valenzuela 1994), the type and quality of the leadership the systems have produced, and other factors. Whatever its faults, however, presidentialism interacts with R&S processes to determine the types of executives and legislators that a system will produce, thereby directly affecting executive\legislative relations. For example, the likelihood of inter-branch cooperation would be enhanced by the combination of *party loyalist* legislators and *party insider* presidents, though the depth and breadth of the president’s legislative support—variables also tied to R&S factors—would also play a role. Pairing other types of presidents and legislators would yield very different dynamics with differing effects on the stability and quality of democracy. Supporters of party-based democracy, for example, would be critical of pairing *entrepreneur* legislators with *free wheeling independent* presidents, while those concerned with “partyocracy” might have other preferences. Power and Mochel’s chapter shows the difficulty that *free wheeling independents* have had cultivating legislative support in Brazil. In contrast, Taylor, et. al.’s chapter on Colombian executive recruitment demonstrates the negative consequences when parties gain excessive control and the development of *partidocracia* undermines the usually positive role ascribed to disciplined parties.

Further, while all of the chapters employ the framework set out in this introductory chapter, different authors stress different of its aspects. This is the case simply because in particular political or institutional contexts certain of the variables we underscore are more significant than others. For example, Altman and Navia stress the importance of R&S to coalition maintenance in their chapters on Chile, simply because of its centrality to post-authoritarian Chilean politics. For their chapters on

Mexico, Camp and Langston stress the changing R&S processes that are the product of the country's ongoing process of democratization. In institutional terms, federalism has a distinct and important impact on how R&S variables and institutional variables interact in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico as stressed by DeLuca, Jones, Samuels, and Langston. The interaction between the electoral system and R&S variables is more of a concern for the chapter on the Colombian legislature (Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno), and the two Uruguayan chapters (Moraes, on the legislature, and Buquet and Chasquetti on the executive), albeit for different reasons. In the former, Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno show how the interaction between the electoral law and R&S helped lead to the disintegration of the Colombian party system, while in the latter this interaction helped to structure the faction politics that have been key to understanding contemporary Uruguayan politics. In sum, different elements of the overall theoretical framework are of variable utility depending on the case, and we expect this to continue to be the case as the volume's theoretical framework is employed in the future.

The core presumption of a representative democracy is that the governed choose those who will govern. Still, we know little about the crucial roles played by the "selectorates" who are the gatekeepers of democracy, and even less about how institutions and R&S processes interact to condition political behavior. This volume is a response to this serious lack of knowledge and understanding. In it we provide a theoretical framework combined with in-depth and detailed case studies by recognized country experts, which together yield a better understanding of the political importance of pathways to power.

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Figure 1: Overlapping Relation of Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection








Table 1--Ideal Types of Legislative Candidates

<b>Candidate Types</b>	<b>Party Loyalist</b>	<b>Constituent Servants</b>	<b>Group Delegates</b>	<b>Entrepreneurs</b>
<b>Party Variables</b>				
Candidate Choice	<i>Centralized Party Elites</i>	<i>Decentralized/Party Primary</i>	<i>Role for Functional Group in Designation</i>	<i>Open Primary/Self Nomination</i>
Campaign Finance	<i>Party Control/State Financing Through Party</i>	<i>State Financing to Individuals/Independents</i>	<i>Financing by/through Functional Groups</i>	<i>Private-Corporate/Self-Financing</i>
Coalitions	<i>Necessary for Victory</i>	<i>Un-necessary or Limited Necessity for Victory</i>	<i>Un-necessary or Limited Necessity for Victory</i>	<i>Un-necessary for Victory</i>
Party Rules	<i>Strict and Constraining</i>	<i>Limited</i>	<i>Rules for Functional Group Inclusion</i>	<i>Few if Any Constraining Rules</i>
Gender or Other Quotas	<i>List Position Determined by Party</i>	<i>Decentralized Position Placement</i>	<i>Quota for Functional Group?</i>	<i>No Quotas</i>
Re-election Norm	<i>Automatic Incumbent Re-nomination</i>	<i>Renomination Subject to Decentralized Approval</i>	<i>Role for Functional Group in Re-nomination</i>	<i>Candidate Choice/No Re-election Allowed</i>
<b>Legal Variables</b>				
District Magnitude/List	<i>Moderate Magnitude Closed Lists</i>	<i>Low Magnitude Closed or Open Lists</i>	<i>Variable--Depends on Party Organization</i>	<i>High Magnitude Open Lists</i>
Barriers to Independents	<i>High</i>	<i>Limited</i>	<i>Limited</i>	<i>Low</i>
Re-election Norms	<i>Permitted and Desired</i>	<i>Permitted and Desired</i>	<i>Permitted and Desired</i>	<i>Banned/Strong Incentive for Prog. Ambition</i>
Residency Requirments	<i>No, or Trumped by High Magnitude</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>None or Easy to Subvert</i>	<i>None or Easy to Subvert</i>

Table 2--Ideal Types of Executive Candidates

<b>Candidate Types</b>	<b><i>Party Insiders</i></b>	<b><i>Party Adherents</i></b>	<b><i>Group Agents</i></b>	<b><i>Free-Wheeling Indep.</i></b>
<b><i>Party Variables</i></b>				
Candidate Choice	<i>Elite Centered</i>	<i>Primary Likely</i>	<i>Primary Unlikely (at least in initial election)</i>	<i>No Primary/Self-Nomination</i>
Party System	<i>Centralized and Institutionalized</i>	<i>Decentralized Among Factions</i>	<i>Functional Groups Influential</i>	<i>Low Institutionalization/Extreme Decentralization</i>
Renomination Norm	<i>Automatic (where legally permitted)</i>	<i>With Primary</i>	<i>Group Influence</i>	<i>Banned</i>
Financing	<i>Party Centered</i>	<i>Decentralized or State Financed</i>	<i>Group Support for Campaigns</i>	<i>Self-financing or Particularistic Sponsors</i>
Functional Group Ties to Parties	<i>Functional Groups Untied or Subordinate to Parties</i>	<i>Potentially Influential Though Subordinate</i>	<i>Strong Ties to Influential Functional Groups</i>	<i>Few Ties to Functional Groups</i>
Importance of Party ID for Voters	<i>High</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Dependent on Perceived Loyalty to Funct. Group</i>	<i>Low, retrospection Key to Election</i>
<b><i>Legal Variables</i></b>				
Plurality Winners?	<i>Legislature Designates</i>	<i>Plurality Runoff</i>	<i>Plurality Runoff</i>	<i>Plurality Victory/Plurality Runoff</i>
Election Concurrence	<i>Concurrent</i>	<i>Concurrent</i>	<i>Non-Concurrent Elections with Low Party ID</i>	<i>Non-Concurrent Elections with Low Party ID</i>
Barriers to Independents	<i>High</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Low</i>