The Battle for Markets in Chiapas: Fighting the Permanent War

Duncan Earle and Jeanne Simonelli

San Cristóbal de las Casas

At 8:30 in the morning on January 4th, the plaza surrounding the colonial church of Santo Domingo in the highland city of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico was alive with activity. Sun broke through the lingering dawn fog, dispersing the chill of one of the coldest winters in years. All through the plaza, Maya women, men and children were arranging their crafts in colorful piles, as they have done in this location for over twenty years. Ranging from intricately woven textiles to tiny, masked models of Zapatista rebels, the Santo Domingo market allows marginalized indigenous people to sell their crafts directly to the public. For artisans, it is an important source of income. For tourists, it is one of the major attractions of the city.

Suddenly, without announcement, three truckloads of police pulled up at the main points of exit from the plaza. Armed with clubs and tear gas, they surrounded the artisan/venders and proceeded to drive them out of the area. Within a few minutes, women and children were bleeding, the area was thick with tear gas, and stacks of crafts had been seized. The action was ordered by the Presidente Municipal, or mayor, of the city, who earlier had promised that he would not dislocate the people during the remaining one year of his term. This specific, violent attack on indigenous people in plain view of the public used pretexts no one believed, claiming that the venders made the area seem like a pigsty and gave a bad impression of the city to tourists. In response, one Maya women commented, "how civil is it for representatives of the government to hit children?"

The attack in San Cristóbal that morning was against some of the most vulnerable people in the area: women, children, and political and economic refugees. It keeps active a state of war that Mexico's new president, Vicente Fox, claimed that he would end "in fifteen minutes" if he were elected. Fox, representing the conservative PAN (National Action Party), took office in December after defeating the entrenched PRI (Party of the Institutionalized Revolution), which had been in power for 71 years. At the same time, an alliance of opposition parties took the governorship of Chiapas. This alliance included the PAN, and resulted in the election of Pablo Salazar, who represented the center-left PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution).

Following the national elections, commentators in the US linked the change in power in Mexico to neoliberal economic policy, calling it a commercial victory. They trace the sequence of events leading to the Fox victory to the international bailout of the troubled Mexican economy. The fall in the price of oil in 1982, the subsequent collapse of the peso, and the financial intervention that followed, laid the groundwork for a decline in living standards for the indigenous and campesino (agricultural) peoples of Chiapas. The removal of food subsidies and a retreat from social programs became a component of the economic reforms mandated for continued international funding. The banking community views these changes as positive actions.

Also cited as a contributing factor in Fox's success is the signing of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) on January 1, 1994. The purpose of NAFTA was to open economic borders between the United States, Mexico and Canada through "free trade". Though free trade should benefit all producers in Chiapas, it has allowed business interests to bypass local governments in decisions concerning use or sale of resources. A precursor to NAFTA was the reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which allowed for the private sale of communally-held ejido land.

Few will acknowledge that the Zapatista uprising, which coincided with the signing of the NAFTA treaty, played a causal role in the power shift by forcing the failing PRI government to act irresponsibly and violently against its own people. Though the rebellion ended with a cease-fire on January 12th , 1994, these events focused the world's attention on the plight of the indigenous and campesino population of Chiapas, and contributed to the collapse of PRI power. Though the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) entered into peace negotiations, the PRI government's response was a massive build-up of military forces, with some troop estimates as high as 70,000. During 1996, the EZLN and the government negotiated and signed the San Andrés Peace Accords. Consisting of three documents, the Accords ask for constitutional recognition of indigenous rights and culture. The agreement has not been honored.

International attention was again focused on Chiapas on December 22, 1997 when 45 women, children, and men were massacred near the village of Acteal. Numerous members of a PRI-backed paramilitary group were arrested and tried for the murders. The Interior Minister and the interim governor of Chiapas, both PRI appointees, were forced to resign. During this period, over 300 foreign human rights observers, activists and scholars were expelled from Mexico. Commenting on these actions and his party's general decline, a PRI functionary noted that "we are going about with a hangover resulting from 71 years of drunkenness".

While the police of San Cristóbal were attacking the market this January, Zapatista rebels, under the leadership of Subcommandante Marcos were preparing to travel to Mexico City to begin negotiations with President Fox. As a precondition for these talks, the Zapatistas have listed three conditions that must be met as a sign of good faith. These are the liberation of all the Zapatista political prisoners in Chiapas, Tabasco, and Querétaro; congressional approval of the initiative for constitutional implementation of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture; and the closing of seven of the 256 military bases currently operative in Chiapas. The seven bases are not strategic sites for the government, but for the Zapatistas, are symbolically strategic and located in areas which have important significance for those involved in the rebellion. As of Feb. 1, four of the seven had been dismantled, but Fox stated that he would not order the closing of the final three unless the Zapatistas made concessions.

Though the attitude of soldiers manning military checkpoints on both well-traveled and remote roads in the state has changed slightly, these remain frequent stops for citizens and travelers. "We are in 'la guerra permanente'-the permanent war- against drugs" say the armed soldiers who carry out the stops. The actions in San Cristóbal point out that the permanent war is not really against drugs, but continues to be against the indigenous and poor agricultural producers of Chiapas. Like the price for harvested coffee paid locally to producers, tourism in San Cristóbal continues to drop. Direct sales of artisan goods to tourists at just prices by the indigenous cut into the resale market in the shops owned by the Spanish-descendant merchants of the city. Here, these 'coletos' sell goods to tourists that they have bought at discounted prices from producers. With reduced tourism, the closing of the artisan market drives visitors back to buying in the coleto stores. This continues an old practice of exploitation of the indigenous by again forcing them to sell their goods for very little, so most of the profits fall into the hands of intermediaries.

That the public space surrounding the Church is now determined to be inappropriate for occupation by the Maya vendors marks an attempt at reconquest for economic and racist reasons. The Santo Domingo Plaza is the symbolic battleground of conquest in Chiapas. The kiosk at its center celebrates the defeat of the Chamula Maya in 1845. It was also once the location of the statue of conquistador Diego de Mazariegos, which was pulled down by Zapatista supporters a few years ago, indignant that such a man was being commemorated for conquest. . Moreover, the battle for Santo Domingo remains a microcosm of policy in Chiapas. Underlying the struggle for indigenous and human rights is a battle for the market. It is a battle for the right to sell the resources of the state, ranging from the artisan products made by the people to the natural resources present on their lands. The struggle for autonomy maintained by Zapatista rebels and communities-in-resistance in Chiapas is not about political secession from Mexico, but about local control of resources and the right to use or sell those resources. Zapatista supporters argue that it will be impossible for Fox to order the dismantling of the remaining 250 military bases in Chiapas because it is that military presence that is protecting the resources for commercial sacking. Regardless of Fox's purported desire to concur with San Andrés peace accords, as a businessman in support of neoliberal policies, he cannot afford to send the army home.

The creeping privatization policies of the Fox government maintain an environment of permanent economic scarcity. Those who were in control and part of the ruling classes must defend that control against the marginalized. For even an honest president to provide the basis for a stable middle class in Mexico, they must preserve the situation of the past, where 'coyotes'-predator middlemen- live off the back of the producers. By passing off natural resource rights which belonged to the indigenous and campesinos to private companies, Chiapas becomes a modernist version of the Mexico of the 1890s, with the army as its guarantor. And as Subcommandante Marcos asked in a recent interview in the liberal Mexican newspaper La Jornada, who is in control of the army? Happily, the Mexican Army in Chiapas is not run by killers, but instead by sackers. The army's presence surrounding indigenous communities is not about maintaining governability, but instead about protecting saleability.

Without regional autonomy concerning the control of resources, Chiapas continues to allow the Fox into the hen house. It is a guarantee of the permanent war, regardless of overtures to a paper peace. This contradiction is reflected in San Cristóbal and elsewhere. In Mexico City, police actions against marginalized street venders highlighted the nationwide character of the battle for the market. In the highlands and the jungle of Chiapas, coffee producers contemplated allowing the crop to rot on the plants because the cost for harvesting exceeds the price paid by coyotes. In San Cristóbal, the owner of a small restaurant noted that the closure of the Santo Domingo market would mean the end of his business, which was dependent on the tourist presence at the Plaza. Though Maya vendors returned cautiously to their sales locations at the Santo Domingo market after six days of absence, their stands had a less permanent appearance, as they prepared to run with their goods at a moment's notice. Peace is not fifteen minutes away in Chiapas. The permanent war of conquest is still under way.